分配意图与上行间接互惠：来自行为与ERP的证据

doi:10.3724/SP.J.1041.2024.01788

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 上行间接互惠是推动人类大规模合作与社会秩序扩展的重要力量。现有文献存在两点不足: 一是忽略了上行间接互惠中人们到底是以什么作为评判善意与非善意的基准;二是大部分上行间接互惠文献未意识到“收入效应”这一竞争性假说。本文假设: 当人们得到高于社会均值的分配时, 真人分配条件下给第三方的金额会高于社会均值, 且比电脑分配条件下给第三方的金额更高; 当人们得到低于社会均值的分配时, 真人分配条件下给第三方的金额会低于社会均值, 且比电脑分配条件下给第三方的金额更低。研究采用两阶段独裁者博弈范式。行为和ERP结果均较好支持了本研究的假设。真人分配比电脑分配诱发更大的N1波幅; 低于社会均值的分配比高于社会均值的分配诱发更大的FRN; 在真人条件下, 接受低于社会均值的分配比高于社会均值的分配结果诱发更大的P3波幅。本结果支持了基于社会分配均值的上行间接互惠假说, 为该研究领域提供了新的理论基础和实验证据。

关键词: 上行间接互惠, 社会规范, 分配意图, 事件相关电位

Abstract: Upstream indirect reciprocity, a widespread phenomenon observed both in real-world settings and controlled experimental environments, extends beyond conventional reciprocity systems and plays a crucial role in fostering large-scale human cooperation and maintaining social order. Although this social phenomenon has garnered significant scholarly attention, existing research remains insufficient in uncovering its underlying mechanisms.
Previous studies typically use a two-stage dictator game to investigate upstream indirect reciprocity. According to meta-analyses of experimental literature on dictator games, dictators typically allocated 28% of the total to recipients, with allocations exceeding 50% being extremely rare (Engel, 2011). Surprisingly, most existing research considers equal distribution (where A allocates 50% to B) as the threshold for determining whether A has good intentions, despite lacking sufficient justification for this criterion. Different from prior work, we propose that individuals assess others' intentions relative to the social mean as a reference point. Based on this premise, we hypothesize that when individuals receive an allocation above the social mean, they are more likely to pass on a value above the mean to third parties, whereas allocations below the mean will result in values passed below the mean. If individuals indeed pass on a higher or lower value based on whether they received above- or below-mean allocations, this result might also be explained by an alternative hypothesis: the income effect, where people give more when they have more resources. Therefore, this study investigates whether intention-based indirect reciprocity persists event after controlling for the income effect.
We recruited 42 undergraduate participants for the experiment, which consists of two parts: a standard dictator game followed by an indirect reciprocity experiment. The second experiment employed a 2 (distribution below the social mean vs. above the social mean) × 2 (human allocation vs. computer allocation) within-subject design. The main experiment featured both a human allocation task and a computer allocation task, with task order counterbalanced among participants. Each task included 156 trials, for a total of 312 trials.
The results show that both distribution outcomes and perceived intentions significantly influence upstream indirect reciprocity. Specifically, participants allocated more to third parties after receiving above-mean distributions from a human compared to a computer, while below-mean distributions from a human led to lower allocations than those from a computer. EEG data revealed that N1 components were modulated by perceived intention, with human allocations eliciting greater N1 responses. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) component was influenced by distribution outcomes, with below-mean distributions evoking larger FRN responses than above-mean distributions. Finally, the P3 component was regulated by the interaction between distribution outcome and intention.

Key words: upstream indirect reciprocity, social norms, intention, event-related potential

王婷, 赵梁佛, 杨金朋, 张丹丹, 雷震. (2024). 分配意图与上行间接互惠：来自行为与ERP的证据. 心理学报, 56(12), 1788-1799.

WANG Ting, ZHAO Liangfo, YANG Jinpeng, ZHANG Dandan, LEI Zhen. (2024). Intention and upstream indirect reciprocity: Insights from behavioral and ERP evidence. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 56(12), 1788-1799.

参考文献

[1] Bartholow B. D., Bushman B. J., & Sestir M. A. (2006). Chronic violent video game exposure and desensitization to violence: behavioral and event-related brain potential data. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(4), 532-539.
[2] Blount, S. (1995). When social outcomes aren't fair: The effect of causal attributions on preferences. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63(2), 131-144.
[3] Boudreau C., McCubbins M. D., & Coulson S. (2009). Knowing when to trust others: An ERP study of decision making after receiving information from unknown people. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 4(1), 23-34.
[4] Chang Y.-P., Lin Y.-C., & Chen L. H. (2012). Pay it forward: Gratitude in social networks. Journal of Happiness Studies, 13(5), 761-781.
[5] Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 817-869.
[6] Cialdini R. B., Reno R. R., & Kallgren C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(6), 1015-1026.
[7] Comesaña M., Soares A. P., Perea M., Piñeiro A. P., Fraga I., & Pinheiro A. (2013). ERP correlates of masked affective priming with emoticons. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(3), 588-595.
[8] de Bruijn, E. R. A., Schubotz R. I., & Ullsperger M. (2007). An event-related potential study on the observation of erroneous everyday actions. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7(4), 278-285.
[9] Dong G., Hu Y., & Zhou H. (2010). Event-related potential measures of the intending process: Time course and related ERP components. Behavioral and Brain Functions, 6, 15.
[10] Duncan-Johnson, C. C., & Donchin, E. (1977). On quantifying surprise: The variation of event-related potentials with subjective probability. Psychophysiology, 14(5), 456-467.
[11] Engel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta study. Experimental Economics, 14, 583-610.
[12] Engelmann, D., & Fischbacher, U. (2009). Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. Games and Economic Behavior, 67(2), 399-407.
[13] Falk A., Fehr E., & Fischbacher U. (2008). Testing theories of fairness-Intentions matter. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 287-303.
[14] Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 293-315.
[15] Faul F., Erdfelder E., Buchner A., & Lang A.-G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research Methods, 41(4), 1149-1160.
[16] Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817-68.
[17] Gehring, W. J., & Willoughby, A. R. (2002). The medial frontal cortex and the rapid processing of monetary gains and losses. Science, 295(5563), 2279-2282.
[18] Gong Y., Yao, L, Chen X., Xia Q., Jiang J., & Du X. (2022). Group membership modulates fairness consideration among deaf college students—An event-related potential study. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 794892.
[19] Gray K., Ward A. F., & Norton M. I. (2014). Paying it forward: Generalized reciprocity and the limits of generosity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(1), 247-254.
[20] Gu R., Lei Z., Broster L., Wu T., Jiang Y., & Luo Y. J. (2011). Beyond valence and magnitude: A flexible evaluative coding system in the brain. Neuropsychologia, 49(14), 3891-3897.
[21] Hayek, F. A. (1980). Individualism and economic order (Reprinted.). Chicago London: the University of Chicago press.
[22] Herrmann, C. S., Knight, R. T. (2001). Mechanisms of human attention: Event-related potentials and oscillations. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 25(6), 465-476.
[23] Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis of human error processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psychological Review, 109(4), 679-709.
[24] Horita Y., Takezawa M., Kinjo T., Nakawake Y., & Masuda N. (2016). Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it- forward reciprocity. Scientific Reports, 6, 19471.
[25] Hoy C. W., Steiner S. C., & Knight R. T. (2021). Single-trial modeling separates multiple overlapping prediction errors during reward processing in human EEG. Communications Biology, 4, 910.
[26] Hu Y., He L., Zhang L., Wölk T., Dreher J., & Weber B. (2018). Spreading inequality: Neural computations underlying paying-it-forward reciprocity. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 13(6), 578-589.
[27] Huang X., Li J., & Ni Y. (2023). Social norm modulates the enhancement effect of behavioral visibility on altruistic preference. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 55(3), 481-495.
[黄馨茹, 李健, 倪荫梅. (2023). 行为可见增加利他偏好及其社会规范机制. 心理学报, 55(3), 481-495.]
[28] Johnson Jr, R., & Donchin, E. (1980). P300 and stimulus categorization: Two plus one is not so different from one plus one. Psychophysiology, 17(2), 167-178.
[29] Kimbrough, E. O., & Vostroknutov, A. (2016). Norms make preferences social. Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(3), 608-638.
[30] Li J., Pan J., & Zhu C. (2020). Inter-brain synchronization is weakened by the power to reject offers in bilateral bargaining games. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617843
[31] Lin H. Y., Gao H. W., You J., Liang J. F., Ma J. P., Yang, N. Xu H., & Jin H. (2014). Larger N2 and smaller early contingent negative variation during the processing of uncertainty about future emotional events. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 94(3), 292-297.
[32] Liu M., Zhou J., Liu Y., & Liu S. (2022). The impact of social comparison and (un)fairness on upstream indirect reciprocity: Evidence from ERP. Neuropsychologia, 177, 108398.
[33] Luck, S. J. (2014). An introduction to the event-related potential technique (2^nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
[34] Ma, Q., & Hu, Y. (2015). Beauty Matters: Social Preferences in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game. PLoS ONE, 10(5), e0125806.
[35] Ma Q., Hu Y., Jiang S., & Meng L. (2015). The undermining effect of facial attractiveness on brain responses to fairness in the Ultimatum Game: an ERP study. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 9, 77.
[36] Mayer S. V., Rauss K., Pourtois G., Jusyte A., & Schönenberg M. (2019). Behavioral and electrophysiological responses to fairness norm violations in antisocial offenders. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 269(6), 731-740.
[37] McBride, M., & Ridinger, G. (2021). Beliefs also make social- norm preferences social. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 191(3), 765-784.
[38] McCullough M. E., Kilpatrick S. D., Emmons R. A., & Larson D. B. (2001). Is gratitude a moral affect? Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), 249-266.
[39] Messick, D. M., & Schell, T. (1992). Evidence for an equality heuristic in social decision making. Acta Psychologica, 80(1-3), 311-323.
[40] Miraghaie A. M., Pouretemad H., Villa A. E. P., Mazaheri M. A., Khosrowabadi R., & Lintas A. (2022). Electrophysiological markers of fairness and selfishness revealed by a combination of dictator and ultimatum games. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 16, 765720.
[41] Montague, P. R., & Lohrenz, T. (2007). To detect and correct: norm violations and their enforcement. Neuron, 56(1), 14-18.
[42] Moore M., Katsumi Y., Dolcos S., & Dolcos F. (2021). Electrophysiological correlates of social decision-making: An EEG investigation of a modified ultimatum game. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 34(1), 54-78.
[43] Niemand, T, Mai R, & Kraus S. (2019). The zero-price effect in freemium business models: The moderating effects of free mentality and price-quality inference. Psychology & Marketing, 36(8), 773-790.
[44] Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998). The dynamics of indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 194(4), 561-574.
[45] Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005). Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature, 437(7063), 1291-1298.
[46] Pereda M., Brañas-Garza P., Rodríguez-Lara I., & Sánchez A. (2017). The emergence of altruism as a social norm. Scientific Reports, 7(1), 9684.
[47] Qu C., Wang Y., & Huang Y. (2013). Social exclusion modulates fairness consideration in the ultimatum game: An ERP study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 505.
[48] Rutte, C., & Taborsky, M. (2007). Generalized reciprocity in Rats. PLoS Biology, 5(7), e196.
[49] Sigmund, K. (2010). The calculus of selfishness. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[50] Stanca L., Bruni L., & Corazzini L. (2009). Testing theories of reciprocity: Do motivations matter? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2), 233-245.
[51] Sun Y. X., Zhang J. H., & Li J. P. (2022). Research progress on indirect reciprocity. Economic Perspectives, (1), 146-160.
[孙熠譞, 张建华, 李菁萍. (2022). 间接互惠理论研究进展. 经济学动态, (1), 146-160.]
[52] Wei, H., & Zhou, R. (2020). High working memory load impairs selective attention: EEG signatures. Psychophysiology, 57(11), e13643.
[53] Wu Y., Leliveld M. C., & Zhou X. (2011). Social distance modulates recipient's fairness consideration in the dictator game: An ERP study. Biological Psychology, 88(2-3), 253-262.
[54] Xie H., Hu X., Mo L., & Zhang D. (2021). Forgetting positive social feedback is difficult: ERP evidence in a directed forgetting paradigm. Psychophysiology, 58(5), e13790.
[55] Yeung, N., & Sanfey, A. G. (2004). Independent coding of reward magnitude and valence in the human brain. The Journal of Neuroscience, 24(28), 6258-6264.
[56] Zhang D. D., Gu R., Wu T., Broster L. S., Luo Y., Jiang Y., & Luo Y. (2013). An electrophysiological index of changes in risk decision-making strategies. Neuropsychologia, 51(8), 1397-1407.
[57] Zhang Y., Yu H., Yin Y., & Zhou X. (2016). Intention Modulates the Effect of Punishment Threat in Norm Enforcement via the Lateral Orbitofrontal Cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 36(35), 9217-9226.
[58] Zhong X., Wang R., Huang S., Chen J., Chen H., & Qu C. (2019). The neural correlate of mid-value offers in ultimatum game. PLoS ONE, 14(8), e0220622.