第三方干预对亲社会行为的影响：一项三水平元分析

doi:10.3724/SP.J.1042.2025.2121

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

作为维护社会规范的重要力量, 第三方干预在促进亲社会行为方面的潜力已受到研究者们的广泛关注。为系统考察第三方干预的亲社会效应强度及其影响因素, 本研究采用三水平元分析方法, 整合了40篇文献中的130个效应量(共计10289名被试)。主效应检验发现, 第三方干预对亲社会行为的促进作用达中等偏大水平。调节效应分析表明, 第三方干预的强度和概率会影响其对亲社会行为的促进作用, 干预强度越大, 概率越高, 第三方干预对亲社会行为的促进效应越强。而被试年龄、性别、第三方干预类型、形式、主体、成本、亲社会行为测量方式, 以及对照组设置均未表现出显著的调节作用。本研究系统验证了第三方干预对亲社会行为的积极影响, 并厘清了一系列关键的调节因素, 为后续理论发展与实证研究提供了一定启示。

关键词: 第三方干预, 亲社会行为, 三水平元分析, 调节效应

Abstract:

Third-party intervention refers to the proactive action of an uninvolved observer who, upon witnessing a behavioral event that violates, conforms to, or exceeds social normative expectations, imposes punishment, delivers rewards, or provides compensation to the actor involved. As a crucial mechanism for maintaining social order, third-party intervention has attracted extensive scholarly attention for its potential to foster prosocial behavior. Nevertheless, empirical findings remain inconsistent, suggesting that its effectiveness may depend on complex boundary conditions.

To systematically examine the strength of third-party intervention’s prosocial effect and its influencing factors, the present study employed a three-level meta-analytic approach, synthesizing 130 effect sizes from 40 empirical studies with a total sample of 10,289 participants. Results of the main effect analysis revealed that third-party intervention has a moderately strong positive impact on prosocial behavior. Moderator analyses further indicated that greater intensity and higher probability of intervention were associated with stronger prosocial effects. This pattern can be explained by several mechanisms: higher intensity and probability increase the anticipated costs of norm violations, enhance the potential benefits of engaging in prosocial actions, and transmit clearer normative signals, thereby fostering prosocial behavior. All forms of third-party intervention—punishment, reward, compensation, and their combinations—significantly promoted prosocial behavior, though the effect of rewards was relatively weaker. This asymmetry may be attributed to the principle of loss aversion, or the higher informational value of negative feedback relative to positive cues. Demographic moderators, including age and gender, were non-significant, suggesting that the prosocial impact of third-party intervention is stable across populations. Likewise, there was no difference between social versus monetary forms of intervention, indicating that both material incentives and social approval serve as fundamental motivation for prosocial behavior. Furthermore, whether the third-party agent was human or computer did not significantly alter prosocial effects. This may be because participants either lacked a strong psychological distinction regarding the agent’s identity, or because they focused more on the behavioral consequences themselves than on the intentions of the interveners. The presence or absence of intervention costs also did not significantly moderate the effect, which may reflect discrepancies between participants’ subjective perceptions and the coding schemes adopted by researchers. Future research should further investigate whether individuals’ prosocial behavior is differentially affected when they can clearly perceive variations in the level of intervention costs. Finally, methodological moderators, including measurement paradigms and control group setting, did not significantly influence outcomes, underscoring the robustness of the overall effect across experimental conditions.

Theoretical integration of these findings provides support for deterrence theory, focus theory of normative conduct, and indirect reciprocity theory. Specifically, deterrence theory explains the effect of punishment by emphasizing the increased costs associated with norm violations; focus theory highlights the capacity of intervention to draw attention to and strengthen normative awareness; and indirect reciprocity theory stresses the indirect reputational or cooperative benefits generated by intervention behaviors. Rather than being mutually exclusive, these perspectives are complementary, offering a multidimensional framework for understanding how third-party intervention fosters prosociality. Beyond theoretical insights, the findings also carry practical significance. Comparisons of control group conditions revealed that active third-party intervention consistently yielded stronger prosocial outcomes than either the absence of a third party or mere passive observation, underscoring its distinctive role in reinforcing social norms and sustaining cooperation.

In conclusion, this meta-analysis provides comprehensive evidence regarding the effectiveness and moderators of third-party intervention in promoting prosocial behavior. By clarifying the robustness of its effects, delineating key boundary conditions, and situating findings within complementary theoretical perspectives, the study advances our understanding of how external normative strategies can be leveraged to cultivate prosociality and collective well-being.

Key words: third-party intervention, prosocial behavior, three-level meta-analysis, moderating effect.

中图分类号:

B849: C91

沈殷琪, 蔡怡, 吴继霞. (2025). 第三方干预对亲社会行为的影响：一项三水平元分析. 心理科学进展 , 33(12), 2121-2137.

SHEN Yinqi, CAI Yi, WU Jixia. (2025). The effects of third-party intervention on prosocial behavior: A three-level meta-analysis. Advances in Psychological Science, 33(12), 2121-2137.

图/表 7

参考文献 116

	(^*元分析用到的参考文献)
[1]	卞峰, 张雯, 李甦, 穆妍. (2024). 儿童早期的社会规范习得与发展:基于社会互动的视角. 应用心理学, 30(4), 323-335. https://doi.org/10.20058/j.cnki.CJAP.023009
[2]	^* 陈鹤之. (2022). 第三方惩罚对亲社会行为的影响:社会规范示范与道德情绪的作用 [博士学位论文]. 浙江大学. https://doi.org/10.27461/d.cnki.gzjdx.2020.004304
[3]	陈世平, 薄欣. (2016). 公平与惩罚价格对第三方惩罚需求的影响. 心理与行为研究, 14(3), 372-376.
[4]	^* 陈思静. (2011). 社会规范激活:第三方惩罚的心理机制及其对合作行为的影响 [博士学位论文]. 浙江大学.
[5]	陈思静, 何铨, 马剑虹. (2015). 第三方惩罚对合作行为的影响:基于社会规范激活的解释. 心理学报, 47(3), 389-405.
[6]	陈思静, 胡华敏, 杨莎莎. (2020). 支付与报复:成本形式对第三方惩罚的影响. 心理科学, 43(2), 416-422. https://doi.org/10.16719/j.cnki.1671-6981.20200222
[7]	陈思静, 马剑虹. (2011). 第三方惩罚与社会规范激活——社会责任感与情绪的作用. 心理科学, 34(3), 670-675. https://doi.org/10.16719/j.cnki.1671-6981.2011.03.021
[8]	^* 陈思静, 邢懿琳, 翁异静, 黎常. (2021). 第三方惩罚对合作的溢出效应:基于社会规范的解释. 心理学报, 53(7), 758-772. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1041.2021.00758
[9]	陈思静, 杨莎莎. (2020). 利他性惩罚的动机. 心理科学进展, 28(11), 1901-1910. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2020.01901
[10]	陈欣, 赵国祥, 叶浩生. (2014). 公共物品困境中惩罚的形式与作用. 心理科学进展, 22(1), 160-170. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2014.00160
[11]	^* 崔丽莹, 何幸, 罗俊龙, 黄晓娇, 曹玮佳, 陈晓梅. (2017). 道德与关系惩罚对初中生公共物品困境中合作行为的影响. 心理学报, 49(10), 1322-1333.
[12]	郭禹辰, 刘艳彬, 程远. (2024). “惩前毖后”与“率先垂范”:第三方干预行为的影响效应. 心理科学进展, 32(1), 151-161. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2024.00151
[13]	^* 廖玉玲, 洪开荣, 张亮. (2015). 第三方惩罚机制与双边合作秩序的维持——来自房地产征用补偿的实验证据. 系统工程理论与实践, 35(11), 2798-2808. doi: 10.12011/1000-6788(2015)11-2798
[14]	林荣茂, 余巧华, 胡添祥, 张九妹, 叶玉珊, 连榕. (2025). 敬畏感与亲社会行为关系的三水平和结构方程模型元分析. 心理学报, 57(4). 631-651. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1041.2025.0631
[15]	刘国芳, 辛自强. (2011). 间接互惠中的声誉机制:印象、名声、标签及其传递. 心理科学进展, 19(2), 233-242.
[16]	^* 刘谞, 马剑虹, 朱玥. (2010). 从归因视角探讨公共物品两难中惩罚系统对合作的影响. 应用心理学, 16(4), 332-340.
[17]	刘映杰. (2018). 得失情境下的公平维护行为:第三方惩罚与第三方补偿 [博士学位论文]. 华东师范大学.
[18]	^* 潘昌明. (2015). 不同奖励方式、奖励实施者对合作秩序建立的作用 [硕士学位论文]. 浙江理工大学.
[19]	石荣, 刘昌. (2019). 基于直觉的亲社会性:来自社会启发式假设的思考. 心理科学进展, 27(8), 1468-1477. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2019.01468
[20]	^* 田莹. (2016). 公平偏好的博弈实验研究——支配地位、惩罚情境和公平感知对公平偏好的影响 [硕士学位论文]. 哈尔滨工程大学.
[21]	王茜雅. (2021). 第三方干预维护和传递社会规范的作用:干预形式和干预力度的影响 [硕士学位论文]. 河北师范大学. https://doi.org/10.27110/d.cnki.ghsfu.2022.000047
[22]	^* 王晓明. (2018). 名声传播对合作行为的影响——积极和消极信息的作用 [博士学位论文]. 华东师范大学. https://doi.org/10.27149/d.cnki.ghdsu.2018.000009
[23]	^* 肖蓁. (2024). 第三方惩罚对儿童公平分配行为的影响 [硕士学位论文]. 鲁东大学. https://doi.org/10.27216/d.cnki.gysfc.2024.000066
[24]	^* 杨晨. (2013). 城市房屋拆迁补偿的公平博弈实验研究——基于不同拆迁方式的视角 [硕士学位论文]. 中南大学.
[25]	^* 杨悦, 郝坚. (2014). 他人的利他惩罚对成人不公平行为的影响. (摘要). 第十七届全国心理学学术会议论文摘要集 (pp.1216-1218). 北京.
[26]	苑明亮, 张梦圆, 寇彧. (2016). 亲社会名声与亲社会行为. 心理科学进展, 24(10), 1655-1662. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2016.01655
[27]	^* 张元鹏, 林大卫. (2015). 社会偏好、奖惩机制与公共品的有效供给——基于一种实验方法的研究. 南方经济, 44(12), 26-39. https://doi.org/10.19592/j.cnki.scje.2015.12.003
[28]	^* 张子莹. (2019). 惩罚和奖励在集中制裁机制中的不对称作用 [硕士学位论文]. 浙江理工大学. https://doi.org/10.27786/d.cnki.gzjlg.2019.000133
[29]	郑好, 陈荣荣, 买晓琴. (2024). 第三方惩罚行为的认知神经机制. 心理科学进展, 32(2), 398-419. doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2024.00398
[30]	^* 周晔馨, 涂勤, 胡必亮. (2014). 惩罚、社会资本与条件合作——基于传统实验和人为田野实验的对比研究. 经济研究, 49(10), 125-138.
[31]	朱思嘉. (2023). 第三方惩罚对第二方受害者后续社会准则遵守行为的影响研究 [硕士学位论文]. 华东师范大学.
[32]	^* 朱玥. (2009). 公共物品两难情境中奖惩系统对合作行为以及信任的影响研究 [硕士学位论文]. 浙江大学.
[33]	Agnew J. R., Anderson L. R., Gerlach J. R., & Szykman L. R. (2008). Who chooses annuities? An experimental investigation of the role of gender, framing, and defaults. American Economic Review, 98(2), 418-422. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.2.418 doi: 10.1257/aer.98.2.418 URL
[34]	Akers R. (1990). Rational choice, deterrence, and social learning theory in criminology: The Path Not Taken. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 81(3), 653-676. doi: 10.2307/1143850 URL
[35]	Almenberg J., Dreber A., Apicella C. L., & Rand D. G. (2011). Third party reward and punishment:Group size, efficiency and public goods. In N. M. Palmetti & J. P. Russo (Eds.), Psychology of punishment (pp. 73-91). Nova Science Publishers.
[36]	Assink M., & Wibbelink C. J. M. (2016). Fitting three-level meta-analytic models in R: A step-by-step tutorial. The Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 12(3), 154-174. https://doi.org/10.20982/tqmp.12.3.p154 doi: 10.20982/tqmp.12.3.p154 URL
[37]	^* Asulin Y., Heller Y., & Munichor N. (2024). Comparing the effects of non-monetary incentives and monetary incentives on prosocial behavior. European Economic Review, 165, 10740. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104740
[38]	Balliet D., Mulder L. B., & Van Lange P. A. M. (2011). Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 137(4), 594-615. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023489 doi: 10.1037/a0023489 URL pmid: 21574679
[39]	Barclay P., Bliege Bird R., Roberts G., & Számadó S. (2021). Cooperating to show that you care: Costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 376(1838), 20200292. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0292
[40]	^* Bašić Z., Bindra P. C., Glätzle-Rützler D., Romano A., Sutter M., & Zoller C. (2021). The roots of cooperation (IZA Discussion Paper No. 14467). Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
[41]	Baumeister R. F., Bratslavsky E., Finkenauer C., & Vohs K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. Review of General Psychology, 5(4), 323-370. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 doi: 10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 URL
[42]	Becker G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217. doi: 10.1086/259394 URL
[43]	Blackwell B. S. (2000). Perceived sanction threats, gender, and crime: A test and elaboration of power-control theory. Criminology, 38(2), 439-488. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2000.tb00896.x doi: 10.1111/crim.2000.38.issue-2 URL
[44]	Boschini A., Muren A., & Persson M. (2011). Men among men do not take norm enforcement seriously. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 40(5), 523-529. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2011.04.001 doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2011.04.001 URL
[45]	Bradley A., Lawrence C., & Ferguson E. (2018). Does observability affect prosociality? Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 285 (1875), 20180116. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0116
[46]	Burnham T. C. (2018). Gender, punishment, and cooperation: Men hurt others to advance their interests. Socius, 4. https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023117742245
[47]	Card N. A. (2012). Applied meta-analysis for social science research (Paperback ed.). The Guilford Press.
[48]	^* Charness G., Cobo-Reyes R., & Jiménez N. (2008). An investment game with third-party intervention. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68(1), 18-28. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.006 doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.006 URL
[49]	Chavez A. K., & Bicchieri C. (2013). Third-party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings from the ultimatum game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 268-277. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.004 doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.004 URL
[50]	Chen X., Sasaki T., Brännström Å., & Dieckmann U. (2015). First carrot, then stick: How the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface, 12(102), 20140935. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.0935 doi: 10.1098/rsif.2014.0935 URL
[51]	Cheung M. W.-L. (2014). Modeling dependent effect sizes with three-level meta-analyses: A structural equation modeling approach. Psychological Methods, 19(2), 211-229. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032968 doi: 10.1037/a0032968 URL pmid: 23834422
[52]	Cheung M. W.-L. (2019). A guide to conducting a meta-analysis with non-independent effect sizes. Neuropsychology Review, 29(4), 387-396. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11065-019-09415-6 doi: 10.1007/s11065-019-09415-6 URL pmid: 31446547
[53]	Cialdini R. B., Kallgren C. A., & Reno R. R. (1991). A focus theory of normative conduct:A theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the role of norms in human behavior. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 24, pp. 201-234). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60330-5
[54]	Cohen J. (1992). Statistical power analysis. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 1(3), 98-101. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.ep10768783 doi: 10.1111/1467-8721.ep10768783 URL
[55]	Cook R. D., & Weisberg S. (1982). Criticism and influence analysis in regression. Sociological Methodology, 13, 313-361. https://doi.org/10.2307/270724 doi: 10.2307/270724 URL
[56]	Ding Y., Wang E., Zou Y., Song Y., Xiao X., Huang W., & Li Y. (2017). Gender differences in reward and punishment for monetary and social feedback in children: An ERP study. Plos One, 12(3), e0174100. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0174100 doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0174100 URL
[57]	Duval S., & Tweedie R. (2000). Trim and fill: A simple funnel-plot-based method of testing and adjusting for publication bias in meta-analysis. Biometrics, 56(2), 455-463. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0006-341X.2000.00455.x doi: 10.1111/j.0006-341x.2000.00455.x URL pmid: 10877304
[58]	Eriksson K., Strimling P., Gelfand M., Wu J., Abernathy J., Akotia C. S., … Van Lange, P. A. M. (2021). Perceptions of the appropriate response to norm violation in 57 societies. Nature Communications, 12(1), 1481.
[59]	^* Fehr D., & Sutter M. (2016). Gossip and the efficiency of interactions. Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 448-460. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.003 doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.003 URL
[60]	Fehr E., Fischbacher U., & Gächter S. (2002). Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature, 13(1), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7 doi: 10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7 URL
[61]	^* Feinberg M., Willer R., Stellar J., & Keltner D. (2012). The virtues of gossip: Reputational information sharing as prosocial behavior. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 102(5), 1015-1030. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026650
[62]	^* Festré A., & Garrouste P. (2014). Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 45, 141-153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2014.09.005 doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2014.09.005 URL
[63]	^* Fiedler M., & Haruvy E. (2017). The effect of third party intervention in the trust game. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 67, 65-74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2016.10.003 doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.10.003 URL
[64]	Gao S., Yu D., Assink M., Chan K. L., Zhang L., & Meng X. (2024). The association between child maltreatment and pathological narcissism: A three-level meta-analytic review. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 25(1), 275-290. https://doi.org/10.1177/15248380221147559
[65]	Glowacki L., & Lew-Levy S. (2022). How small-scale societies achieve large-scale cooperation. Current Opinion in Psychology, 44, 44-48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.026 doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.026 URL
[66]	Gross J., & Vostroknutov A. (2022). Why do people follow social norms? Current Opinion in Psychology, 44, 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.016 doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.016 URL
[67]	Gummerum M., Van Dillen L. F., Van Dijk E., & López-Pérez B. (2016). Costly third-party interventions: The role of incidental anger and attention focus in punishment of the perpetrator and compensation of the victim. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 65, 94-104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.04.004 doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2016.04.004 URL
[68]	^* Guo Y., Zhao X., Liu Y., & Ma J. (2024). The effect of third-party intervention on normative behavior of bystanders: An explanation of the social norm cueing effect. Personality and Individual Differences, 226, 112694. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2024.112694 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2024.112694 URL
[69]	^* Halevy N., & Halali E. (2015). Selfish third parties act as peacemakers by transforming conflicts and promoting cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112(22), 6937-6942. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1505067112
[70]	Harrer M., Cuijpers P., Furukawa T., & Ebert D. (2021). Doing meta-analysis with R:A hands-on guide. Boca Raton, FL and London: Chapman & Hall/CRC Press. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003107347
[71]	^* Harris D., Herrmann B., & Kontoleon A. (2012). When to favour your own group? The threats of costly punishments and in-group favouritism (Economics Series Working Paper No. 628). University of Oxford.
[72]	^* Heim R., & Huber J. (2019). Leading-by-example and third-party punishment: Experimental evidence. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 29, 100436. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2019.03.009 doi: 10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100436 URL
[73]	Heine F., & Strobel M. (2020). Reward and punishment in a team contest. Plos One, 15(9), e0236544. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236544 doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0236544 URL
[74]	Higgins J. P. T., Thompson S. G., Deeks J. J., & Altman D. G. (2003). Measuring inconsistency in meta-analyses. BMJ, 327(7414), 557-560. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.327.7414.557 doi: 10.1136/bmj.327.7414.557 URL
[75]	Hill V., & Pillow B. H. (2006). Children’s understanding of reputations. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 167(2), 137-157. https://doi.org/10.3200/GNTP.167.2.137-157 doi: 10.3200/GNTP.167.2.137-157 URL
[76]	^* Hou G., Wang F., Shi J., Chen W., & Yu J. (2019). Which is the ideal sanction for cooperation? An experimental study on different types of third‐party sanctions. PsyCh Journal, 8(2), 212-231. https://doi.org/10.1002/pchj.259 doi: 10.1002/pchj.2019.8.issue-2 URL
[77]	Kahneman D., & Tversky A. (1988). Prospect theory:An analysis of decision under risk. In P. Gärdenfors & N.-E. Sahlin (Eds.), Decision, probability, and utility: Selected readings (pp. 183-214). Cambridge University Press.
[78]	Kamei K. (2020). Group size effect and over-punishment in the case of third party enforcement of social norms. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 175, 395-412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.002 doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.002 URL
[79]	Kuwabara K., & Yu S. (2017). Costly punishment increases prosocial punishment by designated punishers: Power and legitimacy in public goods games. Social Psychology Quarterly, 80(2), 174-193. https://doi.org/10.1177/0190272517703750 doi: 10.1177/0190272517703750 URL
[80]	^* Lergetporer P., Angerer S., Glätzle-Rützler D., & Sutter M. (2014). Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111(19), 6916-6921. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1320451111
[81]	Lotz S., Okimoto T. G., Schlösser T., & Fetchenhauer D. (2011). Punitive versus compensatory reactions to injustice: Emotional antecedents to third-party interventions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 477-480. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.10.004 doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.10.004 URL
[82]	Lüdecke D. (2019). esc:Effect size computation for meta analysis (version 0.5.1). Retrieved July 6, 2022, from https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/esc/
[83]	^* Martin J. W., Martin S., & McAuliffe K. (2021). Third-party punishment promotes fairness in children. Developmental Psychology, 57(6), 927-939. https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0001183 doi: 10.1037/dev0001183 URL pmid: 34424010
[84]	Martinescu E., Janssen O., & Nijstad B. A. (2014). Tell me the gossip: The self-evaluative function of receiving gossip about others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(12), 1668-1680. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214554916 doi: 10.1177/0146167214554916 URL pmid: 25344294
[85]	Mieth L., Buchner A., & Bell R. (2017). Effects of gender on costly punishment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 30(4), 899-912. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2012 doi: 10.1002/bdm.v30.4 URL
[86]	^* Mulder L. B., Van Dijk E., De Cremer D., & Wilke H. A. M. (2006). When sanctions fail to increase cooperation in social dilemmas: Considering the presence of an alternative option to defect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 1312-1324. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206289978 URL pmid: 16963603
[87]	^* Nakashima N. A., Halali E., & Halevy N. (2017). Third parties promote cooperative norms in repeated interactions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 68, 212-223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.06.007 doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2016.06.007 URL
[88]	^* Pablo B., & Stefania O. (2009). Third-party punishment is more effective on women: Experimental evidence (The Papers No. 09/08). Universidad de Granada.
[89]	Page M. J., McKenzie J. E., Bossuyt P. M., Boutron I., Hoffmann T. C., Mulrow C. D., … Moher D. (2021). The PRISMA 2020 statement: An updated guideline for reporting systematic reviews. BMJ, 372, n71. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n71
[90]	Putz Á., Palotai R., Csertő I., & Bereczkei T. (2016). Beauty stereotypes in social norm enforcement: The effect of attractiveness on third-party punishment and reward. Personality and Individual Differences, 88, 230-235. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.09.025 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2015.09.025 URL
[91]	Qian Y., Takimoto Y., Wang L., & Yasumura A. (2023). Exploring cultural and gender differences in moral judgment: A cross-cultural study based on the CNI model. Current Psychology, 43, 5243-5253. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04662-6 doi: 10.1007/s12144-023-04662-6 URL
[92]	^* Qin X., & Wang S. (2013). Using an exogenous mechanism to examine efficient probabilistic punishment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.07.002 doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.07.002 URL
[93]	Quarmley M., Feldman J., Grossman H., Clarkson T., Moyer A., & Jarcho J. M. (2022). Testing effects of social rejection on aggressive and prosocial behavior: A meta-analysis. Aggressive Behavior, 48(6), 529-545. https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.22026 doi: 10.1002/ab.22026 URL pmid: 35349722
[94]	Raihani N. J., & Bshary R. (2015). The reputation of punishers. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 30(2), 98-103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003 doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003 URL
[95]	Raihani N. J., Thornton A., & Bshary R. (2012). Punishment and cooperation in nature. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 27(5), 288-295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004 doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004 URL
[96]	Rand D. G., Dreber A., Ellingsen T., Fudenberg D., & Nowak M. A. (2009). Positive interactions promote public cooperation. Science, 325(5945), 1272-1275. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1177418 doi: 10.1126/science.1177418 URL pmid: 19729661
[97]	Rand D. G., & Nowak M. A. (2013). Human cooperation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 413-425. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 URL pmid: 23856025
[98]	Roberts G., Raihani N., Bshary R., Manrique H. M., Farina A., Samu F., & Barclay P. (2021). The benefits of being seen to help others: Indirect reciprocity and reputation- based partner choice. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 376(1838), 20200290. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0290 doi: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0290 URL
[99]	Rodgers M. A., & Pustejovsky J. E. (2021). Evaluating meta-analytic methods to detect selective reporting in the presence of dependent effect sizes. Psychological Methods, 26(2), 141-160. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000300 doi: 10.1037/met0000300 URL
[100]	Rothstein H. R., Sutton A. J., & Borenstein M. (2005). Publication bias in meta-Analysis:Prevention, assessment and adjustments. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons. https://doi.org/10.1002/0470870168
[101]	Sefton M., Shupp R., & Walker J. M. (2007). The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods. Economic Inquiry, 45(4), 671-690. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00051.x doi: 10.1111/ecin.2007.45.issue-4 URL
[102]	Shank D. B., Kashima Y., Peters K., Li Y., Robins G., & Kirley M. (2019). Norm talk and human cooperation: Can we talk ourselves into cooperation? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 117(1), 99-123. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000163 doi: 10.1037/pspi0000163 URL pmid: 30475008
[103]	^* Shinohara A., Kanakogi Y., Okumura Y., & Kobayashi T. (2021). Children manage their reputation by caring about gossip. Social Development, 31(2), 455-465. https://doi.org/10.1111/sode.12548 doi: 10.1111/sode.v31.2 URL
[104]	^* Stagnaro M. N., Arechar A. A., & Rand D. G. (2017). From good institutions to generous citizens: Top-down incentives to cooperate promote subsequent prosociality but not norm enforcement. Cognition, 167, 212-254. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.017 doi: S0010-0277(17)30025-2 URL pmid: 28249658
[105]	^* Sutter M., Lindner P., & Platsch D. (2009). Social norms, third-party observation and third-party reward (Working Paper No. 2009-08). University of Innsbruck.
[106]	Thielmann I., Spadaro G., & Balliet D. (2020). Personality and prosocial behavior: A theoretical framework and meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 146(1), 30-90. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000217 doi: 10.1037/bul0000217 URL pmid: 31841013
[107]	Van den Noortgate W., López-López J. A., Marín-Martínez F., & Sánchez-Meca J. (2013). Three-level meta-analysis of dependent effect sizes. Behavior Research Methods, 45(2), 576-594. doi: 10.3758/s13428-012-0261-6 pmid: 23055166
[108]	Vanderhasselt M.-A., De Raedt R., Nasso S., Puttevils L., & Mueller S. C. (2018). Don’t judge me: Psychophysiological evidence of gender differences to social evaluative feedback. Biological Psychology, 135, 29-35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2018.02.017 doi: S0301-0511(18)30160-1 URL pmid: 29510184
[109]	Viechtbauer W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package. Journal of Statistical Software, 36(3), 1-48. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v036.i03
[110]	Viechtbauer W., & Cheung M. W.-L. (2010). Outlier and influence diagnostics for meta-analysis. Research Synthesis Methods, 1(2), 112-125. https://doi.org/10.1002/jrsm.11 doi: 10.1002/jrsm.11 URL pmid: 26061377
[111]	Vollan B. (2011). The difference between kinship and friendship: (Field-) experimental evidence on trust and punishment. Journal of Socio-Economics, 40(1), 14-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.003
[112]	^* Windrich I., Kierspel S., Neumann T., Berger R., & Vogt B. (2024). Enforcement of fairness norms by punishment: A comparison of gains and losses. Behavioral Sciences, 14(1), 39. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs14010039 doi: 10.3390/bs14010039 URL
[113]	^* Wu J., Balliet D., & Van Lange P. A. M. (2016). Reputation management: Why and how gossip enhances generosity. Evolution and Human Behavior, 37(3), 193-201. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.11.001 doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.11.001 URL
[114]	Wu J., Luan S., & Raihani N. (2022). Reward, punishment, and prosocial behavior: Recent developments and implications. Current Opinion in Psychology, 44, 117-123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.003 doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.003 URL
[115]	^* Xiao E., & Houser D. (2011). Punish in public. Journal of Public Economics, 95(7-8), 1006-1017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.021 doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.021 URL
[116]	Zaki J., & Mitchell J. P. (2013). Intuitive prosociality. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(6), 466-470. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413492764 doi: 10.1177/0963721413492764 URL

语言	第三方干预	亲社会行为
中文	第三方干预、第三方利他、第三方惩罚、第三方制裁、利他性惩罚、第三方奖励、第三方补偿、金钱惩罚/奖励/补偿、社会惩罚/奖励/补偿、言语惩罚/奖励/补偿、社会排斥、第三方帮助、流言、八卦、声誉传播、名声传播	亲社会性、亲社会行为、利他、合作、助人、捐赠、慈善、分享、公平、志愿、信任、互惠、信任游戏、投资游戏、公共物品游戏、最后通牒游戏、独裁者游戏、囚徒困境、社会困境
英文	third-party intervention, third-party punishment, third-party sanction, altruistic punishment, third-party compensation, third-party reward, monetary punishment/reward/compensation, social punishment/reward/compensation, verbal punishment/ reward/compensation, social ostracism, third-party help, gossip, reputation spread, reputation transmission	prosociality, prosocial behavior, altruism, cooperation, help, donation, charity, share, fairness, volunteer, trust, trustworthiness, reciprocity, reciprocal, trust game, investment game, public good game, ultimatum game, dictator game, prisoner’s dilemma, social dilemma

语言	第三方干预	亲社会行为
中文	第三方干预、第三方利他、第三方惩罚、第三方制裁、利他性惩罚、第三方奖励、第三方补偿、金钱惩罚/奖励/补偿、社会惩罚/奖励/补偿、言语惩罚/奖励/补偿、社会排斥、第三方帮助、流言、八卦、声誉传播、名声传播	亲社会性、亲社会行为、利他、合作、助人、捐赠、慈善、分享、公平、志愿、信任、互惠、信任游戏、投资游戏、公共物品游戏、最后通牒游戏、独裁者游戏、囚徒困境、社会困境
英文	third-party intervention, third-party punishment, third-party sanction, altruistic punishment, third-party compensation, third-party reward, monetary punishment/reward/compensation, social punishment/reward/compensation, verbal punishment/ reward/compensation, social ostracism, third-party help, gossip, reputation spread, reputation transmission	prosociality, prosocial behavior, altruism, cooperation, help, donation, charity, share, fairness, volunteer, trust, trustworthiness, reciprocity, reciprocal, trust game, investment game, public good game, ultimatum game, dictator game, prisoner’s dilemma, social dilemma

调节变量	k	Intercept/ Hedges’ g (95% CI)	b (95% CI)	F	p	水平2方差水平3方差
年龄群体				0.47	0.627	0.19^*0.14^*
成人	90	0.69 (0.51, 0.87)^***
青少年	12	0.59 (0.06, 1.13)^*	−0.10 (−0.66, 0.46)
儿童	16	0.89 (0.46, 1.33) ^***	0.20 (−0.27, 0.68)
女性比例	98	0.92 (0.49, 1.35) ^***	−0.00 (−0.01, 0.01)	0.41	0.525	0.20^*0.13^*
第三方干预强度	97	0.68 (0.46, 0.90) ^***	0.28 (0.01, 0.55) ^*	4.27	0.042	0.21^*0.17^
第三方干预概率	53	0.05 (−0.75, 0.85)	0.01 (−0.0001, 0.02)	3.97	0.052	0.18^*0.22^*
第三方干预类型				2.09	0.106	0.18^*0.16^*
第三方惩罚	82	0.80 (0.61, 0.99) ^***
第三方奖励	23	0.55 (0.27, 0.84) ^***	−0.36 (−0.68, −0.05)^*
第三方补偿	5	0.80 (0.36, 1.25) ^***	−0.28 (−0.85, 0.29)
第三方惩罚+奖励	17	0.89 (0.58, 1.12) ^***	0.00 (−0.39, 0.40)
第三方干预形式				0.86	0.355	0.18^* 0.15^*
金钱干预	99	0.76 (0.58, 0.93) ^***
社会干预	30	0.61 (0.34, 0.89) ^***	−0.14 (−0.44, 0.16)
第三方干预主体				2.04	0.156	0.19^*0.14^*
人类	94	0.67 (0.49, 0.84) ^***
电脑	36	0.92(0.62, 1.12) ^***	0.25 (−0.10, 0.61)
第三方干预成本				0.44	0.510	0.18^*0.13^*
有成本	65	0.80 (0.60, 1.00) ^***
无成本	64	0.70 (0.49, 0.92) ^***	−0.10 (−0.19, 0.38)
亲社会行为测量范式				0.97	0.327	0.19^*0.14^*
单次互动	54	0.65 (0.42, 0.87) ^***
多轮互动	76	0.79 (0.59, 0.99) ^***	0.14 (−0.15, 0.43)
对照组设置				1.20	0.275	0.19^*0.15^*
无干预组	87	0.78 (0.60, 0.96) ^***
第三方观察组	68	0.64 (0.41, 0.86) ^***	−0.14 (−0.40, 0.12)

调节变量	k	Intercept/ Hedges’ g (95% CI)	b (95% CI)	F	p	水平2方差水平3方差
年龄群体				0.47	0.627	0.19^*0.14^*
成人	90	0.69 (0.51, 0.87)^***
青少年	12	0.59 (0.06, 1.13)^*	−0.10 (−0.66, 0.46)
儿童	16	0.89 (0.46, 1.33) ^***	0.20 (−0.27, 0.68)
女性比例	98	0.92 (0.49, 1.35) ^***	−0.00 (−0.01, 0.01)	0.41	0.525	0.20^*0.13^*
第三方干预强度	97	0.68 (0.46, 0.90) ^***	0.28 (0.01, 0.55) ^*	4.27	0.042	0.21^*0.17^
第三方干预概率	53	0.05 (−0.75, 0.85)	0.01 (−0.0001, 0.02)	3.97	0.052	0.18^*0.22^*
第三方干预类型				2.09	0.106	0.18^*0.16^*
第三方惩罚	82	0.80 (0.61, 0.99) ^***
第三方奖励	23	0.55 (0.27, 0.84) ^***	−0.36 (−0.68, −0.05)^*
第三方补偿	5	0.80 (0.36, 1.25) ^***	−0.28 (−0.85, 0.29)
第三方惩罚+奖励	17	0.89 (0.58, 1.12) ^***	0.00 (−0.39, 0.40)
第三方干预形式				0.86	0.355	0.18^* 0.15^*
金钱干预	99	0.76 (0.58, 0.93) ^***
社会干预	30	0.61 (0.34, 0.89) ^***	−0.14 (−0.44, 0.16)
第三方干预主体				2.04	0.156	0.19^*0.14^*
人类	94	0.67 (0.49, 0.84) ^***
电脑	36	0.92(0.62, 1.12) ^***	0.25 (−0.10, 0.61)
第三方干预成本				0.44	0.510	0.18^*0.13^*
有成本	65	0.80 (0.60, 1.00) ^***
无成本	64	0.70 (0.49, 0.92) ^***	−0.10 (−0.19, 0.38)
亲社会行为测量范式				0.97	0.327	0.19^*0.14^*
单次互动	54	0.65 (0.42, 0.87) ^***
多轮互动	76	0.79 (0.59, 0.99) ^***	0.14 (−0.15, 0.43)
对照组设置				1.20	0.275	0.19^*0.15^*
无干预组	87	0.78 (0.60, 0.96) ^***
第三方观察组	68	0.64 (0.41, 0.86) ^***	−0.14 (−0.40, 0.12)

概念	概念界定	类别/取值	类别界定/取值范围
文献基本信息
发表状态	文献是否发表	J	正式发表的期刊论文
		D	学位论文
		C	会议论文
文献ID	作者名+年份		三名及以上作者仅编码第一作者名字
样本信息
平均年龄	研究样本中所有被试年龄的算术平均值, 通常以研究中报告的平均年龄为准。若仅报告了年龄范围, 则取年龄范围的中点为平均年龄。
年龄群体	被试所属的年龄发展阶段。由原始文献直接报告, 或按照平均年龄划分到对应的群体类别。	Ch	被试为儿童, 或年龄低于12岁
		Te	被试为青少年, 或年龄为13-17岁
		Ad	被试为成年人, 或年龄高于18岁
女性占比	女性被试在最终样本中的所占比例(在排除无效或不符合标准的被试之后, 若文献中报告了该信息)	%	0%-100%
研究特征
实验序号	原始文献中的实验或研究序号	Exp.
实验设计类型	变量操纵属于被试间设计还是被试内设计	BS	被试间设计
实验设计类型	变量操纵属于被试间设计还是被试内设计	WS	被试内设计
自变量特征
第三方干预类型	第三方采取的干预行为类型, 或多种类型的组合。	TP	第三方惩罚：如果被试表现出违规行为, 第三方可以对其进行惩罚, 如减少其金钱收益、传播有关被试的消极流言、对被试进行批评等
		TR	第三方奖励：如果被试表现出亲社会行为, 第三方可以对其进行奖励, 如增加其金钱收益、传播有关被试的积极流言、对被试进行表扬等
		TC	第三方补偿：如果他人因被试的违规行为受到伤害, 第三方可以对受害者进行补偿, 如补偿其金钱、要求违规者对其道歉等
		TP+TR	第三方惩罚+奖励：第三方可以同时实施惩罚和奖励
		TP+TC	第三方惩罚+补偿：第三方可以同时实施惩罚和补偿
		TR+TC	第三方奖励＋补偿：第三方可以同时实施奖励和补偿
第三方干预形式	第三方以物质或非物质形式对利益方进行惩罚、奖励或补偿。	MI	金钱干预：第三方通过增加或减少利益方的收益来实现对其的惩罚、奖励或补偿
		SI	社会干预：第三方以非物质形式的干预来实现对利益方的惩罚、奖励或补偿, 包括言语评价、流言、表情反馈等
		MI+SI	同时实施金钱干预和社会干预
第三方干预主体	被试被告知第三方惩罚、奖励或补偿的实施者是电脑还是真人	S	第三方干预的实施者为预先设定好的电脑程序
第三方干预主体	被试被告知第三方惩罚、奖励或补偿的实施者是电脑还是真人	H	第三方干预的实施者为人类
第三方干预成本	第三方在实施干预行为时是否需要付出成本。	YES	有成本
第三方干预成本	第三方在实施干预行为时是否需要付出成本。	NO	无成本
第三方干预概率	涉事方受到第三方惩罚、奖励或补偿的可能性大小。	p	0%≤p≤100% 第三方对特定行为后果(如合作/背叛、公平/不公平分配等)做出干预的概率; 群体中被第三方干预的个体占总人数的百分比。
第三方干预强度	金钱干预中, 最低的干预水平给被干预者带来的金钱损失或收益与单次违规可带来的最大收益的比值。	q	q = x/y x = 单次最低水平的干预使被干预者的收益产生的变化额第三方惩罚中, x = 违规者受到的最小单位的惩罚金额(例如, 第三方惩罚者可以选择消耗代币对违规者实施惩罚, 惩罚比例为1∶3, 第三方惩罚者实施惩罚时的最低代币消耗金额为1, 此时x = 3)。第三方奖励中, x = 规范遵守者收到的最小单位的奖励金额第三方补偿中, x = 违规行为受害者收到的最小单位的补偿金额 y = 单次违规行为可以产生的最大收益。在独裁者游戏中, y = 独裁者选择保留所有初始代币的收益, 即y =初始代币数额; 在公共物品游戏中, y = 被试选择保留自身所有代币, 并平分其他玩家投资所有代币后的公共物品收益, 即y = 初始代币数+公共物品收益/玩家数量; 在信任投资游戏中, y = 代理人收到投资者投资的所有代币后返还0个代币的收益, 即y = 投资人初始代币数×投资利率(通常=3); 在囚徒困境中, y = 被试选择背叛而其他玩家选择合作时的收益。
因变量特征
亲社会行为测量方式	被试的亲社会行为是在单轮次还是多轮次的互动情境中进行测量	SG	单轮互动：即被试在实验中仅进行了单轮次的游戏互动或单次的任务决策, 所测量的亲社会行为是被试在该轮次中的行为表现。
亲社会行为测量方式	被试的亲社会行为是在单轮次还是多轮次的互动情境中进行测量	RG	多轮互动：被试在实验中进行了多轮次的游戏互动或多次任务决策, 所测量的亲社会行为是被试在多轮次中的行为表现均值或总和。
亲社会行为测量工具	用于测量亲社会行为的实验范式或任务类型	DG	独裁者游戏：包含一名分配者和一名接受者, 分配者可将初始金额在自身与接受者之间自由分配, 而接受者无权反对。亲社会行为指标为被试作为独裁者时的分配金额或分配行为类型。
		PGG	公共物品游戏：通常包含多名组员, 每位组员同时决定向集体账户投资的资金, 剩余资金保留在个人账户中。贡献给集体账户的总资金会乘以一定倍数后再平均分给每位组员, 而保留在个人账户中的资金价值不变。亲社会行为指标为被试在集体账户中的贡献金额。
		PD	囚徒困境游戏：包含两名决策者, 双方同时决定与对方合作或背叛。双方均合作则平分收益, 一方背叛一方合作, 则背叛方获得全部收益, 双方均背叛则均无收益。亲社会行为指标为被试是否选择合作行为。
		IG	投资游戏：包含一名投资者和一名代理人, 投资者可以选择向代理人投资的金额, 用于投资的金额会一定倍数到达代理人手中, 代理人可选择归还给投资者的金额。亲社会行为指标为作为投资人的被试的投资决策或金额; 或是作为代理人的被试的返还决策或返还金额。
		OT	其他工具：不属于上述任务的测量工具, 如亲社会行为倾向问卷、情境故事问答等。应备注说明具体名称。
对照组	未进行第三方干预的实验操纵的条件或组别, 用以与实验组结果进行比较, 推断实验处理的因果效应。	CC	无第三方的控制组：未设置第三方, 不对个体进行任何额外的实验操纵。
对照组	未进行第三方干预的实验操纵的条件或组别, 用以与实验组结果进行比较, 推断实验处理的因果效应。	OC	第三方无干预权的观察组：设置第三方在场观察互动过程, 但其无法对行为结果进行任何形式的干预。
统计分析数据
原始数据出现页码
统计检验量	从样本数据中计算得出的值, 用于估计总体参数或描述样本特征。	t	t统计量
		F	F统计量
		χ²	卡方统计量
		r	皮尔逊相关系数(被试内设计需单独列出)
		β	标准化回归系数
		B	非标准化回归系数
		Z	Z统计量
		H	Kruskal−Wallis H统计量
		U	Mann−Whitney U统计量
		W	Wilcoxon符号秩检验统计量
		E	Fisher精确检验
		rho	Spearman等级相关系数
		W-χ²	Wald卡方统计量
		KS	Kolmogorov−Smirnov检验
		G²	G平方统计量或G平方差值
		M-χ²	McNemar检验卡方统计量
		tau	Kendall秩相关系数
		E-S	Epps−Singleton检验
分子自由度	用于估计分子方差的自由度数, 即分子部分的方差估计所依赖的数据点个数。	df₁
分母自由度	用于估计分母方差的自由度数, 即分母部分的方差估计所依赖的数据点个数。	df₂
统计检验量数值	具体的检验统计量值(如 F、t、χ²等)。
回归系数标准误	回归分析中用于衡量某个回归系数估计值的抽样误差大小的统计量。	SE_b
p 值	表示在原假设成立的前提下, 观察到当前或更极端结果的概率, 是衡量统计显著性的量化指标。
95% CI	95%置信区间	uci	95% 置信区间上限
95% CI	95%置信区间	lci	95% 置信区间下限
报告的效应量类型	原始论文中所使用的效应量指标类型(如 d, r, η² 等)
报告的效应量数值	文章中报告的标准化效应量
实验组的样本量	实验组的样本人数。若未报告, 则默认实验条件间样本量相等; 对于被试内设计, 记录每个条件下的参与者人数而非观测次数。	EG_N
实验组中的亲社会比例	实验组中选择亲社会行为的比例; 适用于只有两种选择的博弈(如囚徒困境、公共物品游戏、投资游戏)。比例越高表示亲社会行为越多。	EG_P
实验组中的平均值	在选择项超过两个的实验设计中, 亲社会行为的平均值(如公共物品博弈中被试贡献金额的均值)	EG_M
实验组中的标准差	亲社会行为的标准差, 仅适用于选择项数量大于2的情形。	EG_SD
实验组中的标准误	亲社会行为的标准误, 仅适用于选择项数量大于2的情形。	EG_SE
对照组的样本量	对照组的样本人数。若未报告, 则默认实验条件间样本量相等; 对于被试内设计, 记录每个条件下的参与者人数而非观测次数。	CG_N
对照组中的亲社会比例	对照组中选择亲社会行为的比例; 适用于只有两种选择的博弈。	CG_P
对照组中的平均值	对照组中, 亲社会行为的平均值, 仅适用于选择项数量大于2的情形。	CG_M
对照组中的标准差	对照组中, 亲社会行为的标准差, 仅适用于选择项数量大于2的情形。	CG_SD
对照组中的标准误	对照组中亲社会行为的标准误, 仅适用于选择项数量大于2的情形。	CG_SE