ISSN 0439-755X
CN 11-1911/B

心理学报 ›› 2011, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (01): 52-64.

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  1. 上海师范大学教育学院心理学系, 上海 200234
  • 收稿日期:2009-04-22 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2011-01-30 发布日期:2011-01-30
  • 通讯作者: 王沛

The Effects of Sanction and Social Value Orientation on Trust and Cooperation in Public Goods Dilemmas


  1. School of Education, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai 200234, China
  • Received:2009-04-22 Revised:1900-01-01 Published:2011-01-30 Online:2011-01-30
  • Contact: WANG Pei

摘要: 通过两个计算机情境模拟实验, 采用“取消惩罚”范式, 引入社会价值取向变量, 发现惩罚对人际信任和合作行为具有消极影响, 具体表现为当惩罚取消后, 经历过惩罚的被试的人际信任水平显著低于无惩罚条件被试的水平。惩罚对博弈者合作行为的影响在社会价值取向不同的博弈者之间存在显著差异:经历过惩罚的亲社会型被试在惩罚取消阶段的合作程度显著低于惩罚存在阶段的合作程度, 并且显著低于无惩罚条件被试的相应水平。惩罚通过亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平对合作程度产生间接负效应, 即惩罚程度越强, 亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平越低, 进而使其合作程度也下降。

关键词: 公共物品两难, 惩罚, 人际信任, 社会价值取向, 合作行为

Abstract: Sanctioning systems in social dilemmas are often discussed to increase trust in others and to increase cooperation. Yamagishi (1986a, 1986b, 1992) showed that people tended to favor the introduction of a sanctioning system when there was little trust that other people would cooperate. The trust positively relates to cooperation (De Cremer et al., 2001). This suggests a sanctioning system may increase cooperation by increasing trust in others. However, findings outside social dilemma research argued that a sanctioning system can decrease trust that others are internally motivated to cooperate (De Dreu et al, 1998). If a sanctioning system decreased trust in others, would the sanctioning negatively affect cooperation with others? Given this, this paper is to explore the relationship of sanction, trust and cooperation by “Removing the Sanction” paradigm and a measurement of social value orientation.
This paper examined the effects of a sanction on the trust and cooperation in public goods dilemma, including two experiments. In the first experiment, 76 participants were randomly assigned to the two conditions. The level of the trust and cooperation for the participants in the two conditions (sanction versus no-sanction) were compared after removing the sanction. 126 participants were measured by social value orientation, and 96 participants were chosen including 48 pro-socials and 48 individualists who were randomly assigned to three conditions including no sanction, mild sanction and severe sanction in the second experiment. After removing the mild sanction and severe sanction respectively, the paper compared the trust and cooperation of pro-socials with participants who had not gone through sanction. The same procedure had been done with individualists.
The main conclusions are as follows: participants who have experienced the presence of the sanction trust that another group member would cooperate less than participants who have not. The former cooperates less than the latter. The negative effect of the former presence of the sanction on cooperation is mediated by the trust in phase 2.
This study has important implications in the practice of organization management. In some organizations, when the trust in others is of initially high degree, a sanction installing can undermine this trust and consequently undermine cooperation after removing the sanction. When the degree of trust in others is initially low, it’s essential to install a sanction in order to increase cooperation with each other.

Key words: public goods dilemmas, sanction, trust, social value orientation, cooperation