ISSN 1671-3710
CN 11-4766/R

心理科学进展 ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (3): 431-442.doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2017.00431

• 研究前沿 • 上一篇    下一篇



  1. (东北师范大学心理学院, 长春 130024)
  • 收稿日期:2016-01-04 出版日期:2017-03-15 发布日期:2017-03-15
  • 通讯作者: 刘秀丽, E-mail:
  • 基金资助:


Do infants have an understanding of false belief?

HUANG Qiyu; LIU Xiuli   

  1. (School of Psychology, Northeast Normal University, Changchun 130024, China)
  • Received:2016-01-04 Online:2017-03-15 Published:2017-03-15
  • Contact: LIU Xiuli, E-mail:


最近10多年, 越来越多的婴儿错误信念理解研究不断拓展自发反应任务的范围, 发现婴儿的任务表现具有一定的灵活性。对此, 有研究者坚持丰富解释, 认为婴儿能理解他人的错误信念; 也有研究者坚持贫瘠解释, 认为婴儿只是借助行为规则等通过任务; 近来还有研究者在新的概念框架下做出一种折衷的解释。最终解决婴儿是否拥有错误信念理解能力这个问题, 需要研究者们提出一个判定个体拥有错误信念理解能力的明确标准。

关键词: 婴儿, 心理理论, 错误信念, 自发反应任务, 诱发反应任务


In the last decade, accumulating studies on infant false-belief understanding have found that infants’ positive performance on a variety of spontaneous-response tasks demonstrates a certain degree of flexibility. Given this result, some researchers persist with the rich interpretation which claims that infants can attribute false beliefs to others, while some insist on the lean interpretation assuming that infants’ success on the tasks can be explained by other abilities such as the use of behavior rules. There are also researchers who recently come to offer a compromising interpretation in the new conceptual framework. To finally solve the question on whether infants have an understanding of false belief or not, a specific standard on the acquisition of false-belief understanding is needed.

Key words: infancy, theory of mind, false belief, spontaneous-response tasks, elicited-response tasks