"公平偏好演化起源"模型预设了19种要价类型,因而其中的公平偏好社会并非自然"演化"而来;同时,该模型一定程度上依赖群体选择理论。本文对其仿真模型做出重要改进,允许各要价类型在[0,1]区间上连续分布,且完全不考虑群体竞争,因而公平偏好主导整个社会将是在[0,1]区间遍历演化的结果,是真正自然"演化"而来的,无须依赖群体选择。运用不同参数进行上百次仿真实验的结果表明,最终的演化稳定均衡是公平偏好主导整个社会。原因在于,相对公平的要价最能实现合作机会多寡和合作利益大小的平衡,从而最具适存性。上述结果对"公平演化起源"思想提供了更加有力的支持。

第三方惩罚对于社会规范的维持至关重要。本文基于一组引入真实劳动(real effort)和第三方的独裁者博弈实验,探讨了由利益无关的第三方实施的惩罚背后隐藏的经济逻辑。本文研究的问题是,利益无关的第三方对惩罚的需求是否敏感反应于惩罚价格?本文通过操控实验中独裁者做出分配决策后第三方面对的惩罚价格检验了这一点。结果发现,第三方确实愿意花费成本惩罚违背潜在规范的独裁者。第三方对惩罚的这种需求一方面随着惩罚价格的上升而下降,另一方面随着独裁者规范违背程度的增加而增加。通过引出接受者关于第三方在给定惩罚价格水平下是否会实施惩罚的信念,本文证明了这种动机模式的普遍性。本文的结论是,即便利益无关,第三方惩罚这种看似纯粹利他的行为背后也存在很强的经济考虑。这意味着,我们在构建有关惩罚的微观行为模型进而进行相应的制度设计时必须同时考虑这两个方面。

第三方干预(third-party intervention)是一种重要的利他行为,它包括惩罚和补偿两种措施。本研究结合情境性问卷与实验法,采用修改后的独裁者博弈范式(Dictator Game,DG),让被试作为第三方对朋友或者陌生人的不公平行为进行干预,考察社会距离对第三方干预的影响。研究发现:(1)对于朋友提出的不公平方案,个体对其的惩罚轻于陌生人,而对第二方(无权者)的补偿没有显著差异。(2)个体对朋友的不公平提议的公平性判断高于陌生人,但提议引发的情绪体验没有显著差异。上述结果表明,社会距离可能通过影响个体对不公平行为的公平感知,进而影响其第三方干预行为。

ABSTRACT Conducted 3 experiments with a total of 119 college students to examine the effects of an inequity between 2 others on the behavior of a third party toward those 2 others. Ss were put in a position of power over the allocation of rewards received by 2 others in an existing inequitable state. It was found that (a) the third party acted to maintain equity or to reduce inequity between 2 others; (b) as maintenance of equity became more costly to the third party, it became less likely that he would act to maintain equity between the 2 others; (c) the third party gave more rewards to the person who became disadvantaged by the inequity as a result of prior harmful behavior by the person advantaged by the inequity, and gave fewer rewards to a person disadvantaged in spite of helpful behavior by the person advantaged by the inequity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Abstract Although often confused, imagining how another feels and imagining how you would feel are two distinct forms of perspective taking with different emotional consequences. The former evokes empathy; the latter, both empathy and distress. To test this claim, undergraduates listened to a (bogus) pilot radio interview with a young woman in serious need. One third were instructed to remain objective while listening; one third, to imagine how the young woman felt; and one third, to imagine how they would feel in her situation. The two imagine perspectives produced the predicted distinct pattern of emotions, suggesting different motivational consequences: Imagining how the other feels produced empathy, which has been found to evoke altruistic motivation; imagining how you would feel produced empathy, but it also produced personal distress, which has been found to evoke egoistic motivation.

abstractUsing a combination of self-interest and deontological theories as justification, we propose a demarcated view of workplace justice that separates justice for an individual (personal justice) and inferred assessments of justice for organizational members (third party justice). Results of two studies confirmed the appropriateness of separate justice measures and demonstrated differential effects on key criteria based on the relevancy (personal or joint) of the outcome in question. Specifically, Studies 1 and 2 found that personal justice was a better predictor of organizational commitment and turnover intentions while third party justice was more closely related to workplace cohesion (Study 1), citizenship behaviours (Study 2), and deviance behaviours (Study 2). Implications of these findings and future research needs are discussed.

The present research explores third parties’ (e.g., jurors, ombudsmen, auditors, and employees observing others’ encounters) ability to objectively judge fairness. More specifically, the current research suggests that third parties’ justice judgments and reactions are biased by their attitudes toward the decision recipient and, in particular, the affective aspect of those attitudes as characterized by their felt social emotions. We explore how the congruence of a social emotion (i.e., the extent to which the emotion reflects feeling a subjective sense of alignment with the target of the emotion) can influence their evaluations of recipients’ decision outcomes. The five studies presented show that congruence can lead third parties to react positively to objectively unfair decision outcomes and, importantly, that the influence of social emotions on subjective justice judgments drive third party reactions to decisions, decision makers, and even national policies.

How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low level of genetic relatedness among group members? We suggest that many humans have a predisposition to punish those who violate group-beneficial norms, even when this imposes a fitness cost on the punisher. Such altruistic punishment is widely observed to sustain high levels of cooperation in behavioral experiments and in natural settings.We offer a model of cooperation and punishment that we call strong reciprocity: where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, strong reciprocators obey the norm and punish its violators, even though as a result they receive lower payoffs than other group members, such as selfish agents who violate the norm and do not punish, and pure cooperators who adhere to the norm but free-ride by never punishing. Our agent-based simulations show that, under assumptions approximating likely human environments over the 100,000 years prior to the domestication of animals and plants, the proliferation of strong reciprocators when initially rare is highly likely, and that substantial frequencies of all three behavioral types can be sustained in a population. As a result, high levels of cooperation are sustained. Our results do not require that group members be related or that group extinctions occur.

This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a variant of the Berg et al. [Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K., 1995. Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–142] “Investment Game”. A third-party's material payoff is not affected by the decisions made by the other participants, but this person may choose to punish a responder who has been overly selfish. The concern over this possibility may serve to discipline potentially selfish responders. We also explore a treatment in which the third party may also choose to reward a sender who has received a low net payoff as a result of the responder's action. We find a strong and significant effect of third-party punishment in both punishment regimes, as the amount sent by the first mover is more than 60% higher when there is the possibility of third-party punishment. We also find that responders return a higher proportion of the amount sent to them when there is the possibility of punishment, with this proportion slightly higher when reward is not feasible. Finally, third parties punish less when reward is feasible, but nevertheless spend more on the combination of reward and punishment when these are both permitted than on punishment when this is the only choice for redressing material outcomes.

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People react negatively not only to injustices they personally endure but also to injustices that they observe as bystanders at work nd typically, people observe more injustices than they personally experience. It is therefore important to understand how organizations can restore observers perceptions of justice after an injustice has occurred. In our paper, we employ a policy capturing design to test and compare the restorative power of monetary compensation, procedure changes and apologies, alone and in combination, from the perspective of third parties. We extend previous research on remedies by including different degrees of compensation and procedural changes, by comparing the effects of sincere versus insincere apologies and by including apologies from additional sources. The results indicate that monetary compensation, procedure changes, and sincere apologies all have a significant and positive effect on how observers perceive the restoration of justice. Insincere apologies, on the other hand, have no significant effect on restoration for third parties. Procedural changes were found to have the strongest remedial effects, a remedy rarely included in previous research. One interpretation of this finding could be that observers of injustice prefer solutions that are not short sighted: changing procedures avoids future injustices that could affect other people. We found that combinations of remedies, such that the presence of a second remedy strengthens the effect of the first remedy, are particularly effective. Our findings regarding interactions underline the importance of studying and administering remedies in conjunction with each other.

This experiment examined children's reactions to a transgression in which one child's property was damaged by another who (a) had a reputation as a good or bad child, (b) apologized or did not, and (c) later expressed remorse when talking about the incident or was happy and unremorseful. As expected, actors who had a good reputation or were remorseful were seen as more likable, as having better motives, as doing the damage unintentionally, as more sorry and as less blameworthy. Further, actors who were good and remorseful were punished least, suggesting that punishment was applied in a rehabilitative fashion. The actor's reputation determined how his or her actions were interpreted: bad actors were seen as more worried about punishment when they expressed remorse and older children thought they apologized merely to avoid punishment. Interestingly, apologies were effective in reducing punishment and making the actor seem more likable, and this was true irrespective of the other factors. The apology-forgiveness script may be such an ingrained aspect of social life that its appearance automatically improves the actor's position. The reactions of second and fifth graders were generally similar, although the younger children displayed less coherent relationships between judgements.

The present research examines how emotions of a third party interacting with an authority who has treated him or her unfairly affect one's feelings of anger toward the authority as a function of the ambiguity of the unfair treatment. Across a scenario and a laboratory study, it was found that when participants did not receive voice and it was unclear whether this was the result of an authority's unfair intentions, participants were less angry when the third party expressed shame, rather than anger, toward the same enacting authority. A second laboratory study replicated this effect, but now by showing that one's feelings of anger (in the case of ambiguity) were lower when the other person expressed guilt, relative to anger.

ABSTRACT There is growing theoretical recognition in the organizational justice literature that an organization’s treatment of external parties (such as patients, community members, customers, and the general public) shapes its own employees’ attitudes and behavior toward it. However, the emerging third-party justice literature has an inward focus, emphasizing perceptions of the treatment of other insiders (e.g., co-workers or team members). This inward focus overlooks meaningful “outward” employee concerns relating to how organizations treat external parties. We propose a relational response model to advance the third-party justice literature asserting that the organization’s fair treatment of external parties sends important relational signals to employees that shape their social exchange perceptions toward their employer. Supporting this proposition, in two multi-source studies in separate healthcare organizations we found that patient-directed justice had indirect effects on supervisory cooperative behavior ratings through organizational trust and organizational identification.

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We conceptualize a multilevel framework that examines the manifestation of abusive supervision in team settings and its implications for the team and individual members. Drawing on Hackman's (1992) typology of ambient and discretionary team stimuli, our model features team-level abusive supervision (the average level of abuse reported by team members) and individual-level abusive supervision as simultaneous and interacting forces. We further draw on team-relevant theories of social influence to delineate two proximal outcomes of abuse-members' organization-based self-esteem (OBSE) at the individual level and relationship conflict at the team level-that channel the independent and interactive effects of individual- and team-level abuse onto team members' voice, team-role performance, and turnover intentions. RESULTS from a field study and a scenario study provided support for these multilevel pathways. We conclude that abusive supervision in team settings holds toxic consequences for the team and individual, and offer practical implications as well as suggestions for future research on abusive supervision as a multilevel phenomenon. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).

This chapter describes how a structural model of deservingness governed by a principle of balance may be applied to the analysis of emotions relating to deserved or undeserved outcomes of other or of self. In each case perceived deservingness/undeservingness is assumed to mediate both general emotional reactions such as pleasure and dissatisfaction and discrete emotions such as sympathy, resentment, disappointment, and guilt, depending on outcome (positive, negative), the evaluative structure of action/outcome relations, and whether outcomes relate to other or to self. Evidence from studies of reactions to success or failure, and reactions to penalties for offences, supports the analysis, as does earlier research on tall poppies or high achievers. The theoretical analysis is then related to the wider psychological literature on justice and emotions, especially to appraisal theory as exemplified in Weiner's approach. Also discussed are issues concerned with reciprocal relations between affect and deservingness, thoughtful versus automatic processing, new extensions of balance theory, and variables such as like/dislike relations, ingroup/outgroup relations, and perceived responsibility that would moderate perceived deservingness/undeservingness, thereby influencing the emotions that are assumed to be activated in each case.

Organizations are concerned with the impact organizational change can have on both individuals' response to the change itself and their ongoing relationship with the organization. This study investigated how organizational changes in 32 different organizations (public and private) affected individuals' commitment to the specific change and their broader commitment to the organization. The results indicate that both types of commitment may be best understood in terms of a 3-way interaction between the overall favorableness (positive/negative) of the change for the work unit members, the extent of the change in the work unit, and the impact of the change on the individual's job. In addition, the fairness of the change process was found to interact with the effects of work unit change on organizational commitment. The implications of these results for future research and practice are discussed.

"There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if a fraction of the people exhibits inequality aversion the puzzles can be resolved."

Despite the fact that humans have a deep motivation to pursue and maintain close relationships, little research has examined social relationships from a motivational perspective. In the current paper, we argue that any model of close relationships must simultaneously account for people’s tendencies to both approach incentives and avoid threats in close relationships. To that end, we review research stemming from Gable’s (2006) social and relationship model of motivation on both the antecedents and the consequences of approach and avoidance goal pursuit in the context of close relationships. We conclude with recommendations for future research in this area.

This research examined whether people experience anger after perceiving intentional and unfair behavior of an outgroup which has negative consequences for others, but not for themselves. It was predicted that such outgroup behavior causes anger in the observer. dependent on the categorization of the victims as part of its own group or as part of another group. Participants were primed with information that made either differences or similarities between them and the vic tims salient, after which they were confronted with negative behavior of an outgroup. Results confirmed the prediction that the same inform ation concerning unfair and intentional behavior of an outgroup harming others led to more anger in the observed when the victims were perceived as ingroup rather than outgroup. Moreover, anxiery was not affected by perceptron of victims as part of the ingroup or outgroup, saggesting that specific emotions rather than just negative affect were influenced.

In this paper, we examined reactions to situations in which, although one is not personally involved, one could see oneself connected to either the perpetrators or the victims of unfair behavior. We manipulated participants' similarity and measured their identification to either one of two groups which participants later learned was the victim or the perpetrator of harmful behavior. As predicted, making salient similarities to the victims lead participants to: 1) appraise the perpetrator's behavior as more unfair; 2) experience more anger; and 3) be more likely to take action against it and less prone to show support for it as a function of their level of identification with their salient ingroup. In sharp contrast, focusing participants' attention on their similarities to the perpetrators reversed this pattern of findings: Compared to high identifiers, low identifiers appraised the behavior as more unfair than high identifiers, which made them feel angry (and guilty) and less likely to show support for the perpetrator's behavior. The data also provide strong support for a mediational model in which appraisal of the situation colors the emotional reaction which in turn orients action tendencies. We discuss the implications of our findings for the issue of group-based emotions. Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

61Costly third-party interventions are unlikely to be motivated by self-interest.61Effects of incidental anger and attention focus on third-party interventions were investigated.61Participants induced to anger punished significantly more and compensated less.61However, third parties induced to empathic anger compensated significantly more.61Incidental anger only affected punishment or compensation when attention was sustained.

Research often paints a dark portrait of power. Previous work underscores the links between power and self-interested, antisocial behavior. In this paper, we identify a potential bright side to power amely, that the powerful are more likely to intervene when they witness workplace incivility. In experimental (Studies 1 and 3) and field (Study 2) settings, we find evidence suggesting that power can shape how, why, and when the powerful respond to observed incivility against others. We begin by drawing on research linking power and action orientation. In Study 1, we demonstrate that the powerful respond with agency to witnessed incivility. They are more likely to directly confront perpetrators, and less likely to avoid the perpetrator and offer social support to targets. We explain the motivation that leads the powerful to act by integrating theory on responsibility construals of power and hierarchy maintenance. Study 2 shows that felt responsibility mediates the effect of power on increased confrontation and decreased avoidance. Study 3 demonstrates that incivility leads the powerful to perceive a status challenge, which then triggers feelings of responsibility. In Studies 2 and 3, we also reveal an interesting nuance to the effect of power on supporting the target. While the powerful support targets less as a direct effect, we reveal countervailing indirect effects: To the extent that incivility is seen as a status challenge and triggers felt responsibility, power indirectly increases support toward the target. Together, these results enrich the literature on third-party intervention and incivility, showing how power may free bystanders to intervene in response to observed incivility.

This research examines how people integrate social reports regarding another person's injustice experience into their own justice assessments. Specifically, we examine three variables—participant injustice experience, co-worker injustice severity, and prior contact with co-worker's supervisor—that influence the degree to which individuals express victim empathy (acceptance of the other's injustice report) and victim derogation (assigning at least some blame to the victim) when a co-worker reports an injustice experience. We hypothesized that personal experiences with injustice would facilitate victim empathy and that the severity of a co-worker's injustice report would simultaneously lead to victim empathy and victim derogation. We hypothesized that the effect of prior contact with co-worker supervisor on justice judgments would be moderated by personal experience and the severity of the co-worker's injustice experience. Results from the experiment confirm these predictions.

The research literature in organizational justice has examined in some detail the dynamics and consequences of justice judgments based on direct experiences with fair and unfair authorities, but little is known about how people form justice judgments on the basis of reports of injustice by others or how group discussion changes justice judgments. The present study examined the consequences of distributed injustice, in which all members of a group experience some denial of voice, and concentrated injustice, in which one member experiences repeated denial of voice and others do not. It was predicted and found that mild personal experiences of injustice are a more potent source of group impressions of injustice than are reports of more severe injustice experienced by others. In both conditions, group ratings of unfairness were more extreme than were the mean of individual ratings either before or after discussion.

Third-party punishment and third-party compensation are primary responses to observed norms violations. Previous studies mostly investigated these behaviors in gain rather than loss context, and few study made direct comparison between these two behaviors. We conducted three experiments to investigate third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the gain and loss context. Participants observed two persons playing Dictator Game to share an amount of gain or loss, and the proposer would propose unfair distribution sometimes. In Study 1A, participants should decide whether they wanted to punish proposer. In Study 1B, participants decided to compensate the recipient or to do nothing. This two experiments explored how gain and loss contexts might affect the willingness to altruistically punish a perpetrator, or to compensate a victim of unfairness. Results suggested that both third-party punishment and compensation were stronger in the loss context. Study 2 directly compare third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the both contexts, by allowing participants choosing between punishment, compensation and keeping. Participants chose compensation more often than punishment in the loss context, and chose more punishments in the gain context. Empathic concern partly explained between-context differences of altruistic compensation and punishment. Our findings provide insights on modulating effect of context on third-party altruistic decisions.

Altruistic punishment refers to the phenomenon that humans invest their own resources to redress norm violations without self-interest involved. We address the question of who will intervene in situations that allow for altruistic punishment. We suggest that individual differences in a genuine concern for justice, as reflected by the personality trait of justice sensitivity, determine the experience of moral emotions in the face of injustice, which in turn trigger altruistic punishment. Results of two studies support the proposed mediation effect for other-regarding justice sensitivity, even though an opportunity for compensation of the victim (Study 2) was offered as an alternative to punishment (Study 1). Furthermore, the mediation effect was observed when moral outrage was measured by means of quantified open statements (Study 1) and self-report scales using discrete emotions (Study 2). The findings help to explain the psychological mechanisms underlying engagement in costly social sanctioning of norm violations.

The almost exclusive focus on punishment and inattention to compensatory alternatives in studies involving experimental games may yield patterns that do not accurately reflect how and when people respond to injustice, particularly if punishment and compensation are not psychologically equivalent approaches to justice restoration. In the current study, we examined participants' preference for punitive and compensatory actions, while also exploring emotional determinants and boundary conditions. Our results indicated that participants actually compensated victims more than they punished offenders and that the majority of participants assigned both. Furthermore, although both interventions were associated with emotional experiences of moral outrage toward the offender, self-focused emotions reflecting feelings of threat only predicted compensation and only when victims were aware that they had been victimized. These findings augment our understanding of third-party interventions, emphasizing the importance of considering response alternatives when studying the psychology of justice.

This research examines 3rd parties' reactions to the abusive supervision of a coworker. Reactions were theorized to depend on 3rd parties' beliefs about the targeted coworker and, specifically, whether the target of abuse was considered deserving of mistreatment. We predicted that 3rd parties would experience anger when targets of abuse were considered undeserving of mistreatment; angered 3rd parties would then be motivated to harm the abusive supervisor and support the targeted coworker. Conversely, we predicted that 3rd parties would experience contentment when targets of abuse were considered deserving of mistreatment; contented 3rd parties would then be motivated to exclude the targeted coworker. Additionally, we predicted that 3rd parties' moral identity would moderate the effects of 3rd parties' experienced emotions on their behavioral reactions, such that a strong moral identity would strengthen ethical behavior (i.e., coworker support) and weaken harmful behavior (i.e., supervisor-directed deviance, coworker exclusion). Moderated mediation results supported the predictions. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Organizations are dynamic, hierarchically structured entities. Such dynamism is reflected in the emergence of significant events at every organizational level. Despite this fact, there has been relatively little discussion about how events become meaningful and come to impact organizations across space and time. We address this gap by developing event system theory, which suggests that events become salient when they are novel, disruptive, and critical (reflecting an event's strength). Importantly, events can originate at any hierarchical level and their effects can remain within that level or travel up or down throughout the organization, changing or creating new behaviors, features, and events. This impact can extend over time as events vary in duration and timing or as event strength evolves. Event system theory provides a needed shift in focus for organizational theory and research by developing specific propositions articulating the interplay among event strength and the spatial and temporal processes through which events come to influence organizations.

Previous research considering reactions to injustice has focused predominantly on retributive (i.e., punitive) responses. Restorative justice , a relatively understudied concept, suggests an alternative justice response which emphasizes bilateral discussion in an attempt to reach a consensus about the meaning of the offense and how to address the transgression. The current research explores the additional contribution of restorative justice processes, examining the extent to which bilateral consensus is viewed as a fairer response to transgressions than unilateral decisions. Results show that, independent of the punishment, restorative responses are generally regarded as fairer than nonrestorative responses. And compared to punishment, which tends to be moderated by offender intent and seriousness of the harm, restorative responses are regarded as particularly fair when the involved parties share an identity. Findings suggest the importance of distinguishing retributive justice from a “restorative notion of justice”—a notion that focuses on addressing concerns over the maintenance of existing social relationships and identity-defining values.

We proposed two distinct understandings of what justice means to victims and what its restoration entails that are reflected in individual-level justice orientations. Individuals with a retributive orientation conceptualize justice as the unilateral imposition of just deserts against the offender. In contrast, individuals with a restorative orientation conceptualize justice as achieving a renewed consensus about the shared values violated by the offence. Three studies showed differential relations between these two justice orientations and various individual-level values/ideologies and predicted unique variance in preferences for concrete justice-restoring interventions, judicial processes and abstract justice restoration goals. The pattern of results lends validity to the understanding of justice as two distinct conceptualizations, a distinction that provides much needed explanation for divergent preferences for injustice responses. Copyright 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

ABSTRACT We present a theory of why some people who witness or learn about acts of mistreatment against others in organizations are more likely to recognize this injustice and become personally involved. Drawing from theories of moral identity, moral intuitions, and self-regulation, we explain third parties' morally motivated responses to mistreatment and consider the role of power and belief in the disciplinary system in this process. We discuss implications of the theory and propose future research directions.

This research takes a moral perspective to studying third parties' reactions to injustice as a function of their moral identity. The authors argue that because third parties with a strong moral identity are more concerned about the welfare of others, they will react more strongly to justice violations than third parties with a comparatively weak moral identity. Furthermore, because interpersonal justice violations are more unambiguously morally wrong compared to distributive and procedural justice violations, the authors propose that third party moral reactions are stronger in response to interpersonal than distributive and procedural justice violations. Results from three studies support these predictions, and show that the third party's moral anger mediates these reactions.

In three experimental studies, we found that witnessing rudeness enacted by an authority figure (Studies 1 and 3) and a peer (Study 2) reduced observers performance on routine tasks as well as creative tasks. In all three studies we also found that witnessing rudeness decreased citizenship behaviors and increased dysfunctional ideation. Negative affect mediated the relationships between witnessing rudeness and performance. The results of Study 3 show that competition with the victim over scarce resources moderated the relationship between observing rudeness and performance. Witnesses that were in a competition with the victim felt less negative affect in observing his mistreatment and their performance decreased to a lesser extent than observers of rudeness enacted against a non-competitive victim. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

The deontic model of justice and ethical behavior proposes that people care about justice simply for the sake of justice. This is an important consideration for business ethics because it implies that justice and ethical behavior are naturally occurring phenomena independent of system controls or individual self-interest. To date, research on the deontic model and third-party reactions to injustice has focused primarily on individuals’ tendency topunishtransgressors. This research has revealed that witnesses to injustice will consider sacrificing their own resources if it is the only way to sanction an observed transgressor. In this paper we seek to extend this model by arguing that punishment may not be the only “deontic” reaction, and that in fact, third-party observers of injustice may engage in moral self-regulation that would lead them to conclude that the most ethical response is to do nothing. We provide preliminary evidence for our propositions using voiced cognitions data collected during a resource allocation task. Results indicate that deonance may be more complex than originally thought, and previous tests of the model conservative in nature.

Social norms pervade almost every aspect of social interaction. If they are violated, not only legal institutions, but other members of society as well, punish, i.e., inflict costs on the wrongdoer. Sanctioning occurs even when the punishers themselves were not harmed directly and even when it is costly for them. There is evidence for intergroup bias in this third-party punishment: third-parties, who share group membership with victims, punish outgroup perpetrators more harshly than ingroup perpetrators. However, it is unknown whether a discriminatory treatment of outgroup perpetrators (outgroup discrimination) or a preferential treatment of ingroup perpetrators (ingroup favoritism) drives this bias. To answer this question, the punishment of outgroup and ingroup perpetrators must be compared to a baseline, i.e., unaffiliated perpetrators. By applying a costly punishment game, we found stronger punishment of outgroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators and weaker punishment of ingroup versus unaffiliated perpetrators. This demonstrates that both ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination drive intergroup bias in third-party punishment of perpetrators that belong to distinct social groups.

The distinctiveness of the justice of need and of humanitarian norms is examined and it is suggested that people do indeed sacrifice their own resources for the benefit of others without hope of external reward, motivated by internalized personal norms. A theoretical process leading from awareness of need through norm activation to overt behavior based on the justice of need is outlined, situational and personality determinants of the activation of personal humanitarian norms and of efforts to neutralize these norms and deflect the moral costs of violating them are explored, and the relationship between humanitarian and exchange norms is discussed.

To date, theory and research on organizational justice has tended to focus on the victim’s (i.e. the employee’s) perspective; the third party’s perspective has received relatively little systematic attention. In this chapter we develop a model describing how third parties make fairness judgments about an employee’s (mis)treatment by an organization or its agents (including supervisors and peers). Our model also identifies factors that can predict whether third parties will act on their unfairness perceptions. We identify several distinctions between the victim’s and third party’s perspectives. We conclude by explaining how the third party’s perspective offers numerous opportunities and challenges for research.

The moral perspective of justice proposes that when confronted by another person's mistreatment, third parties can experience a deontic response, that is, an evolutionary-based emotional reaction that motivates them to engage in retribution toward the transgressor. In this article, we tested whether the third party's deontic reaction is less strong when a rational (vs. experiential) processing frame is primed. Further, we tested whether third parties high (vs. low) in moral identity are more resistant to the effects of processing frames. Results from a sample of 185 French managers revealed that following an injustice, managers primed to use rational processing reported lower retribution tendencies compared with managers primed to use experiential processing. Third parties high in moral identity, however, were less affected by the framing; they reported a high retribution response regardless of processing frame. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Background: Research on organizational injustice has mainly focused on the victim's perspective. This study attempts to contribute to our understanding of third parties' perspective by empirically testing a model that describes third party reactions to mistreatment of employees. Method: Data were obtained from a sample (N = 334) of Spanish employees from various organizations, nested into 66 work-groups, via a survey regarding their perceptions of organizational mistreatment. Structural equation modeling was used to analyze the data. Results: The proposed model had a limited fit to the data and it was re-specified. Organizational mistreatment, employee performance, and employee organizational commitment explained internal attributions blaming the organization. Moreover, coworkers' organizational identification showed a positive impact on external attributions of responsibility. Lastly, supportive organizational climate and internal attributions accounted for a large percentage of variance in coworkers' perceptions of organizational unfairness. Conclusions: The final model explains the perceptions of injustice on the basis of internal attributions of responsibility in the face of organizational mistreatment of employees.

This chapter focuses on one particular aspect of authoritativeness: voluntary compliance with the decisions of authorities. Social psychologists have long distinguished between obedience that is the result of coercion, and obedience that is the result of internal attitudes. Opinions describe “reward power” and “coercive power”, in which obedience is contingent on positive and negative outcomes, and distinguish both of these types of power from legitimate power, in which obedience flows from judgments about the legitimacy of the authority. Legitimate power depends on people taking the obligation on themselves to obey and voluntarily follow the decisions made by authorities. The chapter also focuses on legitimacy because it is important to recognize, that legitimacy is not the only attitudinal factor influencing effectiveness. It is also influenced by other cognitions about the authority, most notably judgments of his or her expertise with respect to the problem at hand. The willingness of group members to accept a leader's directives is only helpful when the leader knows what directives to issue.

The present research contributes to a growing literature on observer reactions to injustice experienced by others. In particular, we separated two variables that have previously been confounded in prior research, namely perpetrator intent to cause harm and victim perception of harm. We expected that injustice intent and injustice perceptions would have both unique and joint effects on observer reactions. The results of three experiments in which we manipulated perpetrator injustice intent and victim injustice perceptions supported our predictions. First, we found that observers had more negative reactions toward superiors who intended to inflict high versus low levels of interpersonal injustice toward a subordinate. Second, the injustice intent of the superior influenced observers' reactions more than did victim perceptions of injustice. Third, most novel, we found that the mere intent to cause injustice generated negative reactions in observers, even in the absence of a “true” victim—that is, when the subordinate perceptions of injustice were low. Together, our results emphasize the importance of examining observers' reactions to injustice and incorporating perpetrator intentions into the study of organizational justice. Copyright 08 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

In the current paper, the author examines whether independent observers of criminal offenses have a relative preference for either retributive justice (i.e., punishing the offender) or compensatory justice (i.e., compensating the victim for the harm done). In Study 1, results revealed that participants recommended higher sums of money if a financial transaction was framed as offender punishment (i.e., the offender would pay money to the victim) than if it was framed as victim compensation (i.e., the victim would receive money from the offender). In Study 2, participants were asked to gather information about court trials following three severe offenses to evaluate whether justice had been done in these cases. Results revealed that participants gathered more information about offender punishment than about victim compensation. In Study 3 these findings were extended by investigating whether observers' relative preference for punishing is moderated by emotional proximity to the victim. Results revealed that the relative preference for punishing only occurred among participants who did not experience emotional proximity to the victim. It is concluded that observers prefer retributive over compensatory justice, provided that they do not feel emotionally close to the victim. Copyright 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract A number of apparently diverse personality scales––variously assessing trait anxiety, neuroticism, ego strength, general maladjustment, repression-sensitization, and social desirability––are reviewed and are shown to be in fact measures of the same stable and pervasive trait. An integrative interpretation of the construct as Negative Affectivity (NA) is presented. A review of studies using measures such as the Beck Depression Inventory, Eysenck Personality Inventory, and Multiple Affect Adjective Check List indicate that high-NA Ss are more likely to experience discomfort at all times and across situations, even in the absence of overt stress. They are relatively more introspective and tend differentially to dwell on the negative side of themselves and the world. Further research is needed to explain the origins of NA and to elucidate the characteristics of low-NA individuals. (505 p ref)

We propose a concept of restorative justice as a sense of justice deriving from consensus about, and the reaffirmation of, values violated by an offence (in contrast to punishment-based retributive justice). Victims should be more likely to seek restorative justice (and less likely retributive justice) when they perceive to share a relevant identity with the offender. In Study 1, when the relevant identity (university affiliation) shared with the offender was made salient (vs. not), participants found a consensus-based response more justice-restoring. In Study 2, when the group (company) shared with the offender was cohesive (vs. not), participants more strongly endorsed a restorative justice philosophy and, mediated by this, responded in consensus-restoring ways. In Study 3, when the offender was an ingroup (vs. outgroup) member, participants more strongly endorsed a restorative justice philosophy, fully mediated by sadness emotions. Copyright 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.