ISSN 1671-3710
CN 11-4766/R
主办:中国科学院心理研究所
出版:科学出版社

心理科学进展 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (2): 301-314.doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2023.00301

• 研究前沿 • 上一篇    下一篇

道德之一元论与多元论:缘起、内涵与论争

张昊天1, 喻丰1(), 许丽颖2(), 玄哲理1   

  1. 1武汉大学哲学学院心理学系, 武汉 430072
    2清华大学马克思主义学院, 北京 100084
  • 收稿日期:2021-12-01 出版日期:2023-02-15 发布日期:2022-11-10
  • 通讯作者: 喻丰,许丽颖 E-mail:psychpedia@whu.edu.cn;liyingxu@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社科基金青年项目(20CZX059);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72101132)

Monism and pluralism in morality: Origins, connotations and debates

ZHANG Haotian1, YU Feng1(), XU Liying2(), XUAN Zheli1   

  1. 1Department of Psychology, School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
    2School of Social Marxism, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
  • Received:2021-12-01 Online:2023-02-15 Published:2022-11-10
  • Contact: YU Feng,XU Liying E-mail:psychpedia@whu.edu.cn;liyingxu@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn

摘要:

一元论与多元论之争是道德心理学领域近些年最为活跃的理论交锋之一。道德一元论认为所有外在的道德现象与内在的道德结构都可以用一种因素来解释。道德多元论则认为道德不能只用单一因素来解释, 而是存在多个不同质的道德维度, 且具有文化敏感性。对应道德理论和道德基础理论是这场争议的典型代表。双方就伤害的解释力、道德失声现象、模块化道德与洁净维度独立性等方面展开论争。未来研究应从三个具体方面进一步探索道德之一元论与多元论难题, 进而保持道德心理学领域的理论活力。

关键词: 一元论, 多元论, 道德基础理论, 对应道德理论, 海特?格雷之争

Abstract:

The distinction between moral monism and moral pluralism has been reflected in the early vision of moral philosophy. Moral pluralism can be traced back to moral relativism, which holds that there is no universal moral principle. And any moral value applies only within certain cultural boundaries and individual value systems. However, moral universalism, a monistic ethical position, holds that there are universal ethics that apply to all people. In recent years, the above theoretical confrontations have entered the field of moral psychology. The dispute between monism and pluralism is one of the most active theoretical controversies in the field of moral psychology in recent years. Moral monism holds that all external moral-related phenomena and internal moral structures can be explained by one factor. The representative theories are stages theory of moral development and dyadic morality theory and so on. On the other hand, moral pluralism holds that morality cannot be explained by a single factor, but there are many heterogeneous moral dimensions, which are culturally sensitive. The representative theories include the triadic moral discourse theory, the relational model theory and the moral foundations theory and so on.

Among them, the dyadic morality theory put forward by Kurt Gray et al. and the moral foundation theory put forward by Jonathon Haidt are the typical representatives of the disputes between monism and pluralism. Gray et al. argued that harm is the most powerful factor in explaining moral judgments and moral judgments about harm are more intuitive. Moreover, people with different political orientations reach a consensus that harm is the core of moral judgments. On the contrary, Haidt et al. believed that people of different political orientations, cultures and social classes is manifested with different moral foundations, and the moral foundations scale has good construct validity, discriminant validity, practical validity, etc. The disputes between the two theories mainly focus on the explanatory power of harm, the harmfulness of moral dumbfounding, modularity views and the problem of purity. Specifically, Gray et al. argued that moral dumbfounding stems from biased sampling that confounds content with weirdness and severity, rather than purity violation. They also believed that the so-called "harmless wrongs" can be explained by perceived harm. Importantly, purity cannot be regarded as an independent construct of morality. Moreover, there is few evidence to support the modular claims. Nevertheless, Haidt et al. believed that moral monism oversimplifies the connotations of morality. The different moral foundations are not " Fodorian modularity", but more flexible and overlapping "massive modularity". Furthermore, plenty of evidence supported purity as an independent moral foundation.

Future research should be carried out in the following aspects. First of all, morality must need a clearer definition. To ensure the validity of moral research, future research should try to define moral concepts more clearly and should ensure that only one construct is tested at a time. Without ensuring that the situation clearly reflects a certain moral dimension, it is difficult for researchers to pinpoint which moral dimension influences people’s moral judgments. Secondly, in addition to paying attention to the disputes between monism and pluralism, we also need to separate from the disputes, take an objective view of the different characteristics of the controversies, learn from each other and complement each other, so as to promote the development of moral psychology. Specifically, moral monism emphasizes the simplicity of moral constructs and the accuracy of measurement, while pluralism emphasizes the understanding of the nature of morality among people in different cultures. These are two different theoretical constructs and explanations of the nature of morality. Future research should combine the advantages of moral monism and moral pluralism, and try to adopt realistic situations with high ecological validity, so as to construct a more perfect integrated theoretical model. Last but not the least, most previous empirical studies have been dominated by the "WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic)” sample. Future research should urgently consider the possibility of carrying out morality research indifferent cultures, especially based on the Chinese culture to explore the nature of morality.

Key words: Monism, Pluralism, Moral Foundations Theory, Dyadic Morality Theory, Haidt-Gray debates

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