A large number of studies have revealed that memories not only easily fade away but also can occasionally be changed spontaneously; memory errors are everywhere, reminding us that memories are not an exact copy of the experienced events. The influences of the various types of stimulus and emotional states on false memories were first studied by using the classical DRM paradigm. Furthermore, we investigated the influence of time stress on mood-congruent false memories.
The first experiment was performed to identify the influences of different emotional stimuli on false memories under time pressure. The hybrid design method was used, namely, 2 (time stress: stress group and control group) × 3 (word titer: positive word, negative word, and neutral word). The between-subject variable was time pressure, the within-subject variable was word titer, and the dependent variable was the number of the false recognitions of the critical lures. The results of experiment 1 showed that the main effect was remarkable under time stress, as was the valence of words. The interaction between the time stress and valence of words was significant. The results demonstrated that the number of false recognitions for the subjects in the stress group with respect to the negative critical lures was much higher than were those of the neutral and positive ones.
The second experiment sought to uncover the influences of different emotional states on the false memory under time pressure. The design method of 2 (time stress: stress group and control group) × 3 (emotion titer: positive emotion group, negative emotion group, and neutral group) was used, and the dependent variable was the number of the false recognitions of the critical lures. The results of experiment 2 showed that the main effect was marginally significant under the time stress, and the emotion was significant. The interaction between time stress and emotion was significant. The results revealed that the false recognition for the subjects in the positive emotion group with respect to the critical lures had the largest number.
The third experiment utilized the hybrid design method of 2 (time stress: stress group and control group) × 4 (mood type: positive mood-congruency, negative mood-congruency, positive mood-inconsistency, and negative mood-inconsistency) to investigate the influences of time pressure on mood-congruent false memories, demonstrating that both the pressure group and the control group subjects showed a significant mood-congruent false memory. The results of experiment 3 showed that the number of false recognitions with respect to the mood-congruency for the subjects in the stress group and the control group were both higher than that of the mood-inconsistency, and the stress group had a larger number of false recognitions than did the control group under the condition of mood-congruency.
The results of three experiments show that time pressure has a positive effect on false memories and further promotes negative mood-consistency false memories. Individual negative emotions can undermine the generation of false memories under time pressure.
It was argued that thinking is characterized by the action of two distinctive cognitive systems, namely, intuitive (Type 1) processing and analytic (Type 2) processing. Intuitive processing is generally described as rapid, automatic, unconscious, and effortless, whereas analytic processing appears to be slow, controlled, conscious, and effortful. Decades of research have established that human judgment is often predisposed to rapid, intuitive processing. However, recent research has indicated that intuitive processing can support reasoning and even enhance it under certain conditions. Recent findings have suggested that intuitive processing should be as affected by cognitive resources and consciousness as analytic processing. However, intuitive and analytic processing will interfere with one another through a series of classical paradigms in which the results of two distinctive cognitive systems are in conflict. To avoid this interference, the present study applied the Chinese character chunking decomposition task, predicting that intuitive processing positively affect problem solving, but that it would disappear under conditions wherein cognitive resources were extremely scarce.
In the present research, we first drew up the Chinese character chunking decomposition task as materials, and participants were asked to judge whether the target character (e.g., “又”) was a component of the original character (e.g., “支”). Then, the formal experiment was organized into a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subject design. The first variable was the duration time of the target character, consisting of 2 levels: 24 ms and 200 ms; the second variable was the material category, consisting of 2 levels: intuitive material and analytic material; and the third variable was the inclusion relation, consisting of 2 levels: inclusion and exclusion. The inclusion condition meant that the target character was a component of the original character, whereas the exclusion condition denoted that the target character was not a component of the original character.
The results indicated that participants showed a lower rate of accuracy and a longer response time on analytic materials than on intuitive ones. However, no difference was observed between the two types of materials in terms of response time and accuracy when the duration time of the target character was 24 ms, and the inclusion relation was inclusion. Meanwhile, the accuracy scores of intuitive and analytic processing were approximately 0.5 at the guessing level. Signal detection analysis showed that the results under the unconsciousness condition were not influenced by the response bias.
The results proved that intuitive processing was rapid and analytic processing was slow. As predicted, intuitive processing positively affects the problem solving process. In addition, the experiment showed that intuitive processing was effortful and relied on cognitive resources, which was inconsistent with prototypical dual-process theories. Therefore, the positive effect would disappear when the cognitive resources were below demand.
According to the dual-process model and the social intuitionist model, moral emotion is defined as a key factor in predicting moral behavior. The difference between the two models is whether moral emotion has a direct effect on moral behavior. The dual-process model points out that moral emotion directly affects moral behavior, whereas in the social intuitionist model, the effect of moral emotion on moral behavior will be mediated through moral reasoning. With the rapid development of internet and information technology, people’s psychological states and behaviors have changed dramatically. So the above distinctions between the two models can be extended to the studies on cyberpsychology and behavior. To test the two models in an network environment, the present study involved a series of experiments to examine whether moral emotion predicted online helping behavior and whether moral reasoning mediated this relation.
Video materials were validated in the pilot study. A total of 120 college students evaluated the feeling of sympathy and guilt, the level of pleasure and arousal after watching one of three video materials (sympathy, guilt and neutral). In Study 1, 56 college students were recruited and randomly assigned to the “sympathy”, “guilt” or “neutral” group. Participants were asked to complete an online test after watching the relevant moral emotion video. After the testing, participants were informed that they would receive an email sent by the experimenter anonymously. In the email, participants were required to offer additional help (to fill in an online questionnaire). Participants’ online helping behavior was measured by the amount of questions that they answered. In Study 2, 233 college students were invited to participate. In addition to the same arrangement as in Study 1, participants’ moral reasoning was measured by the Prosocial Reasoning Objective Measure (PROM).
The results of pilot study suggested that the “sympathy” video material led to greater sympathy and less guilty, while the “guilt” video material led to greater guilt and less sympathy. With regard to the level of pleasure and arousal, there was no significant difference between the “sympathy” video material and the “guilt” video material, whereas there was a significant difference between the “neutral” video material and the other two video materials. In Study 1, ANOVA was used to analyze the data. The results indicated that as compared to neutral emotion, sympathy and guilt aroused more online helping behaviors. However, there was no difference between sympathy and guilt. In Study 2, statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical independent variable (recommended by Hayes and Preacher) was used in the analyses of the data. The results showed that sympathy and guilt could induce online helping behavior through the mediation effect of moral reasoning, whereas moral emotion had a direct effect on moral behavior.
This study has practical and theoretical significance. Specifically, the finding suggests that the role of moral emotion in moral education, in particular as related to moral reasoning, has to be further researched. Theoretically, the present study confirms that video-prime is an effective method to explore moral emotion. Furthermore, most of the findings of the present study supports the dual-process model.
Studies have shown that choline is a substance that is closely related to memory. Previous studies focused on the effect of cholinergic drugs on explicit memory, and those results revealed that explicit memory is sensitive to most cholinergic drugs. However, relatively few studies have discussed the effect of cholinergic drugs on implicit memory. Furthermore, whether the effect of cholinergic drugs on implicit memory is consistent with explicit memory is still uncertain.
The effect of cholinergic drugs on memory was investigated by drawing a comparison between the participants with nicotine condition and those without. We used lexical decision and lexical recognition tasks to test implicit and explicit memory, respectively. In experiment 1, 30 subjects participated in two occasions, 2 days apart. They participated once in memory tasks after receiving 12 mg/ml body weight of nicotine and once after receiving 0 mg/ml placebo. Experiment 2 examined whether receiving treatment before encoding or before the retrieval phase would moderate the cholinergic effect in explicit and implicit memory. In experiment 2, 19 subjects participated in two experimental occasions, 2 days apart, as follows: after receiving 12 mg/ml body weight of nicotine before the encoding phase; after receiving nicotine before the retrieval phase. In addition, we adopted event-related potential (ERP) technology to observe the affected ERPs. Participants were instructed to response to corresponding items by pressing keyboard. The Reaction Time and Accuracy data on retrieval phase of the two memory tasks were recorded and analyzed.
Implicit and explicit memory performance declined under nicotine condition in both experiments. It reflected that receiving nicotine not only impacted explicit memory but also implicit memory. Furthermore, nicotine effects are moderated by the level of processing at the encoding phase. Such impact only occurred on the deep processing level. Moreover, memory retrieval after receiving nicotine was affected. These effects were more remarkable on implicit memory retrieval than on explicit memory. The results of ERP data also showed that related ERPs of memory were affected by nicotine.
In conclusion, results from the current study revealed that effects of cholinergic drugs were similar on implicit and explicit memory. The rest of the segregated results might have been due to the discrepancy of memory tasks rather than the differences in physiological mechanisms of the two memory types. Implicit memory and explicit memory might not belong to two extremely independent memory systems, because there are some covariant effects existing between them.
Although there are many studies focusing on competitive advertising, brand advertising, category advertising, advertising clutter, and advertising interference, there has been little research focusing on strong brands competition. The extent literature focuses on Product Crisis Spillover Effect, Umbrella Branding Spillover Effect, Advertising Spillover Effect, and Corporate Social Responsibility Reputation Spillover Effect. However, what is the spillover effect for competition taking place among strong brands on weak brands? What will happen to the weak brands when two strong brands competing in the same category? Is it explained by the spillover effect theory? And what is the mechanism? These are a series of interesting questions that have both theoretical and practical value.
A total of 855 college students (mean age = 22.6 years, SD = 3.4 years) participated in the experiments. First, advertising repetition and advertising length were used as the stimuli indicating competition strength, and perceived competition was used to represent competition strength. Then, the following focus question was investigated: will there be spillover effect on weak brands when two strong brands competing in the same category? Finally, the moderating role of product involvement and product attribute similarity for the main effect was tested. Experimental methods were adopted in these studies and fictitious brands were used to test the research hypotheses.
The results of the present study indicates that, advertising repetition is closely related to perceived competition, and the more repetitions of two brand advertisements, the higher the competition level perceived by the subjects is, which indicated that advertising repetition can be used as a specific means of operating the advertising competition. However, the advertisement length has no effect on the perceived competition. Strong brand advertising competition has a spillover effect on weak brands. With the increase in the competition strength of strong brand advertising, the spillover effect on weak brands has also increased accordingly. The degree of product involvement and similarity of product attributes have a moderating effect on the main effect, and the lower product involvement and the higher similarity of product attributes tended to produce the greater spillover effect.
The current study enriches the existing spillover theory and discovered the spillover effect of strong brand advertising competition within the same category on weak brands for the first time. At the same time, the study found that the product involvement and product attribute similarities have a moderating effect on the spillover effect. The conclusions of the research can be used to guide advertising practice and brand owners and market managers in different market positions.
Emotional attention bias refers that emotional stimuli usually get priority of attention over the neutral stimuli, which has been frequently replicated in normal participants. However, previous studies reported that teenagers with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) had atypical attention patterns of processing emotional faces and pictures, that is, their first attention was located at the neutral stimuli instead of the emotional stimuli. According to the perceptual load theory, some studies demonstrated the deficiency of attention bias to emotions in the teenagers with ASD was due to the perceptual load of the main task was too high for them, so that they can’t process the emotion. Till now, little has been known about the ASD teenagers’ attention in processing auditory emotional stimuli, although emotional expression also actually depends on the changes of acoustic cues in the speech prosody. To testify the generality of attention bias to cross-model emotions in the teenagers with ASD, we extended the experimental materials to emotional prosody. In present study, 14 teenagers with ASD and 17 typical developing (TD) people were recruited in two experiments. The participants were required to complete a main task while the emotional prosody voices were presented as the deviated task-irrelevant stimuli. In Experiment 1, the participants were instructed to ignore sounds and to classify the pictures. In Experiment 2, we adopted a dual-task paradigm, which required participants to respond to the target letters first and then to point whether they hear the novel emotional prosody. And in experiment 2, we also manipulated the level of perceptual load through changing the similarity between the letters in virtual round.
Results showed that: (1) Reaction time of ASD subjects were longer than TD subjects under any different emotions rhyme categories. (2) Whether in high or low perceptual load, reaction times and error rates of the main task as well as accuracy of emotional prosody detection task between two groups of participants have no significant differences. In providing notice indicating conditions, even in a high perceptual load level, ASD subjects of emotional rhythm detection capability and error rates are similar to TD subjects, but for emotional rhythm react time with neutral rhythm no difference. These findings revealed that ASD have the similar attention processing level with TD in attention conditions.
The results of two studies strongly suggested that the attention bias to emotional prosody was deficient in the teenagers with ASD, which was consistent with the results from visual channels and the teenagers with ASD have defect on emotional attention bias in auditory channel, main showed low perception efficiency on emotional rhythm perception.