不同意识水平下认知资源对直觉优势效应的调节 *

doi:10.3724/SP.J.1041.2018.00583

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

直觉的优势效应近来被越来越多研究者关注, 但该优势效应对认知资源的依赖程度以及受意识调节的情况尚无专门探讨。为此, 本研究采用汉字组块破解任务, 通过汉字的包含关系操纵认知资源, 通过阈上、阈下的呈现时间操纵意识水平考察了直觉与分析的加工过程。结果发现, 相比较分析条件, 直觉条件在阈上表现出优势效应：包含与不包含情况下均正确率更高、反应时更快; 但在阈下只有不包含情况出现直觉优势：不包含情况下正确率更高、反应时更快, 包含情况下二者无显著差异。这表明, 在无意识水平下, 认知资源可以调节直觉的优势效应; 但在意识水平下, 认知资源则不能够调节该效应。

关键词: 意识水平, 认知资源, 直觉加工, 分析加工

Abstract:

It was argued that thinking is characterized by the action of two distinctive cognitive systems, namely, intuitive (Type 1) processing and analytic (Type 2) processing. Intuitive processing is generally described as rapid, automatic, unconscious, and effortless, whereas analytic processing appears to be slow, controlled, conscious, and effortful. Decades of research have established that human judgment is often predisposed to rapid, intuitive processing. However, recent research has indicated that intuitive processing can support reasoning and even enhance it under certain conditions. Recent findings have suggested that intuitive processing should be as affected by cognitive resources and consciousness as analytic processing. However, intuitive and analytic processing will interfere with one another through a series of classical paradigms in which the results of two distinctive cognitive systems are in conflict. To avoid this interference, the present study applied the Chinese character chunking decomposition task, predicting that intuitive processing positively affect problem solving, but that it would disappear under conditions wherein cognitive resources were extremely scarce.

In the present research, we first drew up the Chinese character chunking decomposition task as materials, and participants were asked to judge whether the target character (e.g., “又”) was a component of the original character (e.g., “支”). Then, the formal experiment was organized into a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subject design. The first variable was the duration time of the target character, consisting of 2 levels: 24 ms and 200 ms; the second variable was the material category, consisting of 2 levels: intuitive material and analytic material; and the third variable was the inclusion relation, consisting of 2 levels: inclusion and exclusion. The inclusion condition meant that the target character was a component of the original character, whereas the exclusion condition denoted that the target character was not a component of the original character.

The results indicated that participants showed a lower rate of accuracy and a longer response time on analytic materials than on intuitive ones. However, no difference was observed between the two types of materials in terms of response time and accuracy when the duration time of the target character was 24 ms, and the inclusion relation was inclusion. Meanwhile, the accuracy scores of intuitive and analytic processing were approximately 0.5 at the guessing level. Signal detection analysis showed that the results under the unconsciousness condition were not influenced by the response bias.

The results proved that intuitive processing was rapid and analytic processing was slow. As predicted, intuitive processing positively affects the problem solving process. In addition, the experiment showed that intuitive processing was effortful and relied on cognitive resources, which was inconsistent with prototypical dual-process theories. Therefore, the positive effect would disappear when the cognitive resources were below demand.

Key words: level of consciousness, cognitive resource, intuitive processing, analytic processing.

中图分类号:

B842

于婷婷, 殷悦, 王舒, 周淑金, 唐晓晨, 罗俊龙. (2018). 不同意识水平下认知资源对直觉优势效应的调节 ^*. 心理学报, 50(6), 583-591.

YU Tingting, YIN Yue, WANG Shu, ZHOU Shujin, TANG Xiaochen, LUO Junlong. (2018). Positive effect of intuitive processing is modulated by cognitive resources under different levels of consciousness. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 50(6), 583-591.

图/表 7

图1 材料类型示例

图2 实验材料示例

表1 四种条件下各筛选出40组题目的平均正确率及平均反应时[M (SD)]

实验条件	正确率	反应时
包含下的直觉	0.99 (0.01)	796.94 (68.85)
包含下的分析	0.85 (0.07)	1204.83 (129.17)
不包含下的直觉	0.98 (0.02)	876.97 (62.82)
不包含下的分析	0.81 (0.08)	1224.08 (124.71)

图3 正式实验刺激流程

图4 不同自变量组合条件下被试的平均正确率注：误差线为标准差(下同)

图5 不同自变量组合条件下被试的平均反应时

表2 不同条件下被试的辨别力指数[M (SD)]

条件	分析材料	直觉材料
24 ms	0.32 (0.60)	0.78 (0.78)
200 ms	2.62 (0.85)	3.97 (0.69)

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