Advances in Psychological Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 151-161.doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2024.00151
• Regular Articles • Previous Articles Next Articles
GUO Yuchen, LIU Yanbin, CHENG Yuan()
Received:
2023-04-18
Online:
2024-01-15
Published:
2023-10-25
Contact:
CHENG Yuan
E-mail:ycheng@zju.edu.cn
CLC Number:
GUO Yuchen, LIU Yanbin, CHENG Yuan. Deterrence or signal? The function of third-party intervention[J]. Advances in Psychological Science, 2024, 32(1): 151-161.
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