Is the Bystander Truly Objective? The Moderation of Third-Party Moral Judgment by Perspective Taking in Moral Scenarios

doi:10.3724/SP.J.1041.2025.1070

Abstract

Abstract:

In moral scenarios, individuals often exhibit divergent interpretations and judgments of the same moral event due to varying prior experiences, making true “bystander objectivity” challenging. This study investigates how prior experiences influence perspective selection and subsequently moderate moral judgment and its neural underpinnings by activating different moral role perspectives (decision-maker vs. receiver) using Event-Related Potentials (ERPs). Results reveal that activating the receiver's perspective leads to stricter moral judgments, whereas activating the decision-maker's perspective results in more lenient judgments. Furthermore, the moderating effect of perspective on moral judgment weakens as the decision-maker's gains from immoral choices decrease. At the neural level, activating different moral role perspectives affects early processing and emotional arousal during moral judgment, manifesting as larger N1 and P2 components for the decision-maker perspective, and larger FRN components related to expectation violation for the receiver perspective. These findings indicate that prior moral experiences significantly shape an individual's moral judgment preferences as a bystander, primarily by modulating early processing of others' moral decisions.

Key words: moral role, moral judgment, perspective taking, event-related potentials (ERPs), feedback-related negativity (FRN)

SONG Ru, WU Jun, LIU Caixia, LIU Jie, CUI Fang. (2025). Is the Bystander Truly Objective? The Moderation of Third-Party Moral Judgment by Perspective Taking in Moral Scenarios. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 57(6), 1070-1082.

Figures/Tables 9

References 40

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Variable	Decision-Maker Perspective (n = 30)	Receiver Perspective (n = 30)	Control Group (n = 30)	Difference Test
Age (years)	21.27 ± 2.08	20.43 ± 1.77	20.03 ± 1.73	F = 3.4, p = 0.05
Gender (F/M)	15/15	16/14	15/15
IRI-Perspective Taking	17.37 ± 3.53	18 ± 3.26	17.93 ± 3.15	F = 0.33, p = 0.72
IRI-Fantasy	22.2 ± 4.48	22.53 ±3.73	20.87 ±4.18	F = 1.36, p = 0.26
IRI-Empathic Concern	22.33 ± 2.96	22.03 ± 3.05	21.43 ± 3.11	F = 0.68, p = 0.51
IRI-Personal Distress	16.27 ± 2.74	16.2 ± 4.36	15.37 ± 3.56	F = 0.58, p = 0.56
DMSQ-Empathic Guilt	29.83 ± 5.12	29.97 ± 5.82	29.63 ± 5.08	F = 0.03, p = 0.97
DMSQ-Punitive Tendency	20.53 ± 4.95	22.58 ± 5.83	20.63 ± 5.06	F = 0.75, p = 0.47
DMSQ-Empathic Distress	22.4 ± 4.34	21.03 ± 5.27	22.43 ± 5.11	F = 0.79, p = 0.46
DMSQ-Awareness Frequency	17.4 ± 4.56	18.33 ± 4.98	16.87 ± 4.14	F = 0.79, p = 0.46
DMSQ-Empathic Fantasy	12.47 ± 5.19	12.73 ± 3.92	13.03 ± 3.58	F = 0.13, p = 0.88

Variable	Decision-Maker Perspective (n = 30)	Receiver Perspective (n = 30)	Control Group (n = 30)	Difference Test
Age (years)	21.27 ± 2.08	20.43 ± 1.77	20.03 ± 1.73	F = 3.4, p = 0.05
Gender (F/M)	15/15	16/14	15/15
IRI-Perspective Taking	17.37 ± 3.53	18 ± 3.26	17.93 ± 3.15	F = 0.33, p = 0.72
IRI-Fantasy	22.2 ± 4.48	22.53 ±3.73	20.87 ±4.18	F = 1.36, p = 0.26
IRI-Empathic Concern	22.33 ± 2.96	22.03 ± 3.05	21.43 ± 3.11	F = 0.68, p = 0.51
IRI-Personal Distress	16.27 ± 2.74	16.2 ± 4.36	15.37 ± 3.56	F = 0.58, p = 0.56
DMSQ-Empathic Guilt	29.83 ± 5.12	29.97 ± 5.82	29.63 ± 5.08	F = 0.03, p = 0.97
DMSQ-Punitive Tendency	20.53 ± 4.95	22.58 ± 5.83	20.63 ± 5.06	F = 0.75, p = 0.47
DMSQ-Empathic Distress	22.4 ± 4.34	21.03 ± 5.27	22.43 ± 5.11	F = 0.79, p = 0.46
DMSQ-Awareness Frequency	17.4 ± 4.56	18.33 ± 4.98	16.87 ± 4.14	F = 0.79, p = 0.46
DMSQ-Empathic Fantasy	12.47 ± 5.19	12.73 ± 3.92	13.03 ± 3.58	F = 0.13, p = 0.88

Variable	Decision-Maker Perspective (n = 28)	Receiver Perspective (n = 26)	Difference Test
Age (years)	21.18 ± 2.21	20.57 ± 2.02	F = 1.08, p = 0.30
Gender (F/M)	13/15	13/13
IRI-Perspective Taking	17.89±3.09	17.65±3.60	F = 0.07, p = 0.79
IRI-Fantasy	20.96±4.33	21.23±5.23	F = 0.04, p = 0.84
IRI-Empathic Concern	21.21±3.66	20.69±3.75	F = 0.27, p = 0.61
IRI-Personal Distress	14.86±3.93	15.42±4.73	F = 0.23, p = 0.63
DMSQ-Empathic Guilt	27.21±6.80	27.62±5.56	F = 0.06, p = 0.81
DMSQ-Punitive Tendency	19.43±5.98	19.81±5.86	F = 0.06, p = 0.81
DMSQ-Empathic Distress	21.86±5.49	21.46±5.28	F = 0.07, p = 0.79
DMSQ-Awareness Frequency	17.11±4.93	16.77±3.48	F = 0.08, p = 0.77
DMSQ-Empathic Fantasy	12.82±3.50	12.27±3.71	F = 0.32, p = 0.57

Variable	Decision-Maker Perspective (n = 28)	Receiver Perspective (n = 26)	Difference Test
Age (years)	21.18 ± 2.21	20.57 ± 2.02	F = 1.08, p = 0.30
Gender (F/M)	13/15	13/13
IRI-Perspective Taking	17.89±3.09	17.65±3.60	F = 0.07, p = 0.79
IRI-Fantasy	20.96±4.33	21.23±5.23	F = 0.04, p = 0.84
IRI-Empathic Concern	21.21±3.66	20.69±3.75	F = 0.27, p = 0.61
IRI-Personal Distress	14.86±3.93	15.42±4.73	F = 0.23, p = 0.63
DMSQ-Empathic Guilt	27.21±6.80	27.62±5.56	F = 0.06, p = 0.81
DMSQ-Punitive Tendency	19.43±5.98	19.81±5.86	F = 0.06, p = 0.81
DMSQ-Empathic Distress	21.86±5.49	21.46±5.28	F = 0.07, p = 0.79
DMSQ-Awareness Frequency	17.11±4.93	16.77±3.48	F = 0.08, p = 0.77
DMSQ-Empathic Fantasy	12.82±3.50	12.27±3.71	F = 0.32, p = 0.57