Positive effect of intuitive processing is modulated by cognitive resources under different levels of consciousness
收稿日期: 2017-08-14 网络出版日期: 2018-06-01
Received: 2017-08-14 Online: 2018-06-01
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直觉的优势效应近来被越来越多研究者关注, 但该优势效应对认知资源的依赖程度以及受意识调节的情况尚无专门探讨。为此, 本研究采用汉字组块破解任务, 通过汉字的包含关系操纵认知资源, 通过阈上、阈下的呈现时间操纵意识水平考察了直觉与分析的加工过程。结果发现, 相比较分析条件, 直觉条件在阈上表现出优势效应：包含与不包含情况下均正确率更高、反应时更快; 但在阈下只有不包含情况出现直觉优势：不包含情况下正确率更高、反应时更快, 包含情况下二者无显著差异。这表明, 在无意识水平下, 认知资源可以调节直觉的优势效应; 但在意识水平下, 认知资源则不能够调节该效应。
直觉的优势效应近来被越来越多研究者关注, 但该优势效应对认知资源的依赖程度以及受意识调节的情况尚无专门探讨。为此, 本研究采用汉字组块破解任务, 通过汉字的包含关系操纵认知资源, 通过阈上、阈下的呈现时间操纵意识水平考察了直觉与分析的加工过程。结果发现, 相比较分析条件, 直觉条件在阈上表现出优势效应：包含与不包含情况下均正确率更高、反应时更快; 但在阈下只有不包含情况出现直觉优势：不包含情况下正确率更高、反应时更快, 包含情况下二者无显著差异。这表明, 在无意识水平下, 认知资源可以调节直觉的优势效应; 但在意识水平下, 认知资源则不能够调节该效应。
It was argued that thinking is characterized by the action of two distinctive cognitive systems, namely, intuitive (Type 1) processing and analytic (Type 2) processing. Intuitive processing is generally described as rapid, automatic, unconscious, and effortless, whereas analytic processing appears to be slow, controlled, conscious, and effortful. Decades of research have established that human judgment is often predisposed to rapid, intuitive processing. However, recent research has indicated that intuitive processing can support reasoning and even enhance it under certain conditions. Recent findings have suggested that intuitive processing should be as affected by cognitive resources and consciousness as analytic processing. However, intuitive and analytic processing will interfere with one another through a series of classical paradigms in which the results of two distinctive cognitive systems are in conflict. To avoid this interference, the present study applied the Chinese character chunking decomposition task, predicting that intuitive processing positively affect problem solving, but that it would disappear under conditions wherein cognitive resources were extremely scarce. In the present research, we first drew up the Chinese character chunking decomposition task as materials, and participants were asked to judge whether the target character (e.g., “又”) was a component of the original character (e.g., “支”). Then, the formal experiment was organized into a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subject design. The first variable was the duration time of the target character, consisting of 2 levels: 24 ms and 200 ms; the second variable was the material category, consisting of 2 levels: intuitive material and analytic material; and the third variable was the inclusion relation, consisting of 2 levels: inclusion and exclusion. The inclusion condition meant that the target character was a component of the original character, whereas the exclusion condition denoted that the target character was not a component of the original character. The results indicated that participants showed a lower rate of accuracy and a longer response time on analytic materials than on intuitive ones. However, no difference was observed between the two types of materials in terms of response time and accuracy when the duration time of the target character was 24 ms, and the inclusion relation was inclusion. Meanwhile, the accuracy scores of intuitive and analytic processing were approximately 0.5 at the guessing level. Signal detection analysis showed that the results under the unconsciousness condition were not influenced by the response bias. The results proved that intuitive processing was rapid and analytic processing was slow. As predicted, intuitive processing positively affects the problem solving process. In addition, the experiment showed that intuitive processing was effortful and relied on cognitive resources, which was inconsistent with prototypical dual-process theories. Therefore, the positive effect would disappear when the cognitive resources were below demand.
It was argued that thinking is characterized by the action of two distinctive cognitive systems, namely, intuitive (Type 1) processing and analytic (Type 2) processing. Intuitive processing is generally described as rapid, automatic, unconscious, and effortless, whereas analytic processing appears to be slow, controlled, conscious, and effortful. Decades of research have established that human judgment is often predisposed to rapid, intuitive processing. However, recent research has indicated that intuitive processing can support reasoning and even enhance it under certain conditions. Recent findings have suggested that intuitive processing should be as affected by cognitive resources and consciousness as analytic processing. However, intuitive and analytic processing will interfere with one another through a series of classical paradigms in which the results of two distinctive cognitive systems are in conflict. To avoid this interference, the present study applied the Chinese character chunking decomposition task, predicting that intuitive processing positively affect problem solving, but that it would disappear under conditions wherein cognitive resources were extremely scarce.
In the present research, we first drew up the Chinese character chunking decomposition task as materials, and participants were asked to judge whether the target character (e.g., “又”) was a component of the original character (e.g., “支”). Then, the formal experiment was organized into a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subject design. The first variable was the duration time of the target character, consisting of 2 levels: 24 ms and 200 ms; the second variable was the material category, consisting of 2 levels: intuitive material and analytic material; and the third variable was the inclusion relation, consisting of 2 levels: inclusion and exclusion. The inclusion condition meant that the target character was a component of the original character, whereas the exclusion condition denoted that the target character was not a component of the original character.
The results indicated that participants showed a lower rate of accuracy and a longer response time on analytic materials than on intuitive ones. However, no difference was observed between the two types of materials in terms of response time and accuracy when the duration time of the target character was 24 ms, and the inclusion relation was inclusion. Meanwhile, the accuracy scores of intuitive and analytic processing were approximately 0.5 at the guessing level. Signal detection analysis showed that the results under the unconsciousness condition were not influenced by the response bias.
The results proved that intuitive processing was rapid and analytic processing was slow. As predicted, intuitive processing positively affects the problem solving process. In addition, the experiment showed that intuitive processing was effortful and relied on cognitive resources, which was inconsistent with prototypical dual-process theories. Therefore, the positive effect would disappear when the cognitive resources were below demand.
于婷婷, 殷悦, 王舒, 周淑金, 唐晓晨, 罗俊龙.
YU Tingting, YIN Yue, WANG Shu, ZHOU Shujin, TANG Xiaochen, LUO Junlong.
日常生活中, 人们通常需要严密的逻辑分析来保证解决方案的准确性, 但有些情况下只需依靠直觉就能获取正确的答案。为此, 心理学家在思维领域中提出了双系统加工模型, 该模型认为人们在认知过程中存在两种不同的加工方式, 即系统1加工(也称直觉加工)和系统2加工(也称分析加工) (Evans, 2008; De Neys, 2012)。其中, 直觉加工过程是快速、无意识、自动化的, 以经验为基础, 极少占用认知资源, 依赖于长时记忆, 而分析加工过程则是缓慢、受意识控制的, 以逻辑规则为基础, 需要较多认知资源的参与, 依赖于工作记忆(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Thompson, 2013)。目前, 已有研究更多是从两种加工过程如何相互影响的角度展开探索, 主要集中在因直觉加工所导致的各类非理性的偏差现象(Evans, 2008; Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 2013), 例如基线比例忽视现象(Bonner & Newell, 2010; Bago & De Neys, 2017)、比例偏差现象(Mevel et al., 2015)和信念偏差效应(De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013)等。
那么, 直觉加工真的只能产生误导性的偏差现象吗?一系列实验结果显示, 相对于非冲突问题, 冲突问题会引发个体更长的反应时间(Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011; De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013)和更低的反应信心(De Neys & Feremans, 2013; De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013)。研究者认为, 当直觉加工与分析加工的结果相同时, 依赖于直觉加工可以帮助个体更快的做出正确的选择, 从这个角度来说直觉加工具有其积极作用。此外, 通过双任务范式, 研究者发现认知资源对直觉加工的影响较小, 而对分析加工的影响较大。例如, Evans和Curtis-Holmes (2005)发现, 要求被试在5秒内做出反应会使其分析过程受到一定程度的抑制, 但是对直觉加工并没有产生显著影响。最近, Johnson, Tubau和De Neys (2016)为被试设置不同难度的额外任务来控制认知资源的占用程度, 结果发现直觉加工的反应时间、反应信心及正确率并没有随着任务难度的增长而形成显著差异, 而分析加工过程却受到了显著影响。同时他们发现在非冲突问题中, 直觉过程能够在基本不占用认知资源的前提下自动激活正确反应。因此, 直觉加工在非冲突及认知资源有限的条件下对问题解决可产生促进作用, 也就是说占用认知资源只会抑制分析加工过程, 而直觉加工过程不会受到影响。这些结果体现出直觉加工速度快和认知资源需求低的优势。
虽然直觉优势效应的存在得到了一定认可, 但对于其自动化、不依赖认知资源的属性却受到了质疑。有研究发现在解决简单推理问题时, 压缩被试的反应时间不会使被试的信念偏差效应增强(Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009)。信念偏差现象是由错误的直觉观念引发的, 缩短反应时间压缩了个体的认知资源, 因而使引发正确答案的分析加工过程受到抑制, 而信念偏差程度并未增强则表明直觉加工同时也受到了抑制。Howarth, Handley和Walsh (2016)立足于经典的推理问题发现相较于无负荷情况, 认知负荷条件下直觉及分析加工过程的正确率均有所下降, 但是直觉加工下降的比例显著低于分析加工。这说明虽然直觉加工在认知负荷条件下有优势效应, 但是其仍依赖于一定的认知资源。因此, 直觉加工可能并不是完全自动化的, 它对认知资源是有一定的依赖性。那该依赖性对直觉的优势效应会产生怎样的影响?
此外, 传统双加工理论所提出的直觉加工过程是无意识的观点(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Thompson, 2013)近年来也受到了挑战。有研究者认为直觉加工有时可能是需要意识参与的(Handley & Trippas, 2015)。Handley, Newstead和Trippas (2011)通过指导语来引发不同的加工过程, 即利用信念指导语来引发直觉加工过程, 逻辑指导语来引发分析加工过程, 他们发现与分析加工相比, 直觉加工在冲突问题下的反应时更长、正确率更低, 且直觉加工会显著受到分析过程的干扰。这一结论在基线比例问题中也得到了证实(Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014)。此后Trippas, Thompson和Handley (2017)将此范式应用到三种不同难度的推理问题中, 并发现直觉加工和分析加工过程同时产生且直觉加工一直会受到分析过程的影响。根据上述实验结果可以推论, 直觉加工在冲突情境下需要同分析加工相互竞争并抑制其影响进而才可做出判断, 因而这一过程可能是需要意志努力的, 并非是无意识过程。那么, 在无意识水平下直觉优势效应会不会消失?如果不消失, 将会表现怎样的模式?
以上问题的揭示对厘清直觉加工的优势效应具有十分重要的必要性。不过, 采用传统的实验材料却面临一定局限性。首先, 传统材料基本以推理问题为内容, 在冲突情境下直觉及分析加工的结果处于对立的两端(Bago & De Neys, 2017), 此时, 无论要求被试根据以经验为基础的直觉加工进行判断还是根据以逻辑为基础的分析加工进行判断, 被试必定会受到另一种加工方式的干扰而影响结果(Handley & Trippas, 2015), 而借助汉字组块破解任务则可以避免这一干扰。该任务的关键在于将汉字分解成不同的组块(Luo, Niki, & Knoblich, 2006)。例如, Tang等人(2016)采用的汉字组块破解任务即要求被试从汉字中去掉部分组块从而形成新的汉字, 如“地-土=也”。若去掉组块为部首, 便为自动化的松散组块破解任务; 若去掉组块为笔画或镶嵌于汉字内部的结构, 便为分析式的紧密组块破解任务。此外, Gobet等人(2001)在研究中发现象棋高手在下棋过程中可以将完整的棋局快速分解为已知棋谱, 这便是自动组块的过程; 而象棋新手没有相关棋谱知识, 只能根据局势变化临时将几个棋子组合进行记忆, 这就是分析组块的过程。他们还指出自动组块是无意识、内隐的, 依赖于个体的长时记忆, 而分析组块是需要意识参与的, 依赖于个体的短时记忆(Gobet, Lloyd-Kelly, & Lane, 2016)。不难看出, 这两种组块破解过程可对应于双加工理论中的直觉加工及分析加工过程。据此, 本研究将采用汉字组块破解任务来考察直觉加工与分析加工过程。具体而言, 即要求个体判断目标字是否包含于源字中, 例如判断目标字“口”字是否包含于源字“吕”字中。根据双加工理论中, 直觉加工速度快时间短而分析加工较为缓慢时间长的特征, 同时结合汉字组块破解任务中松散组块及紧密组块的设计, 将材料分为直觉材料及分析材料。如“支”中的“又”类似于松散组块, 个体只需自动激活长时记忆中的汉字知识, 按部首将其分解即可快速完成任务, 因而可归为直觉材料, 而“夹”中的“火”类似于紧密组块, 个体需要一定的意志努力, 按笔画进行分解才能完成任务, 因而可归为分析材料。这样一来, 通过材料直接划分个体的加工过程, 且具有唯一确定的正解, 可以从非对立的角度出发研究双加工理论, 有效避免两种加工过程的相互干扰, 摆脱传统推理材料的局限。
综上, 虽然有研究表明直觉加工存在优势效应(De Neys & Feremans, 2013; Johnson et al., 2016), 但该优势效应同认知资源及意识成分的关联还未形成明确定论(Handley & Trippas, 2015; Pennycook et al., 2014)。鉴于此, 本文将以汉字组块破解任务为材料来考察直觉优势效应受认知资源以及意识水平的影响机制。首先本文通过包含条件的设置操控认知资源。水仁德和刘爱伦(1996)的研究可为此提供依据, 他们发现编码方式对汉字短时记忆提取有很大影响。当用形状编码时, 被试倾向于用自动停止的搜索策略。自动停止搜索策略即对项目逐个进行提取, 一旦找到目标项目就停止查找。那么在包含情况下, 如“又(目标字)——支(源字)”,当源字“支”呈现后, 被试需将目标字的所有笔画与源字一一比对才能得出包含结论, 而在不包含情况下, 如“力(目标字)——支(源字)”, 被试只需根据目标字“力”和源字“支”之间的一处不同就可以做出不包含的判断, 随后停止继续搜索。因此, 相对于不包含结论, 被试做出包含结论需要更多认知资源的参与。其次, 传统的双任务、时间压力等范式无法创设无意识情境, 因而本研究通过调节目标字的呈现时间来设置阈上阈下条件, 进而控制意识水平的参与程度, 以便探讨不同意识水平下认知资源对直觉优势效应的调节。在此基础上, 本研究提出假设即意识和认知资源均会对直觉优势效应产生影响, 在无意识及认知资源缺乏的双重条件下, 直觉加工的优势效应可能会消失。
被试为母语为汉语的在校大学生, 共计30名。其中男生12名, 女生18名。年龄为19~24岁, 平均21.00 ± 1.39岁。右利手, 视力或矫正视力正常, 无神经系统外伤与疾病。
实验为2(目标字呈现时间：24 ms和200 ms) × 2(材料类型：直觉材料和分析材料) × 2(包含关系：包含和不包含)被试内实验设计, 因变量为被试判断的正确率及反应时。第一个自变量为意识水平的操控, 将阈下刺激目标字的呈现时间设置为24 ms, 将阈上刺激目标字的呈现时间设置为200 ms。第二个自变量为材料类型, 分为直觉材料和分析材料。第三个自变量为包含关系, 分为包含和不包含。
选取常用汉字200组, 每组由目标字和源字两个汉字组成, 所有材料均选自《现代汉语词典》。其中直觉材料80组, 分析材料80组。此外, 实验还设置了20%无目标试次的不包含材料, 即目标字不在源字之中。材料示例见图1。
为了保证材料的可靠性, 本研究选取26名被试进行汉字破解任务, 并对两种材料的正确率及反应时分别进行配对样本t检验, 结果发现：直觉材料与分析材料任务判断的正确率差异显著, t (25) = 8.94, p < 0.001, 即直觉材料的准确率显著高于分析材料; 同时直觉材料与分析材料任务判断的反应时差异显著, t (25) = -13.54, p < 0.001, 即直觉材料的反应时显著低于分析材料。在此结果的基础上, 将正确率与反应时在均值2.5个标准差之外的材料删除。同时以直觉材料正确率较高、反应时较短, 分析材料正确率较低、反应时较长为原则, 各挑选出60组材料。
为了实现对包含关系变量的操控, 本研究以挑选出的60组包含材料为基础编制不包含材料, 且两种材料的比例为1:1。同时, 不包含材料下也设置了直觉与分析条件。为减少汉字笔画因素的影响, 将不包含材料中的源字设置成与包含材料源字相同的字, 将目标字替换成与包含条件下笔画相同的其他汉字。这样一来, 就可根据包含下的源字来编制不包含下的目标字。具体而言, 不包含材料下直觉条件：目标字和源字在字形上差异很大, 被试能在短时间内通过直觉做出判断; 不包含材料下分析条件, 目标字和源字在字形上较为相似, 被试需要经过仔细分析后才能做出不包含的判断。材料示例见图2。由此, 包含下直觉、包含下分析、不包含下直觉与不包含下分析这四种条件下各有60组材料。
随后, 对编制的240组材料进行测试。根据测试结果, 四种条件下各筛选出40组题目(见表1)。由于本次材料呈现时间很短, 为了保证被试完成效果确保实验质量, 因而材料筛选以正确率高为首要标准, 同时结合直觉加工快速自动化、分析加工较为缓慢的特征, 将反应时设为次要标准。包含下直觉与不包含下直觉两种条件以正确率高、反应时短为原则进行排序, 包含下分析与不包含下分析两种条件以正确率高、反应时长为原则进行排序, 每种条件各筛选前40组。
表1 四种条件下各筛选出40组题目的 平均正确率及平均反应时[M (SD)]
|包含下的直觉||0.99 (0.01)||796.94 (68.85)|
|包含下的分析||0.85 (0.07)||1204.83 (129.17)|
|不包含下的直觉||0.98 (0.02)||876.97 (62.82)|
|不包含下的分析||0.81 (0.08)||1224.08 (124.71)|
最后, 将每种条件下的40组材料匹配到阈上阈下两种条件, 每种条件20组材料, 确保阈上阈下材料在正确率及反应时上没有显著差异。
本实验在屏幕大小为14寸的笔记本电脑上施测, 分辨率为1366×768, 刷新频率为60 Hz。
实验用E-prime 2.0软件进行编程, 具体实验流程如图3所示。首先在屏幕中央呈现一个800 ms的注视点, 注视点消失之后在屏幕中央呈现目标字。在阈上条件下, 目标字的呈现时间为200 ms; 而阈下条件下, 水仁德、丁海杰和沈模卫(2003)及沈模卫、高涛和丁海杰(2004)在研究汉字加工实验中将阈下条件设置为33 ms。由于本实验使用的计算机刷新频率为60 Hz, 因而其完成一次刷新的时间为16.7 ms, 刷新两次的时间约33.4 ms, 同时考虑电脑延迟约10 ms等因素, 为此本文在程序中将目标字的呈现时间设置为24 ms, 从而达到实际呈现时间为33 ms的目标。此外在阈下条件下, 目标字消失后会呈现176 ms的掩蔽刺激。在600~800 ms的随机空屏之后, 呈现源字3000 ms。被试的任务是判断目标字是否包含于源字之中, 若包含则按“1”键, 不包含则按“2”键。为了保证被试熟练实验任务及流程, 首先要进行10个试次的练习任务, 当正确率不低于70%时才可以进入正式实验。正式实验为3个组块, 每个组块后可以获得适当的休息。实验过程中要求被试尽可能快而准确地做出按键反应。
以正确率为因变量进行重复测量方差分析, 结果表明(见图4), 材料类型的主效应显著, F (1,29) = 60.57, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.676 > 0.14, 被试在分析材料中的正确率显著低于直觉材料(η2p是反映实验因素和因变量关联程度的指标, η2p越大, 说明实验因素对因变量越重要。根据Cohen的标准, 0.01 <η2p < 0.06, 说明效应较小; 0.06 <η2p < 0.14, 属于中等效应; η2p > 0.14, 说明效应较大); 时间的主效应显著, F (1,29) = 333.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.92 > 0.14, 被试在24 ms条件下的正确率显著低于200 ms; 包含关系的主效应显著, F (1,29) = 11.43, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.283 > 0.14, 被试在包含条件下的正确率显著低于不包含条件。时间和包含关系的交互作用显著, F (1,29) = 15.08, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.342 > 0.14, 具体表现为24 ms条件下, 被试解决包含材料的正确率显著低于不包含材料(p = 0.001), 200 ms条件下, 包含材料和不包含材料的正确率没有显著差异(p = 0.185); 材料类型和包含关系的交互作用显著, F (1,29) = 13.13, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.312 > 0.14, 具体表现为包含条件下, 直觉材料的正确率显著高于分析材料(p = 0.005), 不包含条件下, 直觉材料的正确率也显著高于分析材料(p < 0.001)。
以反应时为因变量进行重复测量方差分析, 结果表明(见图5)：材料类型的主效应显著, F (1,29) = 49.32, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.63 > 0.14, 被试在分析材料中的反应时显著长于直觉材料; 时间的主效应显著, F (1,29) = 5.10, p = 0.032, η2p = 0.15 > 0.14,被试在24 ms条件下的反应时显著长于200 ms。材料类型、时间和包含关系三阶交互作用显著, F (1,29) = 22.96, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.442 > 0.14。进一步简单简单效应分析发现, 在包含条件下且呈现时间为24 ms时, 被试在解决分析材料时的反应时同直觉材料之间不存在显著差异(p = 0.183); 呈现时间为200 ms时, 被试在解决分析材料时的反应时显著长于直觉材料(p < 0.001)。在不包含条件下且呈现时间为24 ms时, 被试在解决分析材料时的反应时显著长于直觉材料(p = 0.001); 呈现时间为200 ms时, 被试在解决分析材料时的反应时长于直觉材料(p = 0.001)。
同时, 为了解被试在阈上阈下情况下对实验材料的辨别力, 本文引入了信号检测论, 将包含材料视为信号, 不包含材料视为噪音, 即呈现包含材料时正确选择包含为击中, 呈现不包含材料时错误选择包含为虚报, 并计算每个被试的d’值。
以d’值为因变量进行重复测量方差分析, 结果表明(见表2)：材料类型的主效应显著, F (1,29) = 93.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.76 > 0.14, 被试在分析材料中的d’值显著低于直觉材料; 时间的主效应显著, F (1,29) = 411.23, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.93 > 0.14,被试在24 ms条件下的d’值显著低于200 ms。材料类型和时间的交互作用显著, F (1,29) = 17.45, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.38 > 0.14, 具体表现为24 ms条件下, 被试在分析材料中的d’值显著低于直觉材料(p = 0.001), 200 ms条件下, 被试在分析材料中的d’值也显著低于直觉材料(p < 0.001)。
表2 不同条件下被试的辨别力指数[M (SD)]
|24 ms||0.32 (0.60)||0.78 (0.78)|
|200 ms||2.62 (0.85)||3.97 (0.69)|
此外, 在24 ms条件下目标字呈现时间很短, 尤其在包含条件下被试在分析和直觉材料下的正确率分别为0.5和0.48, 处于随机猜测水平。因此, 为了进一步排除阈下条件下反应偏向对实验结果的影响, 本文以信号检测论为基础, 将包含材料视为信号, 不包含材料视为噪音, 计算24 ms条件下每个被试的β值。
以β值为因变量进行配对样本t检验, 结果表明：分析材料与直觉材料的差异不显著, t (29) = -1.26, p = 0.95,即分析材料(1.15 ± 0.35)与直觉材料(1.33 ± 0.71)的β值没有显著差异。
在经典的推理领域中, 一些研究认为直觉加工是非理性的, 会引导个体做出错误的判断(Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015), 而一些研究则提出直觉加工可能存在优势效应, 可以帮助个体更快的做出正确的选择(De Neys & Feremans, 2013)。导致这一相反结果的原因可能在于诸多研究选用的实验材料一般将直觉与分析加工置于冲突环境中(Bago & De Neys, 2017; Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014), 而冲突环境会使两种加工过程相互干扰(Handley & Trippas, 2015)。同时, Trippas等人(2017)指出问题难度不同, 直觉及分析过程相互干扰的方式也不同。而本文采用的实验材料有效避免了两种过程的相互干扰, 并且通过材料筛选过程对实验材料进行编制和评估, 保证了两种加工过程测量的效度。实验结果显示：正确率方面, 被试完成直觉任务的情况显著高于分析任务。反应时方面, 除正式实验中阈下包含情况下的直觉与分析无显著差异外, 直觉加工的优势效应也被明显观测到。这些结果说明直觉加工存在优势效应(De Neys & Feremans, 2013; Johnson et al., 2016), 其中阈下条件下直觉加工的反应时显著快于分析加工, 这一角度进一步佐证了直觉加工在资源有限甚至无意识的情况下仍存在优势效应。
因此, 直觉加工极少占用认知资源的观点在本研究下得到了印证。不过, 有研究(Handley et al., 2011)对这一观点提出了质疑。最近, Howarth等人(2016)在研究中发现在认知负荷条件下, 直觉和分析过程均受到消极影响, 且直觉过程受影响程度显著高于分析过程, 因此可以推论直觉加工仍依赖于一定的认知资源。还有研究者提出直觉加工有时可能是需要意识努力的(Handley & Trippas, 2015)。那么, 直觉加工对认知资源及意识的依赖程度如何, 其优势效应是否会受到认知资源及意识的影响?本研究则给出了明确答案。首先从阈上角度分析, 在阈上包含及阈上不包含两种条件设置下, 直觉加工的优势效应均存在。而从阈下角度分析, 在阈下包含条件下直觉与分析加工无论是在正确率还是反应时上均无显著差异。虽然二者的正确率无显著性差异没有在三阶交互作用中得到体现, 但直觉(0.50 ± 0.24)与分析(0.48 ± 0.20)的正确率均处于0.5的随机猜测水平。根据水仁德和刘爱伦(1996)的研究可得出, 在汉字组块破解任务中相对于不包含结论, 被试做出包含结论需要更多认知资源的参与, 换言之即被试在包含条件下完成破解任务时的认知资源相对匮乏。而根据实验结果在阈下条件下, 包含条件的正确率显著低于不包含条件, 这能够为上述观点提供进一步证明。较为有趣的是在阈上条件下, 包含与不包含在正确率上则没有差异, 这表明在无意识情况下, 认知资源对加工过程无法产生显著影响; 但在意识条件下, 认知资源能够对加工过程产生影响。综上, 阈下包含设置下的数据说明, 在无意识及认知资源缺乏的双重条件下直觉加工的优势效应消失了; 在阈下不包含条件下, 即无意识且认知资源相对较充足的情况下, 直觉过程同分析过程相比其优势效应仍然是存在的。同时, 结合阈上、阈下两种条件设置的结果可以发现, 在无意识条件下认知资源能够调节直觉优势效应, 具体表现为当认知资源相对较为充足时直觉优势效应存在, 而当认知资源缺乏时直觉优势效应消失。而在意识条件下, 认知资源不能够调节直觉优势效应, 具体表现为认知资源充足或缺乏无法影响直觉优势效应。
为何直觉优势效应在意识及认知资源的不同条件设置下会出现不同的变化趋势?本研究认为这恰恰回应了当前关于双加工理论的相关争议(Evans & Stanovich, 2013)。双加工领域对于直觉与分析两种加工过程给出明确的界定, 即直觉加工是自动快速且无意识的, 几乎不占用认知资源, 而分析过程是缓慢有意识的, 需要较多认知资源的参与(De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Mevel et al., 2015)。但近年来有学者提出这样的划分过于绝对、简单(Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), 且这一观点也得到了诸多实验支持(Pennycook et al., 2014)。就直觉加工而言, 有研究指出其并不是完全无意识的, 在特定条件下仍是需要意志努力的缓慢过程(Handley & Trippas, 2015; Trippas et al., 2017)。而本研究数据显示在意识条件下, 认知资源充足或是缺乏, 直觉优势均存在, 具体表现为直觉过程正确率更高反应时更短。这符合传统理论对于直觉加工快速、较少占用认知资源的认知(Evans, 2008; De Neys, 2012)。但在无意识条件下, 认知资源充足则直觉优势存在, 认知资源缺乏则直觉优势消失同时正确率已处于随机猜测水平。这表明在无意识且认知资源缺乏的双重作用下, 直觉加工已经达到其认知极限, 直觉加工虽是快速的, 但是在极端条件下仍需要一定的认知资源及意识参与。
此外, 本文也验证了以往研究对于分析加工的认知, 即分析加工是缓慢的、受意识控制的, 需要较多认知资源的参与(Evans, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013)。在本文中具体表现为分析加工的正确率显著低于直觉加工而反应时显著长于直觉加工。但在阈下包含条件下, 分析加工同直觉加工一样均处于随机猜测水平, 而在阈上不包含条件下分析过程仍能保证较高的正确率(0.64 ± 0.21), 这说明了在无意识且认知资源缺乏的条件下分析过程同直觉过程均达到了认知极限, 但在无意识且认知资源相对较为充足的条件下, 分析加工仍在发挥作用, 这似乎与分析过程需要意识参与的性质相违背(Bonner & Newell, 2010; Thompson, 2013)。而近年来研究者提出的逻辑性直觉模型则指出, 部分分析过程具有直觉的特征(De Neys, 2012, 2014; Johnson et al., 2016), 这能为本研究的结果提供了解释。但是具体的机制是怎么样的, 未来的研究也可从分析过程的角度入手展开探讨, 为双加工理论提供新的研究视角。
为了解被试的辨别力, 同时排除反应偏向等因素对实验结果的影响, 本文利用信号检测论对被试的辨别力指数d’以及反应偏向β进行分析。首先从辨别力指数来分析, 时间主效应显著说明本文对意识水平这一条件的操纵达到了较好的水平, 具体表现为阈上条件下的d’值显著高于阈下条件; 材料类型主效应显著, 即分析材料的d’值显著低于直觉材料。这说明本文的材料编制符合传统双加工的定义, 即直觉加工过程是快速、无意识、自动化的, 以经验为基础, 极少占用认知资源, 而分析加工过程则是缓慢、受意识控制的, 以逻辑规则为基础, 需要较多认知资源的参与(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Thompson et al., 2013)。其次, 从反应偏向β来分析, 阈下条件下分析材料及直觉材料的反应偏向没有显著差异, 即两种材料下被试的反应偏向是一致的。这表明在阈下条件下, 分析加工及直觉加工之间的正确率差异是由于两种加工过程的不同特点造成的, 并不是由反应偏向的差异导致的。因此, 在排除反应偏向等因素的影响下, 本研究的实验结果仍是成立的, 即阈下包含条件下, 直觉加工的优势效应消失; 阈下不包含条件下, 直觉加工的优势作用仍存在。
总结而言, 本文验证了直觉加工具有快速自动化的特征, 同时进一步证实了其优势效应的存在, 这与传统双加工理论的观点相符合(Evans, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013)。同时本研究发现直觉加工是依赖于一定的认知资源及意识参与的, 这与近年来对传统理论的质疑保持一致(Bago & De Neys, 2017; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Howarth et al., 2016)。但这并不意味直觉过程同分析过程一样是缓慢的、需要较多认知资源参与的(Thompson, 2013)。在本研究中直觉加工只有在无意识且认知资源缺乏的双重压力下其优势效应才可消失, 而在单一压力条件下(如：阈上包含、阈下不包含条件)其优势效应仍可被显著检测。因此, 对于分析过程, 直觉加工仍是具有快速激活的特征(De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013; De Neys & Feremans, 2013), 并且在资源有限的条件下其优势仍然突出(Evans et al., 2009; Howarth et al., 2016), 但是这一优势效应有其极限。所以, 本研究认为直觉加工同分析加工的区别在于加工速度及对认知资源与意识依赖程度的差异, 而不在于是否需要认知资源与意识过程。而分析过程的结果则显示以往对于直觉加工与分析加工的划分过于绝对、简单(Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), 这两个过程可能相互兼有对方的特征, 而未来的研究也需进一步探讨这两种加工过程的特征及加工模式。本文采用汉字组块破解任务旨在为双加工理论提供全新的研究视角。当然, 不可否认, 相较于传统的推理及问题解决任务, 本研究采用的汉字组块破解任务难度较低、加工速度较快, 因而其在思维领域的推广性还需后续实验的进一步验证。
Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory,
Abstract Influential dual process models of human thinking posit that reasoners typically produce a fast, intuitive heuristic (i.e., Type-1) response which might subsequently be overridden and corrected by slower, deliberative processing (i.e., Type-2). In this study we directly tested this time course assumption. We used a two response paradigm in which participants have to give an immediate answer and afterwards are allowed extra time before giving a final response. In four experiments we used a range of procedures (e.g., challenging response deadline, concurrent load) to knock out Type 2 processing and make sure that the initial response was intuitive in nature. Our key finding is that we frequently observe correct, logical responses as the first, immediate response. Response confidence and latency analyses indicate that these initial correct responses are given fast, with high confidence, and in the face of conflicting heuristic responses. Findings suggest that fast and automatic Type 1 processing also cues a correct logical response from the start. We sketch a revised dual process model in which the relative strength of different types of intuitions determines reasoning performance. Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic and analytic processes in decision making,
Many theorists propose two types of processing: heuristic and analytic. In conflict tasks, in which these processing types lead to opposing responses, giving the analytic response may require both detection and resolution of the conflict. The ratio bias task, in which people tend to treat larger numbered ratios (e.g., 20/100) as indicating a higher likelihood of winning than do equivalent smaller numbered ratios (e.g., 2/10), is considered to induce such a conflict. Experiment 1 showed response time differences associated with conflict detection, resolution, and the amount of conflict induced. The conflict detection and resolution effects were replicated in Experiment 2 and were not affected by decreasing the influence of the heuristic response or decreasing the capacity to make the analytic response. The results are consistent with dual-process accounts, but a single-process account in which quantitative, rather than qualitative, differences in processing are assumed fares equally well in explaining the data.
Bias and conflict: A case for logical intuitions,
ABSTRACT Human reasoning has been characterized as often biased, heuristic, and illogical. In this article, I consider recent findings establishing that, despite the widespread bias and logical errors, people at least implicitly detect that their heuristic response conflicts with traditional normative considerations. I propose that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical and probabilistic knowledge that is intuitive and that is activated automatically when people engage in a reasoning task. I sketch the basic characteristics of these intuitions and point to implications for ongoing debates in the field. Association for Psychological Science 2012.
Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some clarifications,
Recent studies on conflict detection during thinking suggest that reasoners are sensitive to possible conflict between their heuristic judgement and elementary logical or probabilistic principles. I have argued that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical intuitions and has implications for the way we conceive the interaction between System-1 and System-2 in dual process theories. In this paper I clarify potential misconceptions about this work, discuss the link with other approaches, and sketch directions for further research.
The ‘whys’ and ‘whens’ of individual differences in thinking biases,
Although human thinking is often biased, some individuals are less susceptible to biases than others. These individual differences have been at the forefront of thinking research for more than a decade. We organize the literature in three key accounts (storage, monitoring, and inhibition failure) and propose that a critical but overlooked question concerns the time point at which individual variance arises: do biased and unbiased reasoners take different paths early on in the reasoning process or is the observed variance late to arise? We discuss how this focus on the ‘whens’ suggests that individual differences in thinking biases are less profound than traditionally assumed, in the sense that they might typically arise at a later stage of the reasoning process.
Development of heuristic bias detection in elementary school,
Although human reasoning is often biased by intuitive heuristics, recent studies have shown that adults and adolescents detect the biased nature of their judgments. The present study focused on the development of this critical bias sensitivity by examining the detection skills of young children in elementary school. Third and 6th graders were presented with child-friendly versions of classic base-rate problems in which a cued heuristic response could be inconsistent or consistent with the base rates. After each problem children were asked to indicate their subjective response confidence to assess their bias detection skills. Results indicated that 6th graders showed a clear confidence decrease when they gave a heuristic response that conflicted with the base rates. However, this confidence decrease was not observed for 3rd graders, suggesting that they did not yet acknowledge that their judgment was not fully warranted. Implications for the development of efficient training programs and the debate on human rationality are discussed.
Belief inhibition during thinking: Not always winning but at least taking part,
Human thinking is often biased by intuitive beliefs. Inhibition of these tempting beliefs is considered a key component of human thinking, but the process is poorly understood. In the present study we clarify the nature of an inhibition failure and the resulting belief bias by probing the accessibility of cued beliefs after people reasoned. Results indicated that even the poorest reasoners showed an impaired memory access to words that were associated with cued beliefs after solving reasoning problems in which the beliefs conflicted with normative considerations (Experiment 1 and 2). The study further established that the impairment was only temporary in nature (Experiment 3) and did not occur when people were explicitly instructed to give mere intuitive judgments (Experiment 4). Findings present solid evidence for the postulation of an inhibition process and imply that belief bias does not result from a failure to recognize the need to inhibit inappropriate beliefs, but from a failure to complete the inhibition process. This indicates that people are far more logical than hitherto believed.
Feeling we’re biased: Autonomic arousal and reasoning conflict.,
Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive beliefs. A key question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with logical considerations or from a failure to discard these tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by focusing on conflict-related autonomic nervous system modulation during biased reasoning. Participants’ skin conductance responses (SCRs) were monitored while they solved classic syllogisms in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the logical correct response. Results indicated that all reasoners showed increased SCRs when solving the inconsistent conflict problems. Experiment 2 validated that this autonomic arousal boost was absent when people were not engaged in an active reasoning task. The presence of a clear autonomic conflict response during reasoning lends credence to the idea that reasoners have a “gut” feeling that signals that their intuitive response is not logically warranted. Supplemental materials for this article may be downloaded from http://cabn.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.
Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: Cognitive misers are no happy fools,
Influential work on human thinking suggests that our judgment is often biased because we minimize cognitive effort and intuitively substitute hard questions by easier ones. A key question is whether or not people realize that they are doing this and notice their mistake. Here, we test this claim with one of the most publicized examples of the substitution bias, the bat-and-ball problem. We designed an isomorphic control version in which reasoners experience no intuitive pull to substitute. Results show that people are less confident in their substituted, erroneous bat-and-ball answer than in their answer on the control version that does not give rise to the substitution. Contrary to popular belief, this basic finding indicates that biased reasoners are not completely oblivious to the substitution and sense that their answer is questionable. This calls into question the characterization of the human reasoner as a happy fool who blindly answers erroneous questions without realizing it.
Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition,
Abstract This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process accounts. However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.
Spot the difference: Distinguishing between two kinds of processing,
Dual-process theories of higher cognition, distinguishing between intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) thinking, have become increasingly popular, although also subject to recent criticism. A key question, to which a number of contributions in this special issue relate, is how to define the difference between the two kinds of processing. One issue discussed is whether they differ at Marr computational level of analysis. I believe they do but that ultimately the debate will decided at the implementational level where distinct cognitive and neural systems need to be demonstrated. Other distinctions raised in the issue are the unique ability for metarepresentation, cognitive decoupling and hypothetical thinking at the Type 2 level, and the association of emotion and metacognitive feelings with the Type 1 level. The relation of the latter to cognitive control is also discussed.
Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning,
In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, compete with slower analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions. Requiring rapid responding thus differentially inhibits the operation of analytic reasoning processes, leading to the results observed.
Reasoning under time pressure: A study of causal conditional inference,
In this study, we examine the role of beliefs in conditional inference in two experiments, demonstrating a robust tendency for people to make fewer inferences from statements they disbelieve, regardless of logical validity. The main purpose of this study was to test whether participants are able to inhibit this belief effect where it constitutes a bias. This is the case when participants are specifically instructed to assume the truth of the premises. However, Experiment 1 showed that the effect is no less marked than when this instruction is given, than when it is not, although higher ability participants did show slightly less influence of belief (Experiment 2). Contrary to the findings with syllogistic reasoning, use of speeded tasks had no effect on the extent of the belief bias (both experiments), although it did considerably reduce the numbers of inferences that were drawn overall. These findings suggest that the belief bias in conditional inference is less open to volitional control than that associated with syllogistic reasoning.
Dual process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate,
Chunking mechanisms in human learning,
Pioneering work in the 1940s and 1950s suggested that the concept of ‘chunking’ might be important in many processes of perception, learning and cognition in humans and animals. We summarize here the major sources of evidence for chunking mechanisms, and consider how such mechanisms have been implemented in computational models of the learning process. We distinguish two forms of chunking: the first deliberate, under strategic control, and goal-oriented; the second automatic, continuous, and linked to perceptual processes. Recent work with discrimination-network computational models of long- and short-term memory (EPAM/CHREST) has produced a diverse range of applications of perceptual chunking. We focus on recent successes in verbal learning, expert memory, language acquisition and learning multiple representations, to illustrate the implementation and use of chunking mechanisms within contemporary models of human learning.
What's in a name? The multiple meanings of "chunk" and "chunking",
What's in a Name? The Multiple Meanings of “Chunk” and “Chunking”
Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias.,
According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically. This finding was observed when instructional set was presented as a between-participants factor (Experiment 1), when instruction was indicated prior to problem presentation by a cue (Experiment 2), and when the cue appeared simultaneously with conclusion presentation (Experiments 3 and 4). The finding also extended to a range of simple and more complex argument forms (Experiment 5). In these latter experiments, belief-based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for default interventionist accounts of belief bias.
Dual processes and the interplay between knowledge and structure: A new parallel processing model,
How do reasoners resolve a conflict between two competing responses, one cued by beliefs and knowledge, and one based upon the problem's underlying logic and structure? The literature suggests that such conflicts are routinely resolved in favor of a belief-based heuristic (Type 1) response that is generated autonomously and by default. Given sufficient effort, time, and motivation, reasoners can and sometimes do engage in more deliberative (Type 2) processing and intervene on default responses, generating responses based upon the underlying structure of the problem. Such default interventionist accounts of reasoning biases have become increasingly popular in the reasoning and judgment domains. In this chapter we review recent evidence which suggests that reasoners show intuitive sensitivity to logical structure, which can interfere with belief or knowledge judgments. We further show that the tendency to respond on the basis of beliefs can be slow and effortful, can increase with development, and often depends upon working memory. We evaluate the implications of these findings for dual process accounts and conclude that existing dual process frameworks cannot account for the evidence. Finally, we sketch the principles of a new model which assumes that both structure and knowledge make intuitive and deliberative contributions to responses on reasoning and judgment tasks.
The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict,
According to the default interventionist dual-process account of reasoning, belief-based responses to reasoning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by default, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful, Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims. In three experiments, we presented participants with a reasoning task that was to be completed while they were generating random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of Experimental Psychology: , , and , 37, 28-43, 2011), which required participants to make judgments based upon either the validity of a conditional argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These findings were replicated in Experiment鈥3, in which we controlled for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that both instructional sets require some effortful processing. However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive resources may be required for each type of judgment. We discuss the implications of our findings for the default interventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an alternative interpretation for our findings.
The doubting system 1: Evidence for automatic substitution sensitivity,
A long prevailing view of human reasoning suggests severe limits on our ability to adhere to simple logical or mathematical prescriptions. A key position assumes these failures arise from insufficient monitoring of rapidly produced intuitions. These faulty intuitions are thought to arise from a proposed substitution process, by which reasoners unknowingly interpret more difficult questions as easier ones. Recent work, however, suggests that reasoners are not blind to this substitution process, but in fact detect that their erroneous responses are not warranted. Using the popular bat-and-ball problem, we investigated whether this substitution sensitivity arises out of an automatic System 1 process or whether it depends on the operation of an executive resource demanding System 2 process. Results showed that accuracy on the bat-and-ball problem clearly declined under cognitive load. However, both reduced response confidence and increased response latencies indicated that biased reasoners remained sensitive to their faulty responses under load. Results suggest that a crucial substitution monitoring process is not only successfully engaged, but that it automatically operates as an autonomous System 1 process. By signaling its doubt along with a biased intuition, it appears System 1 is 鈥渟marter鈥 than traditionally assumed.
Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles,
Abstract A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between intuitive and deliberate judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic, and rational processes (assumed to characterize deliberate judgments). In contrast, we provide convergent arguments and evidence for a unified theoretical approach to both intuitive and deliberative judgments. Both are rule-based, and in fact, the very same rules can underlie both intuitive and deliberate judgments. The important open question is that of rule selection, and we propose a 2-step process in which the task itself and the individual's memory constrain the set of applicable rules, whereas the individual's processing potential and the (perceived) ecological rationality of the rule for the task guide the final selection from that set. Deliberate judgments are not generally more accurate than intuitive judgments; in both cases, accuracy depends on the match between rule and environment: the rules' ecological rationality. Heuristics that are less effortful and in which parts of the information are ignored can be more accurate than cognitive strategies that have more information and computation. The proposed framework adumbrates a unified approach that specifies the critical dimensions on which judgmental situations may vary and the environmental conditions under which rules can be expected to be successful.
Perceptual contributions to problem solving: Chunk decomposition of Chinese characters,
Chunk decomposition is the decomposing of familiar patterns into their component elements so that they can be regrouped in another meaningful manner. Such a regrouping is sometimes critically required in problem solving because during initial encoding the problem elements become automatically grouped into familiar chunks and this may prohibit finding a novel or efficient solution to problems [G. Knoblich, S. Ohlsson, H. Haider, D. Rhenius, Constraint relaxation and chunk decomposition in insight problem solving, J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 25 (1999) 1534-1556]. In order to elucidate the brain mechanisms underlying the process of chunk decomposition, we developed a task that uses Chinese character as materials. Chinese characters are ideal examples of perceptual chunks. They are composed of radicals, which in turn, are composed of strokes. Because radicals are meaningful chunks themselves but strokes are not meaningful in isolation, it is much easier to separate a character by its radicals than to separate a character by its strokes. By comparing the stroke-level decomposition and the radical-level decomposition, we observed activities in occipital, frontal, and parietal lobes. Most importantly, during the moment of chunk decomposition, we found the early visual cortex showed a tendency of negative activation whereas the higher visual cortex showed a tendency of positive activation. This suggests that in order to successfully decompose a chunk, the higher visual areas must at least partly be 'disconnected' from the input provided by early visual processing in order to allow simple features to be rearranged into a different perceptual chunk. We conclude that early perceptual processes can crucially affect thinking and problem solving.
Bias detection: Response confidence evidence for conflict sensitivity in the ratio bias task,
Human reasoning is often biased by heuristic thinking. A key question is whether people detect that their heuristic answer conflicts with logical considerations. Empirical studies suggest that the detection is typically successful but the generality of these findings has been questioned. The present study focuses on this issue. A response confidence measure was used to validate conflict sensitivity findings in the classical ratio bias task and identify individual differences in conflict detection efficiency. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were after solving problems for which a cued heuristic response could be inconsistent or consistent with the correct response. Results confirmed that most reasoners showed a confidence decrease when they were biased, suggesting that they acknowledge that their intuitive answers are not fully warranted. However, there were also subgroups of reasoners who failed to show a confidence effect. Implications for the debate on conflict detection during thinking are discussed.
Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics,
Abstract We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed.
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement,
The distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking is common in psychology. However, while often being quite clear on the characteristics of the two processes (‘Type 1’ processes are fast, autonomous, intuitive, etc. and ‘Type 2’ processes are slow, deliberative, analytic, etc.), dual-process theorists have been heavily criticized for being unclear on the factors that determine when an individual will think analytically or rely on their intuition. We address this issue by introducing a three-stage model that elucidates the bottom-up factors that cause individuals to engage Type 2 processing. According to the model, multiple Type 1 processes may be cued by a stimulus (Stage 1), leading to the potential for conflict detection (Stage 2). If successful, conflict detection leads to Type 2 processing (Stage 3), which may take the form of rationalization (i.e., the Type 1 output is verified post hoc) or decoupling (i.e., the Type 1 output is falsified). We tested key aspects of the model using a novel base-rate task where stereotypes and base-rate probabilities cued the same (non-conflict problems) or different (conflict problems) responses about group membership. Our results support two key predictions derived from the model: (1) conflict detection and decoupling are dissociable sources of Type 2 processing and (2) conflict detection sometimes fails. We argue that considering the potential stages of reasoning allows us to distinguish early (conflict detection) and late (decoupling) sources of analytic thought. Errors may occur at both stages and, as a consequence, bias arises from both conflict monitoring and decoupling failures.
Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,,
A study of Chinese and Arabic numerals' subliminal priming effects
该研究采用了反应窗技术和回归分析范式,通过两个实验对汉字数字和阿拉伯数字的启动效应进行 了实验探索.结果表明(1)在客观阈限以下,汉字数字和阿拉伯数字都可以被加工到语义水平,而数字的表征形式对启动效应无影响;(2)在本研究中,在启动 数字为汉字数字的条件下,当觉察水平高于客观阈限时,不存在启动效应.
该研究采用了反应窗技术和回归分析范式,通过两个实验对汉字数字和阿拉伯数字的启动效应进行 了实验探索.结果表明(1)在客观阈限以下,汉字数字和阿拉伯数字都可以被加工到语义水平,而数字的表征形式对启动效应无影响;(2)在本研究中,在启动 数字为汉字数字的条件下,当觉察水平高于客观阈限时,不存在启动效应.
Unconscious mechanisms of Chinese characters in subliminal semantic activation
Coding effects on retrieving Chinese characters from short-term memory
Probing the cognitive mechanism of mental representational change during chunk decomposition: A parametric fMRI study,
caudate; Chinese character; inferior frontal junction; insight; presupplementary motor area
Why it matters: The implications of autonomous processes for dual-process theories: Commentary on Evans & Stanovich (2013),
Abstract Evans and Stanovich (2013, this issue) propose that Type 1 processes should be defined in terms of autonomy, such that they are initiated and run to completion in the presence of relevant triggering conditions. In this commentary, I argue that their autonomous execution has implications for the nature of the representation that is formed and for the shape and outcome of subsequent Type 2 processes. In addition, I argue that Type 2 processes may also be triggered automatically, but that, unlike Type 1 processes, their completion requires working memory resources, and that the outcome of those processes is more flexible than that of Type 1 processes. 漏 The Author(s) 2013.
Matching bias on the selection task: It’s fast and feels good,
We tested the hypothesis that choices determined by Type 1 processes are compelling because they are fluent, and for this reason they are less subject to analytic thinking than other answers. A total of 104 participants completed a modified version of Wason's selection task wherein they made decisions about one card at a time using a two-response paradigm. In this paradigm participants gave a fast, intuitive response, rated their feeling of rightness (FOR) for that response, and were then allowed free time to reconsider their answers. As we predicted, answers consistent with a matching heuristic (i.e., selecting cards named in the rule) were made more quickly than other answers, were given higher FOR ratings, and received less subsequent analysis as measured by rethinking time and the probability of changing answers. These data suggest that reasoning biases may be compelling because they are fluently generated; this is turn creates a strong FOR, which acts as a signal that further analysis is not necessary.
Intuition, reason, and metacognition,
Abstract Dual Process Theories (DPT) of reasoning posit that judgments are mediated by both fast, automatic processes and more deliberate, analytic ones. A critical, but unanswered question concerns the issue of monitoring and control: When do reasoners rely on the first, intuitive output and when do they engage more effortful thinking? We hypothesised that initial, intuitive answers are accompanied by a metacognitive experience, called the Feeling of Rightness (FOR), which can signal when additional analysis is needed. In separate experiments, reasoners completed one of four tasks: conditional reasoning (N=60), a three-term variant of conditional reasoning (N=48), problems used to measure base rate neglect (N=128), or a syllogistic reasoning task (N=64). For each task, participants were instructed to provide an initial, intuitive response to the problem along with an assessment of the rightness of that answer (FOR). They were then allowed as much time as needed to reconsider their initial answer and provide a final answer. In each experiment, we observed a robust relationship between the FOR and two measures of analytic thinking: low FOR was associated with longer rethinking times and an increased probability of answer change. In turn, FOR judgments were consistently predicted by the fluency with which the initial answer was produced, providing a link to the wider literature on metamemory. These data support a model in which a metacognitive judgment about a first, initial model determines the extent of analytic engagement. Copyright 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency as metacognitive cues for initiating analytic thinking,
When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias,
Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief. The online version of this article (doi:10.3758/s13421-016-0680-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning,
In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3-5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.
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