ISSN 1671-3710
CN 11-4766/R
主办:中国科学院心理研究所
出版:科学出版社

心理科学进展 ›› 2011, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (5): 664-672.

• 研究前沿 • 上一篇    下一篇

赢者诅咒:心理机制、影响因素及应对策略

张鸿飞;徐富明;刘腾飞;张军伟;蒋多   

  1. (1华中师范大学心理学院暨湖北省人的发展与心理健康重点实验室, 武汉 430079)
    (2 中国科学院心理研究所, 北京 100101)
  • 收稿日期:2010-10-26 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2011-05-15 发布日期:2011-05-15
  • 通讯作者: 徐富明

Winner’s Curse: Psychological Mechanisms, Influencing Factors and Coping Strategies

ZHANG Hong-Fei;XU Fu-Ming;LIU Teng-Fei;ZHANG Jun-Wei;JIANG Duo   

  1. (1 School of Psychology, Central China Normal University, and Hubei Human
    Development and Mental Health Key Laboratory, Wuhan 430079, China)
    (2 Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China)
  • Received:2010-10-26 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2011-05-15 Published:2011-05-15
  • Contact: XU Fu-Ming

摘要: 赢者诅咒是指在拍卖情境中, 竞价者为了获得拍卖品会过高估计其价值, 竞价成功以后当他发现其价值和自己之前的期望不一致时所产生的一种“诅咒”心理。赢者诅咒现象普遍存在于企业的资产拍卖、兼并重组、博彩游戏、投资决策等领域。损失规避和过度自信理论是赢者诅咒的主要心理机制, 而其影响因素主要有竞拍商品价值的不确定性、竞价人数、信息因素和竞价经验等。赢者诅咒的应对策略主要包括联合竞标、信息共享和学习。未来对赢者诅咒的研究需要进一步探讨赢者诅咒的心理机制、研究范式及本土化等问题。

关键词: 赢者诅咒, 损失规避, 信息不对称, 联合竞标

Abstract: Winner’s Curse refers to the situation where the auction winner curses after winning the auction through overestimating values of the auction items for ownership acquirement because of the inconformity does exist between their previous expectation and the actual value. It is common that winner’s curse happens in the auction business assets, mergers and acquisitions, gaming, investment decision-making and other fields. Winner’s curse can be explained by the loss aversion, overconfidence theory and meanwhile affected by the uncertainty of the auction goods’ value, the number of bidders, information and lessons learned, etc. Effective strategies for responding to the winner’s curse contain the joint bidding strategy, information sharing and learning more cautious. Future research on the winner’s curse needs to explore the psychological mechanism, research paradigm and localization issues.

Key words: winner’s curse, loss aversion, information asymmetry, joint bidding