In this research the effects of handedness and depth of processing on the explicit and implicit memory was evaluated. An experimental research was carried out individually on 80 students using computerized measurement tools and Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. The data were analyzed through Variance Analysis Method. Results showed that the difference between examinees under different depths of processing is significant in explicit memory. Moreover, there was also a significant difference in explicit memory between the three groups. Mixed-handed and left-handed participants had better recall performance but there was no significant difference in implicit memory. Better performance of the mixed-handed in explicit memory recall test indicates that explicit memory function is dependent on the interrelation between the two hemispheres. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 4th International Conference of Cognitive Science

The sample size necessary to obtain a desired level of statistical power depends in part on the population value of the effect size, which is, by definition, unknown. A common approach to sample-size planning uses the sample effect size from a prior study as an estimate of the population value of the effect to be detected in the future study. Although this strategy is intuitively appealing, effect-size estimates, taken at face value, are typically not accurate estimates of the population effect size because of publication bias and uncertainty. We show that the use of this approach often results in underpowered studies, sometimes to an alarming degree. We present an alternative approach that adjusts sample effect sizes for bias and uncertainty, and we demonstrate its effectiveness for several experimental designs. Furthermore, we discuss an open-source R package, BUCSS, and user-friendly Web applications that we have made available to researchers so that they can easily implement our suggested methods.

Three experiments explored the distinction between identification and production processes (e.g., Gabrieli et al., 1999). A stem decision test was introduced, in which participants were asked to state whether there were any English words that began with the presented three-letter stems. In Experiment 1, stem decision priming was robust for single-solution stems, but much reduced for many-solution stems. In Experiment 2, the solutions effect in stem decision was replicated in a within-subjects design, as was the contrast between the presence of priming in a many-solution stem completion test and the absence of priming in a many-solution stem decision test. In Experiment 3, for each critical many-solution stem in the stem decision test, participants studied three words that began with those three letters. Again, priming was not observed. These results were consistent with the notions that (a) many-solution stem completion relies on production processes, (b) the stem decision test eliminates production processes, and (c) single-solution priming relies on identification processes, regardless of whether the test is stem completion or stem decision.

The aim of this study was to investigate the widely held, but largely untested, view that implicit memory (repetition priming) reflects an automatic form of retrieval. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we explored whether a secondary task (syllable monitoring), performed during retrieval, would disrupt performance on explicit (cued recall) and implicit (stem completion) memory tasks equally. Surprisingly, despite substantial memory and secondary costs to cued recall when performed with a syllable-monitoring task, the same manipulation had no effect on stem completion priming or on secondary task performance. In Experiment 2 we demonstrated that even when using a particularly demanding version of the stem completion task that incurred secondary task costs, the corresponding disruption to implicit memory performance was minimal. Collectively, the results are consistent with the view that implicit memory retrieval requires little or no processing capacity and is not seemingly susceptible to the effects of dividing attention at retrieval.

Working memory refers to a system for temporary storage and manipulation of information in the brain, a function critical for a wide range of cognitive operations. It has been proposed that working memory includes a central executive system (CES) to control attention and information flow to and from verbal and spatial short-term memory buffers. Although the prefrontal cortex is activated during both verbal and spatial passive working memory tasks, the brain regions involved in the CES component of working memory have not been identified. We have used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine brain activation during the concurrent performance of two tasks, which is expected to engage the CES. Activation of the prefrontal cortex was observed when both tasks are performed together, but not when they are performed separately. These results support the view that the prefrontal cortex is involved in human working memory.

Explicit memory refers to the conscious retrieval of past information or experiences, whereas implicit memory refers to an unintentional or nonconscious form of retrieval. Much of the literature in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience has focused on differences between explicit and implicit memory, and the traditional view is that they rely on distinct brain systems. However, the potential interplay between implicit and explicit memory is not always clear. This review draws from behavioral and functional neuroimaging evidence to evaluate three areas in which implicit and explicit memory may be interrelated. First, we discuss views of familiarity-based recognition in terms of its relationship with implicit memory. Second, we review the challenges of distinguishing between implicit memory and involuntary aware memory, at both behavioral and neural levels. Finally, we examine evidence indicating that implicit and explicit retrieval of relational information may rely on a common neural mechanism. Taken together, these areas indicate that, under certain circumstances, there may be an important and influential relationship between conscious and nonconscious expressions of memory.

Four experiments examined a distinction between kinds of repetition priming which involve either the identification of the form or meaning of a stimulus or the production of a response on the basis of a cue. Patients with Alzheimer's disease had intact priming on picture-naming and category-exemplar identification tasks and impaired priming on word-stem completion and category-exemplar production tasks. Division of study-phase attention in healthy participants reduced priming on word-stem completion and category-exemplar production tasks but not on picture-naming and category-exemplar identification tasks. The parallel dissociations in normal and abnormal memory cannot be explained by implicit-explicit or perceptual-conceptual distinctions but are explained by an identification-production distinction. There may be separable cognitive and neural bases for implicit modulation of identification and production forms of knowledge.

Older adults have been hypothesized to show reduced priming relative to younger adults on implicit memory tests that require production of a response because these tasks place high demands on attentional processes associated with frontal lobe function, which are often reduced with age (see D. A. Fleischman & J. D. E. Gabrieli, 1998). The current study directly tested this frontal lobe hypothesis of age effects in production priming. Younger adults and older adults who differed in their attentional abilities as measured by a battery of neuropsychological tests were given two production priming tasks, word stem completion and category production, followed by explicit free recall tests. Results showed that explicit memory performance was reduced by age and older adults' frontal functioning. Age and frontal functioning influenced category production priming but not word stem completion priming. Results failed to support the frontal account of age reductions in production priming. Instead, results implicate the influence of other processes often involved in production priming tasks, such as explicit memory strategies and response competition, as critical for understanding age effects in implicit memory performance.

Behavioral studies have shown that engaging in a secondary task, such as talking on a cellular telephone, disrupts driving performance. This study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the impact of concurrent auditory language comprehension on the brain activity associated with a simulated driving task. Participants steered a vehicle along a curving virtual road, either undisturbed or while listening to spoken sentences that they judged as true or false. The dual-task condition produced a significant deterioration in driving accuracy caused by the processing of the auditory sentences. At the same time, the parietal lobe activation associated with spatial processing in the undisturbed driving task decreased by 37% when participants concurrently listened to sentences. The findings show that language comprehension performed concurrently with driving draws mental resources away from the driving and produces deterioration in driving performance, even when it does not require holding or dialing a phone.

Unconscious priming is a prototypical example of an automatic process, which is initiated without deliberate intention. Classical theories of automaticity assume that such unconscious automatic processes occur in a purely bottom-up driven fashion independent of executive control mechanisms. In contrast to these classical theories, our attentional sensitization model of unconscious information processing proposes that unconscious processing is susceptible to executive control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. It is assumed that unconscious processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways as a function of task sets. This article provides an overview of the latest research on executive control influences on unconscious information processing. I introduce refined theories of automaticity with a particular focus on the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition which is specifically developed to account for various attentional influences on different types of unconscious information processing. In support of the attentional sensitization model, empirical evidence is reviewed demonstrating executive control influences on unconscious cognition in the domains of visuo-motor and semantic processing: subliminal priming depends on attentional resources, is susceptible to stimulus expectations and is influenced by action intentions and task sets. This suggests that even unconscious processing is flexible and context-dependent as a function of higher-level executive control settings. I discuss that the assumption of attentional sensitization of unconscious information processing can accommodate conflicting findings regarding the automaticity of processes in many areas of cognition and emotion. This theoretical view has the potential to stimulate future research on executive control of unconscious processing in healthy and clinical populations.

According to classical theories, automatic processes are autonomous and independent of higher level cognitive influence. In contrast, the authors propose that automatic processing depends on attentional sensitization of task-congruent processing pathways. In 3 experiments, the authors tested this hypothesis with a modified masked semantic priming paradigm during a lexical decision task by measuring event-related potentials (ERPs): Before masked prime presentation, participants attended an induction task either to semantic or perceptual stimulus features designed to activate a semantic or perceptual task set, respectively. Semantic priming effects on the N400 ERP component, an electrophysiological index of semantic processing, were obtained when a semantic task set was induced immediately before subliminal prime presentation, whereas a previously induced perceptual task set attenuated N400 priming. Across experiments, comparable results were obtained regardless of the difficulty level and the verbal or nonverbal nature of the induction tasks. In line with the proposed attentional sensitization model, unconscious semantic processing is enhanced by a semantic and attenuated by a perceptual task set. Hence, automatic processing of unconscious stimuli is susceptible to top-down control for optimizing goal-related information processing.

The experiment reported here examined implicit memory function, as measured through repetition priming, in amnestic mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to examine whether impairments exist in this aspect of memory function. Young adults, healthy older controls, Alzheimer's disease patients, and MCI participants were asked to perform two types of implicit memory tests (word stem completion and threshold identification repetition priming tasks), as well as a recognition test for studied items. As expected, young adults performed better than the other participants on the recognition test and the word stem completion task; there was equivalent priming across groups on the word identification task. While both the older control and MCI participants showed lower levels of priming on the word stem completion task relative to the young adults, the magnitude of priming was equivalent for these two groups, and reliably greater than that of the dementia participants. These results suggest that not all aspects of memory function are impaired in MCI relative to healthy aging.

During many recognition contexts, old items elicit a more positive event-related potentials (ERPs) than new items at mid-frontal electrodes about 300-500ms. The psychological processes that are reflected in is ERP component (i.e., the FN400) has been vigorously debated. Some argue that the FN400 reflects familiarity, whereas others argue that it reflects conceptual implicit memory. Three experiments contrasted these two hypotheses by presenting pre-experimentally familiar (i.e., name-brand) products and novel, off-brand products. In addition, some of the off-brand products were conceptually primed by the name-brand product to determine how FN400 amplitude would be affected by conceptually primed, but novel, products. The results provided mixed support for both theoretical views, and it is integrated with a broader theoretical framework to characterize the psychological processes captured by the FN400.

Many studies have indicated that executing a secondary task during encoding has little influence on implicit memory (priming effect). However, relatively few studies have discussed the effect of interference on implicit memory during retrieval. Our previous studies found asymmetry between implicit encoding and retrieval processes, with the priming effect disrupted by retrieval interference. Therefore, the present study investigated why and how the priming effect is affected by interference at retrieval. We adopted a dual-task paradigm, with a lexical decision task as the memory task and an odd-even decision task as the interference task. The effect of interference during retrieval was assessed by comparing the performance in the interference condition with that in the full-attention condition. In Experiment 1, we observed that the priming effect was absent in the synchronous retrieval interference condition. In Experiment 2, asynchronous interference was also found to block the priming effect. To verify the assumption that the priming effect is sensitive to attentional resource competition during retrieval, we used two different manipulations (an extended stimulus interval in the dual-task paradigm, Experiment 3, and an interference inhibition manipulation, Experiment 4) known to reduce attentional distraction. In these experiments, the priming effect was protected from interference effects. We suggest that implicit memory retrieval could be regarded as a conditional automatic process that depends on a configuration of the cognitive system by attention and task sets. If the limited resources are occupied by another task, the implicit retrieval process can be impacted.

The neural mechanisms that underlie familiarity memory have been extensively investigated, but a consensus understanding remains elusive. Behavioral evidence suggests that familiarity sometimes shares sources with instances of implicit memory known as priming, in that the same increases in processing fluency that give rise to priming can engender familiarity. One underappreciated implication of this account is that patterns of neural activity that appear to index familiarity in a generic sense may instead reflect fluency-related precursors of recognition. In a novel illustration of this principle, we examined brain potentials during recognition tests for visual words. In two experiments, fluency was selectively enhanced for half of the test cues via masked repetition priming. Replicating previous findings, the proportion of words endorsed as "old" was greater for words immediately preceded by a matching masked word versus an unrelated one. In addition, N400 potentials were more positive for test cues preceded by matching versus unrelated masked words. Similar N400 differences were observed when false alarms were compared to correct rejections for the subset of unstudied words that were preceded by matching masked words. These N400 effects were topographically dissociable from other potentials that correlated with familiarity for studied words. We conclude that experiences of familiarity can have different neural correlates that signal the operation of distinct neurocognitive precursors of recognition judgments. Conceptualizations of the neural basis of recognition memory must account for a plurality of mechanisms that produce familiarity memory.

Previous evidence indicates that patients with schizophrenia exhibit reduced repetition priming in production tasks (in which each response cue engenders a competition between alternative responses), but not in identification tasks (in which each response cue allows a unique response). However, cross-task comparisons may lead to inappropriate conclusions, because implicit tests vary on several dimensions in addition to the critical dimension of response competition. The present study sought to isolate the role of response competition, by varying the number of solutions in the context of the same implicit tasks.

Classical theories assume that unconscious automatic processes are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast, we propose that automatic processing depends on a specific configuration of the cognitive system by top-down control. In 2 experiments, we tested the influence of available attentional resources and previously activated task sets on masked semantic priming in a lexical decision task. In Experiment 1, before masked prime presentation, participants were engaged in an easy or hard primary task that differentially afforded attentional resources. Semantic priming was attenuated when the primary task was hard, that is, when only little attentional resources were available. In Experiment 2, a semantic or perceptual induction task differentially modulated subsequent masked semantic priming. Hence, unconscious automatic processing depends on the availability of attentional resources and is susceptible to top-down control.

Previous studies have reported that longer stimulus presentation decreases the magnitude of priming. In the present study, we used meaningless kaleidoscope images, which were reported to minimize conceptual processing, to investigate the mechanism of the phenomenon. We assessed the impact of stimulus duration on perceptual priming (Experiment 1) and implicit recognition memory (Experiment 2). Both the magnitude of priming and the accuracy of implicit recognition were lower with the longer stimulus presentation (350 ms) compared with the shorter presentation (250 ms). This coincidence of temporal dynamics between priming and implicit recognition suggests similar underlying memory mechanisms. In both cases, the decrease of performance with longer presentation can be explained by either changes in perceptual processes or interference from explicit memory retrieval.

Several theoretical views of automaticity are discussed. Most of these suggest that automaticity should be diagnosed by looking at the presence of features such as unintentional, uncontrolled/uncontrollable, goal independent, autonomous, purely stimulus driven, unconscious, efficient, and fast. Contemporary views further suggest that these features should be investigated separately. The authors examine whether features of automaticity can be disentangled on a conceptual level, because only then is the separate investigation of them worth the effort. They conclude that the conceptual analysis of features is to a large extent feasible. Not all researchers agree with this position, however. The authors show that assumptions of overlap among features are determined by the other researchers' views of automaticity and by the models they endorse for information processing in general.

Transfer-appropriate-processing accounts of memory emphasize the similarity of encoding and retrieval processes, and imply that experimental manipulations should have similar effects on encoding and retrieval. Exceptions to this expectation are thus of great interest, but extant exceptions (produced by studies using divided attention, alcohol, and benzodiazepines) are debatable, single dissociations between encoding and retrieval. The present experiments demonstrate a reversed dissociation, in which the same variable produced opposite effects when implemented at encoding and retrieval. At encoding, participants either solved anagrams of study words or read intact study words. At retrieval, participants likewise solved anagrams or read intact words prior to making recognition memory judgments. Compared with reading intact words, solving anagrams at encoding enhanced later recognition accuracy, whereas solving anagrams at test impaired accuracy. These results were obtained with old/new decisions (Experiment 1) and with confidence ratings (Experiment 2).

In four experiments, we examined the effect of manipulating study phase attention in a Stroop task on the extent of repetition priming in the lexical decision task (LDT). Experiment 1 replicated the immunity of the LDT to division of attention reported by Szymanski and MacLeod (1996), using a standard Stroop configuration. Response times to previously encountered words were identical regardless of whether the participants were required to read the words or name the color in which they were presented. Experiment 2 demonstrated that implementing the Stroop manipulation across separate visual objects reduced but did not eliminate priming of unattended words, provided the words remained in the attended region of the stimulus display. When this constraint was removed in Experiment 3, priming of unattended words disappeared. Experiment 4 demonstrated statistically equivalent priming for attended and unattended words when the Stroop manipulation remained in the same visual object but attention was directed to a single letter of the word. In all four experiments, the Stroop manipulation had a clear effect on recognition. These results qualify claims that the LDT might be immune to manipulations of study phase attention and suggest that the LDT has a lower threshold level of attention at encoding than do other standard implicit tests of memory.

A computational model of visual selective attention has been implemented to account for experimental findings on the Perceptual Load Theory (PLT) of attention. The model was designed based on existing neurophysiological findings on attentional processes with the objective to offer an explicit and biologically plausible formulation of PLT. Simulation results verified that the proposed model is capable of capturing the basic pattern of results that support the PLT as well as findings that are considered contradictory to the theory. Importantly, the model is able to reproduce the behavioral results from a dilution experiment, providing thus a way to reconcile PLT with the competing Dilution account. Overall, the model presents a novel account for explaining PLT effects on the basis of the low-level competitive interactions among neurons that represent visual input and the top-down signals that modulate neural activity. The implications of the model concerning the debate on the locus of selective attention as well as the origins of distractor interference in visual displays of varying load are discussed.

reversed ownership effect. Moreover, people high in conscientiousness showed an increase in this trend, suggesting a stronger other-consideration; (2) Self-chosen-self-owned stocks and other-chosen-self-owned stocks revealed no significant d-FRN discrepancy, showing no choosership effect beyond the ownership effect; (3) Other-chosen-self-owned stocks evoked a significantly stronger d-FRN discrepancy than other-chosen-other-owned stocks, demonstrating an ownership effect; (4) Self-chosen-other-owned stocks evoked a significantly stronger d-FRN discrepancy than other-chosen-other-owned stocks, revealing a choosership effect. These findings suggest that the ownership effect could be reversed by conscientiousness induced by perceived choosership in the agency relationship, while the choosership effect is attenuated and even disappears under the influence of perceived ownership.]]>

The ability to carry out two tasks simultaneously, dual tasking, is specifically impaired after traumatic brain injury (TBI). The aim of the present study was to investigate the neuronal correlates to this increased dual cost in chronic severe TBI patients (n = 10) compared to healthy controls (n = 11) using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) at 3 Tesla (T). The tasks were a visual search and a simple two-fingers button press motor task. Performance data demonstrated similar and significant dual task interference in both TBI patients and controls using a linear mixed model. However, principal component analysis showed that TBI patients and controls could be classified into different categories based on motor activity in the single compared to the dual task condition, thus reflecting the increased variability in the performance in the TBI group. Random effects between-group analysis demonstrated significantly reduced activation in the TBI group in both single task conditions in the occipital and posterior cingulate cortices, and for the visual task also in the thalami. This pattern was reversed in the dual task condition with significantly increased activation of a predominantly left lateralized prefrontal-anterior midline-parietal network in the TBI group compared to the controls. The increase in activation occurred within regions described to be engaged in healthy volunteers as dual task cost increases. This finding points to substitution, functional reorganization within the primary network subserving the task, following TBI, and demonstrates more effortful processing. Recruitment of these additional prefrontal resources may be connected to serial rather than parallel processing in low level dual tasking in TBI. Thus, in severe TBI, low level dual task performance depends on increased attentional and executive guidance.

A commonly held assumption is that processes underlying explicit and implicit memory are distinct. Recent evidence, however, suggests that they may interact more than previously believed. Using the remember-know procedure the current study examines the relation between recollection, a process thought to be exclusive to explicit memory, and performance on two implicit memory tasks, lexical decision and word stem completion. We found that, for both implicit tasks, words that were recollected were associated with greater priming effects than were words given a subsequent familiarity rating or words that had been studied but were not recognised (misses). Broadly, our results suggest that non-voluntary processes underlying explicit memory also benefit priming, a measure of implicit memory. More specifically, given that this benefit was due to a particular aspect of explicit memory (recollection), these results are consistent with some strength models of memory and with Moscovitch's (2008) proposal that recollection is a two-stage process, one rapid and unconscious and the other more effortful and conscious.

The recent surge in event-related fMRI studies of episodic memory has generated a wealth of information about the neural correlates of encoding and retrieval processes. However, interpretation of individual studies is hampered by methodological differences, and by the fact that sample sizes are typically small. We submitted results from studies of episodic memory in healthy young adults, published between 1998 and 2007, to a voxel-wise quantitative meta-analysis using activation likelihood estimation [Laird, A. R., McMillan, K. M., Lancaster, J. L., Kochunov, P., Turkeltaub, P. E., & Pardo, J. V., et al. (2005). A comparison of label-based review and ALE meta-analysis in the stroop task. Human Brain Mapping, 25, 6-21]. We conducted separate meta-analyses for four contrasts of interest: episodic encoding success as measured in the subsequent-memory paradigm (subsequent Hit vs. Miss), episodic retrieval success (Hit vs. Correct Rejection), objective recollection (e.g., Source Hit vs. Item Hit), and subjective recollection (e.g., Remember vs. Know). Concordance maps revealed significant cross-study overlap for each contrast. In each case, the left hemisphere showed greater concordance than the right hemisphere. Both encoding and retrieval success were associated with activation in medial-temporal, prefrontal, and parietal regions. Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and medial-temporal regions were more strongly involved in encoding, whereas left superior parietal and dorsolateral and anterior PFC regions were more strongly involved in retrieval. Objective recollection was associated with activation in multiple PFC regions, as well as multiple posterior parietal and medial-temporal areas, but not hippocampus. Subjective recollection, in contrast, showed left hippocampal involvement. In summary, these results identify broadly consistent activation patterns associated with episodic encoding and retrieval, and subjective and objective recollection, but also subtle differences among these processes.

This article reports a meta-analysis comparing the size of repetition priming in full and divided-attention (DA) conditions. The main analysis included 38 effect sizes (ES) extracted from 21 empirical studies, for a total of 2074 (full-attention) and 2148 (divided-attention) participants. The mean weighted ES was 0.357 (95% CI=0.278-0.435), indicating that divided attention produced a small, but significant, negative effect on implicit memory. Overall, the distinction between identification and production priming provided the best fit to empirical data (with the effect of DA being greater for production tests), whereas there was no significant difference between perceptual and conceptual priming. A series of focused contrasts suggested that word-stem completion might be influenced by lexical-conceptual processes, and that perceptual identification might involve a productive component. Implications for current theories of implicit memory are discussed.

Distraction during encoding has long been known to disrupt later memory performance. Contrary to this long-standing result, we show that detecting an infrequent target in a dual-task paradigm actually improves memory encoding for a concurrently presented word, above and beyond the performance reached in the full-attention condition. This absolute facilitation was obtained in 2 perceptual implicit tasks (lexical decision and word fragment completion) but not in a conceptual implicit task (semantic classification). In the case of recognition memory, the facilitation was relative, bringing accuracy in the divided attention condition up to the level of accuracy in the full attention condition. The findings follow from the hypothesis that the attentional boost effect reflects enhanced visual encoding of the study stimulus consequent to the transient orienting response to the dual-task target.

The distinction between identification and production processes suggests that implicit memory should require more attention resources when there is a competition between alternative solutions during the test phase. The present two experiments assessed this hypothesis by examining the effects of divided attention (DA) at encoding on the high- and low-response-competition versions of perceptual identification (Experiment 1) and lexical decision (Experiment 2). In both experiments, words presented in the high-response-competition condition had many orthographic neighbours and at least one higher-frequency neighbour, whereas words presented in the low-response-competition condition had few orthographic neighbours and no higher-frequency neighbour. Consistent with the predictions of the identification/production distinction, Experiment 1 showed that DA reduced repetition priming in the high-, but not in the low-response-competition version of perceptual identification; in contrast, DA had comparable effects in the two versions of lexical decision (Experiments 2). These findings provide the first experimental evidence in support of the hypothesis that perceptual identification, a task nominally based on identification processes, might involve a substantive production component.

Human information processing is characterized by bottlenecks that constrain throughput. These bottlenecks limit both what we can perceive and what we can act on in multitask settings. Although perceptual and response limitations are often attributed to independent information processing bottlenecks, it has recently been suggested that a common attentional limitation may be responsible for both. To date, however, evidence supporting the existence of such a "unified" bottleneck has been mixed. Here, we tested the unified bottleneck hypothesis using time-resolved fMRI. Experiment 1 isolated brain regions involved in the response selection bottleneck that limits speeded dual-task performance. These same brain regions were not only engaged by a perceptual encoding task in Experiment 2, their activity also tracked delays to a speeded decision-making task caused by concurrent perceptual encoding (Experiment 3). We conclude that a unified attentional bottleneck, including the inferior frontal junction, superior medial frontal cortex, and bilateral insula, temporally limits operations as diverse as perceptual encoding and decision-making.