文章旨在通过“请陌生人填写纸笔问卷”（n=68）和“向陌生人借手机打电话”（n=102）两次现场实验，探讨了核心自我评价、心理集体主义与个体求助预期之间的关系。结果表明，被试普遍会高估获助的难度；个体的核心自我评价与估计的获助难度负相关；核心自我评价与心理集体主义的交互作用会显著影响个体估计的获助难度，当心理集体主义较低时，核心自我评价与估计的获助难度之间关系更强。

Abstract When interpersonal transgressions occur, the involved parties try to understand what occurred and how justice should be restored. However, research has documented that victims and transgressors often diverge in their accounts of what transpired. In this paper, I review and summarize empirical research on victims' and transgressors' asymmetric perceptions of interpersonal transgressions and the different justice-restoring responses each party subsequently desires. By conceptualizing transgressions in terms of the social roles of victim and transgressor, I contend that justice responses can be thought of as attempts to correct inequitable distributions of material and symbolic resources. This social exchange perspective enables us to understand each party's motives and how various justice responses might satisfy them. I argue that because of these asymmetric perspectives, reconciliation is difficult, and conflict is liable to be perpetuated rather than resolved.

We investigate the possibility that victims and transgressors are predictably miscalibrated in their interpretation of a transgression, and that this has important implications for the process of forgiveness. Across 5 studies, we find that victims underestimate how much transgressors desire forgiveness. This is driven by a 2-part mediating mechanism: First, victims are more likely than transgressors to see the transgression as intentional, and second, this causes victims to believe transgressors feel less guilty than transgressors report feeling. Ultimately, this chain of asymmetries stymies the processes of forgiveness because victims tend to withhold forgiveness from those who actually desire it. The predicted effect emerged in the context of scenario studies (Studies 3 and 5), a real transgression that occurred in the lab (Study 4), transgressions from participants pasts (Study 1), and transgressions from the same day (Study 2). In Study 4, we describe a new procedure in which 1 participant commits a real transgression against another participant, providing an effective means for researchers to study real-time transgressions from the perspective of both parties involved. Furthermore, in Study 5, we found that when victims were encouraged to empathize with the transgressor, the asymmetries were attenuated, suggesting a means of overcoming this impediment to forgiveness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

Abstract How do people react to those who have helped them? The authors propose that a recipient's evaluation of a helper's intentions and the recipient's own attitudes about future interactions with the helper depend partly on the recipient's perceptions of how the helper decided to assist: on the basis of affect, of role, or of cost-benefit calculation. When a recipient perceives that the decision was based on affect (i.e., positive feelings about him or her), he or she will be more inclined toward future interaction and reciprocation than if he or she perceives the decision as based on role or cost-benefit calculation. It is proposed that these "decision modes" signal the helper's underlying attitudes about the recipient, which in turn, clarify their relationship. A boundary is also identified: The negative impact of apparent cost-benefit thinking is greatest when the amount of help provided is small. Predictions are confirmed in four studies of actual and experimentally manipulated helping episodes.

Nurses and support staff (N = 465; mostly women) participated in a survey study examining the relationships among helping, help seeking, quality of work relationships, and job and individual factors. The results were consistent with a model that linked relationship quality and helping behavior and linked 1 person's help seeking and the other's helping. The results were also consistent with a model that linked relationship quality and an individual's judgments about the costs of seeking help. Finally, there was support for relationships between help seeking and job demands and task interdependence, suggesting indirect relationships with helping.

ABSTRACT Although employee helping behaviors have been widely examined by organizational and human resource management scholars, relatively little is known about the antecedents and consequences of help-seeking in the workplace. Seeking to fill this gap, I draw from the social and counseling psychology literatures, as well as from research in epidemiology and health sociology to first conceptualize the notion of employee help-seeking and then to identify the variables and mechanisms potentially driving such behavior in work organizations. My critical review of this literature suggests that the application of existing models of help-seeking may offer limited predictive utility when applied to the workplace unless help-seeking is conceived as the outcome of a multi-level process. That in mind, I propose a model of employee help-seeking that takes into account the potential direct and cross-level moderating effects of a variety of situational factors (e.g., the nature of the particular problem, organizational norms, support climate) that might have differential influences on help-seeking behavior depending on the particular phase of the help-seeking process examined. Following this, I focus on two sets of help-seeking outcomes, namely, the implications of employee help-seeking on individual and group performance, and the impact of help-seeking on employee well-being. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of some of the more critical issues in employee help-seeking that remain to be explored (e.g., the timing of help solicitation) as well as the methodological challenges likely to be faced by those seeking to engage in such exploration.

This article looks at the trade-offs that gift givers and gift receivers make between desirability and feasibility using construal level theory as a framework. Focusing on the asymmetric distance from a gift that exists within giver-receiver dyads, the authors propose that, unlike receivers, givers construe gifts abstractly and therefore weight desirability attributes more than feasibility attributes. Support for this proposition emerges in studies examining giver and receiver mind-sets, as well as giver and receiver evaluations of gifts. Furthermore, givers do not choose gifts that maximize receiver happiness or other relationship goals even though givers believe they are doing so. Finally, the authors demonstrate that while givers are sensitive to their distance from the receiver, receivers are not sensitive to this distance.

Across four studies we demonstrate that people in a position to provide help tend to underestimate the role that embarrassment plays in decisions about whether or not to ask for help. As a result, potential helpers may overestimate the likelihood that people will ask for help (Studies 1 and 2). Further, helpers may be less inclined to allocate resources to underutilized support programs than help-seekers because they are less likely to attribute low levels of use to help-seekers’ concerns with embarrassment (Study 3). Finally, helpers may misjudge the most effective means of encouraging help-seeking behavior – emphasizing the practical benefits of asking for help, rather than attempting to assuage help-seekers’ feelings of discomfort (Study 4).

Previous research conducted in the United States has demonstrated that help-seekers fail to appreciate the embarrassment and awkwardness (i.e., social costs) targets would experience by saying “no” to a request for help. Underestimation of such social costs leads help-seekers to underestimate the likelihood that others will comply with their requests. We hypothesized that this error would be attenuated in a collectivistic culture. We conducted a naturalistic help-seeking study in the U.S. and China and found that Chinese help-seekers were more accurate than American help-seekers at predicting compliance. A supplementary scenario study in which we measured individual differences in collectivistic and individualistic orientations within a single culture provided converging evidence for the association between collectivism and expectations of compliance. In both cases, the association between collectivism (culturally defined or measured) and predicted compliance was mediated by participants' ratings of the social costs of saying “no”.

Research has shown a robust tendency for people to underestimate their ability to get others to comply with their requests. In five studies, we demonstrate that this underestimation-of-compliance effect is reduced when requesters offer money in exchange for compliance. In Studies 1 and 2, participants assigned to a no-incentive or monetary-incentive condition made actual requests of others. In both studies, requesters who offered no incentives underestimated the likelihood that those they approached would grant their requests; however, when requesters offered monetary incentives, this prediction error was mitigated. In Studies 3 5, we present evidence in support of a model to explain the underlying mechanism for this attenuation effect. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that offering monetary incentives activates a money-market frame. In Study 5, we find that this activation reduces the discomfort associated with asking, allowing requesters to more accurately assess the size of their request and, consequently, the likelihood of compliance.

ABSTRACT The purpose was to show that when a favor reduces a person's freedom, it arouses "psychological reactance," a motivational state aimed at restoration of this freedom. Ss, run individually, learned they were to make 1st-impression ratings of another S (confederate) and then were given a soft drink by this S, prior to making the ratings. In a 2 X 2 design, the 1st-impression ratings were given low or high importance; of each importance group received the favor, did not. An opportunity was presented for S to do a favor for the confederate after the ratings. In the low-importance condition, the favor increased the likelihood that S would perform a favor in turn for the confederate, and in high importance, the favor reduced the likelihood that S would perform the return favor.

Although individuals can derive substantial benefits from exchanging information and ideas, many individuals are reluctant to seek advice from others. We find that people are reticent to seek advice for fear of appearing incompetent. This fear, however, is misplaced. We demonstrate that individuals perceive those who seek advice as more competent than those who do not. This effect is moderated by task difficulty, advisor egocentrism, and advisor expertise. Individuals perceive those who seek advice as more competent when the task is difficult rather than when it is easy, when people seek advice from them personally rather than when they seek advice from others and when people seek advice from experts rather than from nonexperts or not at all. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision making .

Abstract Affective forecasts are used to anticipate the hedonic impact of future events and decide which events to pursue or avoid. We propose that because affective forecasters are more sensitive to outcome specifications of events than experiencers, the outcome specification values of an event, such as its duration, magnitude, probability, and psychological distance, can be used to predict the direction of affective forecasting errors: whether affective forecasters will overestimate or underestimate its hedonic impact. When specifications are positively correlated with the hedonic impact of an event, forecasters will overestimate the extent to which high specification values will intensify and low specification values will discount its impact. When outcome specifications are negatively correlated with its hedonic impact, forecasters will overestimate the extent to which low specification values will intensify and high specification values will discount its impact. These affective forecasting errors compound additively when multiple specifications are aligned in their impact: In Experiment 1, affective forecasters underestimated the hedonic impact of winning a smaller prize that they expected to win, and they overestimated the hedonic impact of winning a larger prize that they did not expect to win. In Experiment 2, affective forecasters underestimated the hedonic impact of a short unpleasant video about a temporally distant event, and they overestimated the hedonic impact of a long unpleasant video about a temporally near event. Experiments 3A and 3B showed that differences in the affect-richness of forecasted and experienced event underlie these differences in sensitivity to outcome specifications, the impact bias, and its reversal.

78 Adaptive emotional reactions to social rejection 78 Compare effects of rejection due to lack of competence and due to lack of warmth 78 Rejection due to lack of competence primarily leads to anger 78 Rejection due to lack of warmth primarily leads to sadness

Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to develop a new classification of helping behavior using the recipient’s solicitation and the helper’s proactiveness. Additionally, the authors explore helping motives for each of the forms of helping behavior that the authors identify. Design/methodology/approach – The authors examined relevant research and performed a theoretical analysis. Findings – The authors classified helping behavior into three distinct forms, including unsolicited proactive helping behavior, unsolicited reactive helping behavior, and solicited reactive helping behavior. Additionally, the authors claimed that unsolicited proactive helping behavior is an outcome of personality and dispositions, that unsolicited reactive helping behavior is a process of social and instrumental exchange, and that solicited reactive helping behavior is a product of functional motives. Practical implications – First, from the perspective of organizational justice, the authors recommend managers to take the form of helping behavior exhibited into consideration when evaluating employees’ helping behavior because certain forms of helping behavior require greater degrees of cooperation and sacrifices from the helper than other forms. Second, because employees who engage in high levels of unsolicited proactive helping behavior are likely to experience interrole conflict, the authors suggest that managers provide counseling and managerial support that help cope with emotional and psychological strain created by excessive role demands. Finally, findings of this study imply that managers need to create a workplace culture where employees can feel comfortable to solicit help when necessary. Originality/value – This is the first study that classifies helping behavior and helping motives using both of the helper’s and recipient’s perspectives.

Abstract We propose that in social interactions, appreciation of a helper depends on that helper's instrumentality: The more motivated one is to accomplish a goal, and the more one perceives a helper as able to facilitate that goal, the more appreciation one will feel for that helper. Four experiments supported this instrumentality-boost hypothesis by showing that beneficiaries felt more appreciation of their helpers while they were receiving help toward an ongoing task than after that task was completed or after the helper was deemed no longer instrumental. This finding held for both the positive side of appreciation (gratitude) and the negative side (feelings of indebtedness) and also across a range of relationships (complete strangers, newly acquainted partners, and friends). This pattern of appreciation is counterintuitive for helpers, and so a mismatch arises between the time courses of beneficiaries' experienced appreciation and helpers' expectations of appreciation.

Abstract In estimating whether they are likely to improve on a performance task, people lean on a performance heuristic. That is, people rely on their previous performance success as a positive cue when estimating their prospects for performance improvement. Participants whose initial performance was better--either at a darts game (Study 1) or an anagram task (Study 2)-bet more money (Study 1) or estimated a higher subjective likelihood (Study 2) that their subsequent performance would show a specified amount of improvement. Reliance on the heuristic was unwise, for initial performance did not positively predict (and, in fact, negatively predicted) performance improvement. Study 2 suggests that the performance heuristic emerges because forecasters engage in attribute substitution, naturally focusing on their demonstrated performance instead of whether they have already maxed out their potential for improvement on the task. Self-assessments of their initial performance mediated the performance heuristic, but focusing participants on how much performance potential lay before them disrupted it (Study 2). Study 3 showed that the performance heuristic is a general-purpose heuristic that is used not merely to predict one's own prospects for improvement, but the prospects for other improvement (e.g., mutual funds' rate of return) as well.

We review theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence. After reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments, we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self-targeting. We then discuss the large literature on in-kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations, including the "Samaritan's Dilemma," pecuniary effects, credit constraints, asymmetric information amongst agents, and political economy considerations. Our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-kind transfer programs but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases. Political economy considerations must also be part of the story.

Psychological costs associated with seeking help were studied. The specific helpseeking costs that were addressed included various costs specific to the recipient (e.g., whether receiving the help leads to less credit for successful outcomes), as well as costs associated with the helper (e.g., inconvenience). The findings suggest that persons deciding whether to seek help take into account not only their own costs and rewards but also the cost-reward contingencies of their helper. It was also predicted and found that subjects for whom the expected tasks were especially involving would seek less help, and that subjects who asked for more help would feel less comfortable about approaching the helper and would believe that the helper would perceive them as less competent.

Abstract Although much research considers how individuals manage their own emotions, less is known about the emotional benefits of regulating the emotions of others. We examined this topic in a 3-week study of an online platform providing training and practice in the social regulation of emotion. We found that participants who engaged more by helping others (vs. sharing and receiving support for their own problems) showed greater decreases in depression, mediated by increased use of reappraisal in daily life. Moreover, social regulation messages with more other-focused language (i.e., second-person pronouns) were (a) more likely to elicit expressions of gratitude from recipients and (b) predictive of increased use of reappraisal over time for message composers, suggesting perspective-taking enhances the benefits of practicing social regulation. These findings unpack potential mechanisms of socially oriented training in emotion regulation and suggest that by helping others regulate, we may enhance our own regulatory skills and emotional well-being.

While a great deal of research has shown that people with more money are somewhat happier than people with less money, our research demonstrates that how people spend their money also matters for their happiness. In particular, both correlational and experimental studies show that people who spend money on others report greater happiness. The benefits of such prosocial spending emerge among adults around the world, and the warm glow of giving can be detected even in toddlers. These benefits are most likely to emerge when giving satisfies one or more core human needs (relatedness, competence, and autonomy). The rewards of prosocial spending are observable in both the brain and the body and can potentially be harnessed by organizations and governments.

The authors propose that people adopt others' perspectives by serially adjusting from their own. As predicted, estimates of others' perceptions were consistent with one's own but differed in a manner consistent with serial adjustment (Study 1). Participants were slower to indicate that another's perception would be different from--rather than similar to--their own (Study 2). Egocentric biases increased under time pressure (Study 2) and decreased with accuracy incentives (Study 3). Egocentric biases also increased when participants were more inclined to accept plausible values encountered early in the adjustment process than when inclined to reject them (Study 4). Finally, adjustments tend to be insufficient, in part, because people stop adjusting once a plausible estimate is reached (Study 5).

Abstract Taking another person's perspective is widely presumed to increase interpersonal understanding. Very few experiments, however, have actually tested whether perspective taking increases accuracy when predicting another person's thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or other mental states. Those that do yield inconsistent results, or they confound accuracy with egocentrism. Here we report 25 experiments testing whether being instructed to adopt another person's perspective increases interpersonal insight. These experiments include a wide range of accuracy tests that disentangle egocentrism and accuracy, such as predicting another person's emotions from facial expressions and body postures, predicting fake versus genuine smiles, predicting when a person is lying or telling the truth, and predicting a spouse's activity preferences and consumer attitudes. Although a large majority of pretest participants believed that perspective taking would systematically increase accuracy on these tasks, we failed to find any consistent evidence that it actually did so. If anything, perspective taking decreased accuracy overall while occasionally increasing confidence in judgment. Perspective taking reduced egocentric biases, but the information used in its place was not systematically more accurate. A final experiment confirmed that getting another person's perspective directly, through conversation, increased accuracy but that perspective taking did not. Increasing interpersonal accuracy seems to require gaining new information rather than utilizing existing knowledge about another person. Understanding the mind of another person is therefore enabled by getting perspective, not simply taking perspective. (PsycINFO Database Record.

Helping behavior is a fundamental aspect of life in organizations, but subjective evaluations of giving and receiving help often diverge. What one employee believes is a generous act might seem insignificant to another. Such disparity in evaluations of helpful acts can negatively affect interpersonal cooperation among peer employees. In this article, I review research on the topic of subjective evaluation in social exchange, present a preliminary model of how members of organizations construct evaluations of help, and explain how these evaluations may shape their work experiences. I conclude by discussing the implications of this framework for research on employee exchange and outline some directions for future research.

<h2 class="secHeading" id="section_abstract">Abstract</h2><p id="">Across three studies, we identify an asymmetry between gift-givers&rsquo; and gift-recipients&rsquo; beliefs about the link between gift price and feelings of appreciation. Gift-givers expected a positive correlation between how much they spent on a gift and the extent to which gift-recipients would appreciate the gift because gift-givers assume that more expensive gifts convey a higher level of thoughtfulness. Gift-recipients, in contrast, reported no such association between gift price and their actual feelings of appreciation. This effect occurred regardless of whether the individual&rsquo;s role and the magnitude of the gift were manipulated or measured in the field. Taken together, these findings cast doubt on whether gift-givers can draw on their personal experience as gift-recipients in order to identify meaningful gifts for others.</p>

A series of studies tested whether people underestimate the likelihood that others will comply with their direct requests for help. In the first 3 studies, people underestimated by as much as 50% the likelihood that others would agree to a direct request for help, across a range of requests occurring in both experimental and natural field settings. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated that experimentally manipulating a person's perspective (as help seeker or potential helper) could elicit this underestimation effect. Finally, in Study 6, the authors explored the source of the bias, finding that help seekers were less willing than potential helpers were to appreciate the social costs of refusing a direct request for help (the costs of saying "no"), attending instead to the instrumental costs of helping (the costs of saying "yes").

Five studies show that gift recipients are more appreciative of gifts they explicitly request than those they do not. In contrast, gift givers assume that both solicited and unsolicited gifts will be equally appreciated. At the root of this dilemma is a difference of opinion about what purchasing an unsolicited gift signals: gift givers expect unsolicited gifts will be considered more thoughtful and considerate by their intended recipients than is actually the case . In our final two studies, we highlight two boundary conditions for this effect: identifying a specific gift and using money as a gift. When gift recipients request one specific gift, rather than providing a list of possible gifts, givers become more willing to purchase the requested gift (Study 4). Further, although givers believe that recipients do not appreciate receiving money as much as receiving a solicited gift, recipients feel the opposite about these two gift options (Study 5).

Sentimental value is the value derived from an emotionally-laden item's associations with significant others, or special events or times in one's life. The present research demonstrates that when faced with the choice between sentimentally valuable gifts and gifts with superficial attributes that match the preferences of the recipient, givers give the latter much more often than recipients would prefer to receive such gifts. This asymmetry appears to be driven by givers feeling relatively certain that preference-matching gifts will be well-liked by recipients, but relatively uncertain that the same is true for sentimentally valuable gifts. Three studies demonstrate this gift-giving mismatch and validate the proposed mechanism across a variety of gift-giving occasions and giver-receiver relationship types. The contribution of these findings to the gift-giving literature, as well as directions for future research, are discussed.

Analyzes ritual elements in social interaction. Combined effect of the rule of self-respect and the rule of considerateness; Definition of face-work in social interaction; Ritual roles of the self; Nature of the ritual order.

Abstract Although research has established that receiving expressions of gratitude increases prosocial behavior, little is known about the psychological mechanisms that mediate this effect. We propose that gratitude expressions can enhance prosocial behavior through both agentic and communal mechanisms, such that when helpers are thanked for their efforts, they experience stronger feelings of self-efficacy and social worth, which motivate them to engage in prosocial behavior. In Experiments 1 and 2, receiving a brief written expression of gratitude motivated helpers to assist both the beneficiary who expressed gratitude and a different beneficiary. These effects of gratitude expressions were mediated by perceptions of social worth and not by self-efficacy or affect. In Experiment 3, we constructively replicated these effects in a field experiment: A manager's gratitude expression increased the number of calls made by university fundraisers, which was mediated by social worth but not self-efficacy. In Experiment 4, a different measure of social worth mediated the effects of an interpersonal gratitude expression. Our results support the communal perspective rather than the agentic perspective: Gratitude expressions increase prosocial behavior by enabling individuals to feel socially valued. (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).

78 Affective forecasting about transgressions showed an overestimation level bias. 78 However, individuals correctly forecast that perpetrators would feel worse than victims. 78 Empathic forecasts also revealed an overestimation bias. 78 Moreover, a role bias (victim versus perpetrator) was evident for empathic forecasts.

Abstract The literature on help-giving behavior identifies individual-level factors that affect a help-giver decision to help another individual. Studying a context in which work was highly interdependent and helping was pervasive, however, we propose that this emphasis on the initial point of consent is incomplete. Instead, we find that workplace help-seeking and help-giving can be intertwined behaviors enacted through an organizational routine. Our research, therefore, shifts the theoretical emphasis from one of exchange and cost to one of joint engagement. More specifically, we move beyond the initial point of consent to recast help-seeking and help-giving as an interdependent process in which both the help-seeker and the helpgiver use cognitive and emotional moves to engage others and thereby propel a helping routine forward. In contrast to the existing literature, an organizational routines perspective also reveals that helping need not be limited to dyads and that the helping routine is shaped by the work context in which help is sought. Finally, we extend these insights to the literatures on routines and coordination and debate how our results might generalize even if helping is not part of an organizational routine.

Although scholars often assume that individuals seek out experts when they need help, recent research suggests that seeking help from experts can be costly. The authors propose that perceiving potential help providers as accessible or trustworthy can reduce the costs of seeking help and thus encourage individuals to seek help from experts. They further predict that perceptions of potential help providers' expertise, accessibility, and trustworthiness are shaped by their experience, formal roles, and organizational commitment. They investigated their theoretical model in a study of 146 nurses on the front lines of healthcare. They found that the decision to seek out help depends on help-seekers' perceptions of experts' accessibility and trustworthiness, and that these perceptions are predicted by experience, formal roles, and affective organizational commitment. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Numerous studies have shown that individuals' help-seeking behavior increases when a computerized helper is endowed with humanlike features in nonachievement contexts. In contrast, the current research suggests that anthropomorphic helpers are not universally conducive to help-seeking behavior in contexts of achievement, particularly among individuals who construe help seeking as a display of incompetence (i.e., entity theorists). Study 1 demonstrated that when entity theorists received help from an anthropomorphized (vs. a nonanthropomorphized) helper, they were more concerned about negative judgments from other people, whereas incremental theorists were not affected by anthropomorphic features. Study 2 showed that when help was provided by an anthropomorphized (vs. a nonanthropomorphized) helper, entity theorists were less likely to seek help, even at the cost of lower performance. In contrast, incremental theorists' help-seeking behavior and task performance were not affected by anthropomorphism. This research deepens the current understanding of the role of anthropomorphic computerized helpers in online learning contexts.

Abstract Four studies document an asymmetry in givers' and receivers' evaluations of gifts: Givers underestimate the extent to which receivers perceive partial (but more desirable) gifts to be thoughtful, valuable, and worthy of appreciation. Study 1 documents this asymmetry and suggests that givers underestimate the extent to which partial gifts signal thoughtfulness to receivers. Study 2 replicates this asymmetry in the context of a real gift exchange among friends. Study 3 shows that this asymmetry arises because givers believe that purchasing partial gifts is a greater violation of gift-giving norms than do receivers, leading givers to expect that partial gifts will damage receivers' perceptions of a gift's value. Study 4 offers an intervention that induces givers to select the (partial) gifts that receivers prefer more than givers expect: framing a gift's separate components as complete units.

Individuals do not seek help, even when help is needed and available, because help seeking implies incompetence and dependence, and therefore is related to powerlessness. It was hypothesized that gender, status, and organizational norms affect the importance of maintaining and accruing power, which in turn affect help seeking behaviors. A laboratory and a field study showed that there was more help seeking between equal-status than unequal-status individuals. Further, both studies revealed that males sought more help in collective than individualistic organizational norms, though the trend was not apparent for females. These results shed light on the psychological mechanisms underlying help seeking behaviors and have practical implications for developing steps to foster help seeking in

Proactivelyseeking help from others involves “social costs” because the help seeker appears incompetent, dependent, and inferior to others. This article hypothesizes that these costs are especially threatening when the help seeker is male and in a male-oriented occupational role, when the helper is in a higher or lower status role than the help seeker, and when the task is novel and central to the organization’s core competence. A field study examined physician and nurse help seeking regarding a new computer system within a large hospital. The results showed that individuals reported less help seeking when theywere male, in male-oriented occupations, and when the task was central to the organization’s core competence. Perceived social costs mediated these effects.

Across three experiments, we document a robust asymmetry between communicators’ and targets’ judgments of and preferences for deception. Communicators are more likely to focus on whether a particular communication tactic reflects a moral transgression, whereas targets are more likely to focus on whether a particular communication tactic helps or harms them. As a result, communicators often believe that omitting information is more ethical than telling a prosocial lie, whereas targets often believe the opposite. We document this asymmetry within the context of healthcare discussions, employee layoffs, and economic games, among both practitioners (i.e., oncologists and cancer patients) and lay people. We identify the moderators of and downstream consequences of this asymmetry. We conclude by discussing psychological and practical implications for medicine, management, behavioral ethics, and human communication.

No abstract is available for this item.

Prior research has shown that people mispredict their own behavior and preferences across affective states. When people are in an affectively "cold" state, they fail to fully appreciate how "hot" states will affect their own preferences and behavior. When in hot states, they underestimate the influence of those states and, as a result, overestimate the stability of their current preferences. The same biases apply interpersonally; for example, people who are not affectively aroused underappreciate the impact of hot states on other people's behavior. After reviewing research documenting such intrapersonal and interpersonal hot-cold empathy gaps, this article examines their consequences for medical, and specifically cancer-related, decision making, showing, for example, that hot-cold empathy gaps can lead healthy persons to expose themselves excessively to health risks and can cause health care providers to undertreat patients for pain.

Abstract Making decisions for the self and providing advice to others are common in daily life. The current research examines the differences in weight that people attach to desirability and feasibility when deciding for themselves versus others. Based on construal level theory, we propose that in a decision-making process, individuals who decide for others tend to focus more on desirability than on feasibility compared with those who decide for themselves. Across five experiments, the predicted self-other differences were observed in preference in the decision stage (Experiments 1a and 1b), information seeking in the predecision stage (Experiment 2), and information recall in the postdecision stage (Experiments 3a and 3b). These findings show that decision behaviors are determined by the decision target (i.e., for whom such decisions are made).

It is suggested that perceptions of the self, of others, and of the relationship between self and others are very powerful and that this influence is clearly reflected in culture. The independent view of the self, represented in Western culture, is contrasted with the interdependent view in many other cultures. (SLD)

Whether people seek help depends on their estimations of both the likelihood and the value of getting it. Although past research has carefully examined how accurately help-seekers predict whether their help requests will be granted, it has failed to examine how accurately help-seekers predict the value of that help, should they receive it. In this paper, we focus on how accurately help-seekers predict a key determinant of help value, namely, helper effort. In four studies, we find that (a) helpers put more effort into helping than help-seekers expect (Studies 1–4); (b) people do not underestimate the effort others will expend in general, but rather only the effort others will expend helping them (Study 2); and (c) this underestimation of help effort stems from help-seekers’ failure to appreciate the discomfort—in particular, the guilt—that helpers would experience if they did not do enough to help (Studies 3 & 4).

Four studies examined help-seekers’ beliefs about how past refusals affect future compliance. In Study 1, help-seekers were more likely than potential helpers to believe that a previous refusal would lead a potential helper to deny a subsequent request of similar size. Study 2 replicated this effect and found that help-seekers underestimated the actual compliance rate of potential helpers who had previously refused to help. Studies 3 and 4 explain this asymmetry. Whereas potential helpers’ willingness to comply with a subsequent request stems from the discomfort of rejecting others not once, but twice, help-seekers rely on dispositional attributions of helpfulness to estimate the likelihood of hearing “yes” from someone who has previously told them "no".

When making affective forecasts, people commit the impact bias. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on their affective experience. In three studies we show that people also commit the impact bias when making empathic forecasts, affective forecasts for someone else. They overestimate the impact an emotional event has on someone else's affective experience (Study 1), they do so for friends and strangers (Study 2), and they do so when other sources of information are available (Study 3). Empathic forecasting accuracy, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's actual affective experience, was lower than between-person forecasting correspondence, the correlation between one person's empathic forecast and another person's affective forecast. Empathic forecasts do not capture other people's actual experience very well but are similar to what other people forecast for themselves. This may enhance understanding between people.

People see themselves differently from how they see others. They are immersed in their own sensations, emotions, and congnitions at the same time that their experience of others is dominated by what can be observed externally. This basic asymmetry has broad consequences. It leads people to judge themselves and their own behavior differently from how they judge others and those others' behavior. Often, those differences produce disagreements and conflict. Understanding the psychological basis of those differences may help mitigate some of their negative effects.

Current work on cooperation is focused on the theory of reciprocal altruism. However, reciprocity is just one way of getting a return on an investment in altruism and is difficult to apply to many examples. Reciprocity theory addresses how animals respond dynamically to others so as to cooperate without being exploited. I discuss how introducing differences in individual generosity together with partner choice into models of reciprocity can lead to an escalation in altruistic behaviour. Individuals may compete for the most altruistic partners and non-altruists may become ostracized. I refer to this phenomenon as competitive altruism and propose that it can represent a move away from the dynamic responsiveness of reciprocity. Altruism may be rewarded in kind, but rewards may be indirectly accrued or may not involve the return of altruism at all, for example if altruists tend to be chosen as mates. This variety makes the idea of competitive altruism relevant to behaviours which cannot be explained by reciprocity. I consider whether altruism might act as a signal of quality, as proposed by the handicap principle. I suggest that altruistic acts could make particularly effective signals because of the inherent benefits to receivers. I consider how reciprocity and competitive altruism are related and how they may be distinguished.

The act of forecasting one's behavior or performance is both commonplace and consequential, but it is also difficult. Previous research has identified a host of systematic forecasting errors. We suggest that existing findings can be better synthesized, and future research can proceed in a less piecemeal fashion, through the introduction of a general model that describes how forecasts unfold. In our salience-assessment-weighting (SAW) model, we outline three steps that describe how people translate information at their disposal into an accurate forecast of a future outcome. Dimensions potentially relevant to the outcome become salient; one's standing on that dimension must be accurately assessed; and one must appropriately weight the importance of that dimension to translate it into a forecast. We illustrate how this SAW model is helpful in unifying previous research findings, identifying how and when forecasts go astray, and suggesting questions for future research.

Evidence from four studies demonstrates that social observers tend to perceive a “false consensus” with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses. A related bias was shown to exist in the observers' social inferences. Thus, raters estimated particular responses to be relatively common and relatively unrevealing concerning the actors' distinguishing personal dispositions when the responses in question were similar to the raters' own responses; responses differing from those of the rater, by contrast, were perceived to be relatively uncommon and revealing of the actor. These results were obtained both in questionnaire studies presenting subjects with hypothetical situations and choices and in authentic conflict situations. The implications of these findings for our understanding of social perception phenomena and for our analysis of the divergent perceptions of actors and observers are discussed. Finally, cognitive and perceptual mechanisms are proposed which might account for distortions in perceived consensus and for corresponding biases in social inference and attributional processes.

ABSTRACT Conducted 5 experiments to assess biases in availability of information in memory and attributions of responsibility for the actions and decisions that occurred during a previous group interaction. The S populations sampled included naturally occurring discussion groups (of undergraduates), 37 married couples, 74 female and 84 male players on intercollegiate basketball teams, and groups of undergraduates assembled in the laboratory. Data provide consistent evidence for egocentric biases in availability and attribution: The S's own contributions to a joint product were more readily available, i.e., more frequently and easily recalled, and Ss accepted more responsibility for a group product than other participants attributed to them. In addition, statements attributed to the self were recalled more accurately and the availability bias was attenuated, though not eliminated, when the group product was negatively evaluated. When another S's contributions were made more available to the S via a selective retrieval process, this S allocated correspondingly more responsibility for the group decisions to the coparticipant. The determinants and pervasiveness of the egocentric biases are considered. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Author(s): Schroeder, J; Waytz, A; Epley, N

Emotional perspective taking involves people's attempts to estimate the attitudes, preferences, and behaviors of other people who are in different emotional situations. We propose a dual judgment model in which perspective takers first predict what their own reactions would be to different emotional situations, and, second, adjust these self-predictions to accommodate perceived differences between themselves and others. Prior literature has focused on egocentric biases in the second judgment, perceived differences and similarities between the self and others. We propose that significant errors in emotional perspective taking often arise from the first judgment, people’s predictions of what their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors would be in different emotional situations. Specifically, people exhibit “empathy gaps,” underestimating how much emotional situations influence their own attitudes, preferences, and behaviors. We review evidence that provides support for (a) the dual judgment model of emotional perspective taking, (b) the occurrence of empathy gaps in self-predictions, and (c) the occurrence of empathy gaps in social predictions that are mediated by empathy gaps in self-judgments. We discuss implications of empathy gaps in emotional perspective taking for social behavior, social judgment, and for other forms of perspective taking and affective forecasting.

A substantial body of research on affective forecasting has found that people often overestimate the affective impact of future events. Levine, Lench, Kaplan, and Safer (2012) argued that whereas people may overestimate the duration of their emotional responses, they do not overestimate the initial intensity of these responses as much as previous research has suggested. We suggest that Levine et al. (a) failed to review or include in their meta-analysis many studies that directly contradict their claim, (b) used a faulty classification scheme, (c) collapsed across conditions that were meant to (and did) produce opposing effects, and (d) miscoded some of the studies they did include. When these errors are corrected, their claim is clearly not supported. Levine et al. also reported the results of 4 studies, which are open to alternative explanations. The impact bias is alive and well.

Abstract Gratitude is a typical social-moral emotion that plays a crucial role in maintaining human cooperative interpersonal relationship. Although neural correlates of gratitude have been investigated, the neurocognitive processes that lead to gratitude, namely, the representation and integration of its cognitive antecedents, remain largely unknown. Here, we combined fMRI and a human social interactive task to investigate how benefactor's cost and beneficiary's benefit, two critical antecedents of gratitude, are encoded and integrated in beneficiary's brain, and how the neural processing of gratitude is converted to reciprocity. A coplayer decided whether to help a human participant (either male or female) avoid pain at his/her own monetary cost; the participants could transfer monetary points to the benefactor with the knowledge that the benefactor was unaware of this transfer. By independently manipulating monetary cost and the degree of pain reduction, we could identify the neural signatures of benefactor's cost and recipient's benefit and examine how they were integrated. Recipient's self-benefit was encoded in reward-sensitive regions (e.g., ventral striatum), whereas benefactor-cost was encoded in regions associated with mentalizing (e.g., temporoparietal junction). Gratitude was represented in perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC), the strength of which correlated with trait gratitude. Dynamic causal modeling showed that the neural signals representing benefactor-cost and self-benefit passed to pgACC via effective connectivities, suggesting an integrative role of pgACC in generating gratitude. Moreover, gyral ACC plays an intermediary role in converting gratitude representation into reciprocal behaviors. Our findings provide a neural mechanistic account of gratitude and its role in social-moral life. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Gratitude plays an integral role in subjective well-being and harmonious interpersonal relationships. However, the neurocognitive processes through which various components and antecedents of gratitude are integrated remain largely unknown. We developed a new interpersonal paradigm to independently and parametrically manipulate two antecedents of gratitude in a helping context, namely, the benefit to beneficiary and the cost to benefactor, to examine their representation and integration in the beneficiary's brain using fMRI. We found the neural encoding of self-benefit and benefactor-cost in reward- and mentalizing-related brain areas, respectively. More importantly, by examining effective connectivity, we showed that these componential signals are passed to perigenual anterior cingulate cortex, which tracks trial-by-trial gratitude levels. Our study thus provides a neural mechanistic account of gratitude.

Maintaining equitable social relations often requires reciprocating "in kind" for others' prosocial favors. Such in-kind reciprocity requires assessing the value of a prosocial action, an assessment that can lead to egocentric biases in perceived value between favor givers versus favor receivers. In any prosocial exchange, 1 person (the giver) incurs a cost to provide a benefit for another person (the receiver). Six experiments suggest that givers may attend more to the costs they incur in performing a prosocial act than do receivers, who tend to focus relatively more on the benefits they receive. Givers may therefore expect to be reciprocated on the basis of the costs they incur, whereas receivers actually reciprocate primarily on the basis of the benefit they receive. This research identifies 1 challenge to maintaining a sense of equity in social relations and predicts when people are likely to feel fairly versus unfairly valued in their relationships.

react-text: 339 Millikan contrasts her substance-based view of concepts with “descriptionism” according to which description determines what falls under a concept. Focusing on her discussion of the role of language in the acquisition of concepts, I argue that descriptions cannot be separated from perception in the ways Millikan's view requires. /react-text react-text: 340 /react-text