Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. With a few exceptions, these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In three large experiments, we investigate whether social framing effects are also present in Dictator games. Since only one of the subjects makes a decision, the frame can affect behavior merely through preferences. In all the experiments, we find that behavior is insensitive to social framing. We discuss how to reconcile the absence of social framing effects in Dictator games with the presence of social framing effects in Ultimatum games.

In this study, the complex relationships among decision makers’ roles, self-esteem, and the frameworks of decision tasks are explored. 111 undergraduate subjects with high or low self-esteem were asked to either make decisions for themselves or make decisions for others on a risk preference questionnaire involving twelve items under gain or loss task frameworks. Implicit self-esteem levels were tested with IAT technology. The results of the experiment show that (1) Subjects were more willing to take risks when making decisions for others than when making decisions for themselves in the gain framework but not in the loss framework; (2) Subjects were more willing to take risks when making decisions for others than when making decisions for themselves if they had low implicit self-esteem but not if they had high implicit self-esteem; (3) There was no significant interaction between task framework and level of implicit self-esteem, and no significant interaction among task framework, level of implicit self-esteem, and decision maker’s role. These results support the general findings from Hsee & Weber (1997); Liu, Chen, Lu, and Wang (2010); and Xu and Xie (2011), but they are inconsistent with the findings from Wallach and Wing (1968); Stone, Yates, and Caruthers (2002); and Guo et al. (2010). The complicated interactions among task framework, level of implicit self-esteem, and decision maker’s role are discussed based on the relevant findings. ]]>

The authors investigate the effect of power differences and associated expectations in social decision making. Using a modified ultimatum game, the authors show that allocators lower their offers to recipients when the power difference shifts in favor of the allocator. Remarkably, however, when recipients are completely powerless, offers increase. This effect is mediated by a change in framing of the situation: When the opponent is without power, feelings of social responsibility are evoked. On the recipient side, the authors show that recipients do not anticipate these higher outcomes resulting from powerlessness. They prefer more power over less, expecting higher outcomes when they are more powerful, especially when less power entails powerlessness. Results are discussed in relation to empathy gaps and social responsibility.

The amount of money a person was willing to forgo in order to give 75 dollars to another person decreased as a hyperbolic function of the perceived social distance between them. Similar hyperbolic functions have previously been shown to describe both time and probability discounting.

A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution.

3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) produces "prosocial" effects that contribute to its recreational use. Few studies have examined the cognitive and behavioral mechanisms by which MDMA produces these effects. Here we examined the effect of MDMA on a specific prosocial effect, i.e. generosity, using a task in which participants make decisions about whether they or another person will receive money (Welfare Trade-Off Task; WTT).

What are the determinants of altruism? While economists assume that altruism is mainly driven by fairness norms, social psychologists consider empathy to be a key motivator for altruistic behavior. To unite these two theories, we conducted an experiment in which we compared behavior in a standard economic game that assesses altruism (the so-called Dictator Game) with a Dictator Game in which participants' behavioral choices were preceded either by an empathy induction or by a control condition without empathy induction. The results of this within-subject manipulation show that the empathy induction substantially increased altruistic behavior. Moreover, the increase in experienced empathy predicted over 40% of the increase in sharing behavior. These data extend standard economic theories that altruism is based on fairness considerations, by showing that empathic feelings can be a key motivator for altruistic behavior in economic interactions.

We introduce an incentivized elicitation method for identifying social norms that uses simple coordination games. We demonstrate that concern for the norms we elicit and for money predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game, including data from a novel experiment and from prior published laboratory studies, that are unaccounted for by most current theories of social preferences. Moreover, we find that the importance of social norm compliance and of monetary considerations is fairly constant across different experiments. This consistency allows prediction of treatment effects across experiments, and implies that subjects have a generally stable willingness to sacrifice money to take behaviors that are socially appropriate.

Minimizing the costs that others impose upon oneself and upon those in whom one has a fitness stake, such as kin and allies, is a key adaptive problem for many organisms. Our ancestors regularly faced such adaptive problems (including homicide, bodily harm, theft, mate poaching, cuckoldry, reputational damage, sexual aggression, and the infliction of these costs on one’s offspring, mates, coalition partners, or friends). One solution to this problem is to impose retaliatory costs on an aggressor so that the aggressor and other observers will lower their estimates of the net benefits to be gained from exploiting the retaliator in the future. We posit that humans have an evolved cognitive system that implements this strategy – deterrence – which we conceptualize as a revenge system. The revenge system produces a second adaptive problem: losing downstream gains from the individual on whom retaliatory costs have been imposed. We posit, consequently, a subsidiary computational system designed to restore particular relationships after cost-imposing interactions by inhibiting revenge and motivating behaviors that signal benevolence for the harmdoer. The operation of these systems depends on estimating the risk of future exploitation by the harmdoer and the expected future value of the relationship with the harmdoer. We review empirical evidence regarding the operation of these systems, discuss the causes of cultural and individual differences in their outputs, and sketch their computational architecture.

In this article, we assess to what extent decision making is affected by the language in which a given problem is presented (native vs. foreign). In particular, we aim to ask whether the impact of various heuristic biases in decision making is diminished when the problems are presented in a foreign language. To this end, we report four main studies in which more than 700 participants were tested on different types of individual decision making problems. In the first study, we replicated Keysar et al.'s (2012) recent observation regarding the foreign language effect on framing effects related to loss aversion. In the second section, we assessed whether the foreign language effect is present in other types of framing problems that involve psychological accounting biases rather than gain/loss dichotomies. In the third section, we studied the foreign language effect in several key aspects of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. In the fourth study, we assessed the presence of a foreign language effect in the cognitive reflection test, a test that includes logical problems that do not carry emotional connotations. The absence of such an effect in this test suggests that foreign language leads to a reduction of heuristic biases in decision making across a range of decision making situations and provide also some evidence about the boundaries of the phenomenon. We explore several potential factors that may underlie the foreign language effect in decision making.

Four studies investigate whether decisions for others produce more creative solutions than do decisions for the self and if construal level explains this relation. In Study 1, participants carried out a structured imagination task by drawing an alien for a story that they would write, or alternatively for a story that someone else would write. As expected, drawing an alien for someone else produced a more creative alien. In Studies 2a and 2b, construal level (i.e., psychological distance) was independently manipulated. Participants generated more creative ideas on behalf of distant others than on behalf of either close others or themselves. Finally, in Study 3, a classic insight problem was investigated. Participants deciding for others were more likely to solve the problem; furthermore, this result was mediated by psychological distance. These findings demonstrate that people are more creative for others than for themselves and shed light on differences in self-other decision making.

Emotional empathy and prosocial behavior were assessed in older, middle-aged, and young adults. Participants watched two films depicting individuals in need, one uplifting and the other distressing. Physiological responses were monitored during the films, and participants rated their levels of emotional empathy following each film. As a measure of prosocial behavior, participants were given an additional payment they could contribute to charities supporting the individuals in the films. Age-related linear increases were found for both emotional empathy (self-reported empathic concern and cardiac and electrodermal responding) and prosocial behavior (size of contribution) across both films and in self-reported personal distress to the distressing film. Empathic concern and cardiac reactivity to both films, along with personal distress to the distressing film only, were associated with greater prosocial behavior. Empathic concern partially mediated the age-related differences in prosocial behavior. Results are discussed in terms of our understanding both of adult development and of the nature of these vital aspects of human emotion.

People are capable of thinking about the future, the past, remote locations, another person's perspective, and counterfactual alternatives. Without denying the uniqueness of each process, it is proposed that they constitute different forms of traversing psychological distance. Psychological distance is egocentric: Its reference point is the self in the here and now, and the different ways in which an object might be removed from that point-in time, in space, in social distance, and in hypotheticality-constitute different distance dimensions. Transcending the self in the here and now entails mental construal, and the farther removed an object is from direct experience, the higher (more abstract) the level of construal of that object. Supporting this analysis, research shows (a) that the various distances are cognitively related to each other, (b) that they similarly influence and are influenced by level of mental construal, and (c) that they similarly affect prediction, preference, and action.

The tri-reference point (TRP) theory takes into account minimum requirements (MR), the status quo (SQ), and goals (G) in decision making under risk. The 3 reference points demarcate risky outcomes and risk perception into 4 functional regions: success (expected value of x ≥ G), gain (SQ < × < G), loss (MR ≤ x < SQ), and failure (x < MR). The psychological impact of achieving or failing to achieve these reference points is rank ordered as MR > G > SQ. We present TRP assumptions and value functions and a mathematical formalization of the theory. We conducted empirical tests of crucial TRP predictions using both explicit and implicit reference points. We show that decision makers consider both G and MR and give greater weight to MR than G, indicating failure aversion (i.e., the disutility of a failure is greater than the utility of a success in the same task) in addition to loss aversion (i.e., the disutility of a loss is greater than the utility of the same amount of gain). Captured by a double-S shaped value function with 3 inflection points, risk preferences switched between risk seeking and risk aversion when the distribution of a gamble straddled a different reference point. The existence of MR (not G) significantly shifted choice preference toward risk aversion even when the outcome distribution of a gamble was well above the MR. Single reference point based models such as prospect theory cannot consistently account for these findings. The TRP theory provides simple guidelines for evaluating risky choices for individuals and organizational management.

Tri-reference point (TRP) theory (Wang, 2008a; Wang & Johnson, 2012) makes use of three reference points, minimum requirement (MR), status quo (SQ), and goal (G) to demarcate choice outcome space into four functional regions: failure, loss, gain, and success. Based on the priority order of the reference points: MR > G > SQ, the model derives from the four regions a double S-shaped value function, connected at the point of SQ. Risk preferences switched between risk-seeking and risk-aversion when the distribution of a gamble straddles a different reference point and resulted in gain-loss and success-failure asymmetries. In sum, the basic task in making risky choices is to maximize the likelihood of reaching a goal and minimize the likelihood of falling below the MR at the same time. The TRP theory synthetically combines the powerful concept of mean-variance used in statistics and finance with the concept of reference points in the behavioral decision making literature takes into consideration the mean-variance distribution of a choice option and its relationship with the three reference points in order to reach adaptive decisions. In this paper, we introduce the basic assumptions, operational principles, experimental tests of the TRP theory, and compare the TRP theory against expected utility theory, and prospect theory. We also discuss practical guidance and implications of the TRP theory for managerial decision making.

The base-rate neglect refers to the phenomenon that individuals tend to underestimate or neglect base-rate information in probability judgment and decision-making. The phenomenon is widespread in daily behavioral decision-making. Since the concept of base-rate neglect has been proposed, the studies of its psychological mechanisms have reached well-documented results and conclusions. But the exploration for its influence factors turned out to be a conservative, thus few researches tried to shed light on its application. What’s more, there is little empirical study of base-rate neglect in China. Therefore, this study aims to verify the base-rate neglect in real decision-making situations, and explore how the psychological distance would affect the base-rate neglect. Study 1 carried out one experiment with 2 (temporal distance: distant vs. near) × 2 (base rate: high vs. low) between-subject design to examine the moderate effect of temporal distance. A total of 121 students were recruited. The results showed that the temporal distance affected the base-rate neglect under the selection circumstances, and that the base-rate neglect effect was weakened along with the increasing temporal distance, thus individuals tended to make probability judgments based on base rate. Similarly, study 2 explored the effect of spatial distance on the base-rate neglect with 2 (spatial distance: distant vs. near) × 2 (base rate: high vs. low) between-subject design. A total of 122 students were recruited. The results indicated that the spatial distance affected the base-rate neglect in the selection circumstances, and that the base-rate neglect effect was weakened along with the increasing spatial distance, thus individuals tended to make probability judgments based on base rate. The same with the pattern in study 1 and study 2, study 3 explored the effect of social distance on the base-rate neglect with 2 (social distance: distant vs. near) × 2 (base rate: high vs. low) between-subject design. A total of 144 students were recruited. It was found that the social distance affected the base-rate neglect in the selection circumstances, and that the base-rate neglect effect was weakened along with the increasing social distance, thus individuals tended to make probability judgments based on base rate. In sum, three studies provided consistent evidences that different dimensions of psychological distance, namely temporal distance, spatial distance and social distance could affect the relative weight according to case description information as well as base rate information in the base-rate neglect situations.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has engaged in an extended period of military conflict, resulting in 4.1 million men and women serving in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn. Whereas not all servicemembers experience mental health issues, many have experienced difficulties with readjusting to the civilian world, often requiring mental health services both inside and outside of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Issues related to stigma and military culture contribute to barriers not only for veterans seeking treatment but for clinicians providing services who may lack experience with military culture. This article provides a framework to use military concepts in clinical sessions to further therapeutic engagement with the military/veteran client.