Negative social feedback often generates aggressive feelings and behavior. Prior studies have investigated the neural basis of negative social feedback, but the underlying neural mechanisms of aggression regulation following negative social feedback remain largely undiscovered. In the current study, participants viewed pictures of peers with feedback (positive, neutral or negative) to the participant's personal profile. Next, participants responded to the peer feedback by pressing a button, thereby producing a loud noise toward the peer, as an index of aggression. Behavioral analyses showed that negative feedback led to more aggression (longer noise blasts). Conjunction neuroimaging analyses revealed that both positive and negative feedback were associated with increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC) and bilateral insula. In addition, more activation in the right dorsal lateral PFC (dlPFC) during negative feedback vs neutral feedback was associated with shorter noise blasts in response to negative social feedback, suggesting a potential role of dlPFC in aggression regulation, or top-down control over affective impulsive actions. This study demonstrates a role of the dlPFC in the regulation of aggressive social behavior.

Attention selects stimuli for cognitive processing, and the mechanisms that underlie the process of attentional selection have been a major topic of psychological research for over 30 years. From this research, it has been well documented that attentional selection can proceed both voluntarily, driven by visual search goals, and involuntarily, driven by the physical salience of stimuli. In this review, I provide a conceptual framework for attentional control that emphasizes the need for stimulus selection to promote the survival and wellbeing of an organism. I argue that although goal-driven and salience-driven mechanisms of attentional selection fit within this framework, a central component that is missing is a mechanism of attentional selection that is uniquely driven by learned associations between stimuli and rewards. I go on to review recent evidence for such a value-driven mechanism of attentional selection, and describe how this mechanism functions independently of the well-documented salience-driven and goal-driven mechanisms. I conclude by arguing that reward learning modifies the attentional priority of stimuli, allowing them to compete more effectively for selection even when nonsalient and task-irrelevant.

Attention is automatically drawn to stimulus features previously associated with reward, a phenomenon referred to as value-driven attentional capture. To date, value-driven attentional capture has been studied exclusively by manipulating stimulus-reward contingencies in an experimental setting. Although practical and intuitively appealing, this approach poses theoretical challenges to understanding the broader impact of reward on attention in everyday life. These challenges arise from the fact that associative learning between a given visual feature and reward is not limited to the context of an experiment, yet such extra-experimental learning is completely ignored in studies of value-driven attention. How is it, then, that experimentally established reward associations even influence attention, seemingly overshadowing any prior learning about particular features and rewards? And how do the effects of this experimental learning persist over long periods of time, in spite of all the intervening experiences outside of the lab that might interfere with the learning? One potential answer to these questions is that value-driven attention is context specific, such that different contexts evoke different value priors that the attention system uses to assign priority. In the present study, I directly tested this hypothesis. The results show that the same stimulus feature either does or does not capture attention, depending on whether it has been rewarded specifically in the context within which it appears. The findings provide insight into how multiple reward structures can efficiently guide attention with minimal interference.

There is growing consensus that reward plays an important role in the control of attention. Until recently, reward was thought to influence attention indirectly by modulating task-specific motivation and its effects on voluntary control over selection. Such an account was consistent with the goal-directed (endogenous) versus stimulus-driven (exogenous) framework that had long dominated the field of attention research. Now, a different perspective is emerging. Demonstrations that previously reward-associated stimuli can automatically capture attention even when physically inconspicuous and task-irrelevant challenge previously held assumptions about attentional control. The idea that attentional selection can be value driven, reflecting a distinct and previously unrecognized control mechanism, has gained traction. Since these early demonstrations, the influence of reward learning on attention has rapidly become an area of intense investigation, sparking many new insights. The result is an emerging picture of how the reward system of the brain automatically biases information processing. Here, I review the progress that has been made in this area, synthesizing a wealth of recent evidence to provide an integrated, up-to-date account of value-driven attention and some of its broader implications.

Paying attention to stimuli that predict a reward outcome is important for an organism to survive and thrive. When visual stimuli are associated with tangible, extrinsic rewards such as money or food, these stimuli acquire high attentional priority and come to automatically capture attention. In humans and other primates, however, many behaviors are not motivated directly by such extrinsic rewards, but rather by the social feedback that results from performing those behaviors. In the present study, I examine whether positive social feedback can similarly influence attentional bias. The results show that stimuli previously associated with a high probability of positive social feedback elicit value-driven attentional capture, much like stimuli associated with extrinsic rewards. Unlike with extrinsic rewards, however, such stimuli also influence task-specific motivation. My findings offer a potential mechanism by which social reward shapes the information that we prioritize when perceiving the world around us.

Which stimuli we pay attention to is strongly influenced by learning. Stimuli previously associated with reward outcomes, such as money and food, and stimuli previously associated with aversive outcomes, such as monetary loss and electric shock, automatically capture attention. Social reward (happy expressions) can bias attention towards associated stimuli, but the role of negative social feedback in biasing attentional selection remains unexplored. On the one hand, negative social feedback often serves to discourage particular behaviours. If attentional selection can be curbed much like any other behavioural preference, we might expect stimuli associated with negative social feedback to be more readily ignored. On the other hand, if negative social feedback influences attention in the same way that other aversive outcomes do, such feedback might ironically bias attention towards the stimuli it is intended to discourage selection of. In the present study, participants first completed a training phase in which colour targets were associated with negative social feedback. Then, in a subsequent test phase, these same colour stimuli served as task-irrelevant distractors during a visual search task. The results strongly support the latter interpretation in that stimuli previously associated with negative social feedback impaired search performance.

Attention selects which aspects of sensory input are brought to awareness. To promote survival and well-being, attention prioritizes stimuli both voluntarily, according to context-specific goals (e. g., searching for car keys), and involuntarily, through attentional capture driven by physical salience (e. g., looking toward a sudden noise). Valuable stimuli strongly modulate voluntary attention allocation, but there is little evidence that high-value but contextually irrelevant stimuli capture attention as a consequence of reward learning. Here we show that visual search for a salient target is slowed by the presence of an inconspicuous, task-irrelevant item that was previously associated with monetary reward during a brief training session. Thus, arbitrary and otherwise neutral stimuli imbued with value via associative learning capture attention powerfully and persistently during extinction, independently of goals and salience. Vulnerability to such value-driven attentional capture covaries across individuals with working memory capacity and trait impulsivity. This unique form of attentional capture may provide a useful model for investigating failures of cognitive control in clinical syndromes in which value assigned to stimuli conflicts with behavioral goals (e.g., addiction, obesity).

Attention is the mechanism by which important or salient stimuli are selected for perceptual and cognitive processing. Which stimuli are attended has important implications for effective goal-directed behaviour, survival, and well-being. A growing body of evidence suggests that reward-predicting stimuli capture attention involuntarily. In previous studies, value-based attentional priority has been observed only when the formerly reward-related stimuli themselves were presented as targets or distractors. Here we show that stimulus-reward associations learned in one task generalize to different stimuli that share a defining feature (colour) in another task. Our results reveal a broad and flexible role for reward learning in modulating attentional priority.

The human brain can learn contingencies built into stimulus sequences unconsciously. The quality of such implicit learning has been connected to stimulus social relevance, but results so far are inconsistent. We engaged participants in an implicit-intentional learning task in which they learned to discriminate between legal and illegal card triads on the sole basis of feedback provided within a staircase procedure. Half of the participants received feedback from pictures of faces with a happy or sad expression (social group) and the other half based on traffic light icons (symbolic group). We hypothesised that feedback from faces would have a greater impact on learning than that from traffic lights. Although performance during learning did not differ between groups, the feedback error-related negativity (fERN) was delayed by ~20 ms for social relative to symbolic feedback, and the P3b modulation elicited by infrequent legal card triads within a stream of illegal ones during the test phase was significantly larger in the symbolic than the social feedback group. Furthermore, the P3b mean amplitude recorded at test negatively correlated with the latency of the fERN recorded during learning. These results counterintuitively suggest that, relative to symbolic feedback, socially salient feedback interferes with implicit learning.

In situations where an agent unintentionally causes harm to a victim, the agent's (harmless) intention typically carries more weight than his/her (harmful) causal role. Therefore, healthy adults typically judge leniently agents responsible for an accident. Using animated cartoons, we show, however, that in the presence of a difficult concurrent task, this result is reversed: the agent's harmless intention is given less weight than her harmful causal role, inducing participants to judge harshly the accidental agent. This was found even though cognitive load did not selectively impair the detection of intentions over causal roles. Not only is this finding evidence that the social/moral evaluation system relies on two dissociable components, but it also demonstrates that these components are asymmetrical, the causal component being more intuitive than the intentional component, and the full integration of the two requiring central cognitive resources.

Individual differences in proneness towards granting benefits (i.e., helping) or imposing costs (i.e., hindering) may have led to processes that detect and remember people who are prone to help or hinder. We examined two factors that might influence such memory: the intentionality of the acts and individual differences in psychopathy characteristics. Participants viewed several videos of computer-animated agents that helped or hindered another agent, either intentionally or unintentionally. Afterward, participants had better memory for agents that acted intentionally. Additionally, participants with more psychopathic tendencies had enhanced memory for helpers, suggesting that certain individual characteristics might result in heightened memory for people who are prone to granting benefits.

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.

Every day, people perceive other people performing interactive actions. Retaining these actions of human agents in working memory (WM) plays a pivotal role in a normal social life. However, whether the semantic knowledge embedded in the interactive actions has a pervasive impact on the storage of the actions in WM remains unknown. In the current study, we investigated two opposing hypotheses: (a) that WM stores the interactions individually (the individual-storage hypothesis) and (b) that WM stores the interactions as chunks (the chunk-storage hypothesis). We required participants to memorize a set of individual actions while ignoring the underlying social interactions. We found that although the social-interaction aspect was task irrelevant, the interactive actions were stored in WM as chunks that were not affected by memory load (Experiments 1 and 2); however, inverting the human actions vertically abolished this chunking effect (Experiment 3). These results suggest that WM automatically and efficiently used semantic knowledge about interactive actions to store them and support the chunk-storage hypothesis.

The response of bystanders to information available in their social environment can have a potent influence on the evolution of cooperation and signalling systems. In the presence of bystanders, individuals might be able to increase their payoff by exaggerating signals beyond their means (cheating) or investing to help others despite considerable costs. In doing so, animals can accrue immediate benefits by manipulating (or helping) individuals with whom they are currently interacting and delayed benefits by convincing bystanders that they are more fit or cooperative than perhaps is warranted. In this paper, I provide some illustrative examples of how bystanders could apply added positive selection pressure on both cooperative behaviour and dishonest signalling during courtship or conflict. I also discuss how the presence of bystanders might select for greater flexibility in behavioural strategies (e.g. conditional or condition dependence), which could maintain dishonesty at evolutionarily stable frequencies under some ecological conditions. By recognizing bystanders as a significant selection pressure, we might gain a more realistic approximation of what drives signalling and/or interaction dynamics in social animals.

Three central problems in the recent literature on visual attention are reviewed. The first concerns the control of attention by top-down (or goal-directed) and bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) processes. The second concerns the representational basis for visual selection, including how much attention can be said to be location- or object-based. Finally, we consider the time course of attention as it is directed to one stimulus after another.

We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experiments. We hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose economic payoff is unaffected by the norm violation, may be willing to enforce these norms although the enforcement is costly for them. Almost two-thirds of the third parties indeed punished the violation of the distribution norm and their punishment increased the more the norm was violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60% of the third parties punished violations of the cooperation norm. Thus, our results show that the notion of strong reciprocity extends to the sanctioning behavior of “unaffected” third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that third-party punishment games are powerful tools for studying the characteristics and the content of social norms. Further experiments indicate that second parties, whose economic payoff is reduced by the norm violation, punish the violation much more strongly than do third parties.

Four experiments tested a new hypothesis that involuntary attention shifts are contingent on the relationship between the properties of the eliciting event and the properties required for task performance. In a variant of the spatial cuing paradigm, the relation between cue property and the property useful in locating the target was systematically manipulated. In Experiment 1, invalid abrupt-onset precues produced costs for targets characterized by an abrupt onset but not for targets characterized by a discontinuity in color. In Experiment 2, invalid color precues produced greater costs for color targets than for abrupt-onset targets. Experiment 3 provided converging evidence for this pattern. Experiment 4 investigated the boundary conditions and time course for attention shifts elicited by color discontinuities. The results of these experiments suggest that attention capture is contingent on attentional control settings induced by task demands.

To not harm others is widely considered the most basic element of human morality. The aversion to harm others can be either rooted in the outcomes of an action (utilitarianism) or reactions to the action itself (deontology). We speculated that the human moral judgments rely on the integration of neural computations of harm and visceral reactions. The present research examined whether utilitarian or deontological aspects of moral judgment are associated with cardiac vagal tone, a physiological proxy for neuro-visceral integration. We investigated the relationship between cardiac vagal tone and moral judgment by using a mix of moral dilemmas, mathematical modeling and psychophysiological measures. An index of bipolar deontology-utilitarianism was correlated with resting heart rate variability (HRV)-an index of cardiac vagal tone-such that more utilitarian judgments were associated with lower HRV. Follow-up analyses using process dissociation, which independently quantifies utilitarian and deontological moral inclinations, provided further evidence that utilitarian (but not deontological) judgments were associated with lower HRV. Our results suggest that the functional integration of neural and visceral systems during moral judgments can restrict outcome-based, utilitarian moral preferences. Implications for theories of moral judgment are discussed.

Previous studies have shown that even elementary school-aged children (7 and 11 years old) experience visually induced perception of illusory self-motion (vection) (Lepecq et al., 1995, Perception, 24, 435-449) and that children of a similar age (mean age = 9.2 years) experience more rapid and stronger vection than do adults (Shirai et al., 2012, Perception, 41, 1399-1402). These findings imply that although elementary school-aged children experience vection, this ability is subject to further development. To examine the subsequent development of vection, we compared junior high school students' (N = 11, mean age = 14.4 years) and adults' (N = 10, mean age = 22.2 years) experiences of vection. Junior high school students reported significantly stronger vection than did adults, suggesting that the perceptual experience of junior high school students differs from that of adults with regard to vection and that this ability undergoes gradual changes over a relatively long period of development.

The capacity to evaluate other people is essential for navigating the social world. Humans must be able to assess the actions and intentions of the people around them, and make accurate decisions about who is friend and who is foe, who is an appropriate social partner and who is not. Indeed, all social animals benefit from the capacity to identify individual conspecifics that may help them, and to distinguish these individuals from others that may harm them. Human adults evaluate people rapidly and automatically on the basis of both behaviour and physical features, but the ontogenetic origins and development of this capacity are not well understood. Here we show that 6- and 10-month-old infants take into account an individual's actions towards others in evaluating that individual as appealing or aversive: infants prefer an individual who helps another to one who hinders another, prefer a helping individual to a neutral individual, and prefer a neutral individual to a hindering individual. These findings constitute evidence that preverbal infants assess individuals on the basis of their behaviour towards others. This capacity may serve as the foundation for moral thought and action, and its early developmental emergence supports the view that social evaluation is a biological adaptation.

The ability to remain focused on goal-relevant stimuli in the presence of potentially interfering distractors is crucial for any coherent cognitive function. However, simply instructing people to ignore goal-irrelevant stimuli is not sufficient for preventing their processing. Recent research reveals that distractor processing depends critically on the level and type of load involved in the processing of goal-relevant information. Whereas high perceptual load can eliminate distractor processing, high load on "frontal" cognitive control processes increases distractor processing. These findings provide a resolution to the long-standing early and late selection debate within a load theory of attention that accommodates behavioural and neuroimaging data within a framework that integrates attention research with executive function.

Whether salient objects automatically capture attention has long been the subject of considerable controversy. A possible resolution, investigated in this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, is that observers vacillate between periods when attention capture is robust and when it is minimal. Human observers searched static displays for a target circle among nontarget squares; an irrelevant color singleton distractor appeared on 50% of trials. Behavioral results showed a distraction effect in which response times to distractor-present trials were slower than for distractor-absent trials. fMRI results confirmed that this distraction effect not only fluctuated within experimental sessions, but the momentary degree of distraction could be predicted in advance by pretrial activity in middle frontal gyrus. A second experiment ruled out an alternative account by which participants achieved resistance to capture by trading off search efficiency. Together, these data reveal that observers frequently exert the capacity to resist attentional distraction, although they do not to sustain this capacity for long periods of time.

perturbing" or "functional" depending on its impact on performance (boat velocity); the rowers experienced it as sometimes meaningful and sometimes meaningless; and their experiences were similar or diverging. By combining phenomenological and behavioral data, we explain how constraints not manipulated by an experimenter but emerging from the ecological context of a race can be associated with functional adaptations or perturbations of the interpersonal coordination.]]>

Adaptive information seeking is critical for goal-directed behavior. Growing evidence suggests the importance of intrinsic motives such as curiosity or need for novelty, mediated through dopaminergic valuation systems, in driving information-seeking behavior. However, valuing information for its own sake can be highly suboptimal when agents need to evaluate instrumental benefit of information in a forward-looking manner. Here we show that information-seeking behavior in humans is driven by subjective value that is shaped by both instrumental and noninstrumental motives, and that this subjective value of information (SVOI) shares a common neural code with more basic reward value. Specifically, using a task where subjects could purchase information to reduce uncertainty about outcomes of a monetary lottery, we found information purchase decisions could be captured by a computational model of SVOI incorporating utility of anticipation, a form of noninstrumental motive for information seeking, in addition to instrumental benefits. Neurally, trial-by-trial variation in SVOI was correlated with activity in striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, cross-categorical decoding revealed that, within these regions, SVOI and expected utility of lotteries were represented using a common code. These findings provide support for the common currency hypothesis and shed insight on neurocognitive mechanisms underlying information-seeking behavior.

AbstractPunishment has been proposed as being central to two distinctively human phenomena: cooperation in groups and morality. Here we investigate moralistic punishment, a behavior designed to inflict costs on another individual in response to a perceived moral violation. There is currently no consensus on which evolutionary model best accounts for this phenomenon in humans. Models that turn on individuals' cultivating reputations as moralistic punishers clearly predict that psychological systems should be designed to increase punishment in response to information that one's decisions to punish will be known by others. We report two experiments in which we induce participants to commit moral violations and then present third parties with the opportunity to pay to punish wrongdoers. Varying conditions of anonymity, we find that the presence of an audience—even if only the experimenter—causes an increase in moralistic punishment.]]>

Decision rules of reciprocity include 'I help those who helped me' (direct reciprocity) and 'I help those who have helped others' (indirect reciprocity), i.e. I help those who have a reputation to care for others. A person's reputation is a score that members of a social group update whenever they see the person interacting or hear at best multiple gossip about the person's social interactions. Reputation is the current standing the person has gained from previous investments or refusal of investments in helping others. Is he a good guy, can I trust him or should I better avoid him as a social partner? A good reputation pays off by attracting help from others, even from strangers or members from another group, if the recipient's reputation is known. Any costly investment in others, i.e. direct help, donations to charity, investment in averting climate change, etc. increases a person's reputation. I shall argue and illustrate with examples that a person's known reputation functions like money that can be used whenever the person needs help. Whenever possible I will present tests of predictions of evolutionary theory, i.e. fitness maximizing strategies, mostly by economic experiments with humans.

Theorists have only recently shown that cooperation through indirect reciprocity can evolve. The first modelling approach favoured a mechanism called image scoring. Helping someone increases one's image score, whereas refusing to help reduces it. The evolutionary outcome was a discriminator image scoring strategy that helps everybody who has, for example, a positive image score. Two experimental studies with humans found results that were compatible with discriminator image scoring. However, a new analysis of other theorists, based on another population structure, has cast doubts on the evolutionary stability of strategies using the recipient's score as a sole basis for decision. The new theoretical study confirmed that a strategy aiming at "good standing" has superior properties and easily beats image scoring. An individual loses good standing by failing to help a recipient in good standing, whereas failing to help recipients who lack good standing does not damage the standing of a potential donor (but would reduce his image score). The present empirical study with 23 groups of seven human subjects each was designed for distinguishing between the two proposed mechanisms experimentally. The results differed strongly from standing strategies, which might demand too much working memory capacity, but were compatible with image scoring or a similar strategy to a large extent. Furthermore, donors of constant "NO players" compensated for their refusing to help these players by being more generous to others.

We describe evidence for an evolved module for fear elicitation and fear learning with four primary characteristics. First, it is preferentially activated by stimuli related to survival threats in evolutionary history. Thus, fear-relevant stimuli lead to superior conditioning of aversive associations compared with fear-irrelevant stimuli. Second, the module is automatically activated by fear-relevant stimuli, meaning that fear activation occurs before conscious cognitive analysis of the stimulus can occur. Third, the fear module is relatively impenetrable to conscious cognitive control, and fear conditioning with fear-relevant stimuli can occur even with subliminal conditioned stimuli. Fourth, the amygdala seems to be the central brain area dedicated to the fear module. Finally, we propose that there are two levels of fear conditioning, with an emotional level that is relatively independent of the cognitive contingency level, each mediated by different brain areas.

Classical fear conditioning has been used as a model paradigm to explain fear learning across species. In this paradigm, the amygdala is known to play a critical role. However, classical fear conditioning requires first-hand experience with an aversive event, which may not be how most fears are acquired in humans. It remains to be determined whether the conditioning model can be extended to indirect forms of learning more common in humans. Here we show that fear acquired indirectly through social observation, with no personal experience of the aversive event, engages similar neural mechanisms as fear conditioning. The amygdala was recruited both when subjects observed someone else being submitted to an aversive event, knowing that the same treatment awaited themselves, and when subjects were subsequently placed in an analogous situation. These findings confirm the central role of the amygdala in the acquisition and expression of observational fear learning, and validate the extension of cross-species models of fear conditioning to learning in a human sociocultural context. Our findings also provides new insights into the relationship between learning from, and empathizing with, fearful others. This study suggests that indirectly attained fears may be as powerful as fears originating from direct experiences.

Social learning (learning through observation or interaction with other individuals) is widespread in nature and is central to the remarkable success of humanity, yet it remains unclear why copying is profitable and how to copy most effectively. To address these questions, we organized a computer tournament in which entrants submitted strategies specifying how to use social learning and its asocial alternative (for example, trial-and-error learning) to acquire adaptive behavior in a complex environment. Most current theory predicts the emergence of mixed strategies that rely on some combination of the two types of learning. In the tournament, however, strategies that relied heavily on social learning were found to be remarkably successful, even when asocial information was no more costly than social information. Social learning proved advantageous because individuals frequently demonstrated the highest-payoff behavior in their repertoire, inadvertently filtering information for copiers. The winning strategy (discountmachine) relied nearly exclusively on social learning and weighted information according to the time since acquisition.

It is well established that attention modulates visual processing in extrastriate cortex. However, the underlying neural mechanisms are unknown. A consistent observation is that attention has its greatest impact on neuronal responses when multiple stimuli appear together within a cell's receptive field. One way to explain this is to assume that multiple stimuli activate competing populations of neurons and that attention biases this competition in favor of the attended stimulus. In the absence of competing stimuli, there is no competition to be resolved. Accordingly, attention has a more limited effect on the neuronal response to a single stimulus. To test this interpretation, we measured the responses of neurons in macaque areas V2 and V4 using a behavioral paradigm that allowed us to isolate automatic sensory processing mechanisms from attentional effects. First, we measured each cell's response to a single stimulus presented alone inside the receptive field or paired with a second receptive field stimulus, while the monkey attended to a location outside the receptive field. Adding the second stimulus typically caused the neuron's response to move toward the response that was elicited by the second stimulus alone. Then, we directed the monkey's attention to one element of the pair. This drove the neuron's response toward the response elicited when the attended stimulus appeared alone. These findings are consistent with the idea that attention biases competitive interactions among neurons, causing them to respond primarily to the attended stimulus. A quantitative neural model of attention is proposed to account for these results.

Previously rewarded stimuli involuntarily capture attention. The learning mechanisms underlying this value-driven attentional capture remain less understood. We tested whether theories of prediction-based associative reward learning explain the conditions under which reward feedback leads to value-based modulations of attentional priority. Across 4 experiments, we manipulated whether stimulus features served as unique predictors of reward outcomes. Participants received monetary rewards for correctly identifying a color-defined target in an initial search task (training phase) and then immediately completed a second, unrewarded visual search task in which color was irrelevant (test phase). In Experiments 1-3, monetary reward followed correct target selection during training, but critically, no target-defining features carried uniquely predictive information about reward outcomes. Under these conditions, we found no evidence of attentional capture by the previous target colors in the subsequent test phase. Conversely, when target colors in the training phase of Experiment 4 carried uniquely predictive information about reward magnitude, we observed significant attentional capture by the previously rewarded color. Our findings show that value-based attentional priority only develops for stimulus features that carry uniquely predictive information about reward, ruling out a purely motivational account and suggesting that mechanisms of reward prediction play an important role in shaping attentional priorities.

To find conditions under which humans cooperate within groups of unrelated individuals has been of major interest in the behavioral sciences. The experimental paradigm for studying potential cooperation in social dilemmas is the public goods game. Here humans regularly fail to sustain a public resource cooperatively. However, the need to maintain good reputation for other social interactions, such as indirect reciprocity, has been identified as an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation in public goods situations. As a side effect of building a good reputation through cooperative actions, an individual provides direct benefits to members of his/her own social group. These benefits could be an incentive to reward a good reputation of group members. Here we show experimentally that building a good reputation through cooperative behavior in a public goods situation is rewarded in future social interactions, not only within ones own social group but also, at a similar level, in other social groups: humans regard cooperative behavior of others as an honest signal irrespective of past direct personal benefits. Reputation gained within as well as outside ones own social group can be a driving force for selfish individuals to cooperate in public goods situations, and thereby sustain any public resource.]]>

Recent evidence suggests that attentional capture is contingent on the attentional control setting induced by the task demands (C. L. Folk, R. Remington, & J. C. Johnston, 1992). Because the experiments on which these conclusions are based can be criticized for several reasons, the contingent capture hypothesis was tested using 2 visual search tasks in which subjects searched multielement displays in which a color singleton and onset singleton were simultaneously present. Both experiments show that the contingent capture hypothesis does not hold: Irrespective of attentional set, attention was captured by the most salient singleton. The findings suggest a stimulus-driven model of performance in which selection is basically determined by the properties of the featural singletons present in the visual field.

The present paper argues for the notion that when attention is spread across the visual field in the first sweep of information through the brain visual selection is completely stimulus-driven. Only later in time, through recurrent feedback processing, volitional control based on expectancy and goal set will bias visual selection in a top-down manner. Here we review behavioral evidence as well as evidence from ERP, fMRI, TMS and single cell recording consistent with stimulus-driven selection. Alternative viewpoints that assume a large role for top-down processing are discussed. It is argued that in most cases evidence supporting top-down control on visual selection in fact demonstrates top-down control on processes occurring later in time, following initial selection. We conclude that top-down knowledge regarding non-spatial features of the objects cannot alter the initial selection priority. Only by adjusting the size of the attentional window, the initial sweep of information through the brain may be altered in a top-down way.

The "tragedy of the commons," that is, the selfish exploitation of resources in the public domain, is a reason for many of our everyday social conflicts. However, humans are often more helpful to others than evolutionary theory would predict, unless indirect reciprocity takes place and is based on image scoring (which reflects the way an individual is viewed by a group), as recently shown by game theorists. We tested this idea under conditions that control for confounding factors. Donations were more frequent to receivers who had been generous to others in earlier interactions. This shows that image scoring promotes cooperative behavior in situations where direct reciprocity is unlikely.

In a valence induction task, one color acquired positive valence by indicating the chance to win money (in the case of fast and correct responses), and a different color acquired negative valence by indicating the danger to lose money (in the case of slow or incorrect responses). In the additional-singleton trials of a visual search task, the task-irrelevant singleton color was either the positive one, the negative one, or one of two neutral colors. We found an additional-singleton effect (i.e., longer RTs with a singleton color than in the no-singleton control condition). This effect was significantly increased for the two valent colors (with no differences between them) relative to the two neutral colors (with no differences between them, either). This result favors the hypothesis that the general relevance of stimuli elicits attentional capture, rather than the negativity bias hypothesis.

The effect of temporal discontinuity on visual search was assessed by presenting a display in which one item had an abrupt onset, while other items were introduced by gradually removing line segments that camouflaged them. We hypothesized that an abrupt onset in a visual display would capture visual attention, giving this item a processing advantage over items lacking an abrupt leading edge. This prediction was confirmed in Experiment 1. We designed a second experiment to ensure that this finding was due to attentional factors rather than to sensory or perceptual ones. Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 1 and demonstrated that the procedure used to avoid abrupt onset--camouflage removal--did not require a gradual waveform. Implications of these findings for theories of attention are discussed.

Traditionally, objects of attention are characterized either as full-fledged entities or either as elements grouped by Gestalt principles. Because humans appear to use social groups as units to explain social activities, we proposed that a socially defined group, according to social interaction information, would also be a possible object of attentional selection. This hypothesis was examined using displays with and without handshaking interactions. Results demonstrated that object-based attention, which was measured by an object-specific attentional advantage (i.e., shorter response times to targets on a single object), was extended to two hands performing a handshake but not to hands that did not perform meaningful social interactions, even when they did perform handshake-like actions. This finding cannot be attributed to the familiarity of the frequent co-occurrence of two handshaking hands. Hence, object-based attention can select a grouped object whose parts are connected within a meaningful social interaction. This finding implies that object-based attention is constrained by top-down information.

Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent's beliefs and an action's consequences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior developmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differentially to the young child's moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) in belief attribution. Participants read vignettes in a 2 x 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome ("negative" belief) or the neutral outcome ("neutral" belief). The RTPJ showed significant activation above baseline for all four conditions but was modulated by an interaction between belief and outcome. Specifically, the RTPJ response was highest for cases of attempted harm, where protagonists were condemned for actions that they believed would cause harm to others, even though the harm did not occur. The results not only suggest a general role for belief attribution during moral judgment, but also add detail to our understanding of the interaction between these processes at both the neural and behavioral levels.