This study investigates how induced relative status affects satisfaction with different relative payoffs. We find that participants with lower status are more satisfied with disadvantageous payoff inequalities than equal or higher status participants. In contrast, when receiving an advantageous payoff, status does not affect satisfaction. Our findings suggest that relative social status has important implications for the acceptance of income inequalities.

Five studies investigated the hypotheses that the sense of power increases optimism in perceiving risks and leads to more risky behavior. In Studies 1 and 2, individuals with a higher generalized sense of power and those primed with a high-power mind-set were more optimistic in their perceptions of risk. Study 3 primed the concept of power nonconsciously and found that both power and gain/loss frame had independent effects on risk preferences. In Study 4, those primed with a high-power mind-set were more likely to act in a risk-seeking fashion (i.e., engage in unprotected sex). In Study 5, individuals with a higher sense of power in a face-to-face negotiation took more risks by divulging their interests. The effects of power on risk-taking were mediated by optimistic risk perceptions and not by self-efficacy beliefs. Further, these effects were attenuated when the high-power individual felt a sense of responsibility. Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

During social bargain, one has to both figure out the others' intentions and behave strategically in such a way that the others' will be consistent with one's expectations. To understand the neurobiological mechanisms underlying these , we used electroencephalography while subjects played as proposers in a repeated ultimatum game. We found that subjects adapted their offers to obtain more acceptances in the last round and that this adaptation correlated negatively with prefrontal theta oscillations. People with higher prefrontal theta activity related to a rejection did not adapt their offers along the game to maximize their earning. Moreover, between-subject variation in posterior theta oscillations correlated positively with how individual theta activity influenced the change of offer after a rejection, reflecting a process of behavioral adaptation to the others' demands. Interestingly, people adapted better their offers when they knew that they where playing against a computer, although the behavioral adaptation did not correlate with prefrontal theta oscillation. Behavioral changes between and computer games correlated with prefrontal theta activity, suggesting that low adaptation in games could be a strategy. Taken together, these results provide evidence for specific roles of prefrontal and posterior theta oscillations in social bargaining.

Since people with low status are more likely to experience social evaluative threat and are therefore more inclined to monitor for these threats and inhibit approach behaviour, we expected that low-status subjects would be more engaged in evaluating their own performance, compared with high-status subjects. We created a highly salient social hierarchy based on the performance of a simple time estimation task. Subjects could achieve high, middle or low status while performing this task simultaneously with other two players who were either higher or lower in status. Subjects received feedback on their own performance, as well as on the performance of the other two players simultaneously. Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded from all three participants. The results showed that medial frontal negativity (an event-related potential reflecting performance evaluation) was significantly enhanced for low-status subjects. Implications for status-related differences in goal-directed behaviour are discussed.

No abstract is available for this article.

The authors tested whether engaging in expansive (vs. contractive) "power poses" before a stressful job interview-preparatory power posing-would enhance performance during the interview. Participants adopted high-power (i.e., expansive, open) poses or low-power (i.e., contractive, closed) poses, and then prepared and delivered a speech to 2 evaluators as part of a mock job interview. All interview speeches were videotaped and coded for overall performance and hireability and for 2 potential mediators: verbal content (e.g., structure, content) and nonverbal presence (e.g., captivating, enthusiastic). As predicted, those who prepared for the job interview with high- (vs. low-) power poses performed better and were more likely to be chosen for hire; this relation was mediated by nonverbal presence, but not by verbal content. Although previous research has focused on how a nonverbal behavior that is enacted during interactions and observed by perceivers affects how those perceivers evaluate and respond to the actor, this experiment focused on how a nonverbal behavior that is enacted before the interaction and unobserved by perceivers affects the actor's performance, which, in turn, affects how perceivers evaluate and respond to the actor. This experiment reveals a theoretically novel and practically informative result that demonstrates the causal relation between preparatory nonverbal behavior and subsequent performance and outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

Despite the wealth of studies investigating factors affecting decisions, not much is known about the impact of stereotypical beliefs on strategic economic decision-making. In the present study, we used the ultimatum game paradigm to investigate how participants playing as proposer modulate their strategic economic behavior, according to their game counterparts stereotypical identity (i.e., responders). The latter were introduced to the participants using occupational role nouns stereotypically marked with gender paired with feminine or masculine proper names (e.g., linguist-Anna; economist-David; economist-Cristina; linguist-Leonardo). When playing with male-stereotyped responders, proposers quickly applied the equity rule, behaving fairly, while they adopted a strategic behavior with responders characterized by female stereotypes. They were also longer to make their offers to female than to male responders but both kinds of responders received comparable offers, suggesting a greater cognitive effort to treat females as equally as males. The present study explicitly demonstrates that gender stereotypical information affect strategic economic decision-making and highlights a possible evolution of gender discrimination into a more insidious discrimination toward individuals with female characteristics.

Abstract The willingness to incur personal costs to enforce prosocial norms represents a hallmark of human civilization. Although recent neuroscience studies have used the ultimatum game to understand the neuropsychological mechanisms that underlie the enforcement of fairness norms; however, a precise characterization of the neural systems underlying fairness-related norm enforcement remains elusive. In this study, we used a coordinate-based meta-analysis on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using the ultimatum game with the goal to provide an additional level of evidence for the refinement of the underlying neural architecture of this human puzzling behavior. Our results demonstrated a convergence of reported activation foci in brain networks associated with psychological components of fairness-related normative decision making, presumably reflecting a reflexive and intuitive system (System 1) and a reflective and deliberate system (System 2). System 1 (anterior insula, ventromedial prefrontal cortex [PFC]) may be associated with the reflexive and intuitive responses to norm violations, representing a motivation to punish norm violators. Those intuitive responses conflict with economic self-interest, encoded in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which may engage cognitive control from a reflective and deliberate System 2 to resolve the conflict by either suppressing (ventrolateral PFC, dorsomedial PFC, left dorsolateral PFC, and rostral ACC) the intuitive responses or over-riding self-interest (right dorsolateral PFC). Taken together, we suggest that fairness-related norm enforcement recruits an intuitive system for rapid evaluation of norm violations and a deliberate system for integrating both social norms and self-interest to regulate the intuitive system in favor of more flexible decision making. Hum Brain Mapp 36:591 602, 2015 . 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Recent research has shown that social power systematically influences information processing in many ways, and can be induced simply via powerful gestures or postures. The current studies investigated the impact of embodied power on confirmatory information processing after decision making. Based upon previous social power research, we hypothesized that individuals who posed in powerful ways (making a clenched fist or sitting in an open, expansive posture) would systematically prefer decision-consistent over decision-inconsistent information; an effect known as selective exposure, or biased assimilation. Four studies consistently indicated that bodily positioning associated with high levels of power induced greater confirmatory tendencies in the evaluation and search stages of a subsequent, decision-relevant information task (Studies 1 4). This tendency is unlikely to be due to mere physical strain (Study 4), and was mediated by differences in experienced decision certainty (Studies 3 and 4); indicating that the embodiment of high power makes people more confident regarding the validity of their decisions. Consequently, high-power posers systematically prefer information that is consistent with their decision preference.Highlights? Power increases confirmatory information processing. ? Power is likely to reduce decision quality. ? Power increases decision certainty.

Abstract This article presents a theory of the mutually reinforcing interaction between power and stereotyping, mediated by attention. The powerless attend to the powerful who control their outcomes, in an effort to enhance prediction and control, so forming complex, potentially nonstereotypic impressions. The powerful pay less attention, so are more vulnerable to stereotyping. The powerful (a) need not attend to the other to control their own outcomes, (b) cannot attend because they tend to be attentionally overloaded, and (c) if they have high need for dominance, may not want to attend. Stereotyping and power are mutually reinforcing because stereotyping itself exerts control, maintaining and justifying the status quo. Two legal cases and a body of research illustrate the theory and suggest organizational change strategies.

Social decision-making tasks involve psychological processes key to effective functioning in a complex, social world. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a widely studied social decision-making task, which models responses to fairness. A number of neuroimaging studies have investigated the UG to identify neural correlates of unfairness and decisions to reject versus accept an offer. We present the first quantitative summary of neuroimaging studies in social decision-making with a meta-analysis of 11 fMRI studies of the UG, including data from 282 participants. Effect-Size Signed Differential Mapping was used to estimate effect sizes from statistical parametric maps and reported peak information before meta-analysing them. Consistent activations were seen in the anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary motor area (SMA) and cerebellum in response to unfair offers. Robust activations in the ACC, SMA and putamen were seen when deciding to reject rather than accept UG offers. These are consistent with models of motivational conflict during the UG decision-making process, a response to norm violations, with a possible role for the reward system.

PurposeThis paper aims to identify and discuss four major sources of power in negotiations.FindingsThe four sources of power are alternatives, information, status and social capital. Each of these sources of power can enhance a negotiator likelihood of obtaining their ideal outcome because power allows negotiators to be more confident and proactive, and it shields them from the bargaining tactics of their opponents.Practical implicationsThe paper discusses how negotiators can utilize each source of power to improve their negotiation outcomes.Originality/valueThe paper provides a parsimonious definition of power in negotiations, identifies the four major sources of negotiator powers and highlights two pathways by which power affects negotiation outcomes.

公平是人类社会生活的基本规范之一,不公平感及其相关决策则是研究者们关注的重要课题。长期以来,该领域的研究一般采用最后通牒博弈或其变式展开。大量脑成像研究探查了关于不公平感及相关决策的认知神经机制,尤其集中探讨了最后通牒博弈的回应者对不公平提议进行反应的脑区及其对应功能。经常得到关注的脑区包括了前脑岛、前扣带皮层、背外侧前额叶、内侧前额叶、杏仁核和颞顶交界等。对特殊人群的不公平感及相关决策进行研究可以帮助检验或澄清上述重要脑区及脑网络在不公平感及相关决策中扮演的角色,同时也阐释特殊人群的社会认知功能的特点。近年来,相当数量的研究关注了不同情境因素(包括分配方案相关因素和社会情境相关因素)调制不公平感及相关决策的过程,并讨论其背后的认知神经机制。未来的研究更应利用多模态数据分析方法,同时结合基因和激素层面的研究,以期深入对不公平感及相关决策的心理和生理机制的理解。

Much decision-making requires balancing benefits to the self with benefits to the group. There are marked individual differences in this balance such that individualists tend to favor themselves whereas prosocials tend to favor the group. Understanding the mechanisms underlying this difference has important implications for society and its institutions. Using behavioral and fMRI data collected during the performance of the ultimatum game, we show that individual differences in social preferences for resource allocation, so-called “social value orientation,” is linked with activity in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala elicited by inequity, rather than activity in insula, ACC, and dorsolateral pFC. Importantly, the presence of cognitive load made prosocials behave more prosocially and individualists more individualistically, suggesting that social value orientation is driven more by intuition than reflection. In parallel, activity in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala, in response to inequity, tracked this behavioral pattern of prosocials and individualists. In addition, we conducted an impunity game experiment with different participants where they could not punish unfair behavior and found that the inequity-correlated activity seen in prosocials during the ultimatum game disappeared. This result suggests that the accumbens and amygdala activity of prosocials encodes “outcome-oriented emotion” designed to change situations (i.e., achieve equity or punish). Together, our results suggest a pivotal contribution of the nucleus accumbens and amygdala to individual differences in sociality.

Abstract Rational choice theory predicts that humans always optimize the expected utility of options when making decisions. However, in decision-making games, humans often punish their opponents even when doing so reduces their own reward. We used the Ultimatum and Dictator games to examine the affective correlates of decision-making. We show that the feedback negativity, an event-related brain potential that originates in the anterior cingulate cortex that has been related to reinforcement learning, predicts the decision to reject unfair offers in the Ultimatum game. Furthermore, the decision to reject is positively related to more negative emotional reactions and to increased autonomic nervous system activity. These findings support the idea that subjective emotional markers guide decision-making and that the anterior cingulate cortex integrates instances of reinforcement and punishment to provide such affective markers.

Abstract In human society, which is organized by social hierarchies, resources are usually allocated unequally and based on social status. In this study, we analyze how being endowed with different social statuses in a math competition affects the perception of fairness during asset allocation in a subsequent Ultimatum Game (UG). Behavioral data showed that when participants were in high status, they were more likely to reject unfair UG offers than in low status. This effect of social status correlated with activity in the right anterior insula (rAI) and with the functional connectivity between the rAI and a region in the anterior middle cingulate cortex, indicating that these two brain regions are crucial for integrating contextual factors and social norms during fairness perception. Additionally, there was an interaction between social status and UG offer fairness in the amygdala and thalamus, implicating the role of these regions in the modulation of social status on fairness perception. These results demonstrate the effect of social status on fairness perception and the potential neural underpinnings for this effect. The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Social hierarchy exists in almost all social species and affects everything from resource allocation to the development of intelligence. Previous studies showed that status within a social hierarchy influences the perceived fairness of income allocation. However, the effect of one’s social status on economic decisions is far from clear, as are the neural processes underlying these decisions. In this study, we dynamically manipulated participants’ social status and analyzed their behavior as recipients in the ultimatum game, during which event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Behavioral results showed that acceptance rates for offers increased with the fairness level of offers. Importantly, participants were less likely to accept unfair offers when they were endowed with high status than with low status. In addition, cues indicating low status elicited a more positive P2 than cues indicating high status in an earlier time window (170 – 240 ms), and cues indicating high status elicited a more negative N400 than did cues indicating low status in a later time window (350 – 520 ms). During the actual reception of offers, the late positivity potential (LPP, 400 – 700 ms) for unfair offers was more positive in the high status condition than in the low status condition, suggesting a decreased arousal for unfair offers during low status. These findings suggest a strong role of social status in modulating individual behavioral and neural responses to fairness.

权力和地位对自利行为的影响不同。权力能够降低认知性观点采择水平，进而使个体更加关注自身利益：地位能够提升认知性观点采择水平，进而使个体推测他人思想与感受，考虑他人利益。然而，权力和地位通过认知性观点采择对自利行为的影响可能受到情境性质的调节。今后的研究应该对这些关系和解释进行验证，探索共情性关心的中介作用，以及权力和地位影响认知性观点采择的调节变量；探究权力和地位拥有者对群体内、外他人的自利行为差异；探讨权力和地位的交互作用对自利行为的影响。

In the present chapter, we advance a reciprocal influence model of social power. Our model is rooted in evolutionist analyses of primate hierarchies, and notions that the capacity for subordinates to form alliances imposes important demands upon those in power, and that power heuristically reduces the likelihood of conflicts within groups. Guided by these assumptions, we posit a set of propositions regarding the reciprocal nature of power, and review recent supporting data. With respect to the acquisition of social power, we show that power is afforded to those individuals and strategic behaviors related to advancing the interests of the group. With respect to constraints upon power, we detail how group‐based representations (a fellow group member's reputation), communication (gossip), and self‐assessments (an individual's modest sense of power) constrain the actions of those in power according to how they advance group interests. Finally, with respect to the notion that power acts as a social interaction heuristic, we examine how social power is readily and accurately perceived by group members and gives priority to the emotions, goals, and actions of high‐power individuals in shaping interdependent action. We conclude with a discussion of recent studies of the subjective sense of power and class‐based ideologies.

A plethora of studies on the Ultimatum Game have shown that responders forfeit the rule of profit maximization and punish unfair proposers, by rejecting their offers. This behavior has been linked to increased amygdala, insula, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation. Studies have suggested a potential role of testosterone in the Ultimatum Game albeit with inconsistent findings. In the present study, we sought to further investigate the role of amygdala and testosterone in the Ultimatum Game, by conducting a double-blinded, single-administration study. Sixty milligram of Tostrex was administered to male and female healthy volunteers, 3 h prior to undergoing an fMRI session, during which they played a standard version of the Ultimatum Game. The behavioral analysis revealed a statistical trend, as participants in the testosterone group tended to accept a greater number of unfair offers than participants in the placebo group, irrespectively of gender. In terms of fMRI results, for the main contrast unfair>fair offers, the testosterone group displayed a greater activation in the right dlPFC compared to the placebo group. Increased testosterone levels were related to greater caudate activity. Our findings suggest a complex role of testosterone in social behavior and decision-making.

中国礼文化蕴含着丰富的隐喻机制,其中蜷缩的身体动作如弯腰、俯视、跪是与高社会地位群体社交的常用姿势。通过3个社会情境实验考察身体蜷缩程度与社会地位的隐喻效应。实验1显示与扩张姿势相比,保持蜷缩姿势的被试对被评价对象的社会地位评分更高。实验2控制被试的社交对象,发现与低社会地位人物相比,被试与高社会地位人物社交时身体蜷缩程度更大。实验3同时控制被试的身体姿势与视角空间,结果是跪姿被试比坐姿被试对被评价对象的社会地位评分更高,俯视被试比仰视被试对被评价对象的认同度更高。以上结果可证明中国礼文化中蜷缩身体姿势与社会地位的双向隐喻效应,同时,身体与空间的双重隐喻启动时其联结效应独立产生作用。

Abstract Many humans exhibit a strong preference for fairness during decision-making. Although there is evidence that social factors influence reward-related and affective neural processing, it is unclear if this effect is mediated by compulsory outcome evaluation processes or results from slower deliberate cognition. Here we show that the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and late positive potential (LPP), two signatures of early hedonic processing, are modulated by the fairness of rewards during a passive rating task. We find that unfair payouts elicit larger FRNs than fair payouts, whereas fair payouts elicit larger LPPs than unfair payouts. This is true both in the time-domain, where the FRN and LPP are related, and in the time-frequency domain, where the two signals are largely independent. Ultimately, this work demonstrates that fairness affects the early stages of reward and affective processing, suggesting a common biological mechanism for social and personal reward evaluation.

In the Ultimatum Game, two players are offered a chance to win a certain sum of money. All they must do is divide it. The proposer suggests how to split the sum. The responder can accept or reject the deal. If the deal is rejected, neither player gets anything. The rational solution, suggested by game theory, is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible share and for the responder to accept it. If humans play the game, however, the most frequent outcome is a fair share. In this paper, we develop an evolutionary approach to the Ultimatum Game. We show that fairness will evolve if the proposer can obtain some information on what deals the responder has accepted in the past. Hence, the evolution of fairness, similarly to the evolution of cooperation, is linked to reputation.

61Previous research suggests that expansive postures are universally connected to power.61We propose that this link varies by cultural background and type of posture.61Expansive-hands-spread-on-desk and upright-sitting poses universally produced power.61Expansive-feet-on-desk pose was viewed as the least compatible with East Asian norms.61This pose led Americans, but not East Asians, to feel powerful and to take action.

Classical economic models assume that people are fully rational and selfish, while experiments often point to different conclusions. A canonical example is the Ultimatum Game: one player proposes a division of a sum of money between herself and a second player, who either accepts or rejects. Based on rational self-interest, responders should accept any nonzero offer and proposers should offer the smallest possible amount. Traditional, deterministic models of evolutionary game theory agree: in the one-shot anonymous Ultimatum Game, natural selection favors low offers and demands. Experiments instead show a preference for fairness: often responders reject low offers and proposers make higher offers than needed to avoid rejection. Here we show that using stochastic evolutionary game theory, where agents make mistakes when judging the pay-offs and strategies of others, natural selection favors fairness. Across a range of parameters, the average strategy matches the observed behavior: proposers offer between 30% and 50%, and responders demand between 25% and 40%. Rejecting low offers increases relative payoff in pairwise competition between two strategies and is favored when selection is sufficiently weak. Offering more than you demand increases payoff when many strategies are present simultaneously and is favored when mutation is sufficiently high. We also perform a behavioral experiment and find empirical support for these theoretical findings: uncertainty about the success of others is associated with higher demands and offers; and inconsistency in the behavior of others is associated with higher offers but not predictive of demands. In an uncertain world, fairness finishes first.

The effects of subunit power on organizational decision making and the bases of subunit power are examined in a large midwestern state university. It is hypothesized that subunits acquire power to the extent that they provide resources critical to the organization and that power affects resource allocations within organizations in so far as the resource is critical to the subunits and scarce within the organization. Departmental power is found to be most highly correlated with the department's ability to obtain outside grants and contracts, with national prestige and the relative size of the graduate program following closely in importance. Power is used most in the allocation of graduate university fellowships, the most critical and scarce resource, and is unrelated to the allocation of summer faculty fellowships, the least critical and scarce resource.

Abstract Power – asymmetric control over valued resources – is a fundamental dimension of social relations. Classical conceptualizations of power emphasize its conscious nature. In this review, we reveal how power often operates nonconsciously and identify the different methods and paradigms used to activate or create a psychological sense of power outside of conscious awareness. First, we establish that cues of power are often attended to nonconsciously, which explains why people can be so accurate at determining their own and others’ level of power yet so inaccurate at identifying the specific cues diagnostic of possessing power. Second, we discuss how people are often unaware of how the possession of power fundamentally alters basic psychological and behavioral tendencies and describe the range of methodologies – roles, cues, episodic recall, conceptual priming – used to identify the nonconscious effects of power. Power produces two broad types of effects: It increases abstraction in thought and approach in behavior, both of which make individuals more focused on their own goals and internal states. Like other psychological constructs and processes, even ones that are inherently social and relational, power’s cues and consequences do not have to be conscious for its profound influence on basic psychological and interpersonal processes to emerge. We discuss the implications of the nonconscious nature of power for limiting the corrupting, dark side often revealed among the powerful.

Abstract OBJECTIVES: This study examined the roles of the insula and the anterior cingulate activations in the rejection of unfair offers in the impunity game. METHODS: Fifteen participants played the impunity game in ten trials as responders during neuroimaging. RESULTS: About 45% of the unfair offers were rejected by the responders even when responders could not restore a fair outcome, which cannot be accounted for by social preference of inequity aversion. Imaging data showed that the right anterior insula was activated when participants faced and rejected unfair offers. CONCLUSIONS: The insula activation during a rejection of the unfair offers is the reflection of an emotional response, rather than social preference of inequity aversion. The role of emotion in the neuroeconomics of fairness was demonstrated.

61We explore the neural correlates of proposers in the UG by using ERP.61Medial frontal negativity (MFN) reflects advantageous inequality aversion of proposers.61Proposers’ decision depends on the interaction of fairness and strategic motives.

Previous studies have shown that ingroup/outgroup membership influences individual’s fairness considerations.

The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response in the ultimatum game provides evidence of the assumption held by strong reciprocity theorists that negative reciprocity observed in the ultimatum game is inseparably related to positive reciprocity as the two sides of a preference for fairness. The prediction of an inseparable relationship between positive and negative reciprocity was rejected on the basis of the results of a series of experiments that we conducted using the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game, and the prisoner's dilemma game. We did not find any correlation between the participants' tendencies to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum game and their tendencies to exhibit various prosocial behaviors in the other games, including their inclinations to positively reciprocate in the trust game. The participants' responses to postexperimental questions add support to the view that the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is a tacit strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior status.

How do human beings decide when to be selfish or selfless? In this study, we gave testosterone to 25 men to establish its impact on prosocial behaviors in a double-blind within-subjects design. We also confirmed participants' testosterone levels before and after treatment through blood draws. Using the Ultimatum Game from behavioral economics, we find that men with artificially raised T, compared to themselves on placebo, were 27% less generous towards strangers with money they controlled (95% CI placebo: (1.70, 2.72); 95% CI T: (.98, 2.30)). This effect scales with a man's level of total-, free-, and dihydro-testosterone (DHT). Men in the lowest decile of DHT were 560% more generous than men in the highest decile of DHT. We also found that men with elevated testosterone were more likely to use their own money punish those who were ungenerous toward them. Our results continue to hold after controlling for altruism. We conclude that elevated testosterone causes men to behave antisocially.