心理科学进展, 2019, 27(1): 128-140 doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1042.2019.00128

研究前沿

无处不在的伤害:二元论视角下的道德判断

詹泽, 吴宝沛,

北京林业大学心理学系, 北京 100083

Ubiquitous harm: Moral judgment in the perspective of the theory of dyadic morality

ZHAN Ze, WU Baopei,

Department of Psychology, Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083, China

通讯作者: 吴宝沛, E-mail: wubaopei@bjfu.edu.cn

收稿日期: 2018-04-29   网络出版日期: 2019-01-15

基金资助: * 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助.  2016ZCQ11

Received: 2018-04-29   Online: 2019-01-15

摘要

道德二元论认为人际伤害是道德认知的典型模板.道德判断由规范违反,消极情感,感知到的伤害结合产生, 并经由二元比较与二元完型, 完成从下至上,从上至下的认知加工.道德失声现象的产生源于混淆了主客观伤害; 电车难题剥离了道德二元模型, 有趣但可能不符合普遍的道德认知; 不同领域的道德判断皆可在二元论的框架下得到解释.未来的研究可以考虑:意图与痛苦影响道德判断的实证; 跨文化研究的开展; 统一认知系统与模块化认知系统的辩证; 伤害的人际与非人际划分以及其他相关因素的检验.

关键词: 道德判断 ; 道德二元论 ; 认知模板 ; 道德失声 ; 电车难题

Abstract

The Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM) suggests that interpersonal harm is a typical cognitive template regarding morality. The moral judgment is a combination of normative violation, negative emotion, and perceived harm. Through dyadic comparison and dyadic completion, moral judgment completes the bottom-up and top-down cognitive processing. Sometimes the moral dumbfounding phenomenon occurs if someone mistakes the perceived harm to the objective harm. The Trolley Problem is interesting but may not be in line with the prevailing moral perception as it strips away the typical cognitive template. We believe that moral judgments in different fields can be explained in the framework of TDM. Future moral judgments research adopting the TDM framework needs to consider the below aspects: seek more evidence supporting that intention and suffering affect moral judgements, conduct cross-cultural studies to generalize the dyadic moral cognitive template, inspect the unified cognitive system and the modular cognitive system dialectically, differentiate interpersonal and non-interpersonal harm, and test other related factors.

Keywords: moral judgment ; The Theory of Dyadic Morality ; cognitive template ; moral dumbfounding ; The Trolley Problem

PDF (787KB) 元数据 多维度评价 相关文章 导出 EndNote| Ris| Bibtex  收藏本文

本文引用格式

詹泽, 吴宝沛. (2019). 无处不在的伤害:二元论视角下的道德判断 . 心理科学进展, 27(1), 128-140

ZHAN Ze, WU Baopei. (2019). Ubiquitous harm: Moral judgment in the perspective of the theory of dyadic morality. Advances in Psychological Science, 27(1), 128-140

道德判断(moral judgment)是对行为是非好坏的判断.社会中的道德问题纷繁杂呈, 道德规范亦显示出其惊人的多样性, 除却传统道德心理学关注的两大领域:伤害,关怀与利他, 公平,互惠和正义(Haidt, 2007), 诸如性(Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson, 2010),食物(Scott, Inbar, & Rozin, 2016),超自然信仰(Atkinson & Bourrat, 2011)等都被纳入道德范围.在伊朗, 人们甚至就“拥有狗是否不道德”争论不休.针对复杂的道德现象, 心理学家不再仅仅着眼于公正与关怀, 而是将更多的道德内容纳入考虑.Shweder, Much, Mahapatra和Park (1997)提出, 道德内容可分为三大领域, 自主性,社群性,神圣性, 以期容纳更广泛的道德内容.道德关系调节理论(Moral Relationships Regulation Theory, Rai & Fiske, 2011)则从道德的社会功能角度出发, 将社会关系结构作为道德判断的基础, 划分了四大基本道德领域:共享,等级排序,平等匹配,市场定价, 分别对应统一,等级,平等和相称四大基本道德动机.

在强调领域多元性的道德理论中, 最具影响力的当属道德基础理论(Moral Foundations Theory).该理论在道德先天,可塑,直觉,多元的四大基本假设之下, 将人类道德领域分为关爱,公平,忠诚,权威,纯洁,自由六个方面(张梦圆, 苑明亮, 寇彧, 2016).它认为, 关爱,公平,忠诚,权威,纯洁五个道德领域(自由/压迫为后续加入的内容), 是进化过程中不同适应问题引发的模块化适应机制, 具有跨文化的普遍性(Graham et al., 2013), 因而称之为“道德基础”.

但无论是Shweder等人(1997)的三大领域划分, 道德关系调节理论的四大领域划分, 还是道德基础理论的五大(六大, 包含自由/压迫)领域划分, 都在试图为杂乱的道德现象做一个简要可行的分类, 或者说为之贴上各自的标签, 以方便梳理, 却未能回答一个问题:道德化因何产生?换句话说, 道德领域的多元性是否包含着一个单一性的框架, 这个单一性的心理框架使得人们面对无比复杂多变的社会现象, 把其中一些纳入了道德的范畴?可惜的是, 这样一个重要问题, 在强调领域多元性的道德理论中遭到了忽视.此外, 道德基础理论更多地谈及了远因, 认为道德判断是对诸多进化挑战的适应, 但近因即道德判断的认知机制则不曾谈及.

在这种形势下, 有学者(Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012)提出了道德二元论(The Theory of Dyadic Morality, TDM).该理论试图回答两个重大问题:第一, 道德判断在表面上涉及多个领域之外, 有没有一个内在的统一框架?第二, 我们在面对社会现象时, 如何使用这套框架做出道德判断?有趣的是, 跟道德基础论一样, 道德二元论也从道德直觉理论发展而来, 前者注重道德判断的内容, 强调多元性, 而后者聚焦于道德判断的框架, 强调单一性, 彼此可以相互补充.这样的话, 道德二元论事实上为道德判断的内容和领域整合提供了一个新思路.本文将简要介绍道德二元论的相关概念, 梳理其在道德判断中的应用, 并尝试解释两个棘手的道德判断问题, 最后探讨该理论的相关争议和发展前景.

1 什么是道德二元论

道德二元论(The Theory of Dyadic Morality, TDM)的核心是感知到的伤害(perceived harm).这种伤害有其特殊定义, 包含两大要素:有意图的行为者(an intentional agent)与遭痛苦的受害者(a suffering patient), 且两者之间存在因果关系(causal link), 可简写为[A→P] (Schein & Gray, 2017).正是感知到的伤害, 即有意的行为者导致了受害者经受苦楚, 构成了“道德冒犯”的典型认知模板(Gray et al., 2012).

伤害与道德之间的联系是毋庸置疑的.伤害在道德认知中, 发挥着不可忽视的重要作用, 对伤害的考虑, 调节了代价高昂的道德(利他)行为(FeldmanHall et al., 2016).不伤害他人被认为是人类道德中最基础的元素(Park, Kappes, Rho, & Van Bavel, 2016), 它的认知通达性与影响力, 是其他道德领域无法比拟的(Schein & Gray, 2015), 当要求被试列出一项道德错误的行为, 90%的回答涉及人际间的伤害, 如谋杀,偷窃.无论是对保守主义者还是自由主义者来说, 伤害都是在提及道德时最频繁考虑的因素(Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014).人类学的研究还发现, 伤害与道德之间的联系具有跨文化普遍性, 无论是在大型的西方工业社会, 还是在传统小国寡民部落, 较之其他领域, 人们更为肯定伤害是一种道德冒犯, 而无论他们持有怎样的道德信念, 这一点都难以动摇(Barrett et al., 2016).道德基础理论将人类道德领域分为关爱,公平,忠诚,权威,纯洁,自由六个方面, 也认同伤害是其中最重要与最普遍的领域(Haidt, Graham, & Ditto, 2015).

道德二元论所定义的“伤害”, 有一大特点, 便是它强调“感知到的”, 这种伤害不需要客观存在, 只需要感知到, 便能够影响道德判断(Gray et al., 2012; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012), 甚至一些表面无伤害的道德冒犯行为, 同样激活了“伤害”相关概念(Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014).这与现代认知神经科学的发现相一致, 道德更多地被视为偏好而非事实, 偏好与道德判断共同激活了背内侧前额叶皮质(dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex, DMPFC)这一关于社会认知的关键区域, 且分享了一个共同倾向——对心理状态表征的唤起(Theriault, Waytz, Heiphetz, & Young, 2017), 即对他人心智的感知.

心智感知(mind perception)理论通过因素分析, 将心智分为两部分:能动性(agency)与感受性(experience) (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), 与传统道德哲学概念相契合(Sytsma & Machery, 2012).“能动性”是计划与执行的心智能力, 包括自我控制,判断,交流,思考,记忆, “感受性”是感觉和感受的心智能力, 包括饥饿,害怕,痛苦,愉快.实体在这两个独立维度上, 可双高, 可双低, 也可一高一低.双高, 诸如成年人; 双低, 诸如死者,无生命客体; 低能动性,高感受性, 诸如动物,儿童; 低感受性,高能动性, 诸如上帝.对他人心智的感知, 影响道德判断.能动性与道德责任(moral responsibilities)相对应, 感受性与道德权利(moral rights)相对应.通常, 道德行为者, 被认为具有更多的能动性与道德责任; 而道德受害者, 则具有更多的感受性与道德权利(Gray, Young, et al., 2012; Gray, Waytz, et al., 2012).心智感知与道德判断的对应关系, 在自闭症与心理变态者这两类人群中得到验证.自闭症患者无法进行能动性归因, 无法分离意外与有意事件的道德责任, 对意外的道德冒犯事件, 做出更为严苛的道德判断(Fadda et al., 2016); 心理变态者无法意识到受害者是有感受性的(Del Gaizo & Falkenbach, 2008), 表现出对道德权利的忽视, 对道德冒犯事件, 做出更为宽松的道德判断(Marsh & Cardinale, 2014).对一般个体来说, 对行为者意图(能动性)与受害者苦楚(感受性)的考量, 同样影响道德判断.

然而道德内容多种多样, 似乎远非“伤害”所能解释的.诸如凶杀,抢劫,欺骗, 的确被视为“道德冒犯”; 除此之外, 如色情影像(Wright, Tokunaga, & Bae, 2014),焚烧国旗(Welch & Bryan, 2000), 这类不涉及明确受害者的伤害行为, 同样被划入道德范围; 再诸如不同文化之下的习俗, 也被道德化.波斯帝国幅员广阔, 不同文化习俗并存, 如希腊人的葬礼习俗为火葬, 而卡拉提亚人则会吃掉父亲的尸体, 原本只是习俗的差异, 但双方均认为对方不道德.国王大流士曾感慨:“我并非这广大土地的王, 习俗才是.”由此看来, 道德二元论所提出的道德认知模板, 涵盖面着实不广.其是否能作为道德认知背后的心理机制, 有待检验.

但事实上, 任何一个有丰富人文内涵的概念, 都无法划定明确的边界, 恰如“正义”, 哲学家花费千年来定义它, 却不得其法, 至今仍争论不休(张国清, 2013).而现代认知心理学的研究发现, 人类在定义一物时, 并非划定边界, 而是找到一个原型(Fehr & Russell, 1991), 以此原型为核心, 判断某物接近原型的程度.若以“道德”论, 道德脱胎于社会关系(Darwin, 1871), 自然以社会关系中的“道德”为原型, 而人际伤害, 即有意行为者导致受害者遭受苦楚, 正是道德冒犯的原型(Gray, Young, et al., 2012; Gray, Waytz, et al., 2012).研究发现, 人们对不道德个体的未来预测具有不对称性, 即使该个体之前的道德冒犯行为属于纯洁冒犯(如乱伦), 也会被认为日后会存在伤害行为(Chakroff, Russell, Piazza, & Young, 2017).这可能说明, 对道德冒犯的理解, 本质上都是基于伤害的.因此, 我们可以说, 伤害是道德冒犯的原型.

如果说感知到的伤害, 即有意的行为者导致了受害者经受苦楚, 构成了“道德冒犯”的典型认知模板, 那么如何解释道德内容的多样性呢?道德二元论认为, 道德内容的多样性, 源于感知到的伤害本身的多元化.而对伤害的不同认知, 来源于文化多元.比如, 保守主义者道德化爱国主义和贞节, 因为他们将对此的违背视为伤害——与自由主义者不同(van der Toorn, Nail, Liviatan, & Jost, 2014).道德内容的多元, 只是一种外在表现形式, 其形成的原料只有一个——感知到的伤害(Schein & Gray, 2017), 纯洁冒犯便以感知到的伤害为中介, 影响道德谴责(Schein, Ritter, & Gray, 2016).

2 道德二元论视角下的道德判断

2.1 道德判断的产生

道德冒犯的原型虽是“有意的行为者造成了受害者经受苦楚”, 但是单凭感知到伤害这一点, 还不能引发“道德错误”的判断.试想电影《饥饿游戏》中的场景, 在一场指定的游戏中, 参与者需要击败所有人, 获得优胜才能生存.女主直接或间接导致了多人死亡, “有意的行为者”,“痛苦的受害者”,“因果关系”, 这三点都满足, 但是几乎没有人觉得获得优胜的女主是不道德的.电影里观看游戏的观众如此, 坐在电影院里观影的我们也是如此.再试想曾经的古罗马竞技场, 无数观众为角斗士的厮杀欢呼呐喊, 那时却少有人将其判定为“道德错误”.这是因为道德判断的产生, 有赖于三个要素:规范违反(norm violation),消极情感(negative core affect)与感知到的伤害(perceptions of harm) (Gray, Schein, & Cameron, 2017).以往的研究业已发现, 规范违反与消极情感, 是个体区分习俗冒犯(conventional violations)与道德冒犯(moral violations)的标准(Nichols, 2002), 而感知到的伤害, 是典型的规范违反, 通常也是消极的.

根据道德二元论, 任何一种道德判断的产生, 都会涉及如下的基本要素.

规范违反.社会规范可分为道德规范,习俗规范,个人规范三类, 一般而言, 违反道德规范被认为是最严重的, 习俗规范其次, 个人规范再次(Tisak & Jankowski, 1996).3~6岁的儿童, 更愿意接纳遵循道德规范(公平的资源分配)的同辈, 而不顾此人是群体内成员还是群体外成员; 他们同样倾向于接纳拥护习俗规范的同辈, 但这种倾向仅仅体现在群体内.值得一提的是, 随着年龄的增长, 儿童对同伴的选择, 更依赖于规范, 而不是群体关系的区分(Rizzo, Cooley, Elenbaas, & Killen, 2018), 足可见规范, 尤其是道德规范, 对于群体形成的重要性.不仅如此, 道德规范还在意图与行为表现之间架起了桥梁, 当意图与态度一致时, 这一意图不一定会通过行为体现, 而当意图与道德规范相一致时, 意图转化为行为表现的可能性大大提升(Godin, Conner, & Sheeran, 2005).反向可知, 人们在意图违背道德规范时, 不愿以行为体现.对于自己尚且如此, 那么在观察到他人行为违背道德规范时, 自然不肯姑息.较之习俗规范与个人规范, 道德规范运用更广, 更具普适性, 而将道德冒犯与习俗冒犯区分开来的, 正是消极情感.

消极情感.情感, 或者称之为“情绪”, 无疑是道德判断中的重要元素, 社会直觉理论更是将情绪作为人们做出道德判断的主要原因, 认为认知推理在其中不过起到了事后解释的作用(Haidt, 2001).愤怒与厌恶是得到了广泛研究的两种道德情绪(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).人们会因为破坏道德规范感到愤怒(DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009), 认为违反道德是“恶心的” (Haidt, Mccauley, & Rozin, 1994).还有研究发现, 在厌恶情绪被唤起时, 人们对行为的道德判断更为严苛, 无论这种厌恶感来自于嗅觉还是味觉(Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).另外, 内疚作为一种典型的道德情绪, 同样会对道德判断,道德行为产生影响(张琨, 方平, 姜媛, 于悦, 欧阳恒磊, 2014).在消极情绪状态下, 无论强度如何, 都会增加对消极事件(如, 规范违反)的敏感性, 使道德判断更加严苛(杨青松, 2013).

情绪影响道德判断是必然的, 但尚存在一个主要争论:情绪对道德判断的影响, 是一对一的, 即特定情绪针对特定领域; 还是无特定性的, 广泛影响一般领域的道德判断.CAD (Contempt/ Community, Anger/Autonomy, Disgust/Divinity)三位一体假设(Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999)认为, 无论在何种文化背景下, 人们在冒犯自主性时感到愤怒, 冒犯社群性时感到蔑视, 冒犯神圣性时感到厌恶.确实有研究发现, 厌恶敏感度更多的与纯洁领域的道德冒犯相关联, 激起更强烈的道德谴责(Wagemans, Brandt, & Zeelenberg, 2017).关于堕胎道德判断的研究同样发现, 堕胎道德化是基于厌恶情绪, 而非愤怒与感知到的伤害(Wisneski & Skitka, 2017).但同时也存在相反证据, 无论道德冒犯涉及何种内容, 愤怒都是道德判断中的主导情绪(Royzman, Atanasov, Landy, Parks, & Gepty, 2014).在Royzman等人(2014)的研究中, 研究者让被试评价了多个场景, 分别涉及多种道德冒犯, 有的是自主冒犯, 有的是纯洁冒犯.研究者通过多个实验发现, 即便在纯洁冒犯领域, 被害者也被认为更可能感到愤怒, 这是其中的主导情绪.使用更具生态效度的档案数据, 他们还调查了美国军方焚烧《古兰经》的后果, 发现穆斯林感到极大的愤怒.假如拥有相同信仰的同伴违背了纯洁原则, 人们也更可能感到愤怒而非厌恶.

情绪对道德判断的影响, 以厌恶为例, 一般有两种检验方式:其一, 启动厌恶情绪后, 让被试对不同领域的道德冒犯做出道德判断; 其二, 划分道德冒犯领域之后, 进行厌恶水平评定.两种不同的实验范式难以整合比较.首先, 启动的厌恶情绪, 与对道德事件的厌恶水平评定, 究竟是否是同一种情绪, 这点难以分辨, 前者更接近于情绪, 后者则更接近于道德情绪.其次, 就第一种范式来说, 刺激材料的分类不明, 常见的分类有三分(核心厌恶,动物本性提醒厌恶,感染厌恶)与两分(身体厌恶,道德厌恶) (吴宝沛, 张雷, 2012).出于以上种种原因, 情绪对道德判断的影响争议尚存.

感知到的伤害需要从它所包含的三个元素进行分析.

行为者意图.意图能改变我们的知觉, 甚至对物理刺激的体验, 也并非依赖于物理特征, 而取决于感知到的他人的心智.仁慈的意图减轻冲击伤害, 使按摩更加愉快, 使糖更甜(Gray, 2012).善意的谎言, 因其善良的意图, 被认为比真实的陈述更加符合道德(Levine & Schweitzer, 2014), 利他谎言甚至增强了信任(Levine & Schweitzer, 2015).对意图的不同敏感度影响了道德判断.宗教信仰可分为两个截然不同的方面——正统观念(强调信仰)和正统实践(强调行为), 研究发现, 对于无意的道德冒犯, 高正统观念的被试道德判断更宽松, 而正统实践者相对严苛(Laurin & Plaks, 2014), 其原因便在于高正统观念的被试将行为者的意图纳入了考量.意图在儿童的道德判断中, 同样作用突出, 4~5岁孩子的判断几乎同时被意图与结果影响, 从5~9岁开始, 他们的判断主要依赖于意图, 儿童做出基于意图的判断的能力常常被大大低估(李占星, 朱莉琪, 2015; Margoni & Surian, 2017; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Bartholomew, 2016).意图对道德判断的重要影响, 还在道德谴责中有所体现.相较于无意冒犯, 人们经常高估有意冒犯的危害程度, 出现“伤害放大(harm-magnification)”, 被试在有意伤害的情境下, 倾向于对肇事者进行惩罚(Ames & Fiske, 2015).责备路径模型(Path Model of Blame)预测, 人们在判断行为是否该责备时, 有获取信息的经典顺序——发现消极事件, 考虑因果, 接下来意图.考虑意图时, 先将意图划分为有意与无意两种, 之后进一步进行加工, 对有意行为考虑其原因, 对无意行为则考虑其可预防性(Guglielmo & Malle, 2017; Monroe & Malle, 2017).

受害者痛苦.受害者的痛苦在以往关于道德判断的研究中鲜有提及, 但如果道德行为确实来源于同情心(Darwin, 1871), 那么对不道德行为“道德错误”的判断, 是否也与此相关?电车难题[一辆有轨电车正在驶来, 如果它不切换轨道, 会撞上轨道上的5个工人, 但是如果切换轨道, 就会撞上另一条轨道上的1名工人.有一个开关, 可以达到切换轨道的目的.你(他)是否应该按下开关?(王鹏, 方平, 姜媛, 2011)]相关研究发现, 共情影响道德判断, 无论是酒精造成的共情减少(Duke & Bègue, 2015), 还是脑功能异常造成的心理变态, 共情能力低下, 都会使功利主义决策增多(Marsh & Cardinale, 2014), 而共情的弱化, 可能正是对受害者痛苦感知的削弱.另外, 被试倾向于牺牲年龄大的对象, 来杀一救五, 杀害一个年龄小的对象被认为更不道德(Bleske-rechek, Nelson, Baker, Remiker, & Brandt, 2010; Kawai, Kubo, & Kubo-Kawai, 2014).若按心智感知理论解释, 相较于高能动性,高感受性的成年人, 孩子通常被认为是低能动性,高感受性的, 判断者可能从孩子身上, 感知到了更多的痛苦体验(Gray et al., 2007).研究发现, 在呈现了不道德的场景标题之后, 被试在孩子悲伤的表情中, 体验到更多的痛苦(Gray et al., 2014).

因果关系.不作为的道德冒犯, 指行为者预料到了自己的不作为将造成道德冒犯, 但其依然选择不作为.相较于直接做出道德冒犯行为, 个体对不作为的道德冒犯更为宽容; 相较于以道德冒犯为手段达到个人目的, 个体对道德冒犯仅为行为的副作用时更为宽容, 研究中将此称之为“不作为效应”与“副作用效应(byproduct effects)” (Peter, Kelly, & Robert, 2012).在“不作为效应”与“副作用效应”中, 无一不是因果关系的削弱导致了道德判断的宽松.如果有意的行为者与痛苦的受害者之间的因果关系消失, 道德判断也将不复存在.

道德二元论强调, 对不道德判断的产生, 应持维恩图(Venn diagrams)式的理解(如图1所示), 而不应该将情绪与道德之间的联系视为一一对应, 即箭头式的理解(Gray et al., 2017).道德判断是规范违反,消极情感和感知到的伤害的结合.

图1

图1   道德二元论认为不道德的基础, 是规范违反,(消极)核心情感与感知到的伤害三者的结合(Gray et al., 2017).


2.2 道德判断的加工

道德判断的加工是由上至下与由下至上并存的:感知到(行为者的)意图和(受害者的)痛苦, 是道德判断的原因, 也是结果(Gray et al., 2012), 并最终体现为一个道德认知循环圈, 从感知到的伤害到不道德判断, 再由不道德判断到感知到的伤害(Schein & Gray, 2016).道德二元论将由下至上的加工过程称为“道德二元比较(dyadic comparison)”, 即人们在观察到某一行为时, 会将其与二元模型相比较, 判断这一行为中是否存在有意图的行为者和遭痛苦的受害者, 两者之间是否存在因果关系, 如果三点均满足, 则将此行为判断为不道德行为; 而由上至下加工的过程被称为“道德二元完型(dyadic completion)”, 即人们在知觉到某一行为不道德时, 就自动将二元模板套用到所观察到的行为中去, 对原本行为者,因果关系,受害者三元素并不完全的行为, 进行元素补全, 因此称之为“二元完型”.道德二元比较的例证, 上文已从行为者的意图,受害者的痛苦,因果关系三方面阐释; 道德二元完型, 则从实验中得到了部分证实.

根据“感知到的伤害”中的三个元素, 道德二元完型也可分为三种:行为者补全,因果关系补全,受害者补全(Gray et al., 2014).行为者补全, 诸如在遭受苦难时, 人们感慨上帝不公, 对上帝意图如此的信念增强(Gray & Wegner, 2010); 因果关系补全, 诸如罗马皇帝尼禄, 因其残暴统治饱受非议, 虽发生于公元64年的罗马大火非其所为, 却“不能使人们不相信这次大火是故意放起来的” (塔西佗, 1981).群众自然而然将自己所受到的伤害, 与尼禄残暴的统治相连.受害者补全, 则是道德二元完型中最常见的现象.Gray等(2014)通过5个实验发现了受害者补全现象的存在.第一个实验需要被试在时间有限或时间充足的情境下, 对纯洁冒犯,伤害冒犯,中性的情境做出道德判断, 并判断是否存在受害者.结果发现, 与时间充裕时相比, 在时间压力下, 被试在纯洁冒犯情境中判断更可能存在受害者.实验2与3发现, 客观无伤害(纯洁冒犯)情境中, 也出现了内隐伤害概念的激活.实验4与5则发现, 道德冒犯场景标题的呈现, 使被试对身体伤害的疼痛程度评价更高, 对悲伤面孔的痛苦程度评价更高, 即带来了更多对受害者身体与精神痛苦的感知.

道德角色分配(moral typecasting)现象也能为道德判断自上而下的加工过程做些许补充.道德行为者(moral agent)被视为拥有更多的能动性, 而弱化了他人对其感受性的感知, 因此当一个曾经做过道德行为或者不道德行为的个体受到伤害时, 通常被认为所经受的痛苦更少, 不易受到伤害; 而道德受害者(moral patient)被视为拥有更多的感受性, 而弱化了对其能动性的感知, 这也就是为何人们常常认为受害者不可能做出伤害他人行为的缘由(Gray & Wegner, 2009).在企图逃避责任之时, 伪装成受害者(强调感受性), 而不是英雄(强调能动性), 确实能减少谴责(Gray & Wegner, 2011).可见个体在进行道德判断时, 不但进行道德二元完型, 且在认定道德角色(道德行为者或道德受害者)之后, 难以转化, 能动性(包含意图)与感受性(包含痛苦)之间存在相互抑制的关系.而这种道德角色分配, 可能通过影响对道德权利与道德责任的感知, 影响道德判断.在复杂的道德判断中, 道德角色分配也有可能存在于道德二元完型之前.当行为者与受害者角色混乱(比如, 两厢情愿的乱伦), 或者判断对象之前有过复杂的道德经历之时, 就需要先通过感知能动性/感受性, 认定行为者/受害者, 再进行道德二元完型, 补全受害者/行为者.

3 道德二元论的解释力

3.1 道德失声(moral dumbfounding)

道德失声现象的提出, 来源于Björklund, Haidt和Murphy (2000)一份未出版却得到了广泛引用的手稿.实验中被试需要对两个行为做出道德判断, 其一, 是两厢情愿的兄妹乱伦, 其二, 是一个女人将用于病理学教育的尸体煮熟了之后食用.这两个行为的共同点在于, 虽然令人厌恶, 却不存在伤害, 但是被试依旧判断其不道德, 且无法说明原因.Haidt (2001)随后提出了社会直觉理论模型, “道德失声现象”成为了道德判断主要依靠直觉的佐证.

道德二元论认同“道德判断主要依赖直觉”的论调, 但另一方面, 它并不认同道德失声现象的存在——个体之所以无法解释为何判定无伤害行为是不道德的, 完全是因为研究者自认为排除了“伤害”所致, 事实上没有“伤害”的道德冒犯行为并不存在(Schein & Gray, 2017), 即使在客观无伤害的情境中, 被试依然感知到了伤害, 他们并不相信两兄妹两厢情愿的乱伦是真正无伤害的(Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015).主观伤害与客观伤害的分离, 导致了道德失声现象的产生, 或许可以说, 道德失声现象并不存在.

3.2 道德两难

电车难题在道德两难问题中广受关注.传统道德心理学将电车难题作为研究道德判断背后心理机制的有力手段, 认为道德两难是“道义主义”与“功利主义”的冲突.Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley和Cohen (2004)借助对道德两难问题的神经科学研究, 提出了双加工理论模型, 认为道德判断是情感系统与认知系统相互竞争的结果.他们认为, 功利主义判断与认知系统相对应, 而道义主义判断则与情感系统对应(喻丰, 彭凯平, 韩婷婷, 柴方圆, 柏阳, 2011; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008).双加工模型得到了众多研究的验证(段蕾, 莫书亮, 范翠英, 刘华山, 2012; Greene & Haidt, 2002).近来, 有研究对双加工理论模型提出了质疑与修正.如有研究发现, 让被试思考更多的判断理由, 反而减少了功利主义决策(Rai & Holyoak, 2010), 研究者认为, 功利主义行为主要由共情减少或共情能力不足所导致, 减少的共情较深思熟虑, 能够更好地预测功利主义倾向(Duke & Bègue, 2015; Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013).

道德二元论则认为, 电车难题虽然非常有趣, 且得到了广泛的研究, 但功利主义与道义主义的冲突, 并非一般道德判断时所采用的认知模式, 因此对电车难题的研究可能是无意义的(Gray et al., 2014).具体来说, 电车难题是在迫使个体在道义主义与功利主义之间做出选择.做出功利主义决策, 就意味着个体成为了一个有意的行为者, 杀死1人救下5人(相较于道义主义的不作为, 功利主义决策含有更强烈的意图); 做出道义主义决策, 就意味着个体要承受5个受害者因自己的不作为遭受痛苦(相较于功利主义使一人遭受痛苦, 道义主义决策则需承受五个受害者的痛苦).因此电车难题是在迫使个体选择成为一个有意的行为者(功利主义)或者承受受害者的痛苦(道义主义), 这割裂了道德认知的一般模式, 即道德行为者与道德受害者同时存在, 并据此做出道德判断.也就是说, 电车难题中所设置的场景, 与普遍存在的道德认知模式是背道而驰的, 如图2所示.

图2

图2   典型道德行为是二元的, 同时包含行为者(agent)和受害者(patient).电车难题被用来检验很多关于道德判断认知的争论, 但它是反二元的, 要求个体在行为者与受害者之间选择其一(Gray et al., 2014).


但是情理之争是否是毫无意义的?事实上不尽然.我们可以再次回想道德二元论所提出的一般道德认知模板:有意的行为者导致受害者经历苦楚.所谓的二元, 即有意图的行为者与遭痛苦的受害者.在复杂的道德事件中(引起广泛争论的道德事件通常是复杂的), 意图通常需要推断, 而对痛苦的感知则更加快速.若与双加工模型加以对应, 意图可能更多地与道德推理相对应, 痛苦可能更多地与道德情绪相对应.那么是否存在这样的可能:在一般道德认知模板之内, 就存在着情理之争?

恰如角色分配理论所述, 如果一个好人(做过好事, 有好的意图)遭受痛苦, 人们难以感知他的痛苦, 这时, 可视为道德推理占得上风; 而一个受害者(受过伤害, 遭受痛苦)做坏事, 人们难以推理他的意图, 这时道德情绪占得上风(Gray & Wegner, 2009).因此, 情理之争, 可能不是对道德认知模板的割裂, 而是在复杂情境下进行道德判断之时, 道德认知模板之中普遍存在的矛盾, 道德两难问题正好放大了这一矛盾.因此, 时至今日, 道德判断的情理之争, 依然是一个值得关注的问题(谢熹瑶, 罗跃嘉, 2009).

3.3 道德领域

道德二元论虽然提出道德内容的多元, 来源于对伤害感知的多元, 但它还有个待解释的问题, 即伤害多元的具体表现是什么, 又如何与道德内容的多元化相对应?这就涉及到, 人们在面对不同道德领域(尤其是不涉及明显伤害的领域, 如公平,忠诚,权威,纯洁,自由)冒犯时, 内隐被激活的“伤害”概念中, 受害者究竟是谁?

Gray等人(2014)在用内隐联想测验确定在纯洁冒犯中伤害概念被激活之后, 询问被试在纯洁冒犯中感知到的受害者是谁, 被试的回答大致可分为三类:自己,他人/灵魂,社会.如在“看着姐姐的照片自慰”的场景中, 被试认为姐姐的灵魂/记忆,肇事者自己或者家庭,社会被伤害.但这可以视为在道德判断之后的推理解释, 当伤害概念被激活的瞬间, 被试具体感知到了什么伤害依然不得而知.

道德二元论强调道德有进化基础, 但凡被道德化的行为都涉及伤害, 并认为显而易见的伤害是直接的生存繁衍威胁, 因而被普遍的道德化, 而诸如纯洁之类的道德领域, 则可能是间接地对生存繁衍造成威胁, 形成了远端威胁, 所以道德化程度不如伤害那么高(Schein & Gray, 2017).那么我们不妨从中推测所谓的“远端威胁”中, 伤害是以何种形式存在的.以道德基础理论的剩余五大方面为例:公平,忠诚,权威,纯洁,自由.

公平.与公平相对的道德冒犯行为是欺骗.人作为社会性动物, 在社会交换中获益, 并在社会交换中遵循互惠原则(Trivers, 1971), 如果一方在付出代价之后, 却受到欺骗, 未获得等价的回报, 那么显而易见, 这是一种物质损失, 也是对情感的伤害.

忠诚.道德行为之所以被自然选择青睐, 是基于群体选择, 它提升了群体在群际竞争中胜出的可能性(Darwin, 1871), 忠诚显然是有助于群际竞争的道德行为.反过来说, 忠诚冒犯, 便会使群体凝聚力减弱, 从而在群际竞争中失利.而群体的失利, 最终伤害的是个体自身.

权威.权威讲究的是等级秩序, 简单来说, 受害者可能是社会秩序, 但还有以下两种可能性:第一, 由历史可知, 社会阶级是极难改变的, 而一个人对权威的反抗, 恰恰是其想打破阶级的表现.若是做出道德判断的是同一阶级者, 难免畏惧反抗者步入上一阶级, 那么于他来说, 便是一种不公平, 伤害其情感; 若做出道德判断的是权威本身, 那么其维护自身阶级地位的情感不言而喻.第二, 从心智感知理论出发, 反抗权威者, 由于他反抗权威的行为, 被认为具有更多的能动性.根据道德角色分配理论, 能动性与感受性的分配难以转换, 这容易让人忽略其感受性.如此分配之后, 再进行道德二元完型, 明明处于优势的权威, 反而成了受害者.

纯洁.纯洁是获得较多探讨的道德领域, 常用来和伤害领域做对比.诸如乱伦,乱交,兽交之类的非正常性行为, 其背后, 隐藏着传染,传播疾病的风险, 不论对自身还是对他人(包括动物), 都是伤害.

自由.自由是个难以界定的概念, 甚至与权威相对, 将它纳入道德基础理论似乎并不是那么合适.即使有人觉得父母夜晚11点不让孩子出门看电影限制了孩子的自由, 但没人会觉得这是不道德的.但如果以自由的反面压迫论, 当压迫威胁了生存, 自然就是伤害了.

因此, 道德二元论与道德基础理论并非不可调和.道德基础理论中认为道德基础来源于对不同适应性问题的应对, 并由此形成了不同的道德领域.在这一论述中, 有一个尚待解决的问题, 即对进化根源验证的实证研究匮乏.但我们不妨先假设不同的道德领域拥有不同的进化基础, 这与道德二元论并不矛盾, 道德二元论回答的是这样一个问题:是什么使人们将这些领域整合在一起, 纳入道德范围, 将它们统称为“道德”?因此道德基础理论与道德二元论, 事实上更像是对道德的分层理解, 道德二元论, 恰恰为道德基础理论, 补上了认知机制这一层空缺.

4 总结与展望

道德二元论的优势, 可以在与其他理论的比较中得到明晰.首先, 与道德关系调节理论相比, 两者都是以道德的社会功能为切入点, 但道德二元论认识到, 道德虽然脱胎于社会关系, 却绝不囿于社会关系, 因而以社会关系类型为基础所划分出的道德领域, 是不足以概括所有道德现象的.而且, 道德二元论不满足于将社会关系进行表面的分类, 来寻求与道德动机的一一对应, 而是深入探讨了一般道德认知背后的可能机制——感知到的伤害, 即有意的行为者导致受害者经历苦楚, 以此构成了道德认知的典型模板.其次, 与道德基础理论相比, 道德二元论没有做标签式的道德内容划分——这也是与道德关系调节理论相比的优势所在, 而是试图在道德多元的现象背后, 寻找道德多元的认知原因——道德内容的多元, 来自于对伤害理解的多元.且不论道德二元论是否揭示了一般道德认知背后的心理机制, 但它对此的尝试, 是令人欢欣鼓舞的, 尤其是在得到了一系列研究结果支持的情况下.但无论是何理论, 都不可避免地存在一些瑕疵, 道德二元论也不例外.

第一, 存在行为者意图与受害者苦楚影响道德判断的反证.意图方面, 人们普遍接受意图在道德与法律审判中起到了中心作用, 但这可能只是反映了相对最近的文化演变中道德判断的规范, 仅在大规模工业化社会中成立.一项调研了8个小规模传统社会的研究发现, 虽然所有被试都在一定程度上考虑了意图, 但是程度差异极大, 甚至在两个小规模社会中, 意图未产生显著影响(Barrett et al., 2016).苦楚方面, 共情是控制道德判断的关键情感反应, 也是被普遍认同的假设, 但近来有研究发现, 人们对行为本身的厌恶, 而不是对受害者痛苦的厌恶, 预测了道德谴责(Miller, Hannikainen, & Cushman, 2014).若要明确行为者意图与受害者痛苦的影响, 还需要在不同社会背景下再做验证.另外, 研究材料的混杂, 可能也是得出不同研究结果的原因, 尤其是道德相关研究中, 道德故事的变量繁杂, 通常难以控制, 要比较不同研究的异同, 本身就存在困难, 因此选取一个统一有效的范式, 是道德研究的必经之路.

第二, 有意的行为者导致受害者经历苦楚, 是不是道德背后的典型认知模板, 可以通过跨文化研究来探讨.一项在蒙古展开的道德研究发现, 公平比伤害, 在道德判断中起到更重要的影响, 被试甚至将伤害领域归结于公平领域(Berniūnas, Dranseika, & Sousa, 2016).而在以中国人为被试的道德研究中发现, 中国人更倾向于认为违反“礼(civility)”的行为不道德(Buchtel et al., 2015).即便道德二元论理论提出者对这一结论做了反驳, 质疑了研究中“道德”的概念, 并认为在美国, 也存在“礼”的概念, 在中国文化中得出这样的结果是令人疑惑的(Schein & Gray, 2017).但这种质疑并不具有实质性价值, 未颠覆Buchtel等人(2015)的结论.东方文化与西方文化的差异, 可能导致了道德认知的不同, 那么其背后的心理机制是否存在差异, 这是需要跨文化研究继续探讨的问题.

第三, 也是道德心理学中至今没有答案的争论, 道德判断背后, 是由不同的认知系统计算不同类型行为的道德错误, 还是由一种统一的认知系统, 计算了所有类型行为的道德错误(Peter et al., 2012).道德基础理论是前一类模块化理论的代表(但其对此的推论来源于不同道德领域有不同的进化基础), 而道德二元论则是统一认知系统的代表, 两者各执一词, 尚无定论.其中有迹可循的是道德情绪与道德领域的关系.支持道德情绪与道德领域一一对应的不少(Rozin et al. 1999; Wagemans et al. 2017; Wisneski & Skitka, 2017), 支持道德情绪与道德领域并无对应关系的实验结果也不少(Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015; Royzman et al., 2014).Gray和Keeney (2015)曾对道德基础理论提出过质疑, 道德领域之间的界限, 可能来源于题目的怪异, 而不是领域本身之间存在差异.这其实为我们提供了一个全新的角度, 日常生活中的道德冒犯行为, 是否总是单一地属于一个道德领域?实际生活中的道德冒犯行为非常复杂, 完全可以包含多个领域.如在一次军事行动中, 长官与士兵同时流落荒岛, 士兵因为极度的恐惧, 殴打了长官, 但在只剩最后一瓶水时, 他将自己的水分了一半给对方.关爱,公平,忠诚,权威交织, 不知身为读者的你阅读此故事时, 被激发了怎样的道德情绪?所以道德与情绪的研究迷雾重重, 研究结论的不同, 可能只是领域比重的不同产生的差异, 亦或是领域交织, 也会产生不同的情绪.道德二元论虽然提倡要对此持维恩图(Venn diagrams)式的理解, 将道德情绪视为规范违反,消极情感和感知到的伤害重叠区域的产物(Gray et al., 2017), 但事实上, 到目前为止, 还未有实验证明这一假想.之后的研究中, 以实证研究辨明此假想是否为真, 是重要的一步.另外有研究发现, 伤害与纯洁冒犯, 在目标不同时, 表现出不同的道德判断模式, 纯洁冒犯倾向于被视为自我指向, 而伤害倾向于被视为他人指向(Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013); 禁止伤害与禁止纯洁冒犯, 可能出于不同的目的, 禁止伤害是为了规范人际交往, 禁止纯洁冒犯则是为了自我保护(Young & Tsoi, 2013).这可能说明了伤害领域与纯洁领域背后存在不同的认知机制, 是值得注意的地方.

第四, 就理论本身而言, 道德二元论存在若干未解释的问题.首先, 道德二元论将人际伤害作为道德认知的典型认知模板, 即一个有意图的行为者给受害者带来了痛苦.但我们发现, 一些伤害跨越了人际界限, 譬如对制度,社会,风俗和传统的伤害, 似乎很难找到明确的受害者.一些值得思考的问题就会呼之欲出:哪些因素扩展了道德的界限, 使其不再局限于人际伤害?道德的边界由人际向外扩展, 是否存在着更深层的认知机制?其次, 伤害行为越出人际伤害的边界时, 个体对其道德判断的心理机制, 是否与人际伤害中的道德判断相似?对于非人际对象(比如制度和风俗)而言, 寻找一个具体的受害者更困难, 但另一方面, 假如个体把自己的情感投向了这些抽象的存在, 对它们产生了认同, 那么对它们的伤害也很容易被识别出来.人际伤害与非人际伤害会导致不同模式的道德判断, 还是会保留在同一个道德判断模式中, 值得探讨.最后, 道德二元论的关键是伤害感知.研究发现, 3个月大的婴儿就能对他人的道德行为做出评价, 区别对待, 他们被亲社会者吸引, 回避反社会者(Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2010).而8个月大的婴儿就表现出了明确的道德偏好, 他们会奖励作为亲社会者的“好人”, 惩罚作为反社会者的“坏人” (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2011).即便他们的语言能力尚未发展出来, 但这些行为表明婴儿就有相当的道德意识, 暗示道德判断可能是一种与生俱来的普遍能力(Bloom & Jarudi, 2006).假如道德判断是一种普遍能力, 那么就有必要证明感知伤害的能力也有普遍性.而这种能力显然跟同情,共情,情绪识别,疼痛感知有关, 这些倾向是否具有跨文化的一致性就很重要了.道德二元论的理论建构和完善, 有必要考虑这些跟伤害感知有关的因素, 并检验它们是否具有普遍性.

参考文献

段蕾, 莫书亮, 范翠英, 刘华山 . (2012).

道德判断中心理状态和事件因果关系的作用:兼对道德判断双加工过程理论的检验.

心理学报,44(12), 1607-1617.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

考察青少年儿童和成人在道德判断中利用心理状态和事件因果关系信息的差异,并验证道德判断双加工过程理论。以道德判断中"行为坏的"程度和"应担负的道德责任程度"作为判断问题类型,共有10~11岁和13~15岁的青少年儿童及大学生各120名,完成道德判断测试任务。结果表明在不同的道德判断问题类型下,事件中他人愿望和信念、因果关系信息的作用模式是不同的,支持道德判断双加工过程理论。10~11岁儿童和13~15岁青少年在判断行为坏的程度时,利用心理状态信息和因果关系信息与成人类似。在判断应担负的道德责任程度时,10~11岁儿童更注重行为结果,并且不能综合应用心理状态信息和事件的因果关系信息。13~15岁青少年的道德判断中心理状态信息和事件因果关系信息的作用与成人的情况类似,但在进行应担负的道德责任程度判断时,还不能融合信念与因果关系信息进行道德判断。研究结果为道德判断双加工过程理论提供了支持,而且表明从儿童青少年到成人,利用心理状态和因果关系信息进行道德判断存在不断发展和成熟的过程。

李占星, 朱莉琪 . (2015).

道德情绪判断与归因:发展与影响因素.

心理科学进展,23(6), 990-999.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

Previous research has shown developmental differences in moral emotion judgment. In general, the pattern of attribution changes from outcome-oriented to morality-oriented. Factors such as social cognitive ability, context, and personality all contribute to children’s judgment and attribution. There are also some cross-cultural differences in children’s judgment and attribution of moral emotions. The patterns of children’s moral judgment are significantly associated with their moral behavior. Future research can explore moral emotion judgment and attribution in children with cognitive or behavioral disorders for intervention purposes.

塔西佗 . (1981).

塔西佗《编年史》 (王以铸, 崔妙因译).

北京: 商务印书馆.

[本文引用: 1]

王鹏, 方平, 姜媛 . (2011).

道德直觉背景下的道德决策:影响因素探究.

心理科学进展,19(4), 573-579.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

以往对道德直觉的研究表明了情绪因素在道德决策中的重要作用,研究者提出道德决策中存在有意 识认知和无意识情绪两种加工过程,二者之间不能够完全分离与孤立。针对这种认知—情绪过程解释、经典电车和人行桥困境中的道德判断差异等问题,近年来大量 研究通过对道德行为者和道德判断者自身原因、道德情境等主客观因素的深入考察,试图从不同角度来揭示认知—情绪过程解释的合理性及道德决策差异背后的其他 原因,形成了道德直觉背景下相关领域诸多新的关注点。未来研究有必要针对道德决策研究的方法学、情境的扩展及认知—情感系统内部交互等问题作进一步探讨。

吴宝沛, 张雷 . (2012).

厌恶与道德判断的关系.

心理科学进展,20(2), 309-316.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

来自问卷调查和认知神经科学的证据表明,厌恶与道德判断可能存在 密切关系,但是研究者对两者之间的关系是一般性的还是特异性的尚无定论.有若干证据表明厌恶影响一般的道德判断,也有研究认为厌恶主要影响人们对纯洁领域 的道德判断.未来研究需要明确界定厌恶的类别,区分厌恶与道德厌恶两种不同的构念,从疾病防御的角度理解厌恶的进化根源,以及测量厌恶启动之后人们对不同 道德冒犯的内隐态度.

谢熹瑶, 罗跃嘉 . (2009).

道德判断中的情绪因素——从认知神经科学的角度进行探讨.

心理科学进展,17(6), 1250-1256.

[本文引用: 1]

杨青松 . (2013).

时间距离对道德违规行为判断的影响及其作用机制(博士学位论文).

湖南师范大学.

[本文引用: 1]

喻丰, 彭凯平, 韩婷婷, 柴方圆, 柏阳 . (2011).

道德困境之困境——情与理的辩争.

心理科学进展,19(11), 1702-1712.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

Though moral judgment ranks among one of the most essential human activities, arguments about the roles of emotion and reasoning play in moral judgment never cease. From the philosophical controversy between Hume and Kant to the debates among developmental psychologists; from social psychology arguments about the power of the situations to neuroscience insights about the brain constraints to human morality, modern psychology has witnessed the paradigm shifts from time to time concerning the importance of emotion and reasoning in moral judgments. We reviewed several competing theories on moral judgment and gave a synthetic view of the roles emotion and reasoning play in moral judgment. We suggest that the psychological contributions in understanding human morality would come from the systematical analysis of moral judgments in real life situations involving real individuals with real implications. Methodologically, multi-level and multi-method analysis is much needed. By studying the effects of situational factors in moral judgments, we may eventually be able to go beyond the dichotomy of emotion and reasoning to truly understand the mechanisms involved in human moral judgments.

张国清 . (2013).

罗尔斯难题: 正义原则的误读与批评.

中国社会科学, 39(10),22-40.

[本文引用: 1]

张琨, 方平, 姜媛, 于悦, 欧阳恒磊 . (2014).

道德视野下的内疚.

心理科学进展,22(10), 1628-1636.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

For decades, the researches on guilt have attracted significant attention, most of which were focused on the children development and mental health. While in recent years, the focus has been turned to the moral dimension of guilt, concerning more about the moral values of emotions in interpersonal relationship and social events. Guilt, a moral emotion, develops with moral consciousness and plays an important role in maintaining and reconstructing social relations and the development of emotions. From the perspective of morality, this review gives detailed discussions on the definition, generation mechanism, behavioral response and prosocial impacts of guilt. It is hoped that this study can provide some new insights into domestic studies in this field.

张梦圆, 苑明亮, 寇彧 . (2016).

论西方道德心理研究的新综合取向: 道德基础理论.

北京师范大学学报(社会科学版), 253(1), 50-59.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

个体的道德系统不仅包括评价道德水平的道德形式,而且也包括界定道德范畴的道德内容。以理性主义为基础的传统道德心理研究重视道德形式,忽视情绪因素,未能充分揭示道德判断规律;忽视道德情感与行为,未能系统描述个体道德全貌;忽略文化多样性,反映出有限的道德内容观。随着多学科的发展与交流,新综合取向的道德基础理论应运而生。该理论认为道德具有先天性、可塑性、直觉性和多元性四个基本特征,包含关爱/伤害,公平/欺骗,忠诚/背叛,权威/颠覆,洁净/堕落五元道德内容,后新增自由/压迫共六大道德内容。基于该理论的应用研究,涉及个体心理特征与多元道德内容的关系、不同群体道德内容的差异性及其影响因素、道德内容差异性对个体态度的预测三个方面。未来研究可以继续深入探讨不同道德内容对于个体社会行为的交互影响,以及多元道德内容基础上的个体道德发展。

Ames D.L., &Fiske S.T . (2015).

Perceived intent motivates people to magnify observed harms.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, of the United States of America, 112(12), 3599-3605.

URL     PMID:25733850      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Existing moral psychology research commonly explains certain phenomena in terms of a motivation to blame. However, this motivation is not measured directly, but rather is inferred from other measures, such as participants' judgments of an agent's blameworthiness. The present paper introduces new methods for assessing this theoretically important motivation, using tools drawn from animal-model research. We test these methods in the context of recent "harm-magnification" research, which shows that people often overestimate the damage caused by intentional (versus unintentional) harms. A preliminary experiment exemplifies this work and also rules out an alternative explanation for earlier harm-magnification results. Exp. 1 asks whether intended harm motivates blame or merely demonstrates the actor's intrinsic blameworthiness. Consistent with a motivational interpretation, participants freely chose blaming, condemning, and punishing over other appealing tasks in an intentional-harm condition, compared with an unintentional-harm condition. Exp. 2 also measures motivation but with converging indicators of persistence (effort, rate, and duration) in blaming. In addition to their methodological contribution, these studies also illuminate people's motivational responses to intentional harms. Perceived intent emerges as catalyzing a motivated social cognitive process related to social prediction and control.

Atkinson Q.D., & Bourrat P. (2011).

Beliefs about god, the afterlife and morality support the role of supernatural policing in human cooperation.

Evolution and Human Behavior, 32(1), 41-49.

URL     Magsci     [本文引用: 1]

Reputation monitoring and the punishment of cheats are thought to be crucial to the viability and maintenance of human cooperation in large groups of non-kin. However, since the cost of policing moral norms must fall to those in the group, policing is itself a public good subject to exploitation by free riders. Recently, it has been suggested that belief in supernatural monitoring and punishment may discourage individuals from violating established moral norms and so facilitate human cooperation. Here we use cross-cultural survey data from a global sample of 87 countries to show that beliefs about two related sources of supernatural monitoring and punishment God and the afterlife independently predict respondents' assessment of the justifiability of a range of moral transgressions. This relationship holds even after controlling for frequency of religious participation, country of origin, religious denomination and level of education. As well as corroborating experimental work, our findings suggest that, across cultural and religious backgrounds, beliefs about the permissibility of moral transgressions are tied to beliefs about supernatural monitoring and punishment, supporting arguments that these beliefs may be important promoters of cooperation in human groups.

Barrett H. C., Bolyanatz A., Crittenden A. N., Fessler D. M. T., Fitzpatrick S., Gurven M ., et al. Laurence, S. (2016).

Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 113(17), 4688-4693.

URL     PMID:27035959      [本文引用: 3]

Beller, Bender, and Medin argue that a reconciliation between anthropology and cognitive science seems unlikely. We disagree. In our view, Beller et al.'s view of the scope of what anthropology can offer cognitive science is too narrow. In focusing on anthropology's role in elucidating cultural particulars, they downplay the fact that anthropology can reveal both variation and universals in... [Show full abstract]

Berniūnas R., Dranseika V., & Sousa P . (2016).

Are there different moral domains? Evidence from Mongolia.

Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 19(3), 275-282.

Björklund F., Haidt J., & Murphy S . (2000).

Moral dumbfounding: When intuition finds no reason. Department of Psychology.

Lund University.

Bleske-rechek A., Nelson L. A., Baker J. P., Remiker M. W., & Brandt S. J . (2010).

Evolution and the trolley problem: People save five over one unless the one is young, genetically related, or a romantic partner.

Journal of Social, 4(3), 115-127.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

ABSTRACT We investigated men’s and women’s responses to variations of an ethical thought experiment known as the Trolley Problem. In the original Trolley Problem, readers must decide whether they will save the lives of five people tied to a track by pulling a lever to sacrifice the life of one person tied to an alternate track. According to W. D. Hamilton's (1964) formulation of inclusive fitness, people's moral decisions should favor the well-being of those who are reproductively viable, share genes, and provide reproductive opportunity. In two studies (Ns = 652 and 956), we manipulated the sex, age (2, 20, 45, and 70 years old), genetic relatedness (0, .125, .25, and .50), and potential reproductive opportunity of the one person tied to the alternate track. As expected, men and women were less likely to sacrifice one life for five lives if the one hypothetical life was young, a genetic relative, or a current mate.

Bloom P., & Jarudi I. (2006).

The Chomsky of morality.

Nature, 443(7114), 909-910.

[本文引用: 1]

Buchtel E. E., Guan Y., Peng Q., Su Y., Sang B., Chen S. X., & Bond M. H . (2015).

Immorality east and west: Are immoral behaviors especially harmful, or especially uncivilized?.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(10), 1382-1394.

URL     PMID:26253486      [本文引用: 1]

What makes some acts immoral? While Western theories of morality often define harmful behaviors as centrally immoral, whether this is applicable to other cultures is still under debate. In particular, Confucianism emphasizes civility as fundamental to moral excellence. We designed three studies examining how the word “immoral” is used by Chinese and Westerners. Layperson-generated examples were used to examine cultural differences in which behaviors are called “immoral” (Study 1, N = 609; Study 2, N = 480), and whether “immoral” behaviors were best characterized as particularly harmful vs. uncivilized (Study 3, N = 443). Results suggest that Chinese were more likely to use the word “immoral” for behaviors that were uncivilized, rather than exceptionally harmful; while Westerners were more likely to link immorality tightly to harm. More research into lay concepts of morality is needed to inform theories of moral cognition and improve understanding of human conceptualizations of social norms.

Cameron C. D., Lindquist K. A., & Gray K . (2015).

A constructionist review of morality and emotions: No evidence for specific links between moral content and discrete emotions.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 19(4), 371-394.

URL     PMID:25587050      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many "whole number" accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality-emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality-emotion links. 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Chakroff A., Dungan J., & Young L . (2013).

Harming ourselves and defiling others: What determines a moral domain?

Plos One, 8(9), e74434.

URL     PMID:24040245      [本文引用: 1]

Recent work has distinguished "harm" from "purity" violations, but how does an act get classified as belonging to a domain in the first place? We demonstrate the impact of not only the kind of action (e.g., harmful versus impure) but also its target (e.g., oneself versus another). Across two experiments, common signatures of harm and purity tracked with other-directed and self-directed actions, respectively. First, participants judged self-directed acts as primarily impure and other-directed acts as primarily harmful. Second, conservatism predicted harsher judgments of self-directed but not other-directed acts. Third, while participants delivered harsher judgments of intentional versus accidental acts, this effect was smaller for self-directed than other-directed acts. Finally, participants judged self-directed acts more harshly when focusing on the actor's character versus the action itself; other-directed acts elicited the opposite pattern. These findings suggest that moral domains are defined not only by the kind of action but also by the target of the action.

Chakroff A., Russell P. S., Piazza J., & Young L . (2017).

From impure to harmful: Asymmetric expectations about immoral agents.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 69, 201-209.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

How does information about agents' past violations influence people's expectations about their future actions? We examined this question, with a focus on the contrast between past harmful and past impure actions. Participants' judgments reflected two independent influences: action consistency and expectation asymmetry. An expectation asymmetry was observed across seven studies, including two pilot studies and two supplemental studies: impure agents were judged as more likely to be harmful than harmful agents were judged likely to be impure. This expectation asymmetry is not due to an expectation that impure agents will be globally deviant, i.e., likely to commit all kinds of violations (Study 1), nor is it due to differences in the perceived wrongness or weirdness of harmful versus impure acts (Study 2). Study 3 demonstrated that this asymmetry is not attributable to the perceived harmfulness of impure actions; only impure agents, and not harmful agents, were expected to be more harmful than they were previously. These findings highlight an important asymmetry in the way people make predictions about future wrongdoing: immoral agents are expected to behave consistently, and are also expected to be harmful, regardless of their prior violation.

Darwin, C. (1871/1981). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[本文引用: 4]

DelGaizo A.L., &Falkenbach D.M . (2008).

Primary and secondary psychopathic-traits and their relationship to perception and experience of emotion.

Personality and Individual Differences, 45(3), 206-212.

URL     Magsci    

Deficits in the ability to perceive and experience affect are associated with psychopaths. However, past research is inconsistent, perhaps because it measures psychopathy homogeneously rather than using the two-factor structure. This study considered psychopathic-like-traits in college students as heterogeneous (primary and secondary), and evaluated their relationship to the processing and experience of positive (PE) and negative affect (NE). Results generally indicated that primary psychopathic-traits were positively correlated with accuracy of perception of fearful faces and PE, and negatively associated with NE, while secondary psychopathic-traits were not related to emotional recognition or PE, but positively associated with NE.

Descioli P., & Kurzban R. (2009).

Mysteries of morality.

Cognition, 112(2), 281-299.

[本文引用: 1]

Duke A.A., & Bègue L. (2015).

The drunk utilitarian: Blood alcohol concentration predicts utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas.

Cognition, 134, 121-127.

URL     PMID:25460385      [本文引用: 2]

The hypothetical moral dilemma known as the trolley problem has become a methodological cornerstone in the psychological study of moral reasoning and yet, there remains considerable debate as to the meaning of utilitarian responding in these scenarios. It is unclear whether utilitarian responding results primarily from increased deliberative reasoning capacity or from decreased aversion to harming others. In order to clarify this question, we conducted two field studies to examine the effects of alcohol intoxication on utilitarian responding. Alcohol holds promise in clarifying the above debate because it impairs both social cognition (i.e., empathy) and higher-order executive functioning. Hence, the direction of the association between alcohol and utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian responding should inform the relative importance of both deliberative and social processing systems in influencing utilitarian preference. In two field studies with a combined sample of 103 men and women recruited at two bars in Grenoble, France, participants were presented with a moral dilemma assessing their willingness to sacrifice one life to save five others. Participants blood alcohol concentrations were found to positively correlate with utilitarian preferences (r=.31, p<.001) suggesting a stronger role for impaired social cognition than intact deliberative reasoning in predicting utilitarian responses in the trolley dilemma. Implications for Greene dual-process model of moral reasoning are discussed.

Eskine K. J., Kacinik N. A., & Prinz J. J . (2011).

A bad taste in the mouth: Gustatory disgust influences moral judgment.

Psychological Science, 22(3), 295-299.

URL     PMID:21307274      [本文引用: 2]

Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought.

Fadda R., Parisi M., Ferretti L., Saba G., Foscoliano M., Salvago A., & Doneddu G . (2016).

Exploring the role of theory of mind in moral judgment: The case of children with autism spectrum disorder.

Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 523.

URL     PMID:4834434     

This paper adds to the growing research on moral judgment (MJ) by considering whether theory of mind (ToM) might foster children’s autonomous MJ achievement. A group of 30 children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) was compared in MJ and ToM with 30 typically developing (TD) children. Participants were tested for MJ with a classical Piaget’s task and for ToM with a second order False Belief task. In the moral task, children were told two versions of a story: in one version the protagonist acted according to a moral intention but the action resulted in a harmful consequence; in the other version the protagonist acted according to an immoral intention, but the action resulted in a harmless consequence. Children were asked which of the two protagonists was the “naughtier.” In line with previous studies, the results indicated that, while the majority of TD participants succeeded in the second order False Belief task, only few individuals with ASD showed intact perspective taking abilities. The analysis of the MJ in relation to ToM showed that children with ASD lacking ToM abilities judged guilty the protagonists of the two versions of the story in the moral task because both of them violated a moral rule or because they considered the consequences of the actions, ignoring any psychological information. These results indicate a heteronomous morality in individuals with ASD, based on the respect of learned moral rules and outcomes rather than others’ subjective states.

Fehr B., &Russell J.A . (1991).

The concept of love viewed from a prototype perspective.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(3), 425-438.

URL     [本文引用: 2]

ABSTRACT Even if superordinate concepts (such as "fruit," "vehicle," "sport") are prototypically organized, basic-level concepts (such as "apple," "truck," "hockey") might be classically defined in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient features. A series of 6 studies examined 1 basic-level concept in the domain of emotion, "love," and found that it is better understood from a prototype than a classical perspective. The natural language concept of "love" has an internal structure and fuzzy borders: Maternal love, romantic love, affection, love of work, self-love, infatuation, and other subtypes of love can be reliably ordered from better to poorer examples of love. In turn, each subtype's goodness as an example of love (prototypicality) was found to predict various indices of its cognitive processing. Implications for a scientific definition and typology of love are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

FeldmanHall O., Dalgleish T., Evans D., Navrady L., Tedeschi E., & Mobbs D . (2016).

Moral chivalry: Gender and harm sensitivity predict costly altruism.

Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(6), 542-551.

URL     PMID:27478541     

Moral perceptions of harm and fairness are instrumental in guiding how an individual navigates moral challenges. Classic research documents that the gender of a target can affect how people deploy these perceptions of harm and fairness. Across multiple studies, we explore the effect of an individual’s moral orientations (their considerations of harm and justice) and a target’s gender on altruistic behavior. Results reveal that a target’s gender can bias one’s readiness to engage in harmful actions and that a decider’s considerations of harm—but not fairness concerns—modulate costly altruism. Together, these data illustrate that moral choices are conditional on the social nature of the moral dyad: Even under the same moral constraints, a target’s gender and a decider’s gender can shift an individual’s choice to be more or less altruistic, suggesting that gender bias and harm considerations play a significant role in moral cognition.

Gleichgerrcht E., & Young L. (2013).

Low levels of empathic concern predict utilitarian moral judgment.

Plos One, 8(4), e60418.

[本文引用: 1]

Godin G., Conner M., & Sheeran P . (2005).

Bridging the intention-behaviour gap: The role of moral norm.

British Journal of Social Psychology, 44(4), 497-512.

URL     PMID:16368016      [本文引用: 2]

This research examined whether intentions aligned with moral norms better predict behaviour compared with intentions aligned with attitudes. Six data sets predicting behaviours in the health domain (smoking, driving over speed limit, applying universal precautions, exercising) were analysed. Moderated regression analysis indicated that participants whose intentions were more aligned with their moral norm were more likely to perform behaviours compared with participants whose intentions were more aligned with their attitude. However, further analysis indicated that this moderation effect was only present when participants construed the behaviour in moral terms. The findings suggest that the theory of planned behaviour should more clearly acknowledge the importance of internalized norms and self-expectations in the development of one's motivation to adopt a given behaviour.

Graham J., Haidt J., Koleva S., Motyl M., Iyer R., Wojcik S. P., & Ditto P. H . (2013).

Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism.

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47(12), 55-130.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

Where does morality come from? Why are moral judgments often so similar across cultures, yet sometimes so variable? Is morality one thing, or many? Moral Foundations Theory (MET) was created to answer these questions. In this chapter, we describe the origins, assumptions, and current conceptualization of the theory and detail the empirical findings that MET has made possible, both within social psychology and beyond. Looking toward the future, we embrace several critiques of the theory and specify five criteria for determining what should be considered a foundation of human morality. Finally, we suggest a variety of future directions for MFT and moral psychology.

Gray H. M., Gray K., & Wegner D. M . (2007).

Dimensions of mind perception.

Science, 315(5812), 619.

[本文引用: 1]

Gray K. . (2012).

The power of good intentions: Perceived benevolence soothes pain, increases pleasure, and improves taste.

Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(5), 639-645.

URL     [本文引用: 3]

The experience of physical stimuli would seem to depend primarily on their physical characteristics-chocolate tastes good, getting slapped hurts, and snuggling is pleasurable. This research examined, however, whether physical experience is influenced by the interpersonal context in which stimuli occur. Specifically, three studies examined whether perceiving benevolent intentions behind stimuli can improve their experience. Experiment 1 tested whether benevolently intended shocks hurt less, Experiment 2 tested whether benevolently intended massages were more pleasurable, and Experiment 3 tested whether benevolently intended candy tastes sweeter. The results confirm that good intentions-even misguided ones-can sooth pain, increase pleasure, and make things taste better. More broadly, these studies suggest that basic physical experience depends upon how we perceive the minds of others.

Gray K., &Keeney J.E . (2015).

Impure or just weird? Scenario sampling bias raises questions about the foundation of morality.

Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(8), 859-868.

URL     [本文引用: 3]

Moral psychologists have used scenarios of abuse and murder to operationalize harm and chicken-masturbation and dog-eating to operationalize impurity. These scenarios reveal different patterns of moral judgment across harm and purity, ostensibly supporting distinct moral mechanisms, modules, or “foundations.” However, these different patterns may stem not from differences in moral content per se but instead from biased sampling that confounds content with weirdness and severity. Supporting this hypothesis, frequently used impurity scenarios are weirder and less severe than both harm scenarios (Study 1) and participant-generated impurity scenarios (Study 2). Weirdness and severity—not content—also appear to drive differences between act and character evaluations (Study 3). Also problematic for modular accounts are extremely high correlations between harm and impurity (rs >.86), and findings that harm scenarios assess impurity better than researcher-devised impurity scenarios. Overall, patterns of moral judgment previously ascribed to distinct moral mechanisms may reflect domain-general moral cognition.

Gray K., Schein C., & Cameron C. D . (2017).

How to think about emotion and morality: Circles, not arrows.

Current Opinion in Psychology, 17, 41-46.

URL     PMID:28950971      [本文引用: 5]

Abstract Emotion and morality are powerful conscious experiences. There are two ways to think about their psychological basis: arrows and circles. Arrows ground each experience in its own specialized mechanism (mechanism x causes phenomenon x; mechanism y causes phenomenon y). Examples of arrows include when feelings of disgust are attributed to a specialized “disgust circuit” and when judgments of impurity are attributed to a specialized “purity foundation.” In contrast, circles—Venn diagrams—describe experiences as emerging from the overlap of more fundamental domain-general processes (different combinations of processes a, b, c cause both phenomena x and y). Circles are used by constructionist theories of emotion and morality, including the Theory of Dyadic Morality, which grounds moral judgment in the combination of norm violations, negative affect, and perceived harm. Despite the intuitive popularity of arrows, we show that scientific evidence is more consistent with circles.

Gray K., Schein C., & Ward A. F . (2014).

The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.

Journal of Experimental Psychology General, 143(4), 1600-1615.

URL     PMID:24635184      [本文引用: 6]

Abstract When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

Gray K., Waytz A., & Young L . (2012).

The moral dyad: A fundamental template unifying moral judgment.

Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 206-215.

[本文引用: 2]

Gray K., &Wegner D.M . (2009).

Moral typecasting: Divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(3), 505-520.

URL     PMID:19254100      [本文引用: 2]

Moral agency is the capacity to do right or wrong, whereas moral patiency is the capacity to be a target of right or wrong. Through 7 studies, the authors explored moral typecasting-an inverse relation between perceptions of moral agency and moral patiency. Across a range of targets and situations, good- and evil-doers (moral agents) were perceived to be less vulnerable to having good and evil done to them. The recipients of good and evil (moral patients), in turn, were perceived as less capable of performing good or evil actions. Moral typecasting stems from the dyadic nature of morality and explains curious effects such as people's willingness to inflict greater pain on those who do good than those who do nothing.

Gray K., &Wegner D.M . (2010).

Blaming god for our pain: Human suffering and the divine mind.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14(1), 7-16.

URL     PMID:19926831      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people's normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God's unique mind is due, the authors suggest, to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine.

Gray K., &Wegner D.M . (2011).

To escape blame, don't be a hero — Be a victim.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(2), 516-519.

Magsci     [本文引用: 1]

In situations where people (or their lawyers) seek to escape blame for wrongdoing, they often use one of two strategies: frame themselves as a hero (hero strategy) or as a victim (victim strategy). The hero strategy acknowledges wrongdoing, but highlights previous good deeds to offset blame. The victim strategy also acknowledges wrongdoing, but highlights the harms suffered by the perpetrator to deflect blame. Although commonsense suggests that past good deeds can offset blame from transgressions, moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009) suggests otherwise. Despite past good deeds, heroes remain blameworthy as moral agents. On the other hand, victims are moral patients and thus incapable of blame. Three studies found that victim strategy consistently reduced blame, while the hero strategy was at best ineffectual and at worst harmful. This effect appeared to stem from how the minds of victims and heroes are perceived. (c) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Gray K., Young L., & Waytz A . (2012).

Mind perception is the essence of morality.

Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 101-124.

URL     PMID:22754268      [本文引用: 1]

Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.

Greene J., & Haidt J. (2002).

How (and where) does moral judgment work?.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(12), 517-523.

[本文引用: 1]

Greene J. D., Morelli S. A., Lowenberg K., Nystrom L. E., & Cohen J. D . (2008).

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.

Cognition, 107(3), 1144-1154.

URL     PMID:2429958      [本文引用: 1]

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.

Greene J. D., Nystrom L. E., Engell A. D., Darley J. M., & Cohen J. D . (2004).

The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment.

Neuron, 44(2), 389-400.

URL     PMID:15473975      Magsci    

Traditional theories of moral psychology emphasize reasoning and “higher cognition,” while more recent work emphasizes the role of emotion. The present fMRI data support a theory of moral judgment according to which both “cognitive” and emotional processes play crucial and sometimes mutually competitive roles. The present results indicate that brain regions associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex) are recruited to resolve difficult personal moral dilemmas in which utilitarian values require “personal” moral violations, violations that have previously been associated with increased activity in emotion-related brain regions. Several regions of frontal and parietal cortex predict intertrial differences in moral judgment behavior, exhibiting greater activity for utilitarian judgments. We speculate that the controversy surrounding utilitarian moral philosophy reflects an underlying tension between competing subsystems in the brain.

Guglielmo S., &Malle B.F . (2017).

Information- acquisition processes in moral judgments of blame.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(7), 957-971.

URL     PMID:28903702      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract When people make moral judgments, what information do they look for? Despite its theoretical and practical implications, this question has largely been neglected by prior literature. The recent Path Model of Blame predicts a canonical order in which people acquire information when judging blame. Upon discovering a negative event, perceivers consider information about causality, then intentionality, then (if the event is intentional) reasons or (if the event is unintentional) preventability. Three studies, using two novel paradigms, assessed and found support for these predictions: In constrained (Study 1) and open-ended (Study 2) information-acquisition contexts, participants were most likely, and fastest, to seek information in the canonical order, even when under time pressure (Study 3). These findings indicate that blame relies on a set of information components that are processed in a systematic order. Implications for moral judgment models are discussed, as are potential roles of emotion and motivated reasoning in information acquisition.

Haidt J. . (2001).

The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Psychological Review, 108(4), 814-834.

[本文引用: 2]

Haidt J. . (2007).

The new synthesis in moral psychology.

Science, 316(5827), 998-1002.

[本文引用: 1]

Haidt J., Graham J. ,

& Ditto, P. The Volkswagen of moral psychology. Retrieved October 28, 2015, from

& Ditto, P. The Volkswagen of moral psychology. Retrieved October 28, 2015, from

URL    

Haidt J., Mccauley C., & Rozin P . (1994).

Individual differences in sensitivity to disgust: A scale sampling seven domains of disgust elicitors.

Personality and Individual Differences, 16(5), 701-713.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

ABSTRACT We describe the development of a reliable measure of individual differences in disgust sensitivity. The 32-item Disgust Scale includes 2 true-false and 2 disgust-rating items for each of 7 domains of disgust elicitors (food, animals, body products, sex, body envelope violations, death, and hygiene) and for a domain of magical thinking (via similarity and contagion) that cuts across the 7 domains of elicitors. Correlations with other scales provide initial evidence of convergent and discriminant validity: the Disgust Scale correlates moderately with Sensation Seeking (r= - 0.46) and with Fear of Death (r= 0.39), correlates weakly with Neuroticism (r = 0.23) and Psychoticism (r= - 0.25), and correlates negligibly with Self-Monitoring and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Extraversion and Lie scales. Females score higher than males on the Disgust Scale. We suggest that the 7 domains of disgust elicitors all have in common that they remind us of our animality and, especially, of our mortality. Thus we see disgust as a defensive emotion that maintains and emphasizes the line between human and animal.

Hamlin J. K., Wynn K., & Bloom P . (2010).

3-month-olds show a negativity bias in their social evaluations.

Developmental Science, 13(6), 923-929.

URL     PMID:2966030      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Previous research has shown that 6-month-olds evaluate others on the basis of their social behaviors--they are attracted to prosocial individuals, and avoid antisocial individuals (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2007). The current studies investigate these capacities prior to 6 months of age. Results from two experiments indicate that even 3-month-old infants evaluate others based on their social behavior towards third parties, and that negative social information is developmentally privileged. 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Hamlin J. K., Wynn K., Bloom P., & Mahajan N . (2011).

How infants and toddlers react to antisocial others.

Proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the United States of America, 108(50), 19931-19936.

URL     PMID:22123953      Magsci     [本文引用: 2]

Although adults generally prefer helpful behaviors and those who perform them, there are situations (in particular, when the target of an action is disliked) in which overt antisocial acts are seen as appropriate, and those who perform them are viewed positively. The current studies explore the developmental origins of this capacity for selective social evaluation. We find that although 5-mo-old infants uniformly prefer individuals who act positively toward others regardless of the status of the target, 8-mo-old infants selectively prefer characters who act positively toward prosocial individuals and characters who act negatively toward antisocial individuals. Additionally, young toddlers direct positive behaviors toward prosocial others and negative behaviors toward antisocial others. These findings constitute evidence that the nuanced social judgments and actions readily observable in human adults have their foundations in early developing cognitive mechanisms.

Hofmann W., Wisneski D. C., Brandt M. J., & Skitka L. J . (2014).

Morality in everyday life.

Science, 345(6202), 1340-1343.

URL     PMID:25214626      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract The science of morality has drawn heavily on well-controlled but artificial laboratory settings. To study everyday morality, we repeatedly assessed moral or immoral acts and experiences in a large (N = 1252) sample using ecological momentary assessment. Moral experiences were surprisingly frequent and manifold. Liberals and conservatives emphasized somewhat different moral dimensions. Religious and nonreligious participants did not differ in the likelihood or quality of committed moral and immoral acts. Being the target of moral or immoral deeds had the strongest impact on happiness, whereas committing moral or immoral deeds had the strongest impact on sense of purpose. Analyses of daily dynamics revealed evidence for both moral contagion and moral licensing. In sum, morality science may benefit from a closer look at the antecedents, dynamics, and consequences of everyday moral experience. Copyright 2014, American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Hutcherson C.A., &Gross J.J . (2011).

The moral emotions: A social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(4), 719-737.

URL     PMID:21280963      Magsci     [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social-functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1-3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions.

Kawai N., Kubo K., & Kubo-Kawai N . (2014).

“Granny dumping”: Acceptability of sacrificing the elderly in a simulated moral dilemma.

Japanese Psychological Research, 56(3), 254-262.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

ABSTRACT In a simulated moral dilemma, most people would be willing to endorse killing a single individual to save five others, but do people show the same degree of resistance to sacrificing people of different ages? In the present study, participants were asked to choose how acceptable it was to sacrifice one individual from a number of different age groups in order to save five others in a trolley problem. The sacrificial targets were a 70-year-old male stranger, a 20-year-old male stranger, a 5-year-old male stranger, or a 20-year-old male disabled stranger. Our results indicated that more participants accepted sacrificing the elderly stranger than the other three targets; sacrificing the child was the least accepted option. These results indicate that the decision-making process in a moral dilemma involves weighing others' lives according to their age and implicitly predicting their life span.

Laurin K., &Plaks J.E . (2014).

Religion and punishment: Opposing influences of orthopraxy and orthodoxy on reactions to unintentional acts.

Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5(7), 835-843.

Magsci     [本文引用: 1]

We hypothesize that two distinct facets of religiosity-orthodoxy (an emphasis on belief) and orthopraxy (an emphasis on behavior)-predict differential sensitivity to an actor's intent when making moral judgments. Participants judged actors who performed misdeeds intentionally or unintentionally. In Study 1, high orthopraxy predicted harsher judgments of the unintentional actor, while high orthodoxy predicted more lenient judgments. In Study 2, we investigated a potential explanation for these effects, priming participants with either an "action focus" or a "thought focus." Action-focused participants judged the unintentional actor more harshly than did thought-focused participants. In Study 3, participants from an orthopraxic tradition (Hinduism) judged the unintentional actor more harshly than did those from an orthodox tradition (Protestantism). These findings contribute to a growing literature on the multifaceted nature of religion. They also carry broader implications for understanding people's responses to actions as a function of the actor's mental state.

Levine E.E., &Schweitzer M.E . (2014).

Are liars ethical? On the tension between benevolence and honesty.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 53, 107-117.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

61Deception is sometimes perceived to be ethical.61Prosocial liars are perceived to be more moral than honest individuals.61Benevolence may be more important than honesty for judgments of moral character.61The moral principle of care is sometimes more important than justice.

Levine E.E., &Schweitzer M.E . (2015).

Prosocial lies: When deception breeds trust.

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 126, 88-106.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long asserted that deception harms trust. We challenge this claim. Across four studies, we demonstrate that deception can increase trust. Specifically, prosocial lies increase the willingness to pass money in the trust game, a behavioral measure of benevolence-based trust. In Studies 1a and 1b, we find that altruistic lies increase trust when deception is directly experienced and when it is merely observed. In Study 2, we demonstrate that mutually beneficial lies also increase trust. In Study 3, we disentangle the effects of intentions and deception; intentions are far more important than deception for building benevolence-based trust. In Study 4, we examine how prosocial lies influence integrity-based trust. We introduce a new economic game, the Rely-or-Verify game, to measure integrity-based trust. Prosocial lies increase benevolence-based trust, but harm integrity-based trust. Our findings expand our understanding of deception and deepen our insight into the mechanics of trust.

Margoni F., & Surian L. (2017).

Children’s intention-based moral judgments of helping agents.

Cognitive Development, 41, 46-64.

[本文引用: 1]

Marsh A.A., &Cardinale E.M . (2014).

When psychopathy impairs moral judgments: Neural responses during judgments about causing fear.

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(1), 3-11.

URL     PMID:22956667      Magsci     [本文引用: 2]

Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by reduced empathy, shallow affect, and behaviors that cause victims distress, like threats, bullying, and violence. Neuroimaging research in both institutionalized and community samples implicates amygdala dysfunction in the etiology of psychopathic traits. Reduced amygdala responsiveness may disrupt processing of fear-relevant stimuli like fearful facial expressions. The present study links amygdala dysfunction in response to fear-relevant stimuli to the willingness of individuals with psychopathic traits to cause fear in other people. Thirty-three healthy adult participants varying in psychopathic traits underwent whole-brain fMRI scanning while they viewed statements that selectively evoke anger, disgust, fear, happiness, or sadness. During scanning, participants judged whether it is morally acceptable to make each statement to another person. Psychopathy was associated with reduced activity in right amygdala during judgments of fear-evoking statements and with more lenient moral judgments about causing fear. No group differences in amygdala function or moral judgments emerged for other emotion categories. Psychopathy was also associated with increased activity in middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) during the task. These results implicate amygdala dysfunction in impaired judgments about causing distress in psychopathy, and suggest that atypical amygdala responses to fear in psychopathy extend across multiple classes of stimuli.

Miller R. M., Hannikainen I. A., & Cushman F. A . (2014).

Bad actions or bad outcomes? Differentiating affective contributions to the moral condemnation of harm.

Emotion, 14(3), 573-587.

URL     PMID:24512250      Magsci     [本文引用: 1]

Moral condemnation of harmful behavior is influenced by both cognitive and affective processes. However, despite much recent research, the proximate source of affect remains unclear. One obvious contender is empathy; simulating the victim's pain could lead one to judge an action as wrong ("outcome aversion"). An alternative, less obvious source is one's own aversion to performing the action itself ("action aversion"). To dissociate these alternatives, we developed a scale that assessed individual aversions to (a) witnessing others experience painful outcomes (e.g., seeing someone fall down stairs); and (b) performing actions that are harmless yet aversive (e.g., stabbing a fellow actor with a fake stage knife). Across 4 experiments, we found that moral condemnation of both first-person and third-party harmful behavior in the context of moral dilemmas is better predicted by one's aversion to action properties than by an affective response to victim suffering. In a fifth experiment, we manipulated both action aversion and the degree of expected suffering across a number of actions and found that both factors make large, independent contributions to moral judgment. Together, these results suggest we may judge others' actions by imagining what it would feel like to perform the action rather than experience the consequences of the action. Accordingly, they provide a counterpoint to a dominant but largely untested assumption that empathy is the key affective response governing moral judgments of harm.

Monroe A.E., &Malle B.F . (2017).

Two paths to blame: Intentionality directs moral information processing along two distinct tracks.

Journal of Experimental Psychology General, 146(1), 123-133.

URL     PMID:28054816      [本文引用: 2]

Abstract There is broad consensus that features such as causality, mental states, and preventability are key inputs to moral judgments of blame. What is not clear is exactly how people process these inputs to arrive at such judgments. Three studies provide evidence that early judgments of whether or not a norm violation is intentional direct information processing along 1 of 2 tracks: if the violation is deemed intentional, blame processing relies on information about the agent reasons for committing the violation; if the violation is deemed unintentional, blame processing relies on information about how preventable the violation was. Owing to these processing commitments, when new information requires perceivers to switch tracks, they must reconfigure their judgments, which results in measurable processing costs indicated by reaction time (RT) delays. These findings offer support for a new theory of moral judgment (the Path Model of Blame) and advance the study of moral cognition as hierarchical information processing.

Nichols S. . (2002).

Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment.

Cognition, 84(2), 221-236.

URL     PMID:12175573      [本文引用: 1]

There is a large tradition of work in moral psychology that explores the capacity for moral judgment by focusing on the basic capacity to distinguish moral violations (e.g. hitting another person) from conventional violations (e.g. playing with your food). However, only recently have there been attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying moral judgment (e.g. Cognition 57 (1995) 1; Ethics 103 (1993) 337). Recent evidence indicates that affect plays a crucial role in mediating the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction. However, the prevailing account of the role of affect in moral judgment is problematic. This paper argues that the capacity to draw the moral/conventional distinction depends on both a body of information about which actions are prohibited (a Normative Theory) and an affective mechanism. This account leads to the prediction that other normative prohibitions that are connected to an affective mechanism might be treated as non-conventional. An experiment is presented that indicates that “disgust” violations (e.g. spitting at the table), are distinguished from conventional violations along the same dimensions as moral violations.

Nobes G., Panagiotaki G., & Bartholomew K. J . (2016).

The influence of intention, outcome and question-wording on children's and adults' moral judgments.

Cognition, 157, 190-204.

URL     PMID:27649094      [本文引用: 2]

The influence of intention and outcome information on moral judgments was investigated by telling children aged 4–8yearsandadults (N=169) stories involving accidental harms (positive intention, negative outcome) or attempted harms (negative intention, positive outcome) from two studies (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). When the original acceptability (wrongness) question was asked, the original findings were closely replicated: children’s and adults’ acceptability judgments were based almost exclusively on outcome, and children’s punishment judgments were also primarily outcome-based. However, when this question was rephrased, 4–5-year-olds’ judgments were approximately equally influenced by intention and outcome, and from 5–6years they were based considerably more on intention than outcome. These findings indicate that, for methodological reasons, children’s (and adults’) ability to make intention-based judgment has often been substantially underestimated.

Park G., Kappes A., Rho Y ., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2016).

At the heart of morality lies neuro-visceral integration: Lower cardiac vagal tone predicts utilitarian moral judgment.

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11(10), 1588-1596.

URL     PMID:5040918      [本文引用: 1]

Extensive research has examined the role of countervailing emotional and cognitive systems in moral judgment. We speculated that typical human moral judgments m

Peter D., Kelly A., & Robert K . (2012).

Omissions and byproducts across moral domains.

PloS One, 7(10), e46963.

URL     PMID:23071678      [本文引用: 1]

Research indicates that moral violations are judged less wrong when the violation results from omission as opposed to commission, and when the violation is a byproduct as opposed to a means to an end. Previous work examined these effects mainly for violent offenses such as killing. Here we investigate the generality of these effects across a range of moral violations including sexuality, food, property, and group loyalty. InExperiment 1, we observed omission effects in wrongness ratings for all of the twelve offenses investigated. In Experiments 2 and 3, we observed byproduct effects in wrongness ratings for seven and eight offenses (out of twelve), respectively, and we observed byproduct effects in forced-choice responses for all twelve offenses. Our results address an ongoing debate about whether different cognitive systems compute moral wrongness for different types of behaviors (surrounding violence, sexuality, food, etc.), or, alternatively, a common cognitive architecture computes wrongness for a variety of behaviors.

Pratt M. W., Golding G., Hunter W., & Sampson R . (2010).

Sex differences in adult moral orientations.

Journal of Personality, 56(2), 373-391.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

ABSTRACT Gilligan's (1982) hypotheses regarding sex differences in moral reasoning orientation were investigated in two samples of adults In Study 1, adults ages 18 to 75 were interviewed about both hypothetical and personal moral dilemmas Women were more likely than men overall to show Gilligan's care orientation as expected, particularly in personal reasoning However, these sex differences were not as pervasive as Gilligan argues, and were influenced by subject age, subject stage level on Kohlberg's measure of moral reasoning, and the type of real-life dilemma content recalled by subjects for discussion

Rai T.S., &Fiske A.P . (2011).

Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality.

Psychological Review, 118(1), 57-75.

URL     PMID:21244187      Magsci    

Genuine moral disagreement exists and is widespread. To understand such disagreement, we must examine the basic kinds of social relationships people construct across cultures and the distinct moral obligations and prohibitions these relationships entail. We extend relational models theory (Fiske, 1991) to identify 4 fundamental and distinct moral motives. Unity is the motive to care for and support the integrity of in-groups by avoiding or eliminating threats of contamination and providing aid and protection based on need or empathic compassion. Hierarchy is the motive to respect rank in social groups where superiors are entitled to deference and respect but must also lead, guide, direct, and protect subordinates. Equality is the motive for balanced, in-kind reciprocity, equal treatment, equal say, and equal opportunity. Proportionality is the motive for rewards and punishments to be proportionate to merit, benefits to be calibrated to contributions, and judgments to be based on a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits. The 4 moral motives are universal, but cultures, ideologies, and individuals differ in where they activate these motives and how they implement them. Unlike existing theories (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Turiel, 1983), relationship regulation theory predicts that any action, including violence, unequal treatment, and "impure" acts, may be perceived as morally correct depending on the moral motive employed and how the relevant social relationship is construed. This approach facilitates clearer understanding of moral perspectives we disagree with and provides a template for how to influence moral motives and practices in the world. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).

Rai T.S., &Holyoak K.J . (2010).

Moral principles or consumer preferences? Alternative framings of the trolley problem.

Cognitive Science, 34(2), 311-321.

URL     PMID:21564214      [本文引用: 2]

We created paired moral dilemmas with minimal contrasts in wording, a research strategy that has been advocated as a way to empirically establish principles operative in a domain-specific moral psychology. However, the candidate "principles" we tested were not derived from work in moral philosophy, but rather from work in the areas of consumer choice and risk perception. Participants were paradoxically less likely to choose an action that sacrifices one life to save others when they were asked to provide more reasons for doing so (Experiment 1), and their willingness to sacrifice lives depended not only on how many lives would be saved, but on the number of lives at risk (Experiment 2). The latter effect was also found in a within-subjects design (Experiment 3). These findings suggest caution in the use of artificial dilemmas as a key testbed for revealing principled bases for moral judgment.

Rizzo M. T., Cooley S., Elenbaas L., & Killen M . (2018).

Young children’s inclusion decisions in moral and social-conventional group norm contexts.

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 165, 19-36.

URL     PMID:28645542      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Being a member of a peer group involves making decisions about whom to include in or exclude from the group. Sometimes these decisions are related to whether members of the group support or challenge the norms of the group. To examine how young children weigh concerns for group norms and group membership in both moral and social–conventional norm contexts, children (3- to 6-year-olds; N = 73) were asked to decide between including an ingroup member who challenged the group’s norm or an outgroup member who supported the norm. Groups held either moral (equal or unequal resource allocation) or social–conventional (traditional or nontraditional) norms. In the moral contexts, children were more likely to include the peer who advocated for the moral concern for equality regardless of the peer’s group membership or their group’s specific norm. In the social–conventional contexts, however, children were more likely to include the peer who advocated for the conventional concern for maintaining traditions but only at the group-specific level. Furthermore, with age children increasingly based their inclusion decisions on normative concerns, rather than on group membership concerns, and differed in their inclusion decisions for ingroups and outgroups. Finally, children reasoned about their decisions by referencing concerns for fairness, group norms, and group membership, suggesting that preschool children weigh multiple concerns when deciding whom to include in their groups. Overall, the current study revealed differences in how preschool children weigh moral and social–conventional concerns in intergroup contexts.

Royzman E., Atanasov P., Landy J. F., Parks A., & Gepty A . (2014).

Cad or mad? Anger (not disgust) as the predominant response to pathogen-free violations of the divinity code.

Emotion, 14(5), 892-907.

URL     PMID:24866519      Magsci     [本文引用: 1]

Abstract The CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999) stipulates that, cross-culturally, people feel anger for violations of autonomy, contempt for violations of community, and disgust for violations of divinity. Although the disgust-divinity link has received some measure of empirical support, the results have been difficult to interpret in light of several conceptual and design flaws. Taking a revised methodological approach, including use of newly validated (Study 1), pathogen-free violations of the divinity code, we found (Study 2) little evidence of disgust-related phenomenology (nausea, gagging, loss of appetite) or action tendency (desire to move away), but much evidence of anger-linked desire to retaliate, as a major component of individuals' projected response to "pure" (pathogen-free) violations of the divinity code. Study 3 replicated these results using faces in lieu of words as a dependent measure. Concordant findings emerged from an archival study (Study 4) examining the aftermath of a real-life sacred violation-the burning of Korans by U.S. military personnel. Study 5 further corroborated these results using continuous measures based on everyday emotion terms and new variants of the divinity-pure scenarios featuring sacrilegious acts committed by a theologically irreverent member of one's own group rather than an ideologically opposed member of another group. Finally, a supplemental study found the anger-dominant attribution pattern to remain intact when the impious act being judged was the judge's own. Based on these and related results, we posit anger to be the principal emotional response to moral transgressions irrespective of the normative content involved. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

Royzman E. B., Kim K., & Leeman R. F . (2015).

The curious tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect.

Judgment and Decision Making, 10(4), 296-313.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

The paper critically reexamines the well-known “Julie and Mark” vignette, a stylized account of two college-age siblings opting to engage in protected sex while vacationing abroad (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Since its inception, the story has been viewed as a rhetorically powerful validation of Hume’s “sentimentalist” dictum that moral judgments are not rationally deduced but arise directly from feelings of pleasure or displeasure (e.g., disgust). People’s typical reactions to the vignette are alleged to support this view by demonstrating that individuals are prone to become

Rozin P., Lowery L., Imada S., & Haidt J . (1999).

The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, divinity).

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(4), 574-586.

URL     PMID:10234846      [本文引用: 2]

It is proposed that 3 emotions--contempt, anger, and disgust--are typically elicited, across cultures, by violations of 3 moral codes proposed by R. A. Shweder and his colleagues (R. A. Shweder, N. C. Much, M. Mahapatra, & L. Park, 1997). The proposed alignment links anger to autonomy (individual rights violations), contempt to community (violation of communal codes including hierarchy), and disgust to divinity (violations of purity-sanctity). This is the CAD triad hypothesis. Students in the United States and Japan were presented with descriptions of situations that involve 1 of the types of moral violations and asked to assign either an appropriate facial expression (from a set of 6) or an appropriate word (contempt, anger, disgust, or their translations). Results generally supported the CAD triad hypothesis. Results were further confirmed by analysis of facial expressions actually made by Americans to the descriptions of these situations.

Schein C., & Gray K. (2015).

The unifying moral dyad: Liberals and conservatives share the same harm-based moral template.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(8), 1147-1163.

URL     PMID:26091912      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is "no." Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition--in both liberals and conservatives--is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested--and confirmed--through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes--and overlaps with--diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives. 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Schein C., & Gray K. (2016).

Moralization and harmification: The dyadic loop explains how the innocuous becomes harmful and wrong.

Psychological Inquiry, 27(1), 62-65.

URL     [本文引用: 2]

Of course, there are counterexamples that suggest a shrinking moral domain, such as allowing people to marry those of different races and the same gender. But upon closer inspection, these evolving issues actually reveal the pull of harm and immorality. Con- sider the case of gay marriage. What led many to see gay marriage as no longer intrinsically harmful and immoral? The answer is perceived harm--to gay peo- ple. In advancing the cause of gay rights, its cham- pions emphasized the suffering of gay people who were denied the chance for equal treatment. The effectiveness of this campaign to associate denial of marriage rights with harm is evident in Justice Kennedy's (Kennedy, Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al., 2015) majority opinion in support of same-sex marriage, where he noted, "The marriage laws at issue here . . . harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples." This greater harm tipped the scales of jus- tice toward gay marriage.More broadly, issues may be "de-moralized and de-harmified" by emphasizing an opposing and more powerful understanding of harm and immorality. Tobacco companies continually try to use harm creep in their own interest, framing smoking bans as infringement upon individual rights--and therefore representing the destruction of self-determination (Dye, 2015). However, once it was revealed that these companies suppressed knowledge that smoking caused cancer (United States of America v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2006)--sometimes in children via secondhand smoke--these companies started to face a strong opposition from harm creep in the opposite direction. Impinging upon self-determination is harm- ful and immoral, but knowingly killing kids is more harmful and more immoral.Another (meta-)example can be found in the dis- cussions about the implications of harm's creep. Although Haslam (this issue) remains carefully neu- tral, critics of political correctness see the expansion of harm as deplorable because it suppresses individ- ual freedoms and breeds weakness. They have argued that seeing trauma in the exploration of sensitive topics at college (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015), seeing prejudice in humor (Flanagan, 2015), and seeing dis- crimination in the expression of personal opinions (Mackey, 2014) all have potentially chilling effects on free speech. There may be truth to these claims, but what is notable--and ironic--is that they argue against the creep of harm by encouraging an oppos- ing creep of harm. Critics of political correctness see the growing sensitivity to diversity as victimizing the majority culture and harming the status of White men.Opponents of political correctness push harm-- and immorality--into areas previously seen as harm- less. Historically, infringements of free speech meant

Schein C., & Gray K. (2017).

The theory of dyadic morality: Reinventing moral judgment by redefining harm.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, 22(1), 32-70.

URL     PMID:28504021      [本文引用: 5]

Abstract The nature of harm—and therefore moral judgment—may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism—the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and—importantly—perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the “dyadic loop,” explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular “foundations,” but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts understandings of moral character, moral emotion, and political/cultural differences, and provides research guidelines for moral psychology.

Schein C., Ritter R. S., & Gray K . (2016).

Harm mediates the disgust-immorality link.

Emotion, 16(6), 862-876.

URL     PMID:27100369      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Many acts are disgusting, but only some of these acts are immoral. Dyadic morality predicts that disgusting acts should be judged as immoral to the extent that they seem harmful. Consistent with this prediction, 3 studies reveal that perceived harm mediates the link between feelings of disgust and moral condemnation-even for ostensibly harmless "purity" violations. In many cases, accounting for perceived harm completely eliminates the link between disgust and moral condemnation. Analyses also reveal the predictive power of anger and typicality/weirdness in moral judgments of disgusting acts. The mediation of disgust by harm holds across diverse acts including gay marriage, sex acts, and religious blasphemy. Revealing the endogenous presence and moral relevance of harm within disgusting-but-ostensibly harmless acts argues against modular accounts of moral cognition such as moral foundations theory. Instead, these data support pluralistic conceptions of harm and constructionist accounts of morality and emotion. Implications for moral cognition and the concept of "purity" are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Schnall S., Haidt J., Clore G. L., & Jordan A. H . (2008).

Disgust as embodied moral judgment.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(8), 1096-1109.

URL     PMID:18505801      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments.

Scott S. E., Inbar Y., & Rozin P . (2016).

Evidence for absolute moral opposition to genetically modified food in the United States.

Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(3), 315-324.

URL     PMID:27217243     

Abstract Public opposition to genetic modification (GM) technology in the food domain is widespread (Frewer et al., 2013). In a survey of U.S. residents representative of the population on gender, age, and income, 64% opposed GM, and 71% of GM opponents (45% of the entire sample) were "absolutely" opposed-that is, they agreed that GM should be prohibited no matter the risks and benefits. "Absolutist" opponents were more disgust sensitive in general and more disgusted by the consumption of genetically modified food than were non-absolutist opponents or supporters. Furthermore, disgust predicted support for legal restrictions on genetically modified foods, even after controlling for explicit risk-benefit assessments. This research suggests that many opponents are evidence insensitive and will not be influenced by arguments about risks and benefits. The Author(s) 2016.

Shweder R. A., Much, N. C, Mahapatra, M., & Park L . (1997).

The "Big Three" of morality (autonomy, community, divinity) and the "Big Three" explanations of suffering.

In A. M. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), Morality and health(pp. 119-169). New York: Routledge.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

The chapter by Shweder et al examines both the nature of morality and causal explanations for suffering, across the cultures of the world, with special emphasis on Hindu India. They present an original taxonomy of 3 moral domains that may encompass all moral systems in the world: autonomy codes, based on rights violations; community codes, based on communal values and hierarchy violations; and divinity codes, based on concepts such as sanctity and purity. The 3 codes structure the domain of morality as it applies to health and widen the scope of morality-health interactions. The authors summarize prior cross-cultural work on accounts of suffering, supplementing this with their own recent study of 47 Ss (mostly adults) in India. This work reveals that the most common explanatory frameworks are interpersonal, moral, and biomedical accounts of suffering. The authors also examine the moral explanations for suffering in an Indian town, where moral imagination emphasizes notions of suffering, personal responsibility, and Karma in which individuals know that every act of good or evil that is committed will affect well-being, in contrast with American notions in which illness and suffering may appear random and meaningless. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved)

Sytsma J., & Machery E. (2012).

The two sources of moral standing.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(3), 303-324.

URL     Magsci     [本文引用: 1]

AbstractThere are two primary traditions in philosophical theorizing about moral standing ne emphasizing Experience (the capacity to feel pain and pleasure) and one emphasizing Agency (complexity of cognition and lifestyle). In this article we offer an explanation for this divide: Lay judgments about moral standing depend importantly on two independent cues (Experience and Agency), and the two philosophical traditions reflect this aspect of folk moral cognition. In support of this two-source hypothesis, we present the results of a series of new experiments providing evidence for our account of lay judgments about moral standing, and argue that these results lend plausibility to the proposed causal link between folk moral cognition and the philosophical traditions.

Theriault J., Waytz A., Heiphetz L., & Young L . (2017).

Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

Journal of Experimental Psychology General, 146(11), 1586-1605.

URL     PMID:28805441      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims. Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can (a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and (b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within the dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the theory of mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record.

Tisak M.S., &Jankowski A.M . (1996).

Societal rule evaluations: Adolescent offenders' reasoning about moral, conventional, and personal rules.

Aggressive Behavior: Official Journal of the International Society for Research on Aggression, 22(3), 195-207.

[本文引用: 1]

Trivers R.L . (1971).

The evolution of reciprocal altruism.

The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35-57.

[本文引用: 2]

Wagemans F., Brandt M. J., & Zeelenberg M . (2017).

Disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with purity-based moral judgments.

Emotion, 18(2), 277-289.

URL     PMID:28872334      [本文引用: 2]

Abstract Individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with a range of judgments and attitudes related to the moral domain. Some perspectives suggest that the association between disgust sensitivity and moral judgments will be equally strong across all moral domains (i.e., purity, authority, loyalty, care, fairness, and liberty). Other perspectives predict that disgust sensitivity is primarily associated with judgments of specific moral domains (e.g., primarily purity). However, no study has systematically tested if disgust sensitivity is associated with moral judgments of the purity domain specifically, more generally to moral judgments of the binding moral domains, or to moral judgments of all of the moral domains equally. Across 5 studies (total N = 1,104), we find consistent evidence for the notion that disgust sensitivity relates more strongly to moral condemnation of purity-based transgressions (meta-analytic r = .40) than to moral condemnation of transgressions of any of the other domains (range meta-analytic rs: .07-.27). Our findings are in line with predictions from Moral Foundations Theory, which predicts that personality characteristics like disgust sensitivity make people more sensitive to a certain set of moral issues. (PsycINFO Database Record.

van der Toorn J., Nail P. R., Liviatan I., & Jost J. T . (2014).

My country, right or wrong: Does activating system justification motivation eliminate the liberal-conservative gap in patriotism?.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 50-60.

URL    

61In the absence of system justification activation, conservatives exhibit stronger national attachment than liberals.61Activating system justification motivation eliminated the ideological gap by strengthening national attachment among liberals.61This effect was specific to patriotism (vs. nationalism) attachment.61Converging evidence is provided using diverse samples, contexts, and methodological operations.

Welch M., &Bryan J.L . (2000).

Moral campaigns, authoritarian aesthetics, and escalation: An examination of flag desecration in the post-Eichman era.

Journal of Crime & Justice, 23(1), 25-45.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0735648X.2000.9721108

Wisneski D.C., &Skitka L.J . (2017).

Moralization through moral shock: Exploring emotional antecedents to moral conviction.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(2), 139-150.

URL     PMID:27872393      [本文引用: 1]

Abstract The current research tested whether exposure to disgusting images increases moral conviction and whether this happens in the presence of incidental disgust cues versus disgust cues relevant to the target of moralization. Across two studies we exposed participants to one of four sets of disgusting versus control images to test the moralization of abortion attitudes: pictures of aborted fetuses, animal abuse, non-harm related disgusting images, harm related disgusting images, or neutral pictures, at either sub- or supraliminal levels of awareness. Moral conviction about abortion increased (compared to control) only for participants exposed to abortion related images at speeds slow enough to allow conscious awareness. Study 2 replicated this finding, and found that the relationship between attitudinally relevant disgust and moral conviction was mediated by disgust, and not anger or harm appraisals. Findings are discussed in terms of their relevance for intuitionist theories of morality and moral theories that emphasize harm.

Wright P. J., Tokunaga R. S., & Bae S . (2014).

Pornography consumption and us adults' attitudes toward gay individuals' civil liberties, moral judgments of homosexuality, and support for same-sex marriage: Mediating and moderating factors.

Communication Monographs, 81(1), 79-107.

URL     Magsci     [本文引用: 2]

This study compared views on homosexuality among US adults who varied in their consumption of pornography. Nationally representative cross-sectional data generated by the General Social Survey (GSS) between 2000 and 2012 were employed. Pornography consumers expressed more positive attitudes toward gay individuals' civil liberties, more moral acceptance of homosexuality, and more support for same-sex marriage. Moderation analyses indicated the importance of consumers' views on personal freedom and morality. Associations between pornography consumption and positive views on homosexuality were strongest when consumers placed a premium on personal freedom and adopted a relativistic perspective on morality. Mediation analyses indicated that pornography consumption indirectly predicted more positive views on homosexuality through a nontraditional attitude toward sex. Supplementary analysis of nationally representative three-wave GSS panel data confirmed the temporal sequencing of these links. Prior pornography consumption predicted a more positive subsequent attitude toward nontraditional sex, which in turn predicted more positive subsequent views on homosexuality.

Young L., & Tsoi L. (2013).

When mental states matter, when they don't, and what that means for morality.

Social & Personality Psychology Compass, 7(8), 585-604.

URL     [本文引用: 1]

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi-dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.

版权所有 © 《心理科学进展》编辑部
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发  技术支持:support@magtech.com.cn

/