Lakoff依据现象学方法提出概念隐喻理论伊始,便不乏质疑,其一便是有无心理现实性。由于方法论和研究角度的局限性,争辩双方早期常常囿于本体论的证明,难以超越逻辑思辨层面得到定论。近期神经科学的研究成果表明,概念隐喻基于神经元的心智模拟功能,其心理现实性在行为、神经心理学和个体发育等方面都是成立的。本文从认识论角度入手,综述了神经科学中有关概念隐喻心理现实性的最新研究,并对前人实验中的问题进行了总结和展望。语言体现于心智,物化于大脑。通过神经科学研究隐喻,有利于该理论的巩固与发展。

本研究采用离线加工任务,以问卷调查法考察压力感对汉语使用者时间认知的影响。结果发现：1）较强的压力感会激活被试有关逃离的感觉运动信息,其空间移动方向与时间在动隐喻相同,出现了＂隐喻一致性效应＂;2）被试可以将直接感受到的空间经验作为具身认知的桥梁,使压力感和时间两个抽象概念产生联系;3）从神经科学角度来看,压力感和时间等抽象概念的离线认知加工,会受到在线加工编码的感觉运动信息的影响。整个研究表明,对抽象概念的理解必须基于感觉运动的加工,符合概念隐喻理论的基本假设。

采用听觉刺激-口头问答任务考察汉语母语者对指示性时间句和顺序性时间句的加工。结果表明：（1）对指示性时间句,被试的加工不受听觉刺激的呈现位置影响,时间概念与空间知觉之间无法形成对应的自动化联结;（2）对顺序性时间句,汉语母语者对出现在前方的＂较早＂事件和出现在后方的＂较晚＂事件反应快,出现了隐喻一致性效应,即汉语母语者更倾向于用＂前＂表示过去,用＂后＂表示未来。整个研究表明,对于汉语母语者而言,＂自我参照点＂和＂时间参照点＂两大时间隐喻系统都具有心理现实性,二者之间的区别在于是否有运动经验参与,并由此造成汉语母语者在听觉任务中对指示性时间句和顺序性时间句加工的差异。

本研究旨在探讨不同时间关注特征人群的空间-时间联合编码效应是否存在差异。采用时间关注点量表将被试分为关注过去组和关注未来组,进行反应区分实验。实验以时间词作为启动刺激,目标刺激是随后出现在屏幕左或右侧的圆点。结果发现,不同时间关注点人群在不同时间词、空间位置实验条件下的反应不同,关注过去组对左侧空间反应更快,关注未来组在未来词启动下的反应时更短。表明不同时间关注点人群分别在时间和空间维度上存在差异,没有直接发现相反的时间-空间表征形式,但可能具有该趋势。这种区别可能由于注意分配上的差异,在一定程度上支持"左-右"轴上时间概念加工的时间关注点假设。

具身认知强调身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。其中心含义包括:(1)认知过程的进行方式和步骤实际上是被身体的物理属性所决定的;(2)认知的内容是身体提供的;(3)认知、身体、环境是一体的,认知存在于大脑,大脑存在于身体,身体存在于环境。具身认知最初仅仅是一种哲学思考,有深刻的哲学思想渊源,但是现在这种哲学思考已经开始走向实证领域,实验的认知心理学家开始从具身的角度看待认知,形成了具身认知研究思潮。但是具身认知研究也面临着许多亟待解决的问题。

Abstract The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing.

When speaking and reasoning about time, people around the world tend to do so with vocabulary and concepts borrowed from the domain of space. This raises the question of whether the cross-linguistic variability found for spatial representations, and the principles on which these are based, may also carry over to the domain of time. Real progress in addressing this question presupposes a taxonomy for the possible conceptualizations in one domain and its consistent and comprehensive mapping onto the other—a challenge that has been taken up only recently and is far from reaching consensus. This article aims at systematizing the theoretical and empirical advances in this field, with a focus on accounts that deal with frames of reference (FoRs). It reviews eight such accounts by identifying their conceptual ingredients and principles for space–time mapping, and it explores the potential for their integration. To evaluate their feasibility, data from some thirty empirical studies, conducted with speakers of sixteen different languages, are then scrutinized. This includes a critical assessment of the methods employed, a summary of the findings for each language group, and a (re-)analysis of the data in view of the theoretical questions. The discussion relates these findings to research on the mental time line, and explores the psychological reality of temporal FoRs, the degree of cross-domain consistency in FoR adoption, the role of deixis, and the sources and extent of space–time mapping more generally.

The present paper evaluates the claim that abstract conceptual domains are structured through metaphorical mappings from domains grounded directly in experience. In particular, the paper asks whether the abstract domain of time gets its relational structure from the more concrete domain of space. Relational similarities between space and time are outlined along with several explanations of how these similarities may have arisen. Three experiments designed to distinguish between these explanations are described. The results indicate that (1) the domains of space and time do share conceptual structure, (2) spatial relational information is just as useful for thinking about time as temporal information, and (3) with frequent use, mappings between space and time come to be stored in the domain of time and so thinking about time does not necessarily require access to spatial schemas. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence for Metaphoric Structuring. It appears that abstract domains such as time are indeed shaped by metaphorical mappings from more concrete and experiential domains such as space.

Abstract Does the language you speak affect how you think about the world? This question is taken up in three experiments. English and Mandarin talk about time differently--English predominantly talks about time as if it were horizontal, while Mandarin also commonly describes time as vertical. This difference between the two languages is reflected in the way their speakers think about time. In one study, Mandarin speakers tended to think about time vertically even when they were thinking for English (Mandarin speakers were faster to confirm that March comes earlier than April if they had just seen a vertical array of objects than if they had just seen a horizontal array, and the reverse was true for English speakers). Another study showed that the extent to which Mandarin-English bilinguals think about time vertically is related to how old they were when they first began to learn English. In another experiment native English speakers were taught to talk about time using vertical spatial terms in a way similar to Mandarin. On a subsequent test, this group of English speakers showed the same bias to think about time vertically as was observed with Mandarin speakers. It is concluded that (1) language is a powerful tool in shaping thought about abstract domains and (2) one's native language plays an important role in shaping habitual thought (e.g., how one tends to think about time) but does not entirely determine one's thinking in the strong Whorfian sense. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.

Abstract How are people able to think about things they have never seen or touched? We demonstrate that abstract knowledge can be built analogically from more experience-based knowledge. People's understanding of the abstract domain of time, for example, is so intimately dependent on the more experience-based domain of space that when people make an air journey or wait in a lunch line, they also unwittingly (and dramatically) change their thinking about time. Further, our results suggest that it is not sensorimotor spatial experience per se that influences people's thinking about time, but rather people's representations of and thinking about their spatial experience.

Abstract How does culture shape our concepts? Across many cultures, people conceptualize time as if it flows along a horizontal timeline, but the direction of this implicit timeline is culture specific: Later times are on the right in some cultures but on the left in others. Here we investigated whether experience reading can determine the direction and orientation of the mental timeline, independent of other cultural and linguistic factors. Dutch speakers performed space-time congruity tasks with the instructions and stimuli written in either standard, mirror-reversed, or rotated orthography. When participants judged temporal phrases written in standard orthography, their reaction times were consistent with a rightward-directed mental timeline, but after brief exposure to mirror-reversed orthography, their mental timelines were reversed. When standard orthography was rotated 90 clockwise (downward) or counterclockwise (upward), participants' mental timelines were rotated, accordingly. Reading can play a causal role in shaping people's implicit time representations. Exposure to a new orthography can change the direction and orientation of the mental timeline within minutes, even when the new space-time mapping directly contradicts the reader's usual mapping. To account for this representational flexibility, we propose the hierarchical mental metaphors theory, according to which culturally conditioned mappings between space and time are specific instances of a more general mapping, which is conditioned by the relationship between space and time in the physical world. Conceptualizations of time are culture specific at one level of analysis but may be universal at another.

Do English speakers think about time the way they talk about it? In spoken English, time appears to flow along the sagittal axis (front/back): the future is ahead and the past is behind us. Here we show that when asked to gesture about past and future events deliberately, English speakers often use the sagittal axis, as language suggests they should. By contrast, when producing co-speech gestures spontaneously, they use the lateral axis (left/right) overwhelmingly more often, gesturing leftward for earlier times and rightward for later times. This left-right mapping of time is consistent with the flow of time on calendars and graphs in English-speaking cultures, but is completely absent from conventional spoken metaphors. English speakers gesture on the lateral axis even when they are using front/back metaphors in their co-occurring speech. This speech-gesture dissociation is not due to any lack of lexical or constructional resources to spatialize time laterally in language, nor to any lack of physical resources to spatialize time sagittally in gesture. We propose that when speakers are describing sequences of events, they often use neither the Moving Ego nor Moving Time perspectives. Rather, they adopt a -oving Attention perspective, which is grounded in patterns of interaction with cultural artifacts, not in patterns of interaction with the natural environment. We suggest possible pragmatic, kinematic, and mnemonic motivations for the use of a lateral mental timeline in gesture and in thought. Gestures reveal an implicit spatial conceptualization of time that cannot be inferred from language.

Abstract Do Mandarin and English speakers think about time differently? The seminal work by Boroditsky (2001) claimed they do, but the claim did not stand in three failed replications (Chen 2007; January and Kako 2007; Tse and Altarriba 2008). Recently, new data from different tasks were interpreted as further support of the claim (Boroditsky, Fuhrman and McCormick, 2011; Fuhrman et al. 2011). We evaluate the claim, its logical ground, and the existing evidence, including results from the original spatial priming task, the spatial projection (of temporal events) task, and the temporal judgment task. A reasonable conclusion from this line of research is that there might be a relationship between temporal cognition and specific language experience, but the relationship is a complex one which varies with the task, the language of instructions, the cultural shade of the materials, the location of test, the nature and extent of bilingualism, in addition to language and directionality of print. Some of the tasks are easier to replicate than others, and when replicable, the evidence they yield requires careful evaluations, interpretations, and qualifications. Under scrutiny, the evidence appears weak that Mandarin and English speakers think about time in a categorically different way because they use spatial metaphors differently to express time.

Different lines of research suggest that our mental representations of time and space are linked, though the strength of this linkage has only recently been addressed for the front-back mental timeline (Eikmeier, Schr枚ter, Maienborn, Alex-Ruf, & Ulrich, 2013). The present study extends this investigation to the left-right mental timeline. In contrast to what was found in the cited previous study, the obtained space-time congruency effects were smaller than benchmark stimulus-response congruency effects in control conditions. This pattern of results suggests that the representations of time and space are less strongly linked for the left-right axis than for the back-front axis. (PsycINFO Database Record.

In this paper we examine how English and Mandarin speakers think about time, and we test how the patterns of thinking in the two groups relate to patterns in linguistic and cultural experience. In Mandarin, vertical spatial metaphors are used more frequently to talk about time than they are in English; English relies primarily on horizontal terms. We present results from two tasks comparing English and Mandarin speakers090005 temporal reasoning. The tasks measure how people spatialize time in three-dimensional space, including the sagittal (front/back), transverse (left/right), and vertical (up/down) axes. Results of Experiment 1 show that people automatically create spatial representations in the course of temporal reasoning, and these implicit spatializations differ in accordance with patterns in language, even in a non-linguistic task. Both groups showed evidence of a left-to-right representation of time, in accordance with writing direction, but only Mandarin speakers showed a vertical top-to-bottom pattern for time (congruent with vertical spatiotemporal metaphors in Mandarin). Results of Experiment 2 confirm and extend these findings, showing that bilinguals090005 representations of time depend on both long-term and proximal aspects of language experience. Participants who were more proficient in Mandarin were more likely to arrange time vertically (an effect of previous language experience). Further, bilinguals were more likely to arrange time vertically when they were tested in Mandarin than when they were tested in English (an effect of immediate linguistic context).

react-text: 397 In this paper we examine how English and Mandarin speakers think about time, and we test how the patterns of thinking in the two groups relate to patterns in linguistic and cultural experience. In Mandarin, vertical spatial metaphors are used more frequently to talk about time than they are in English; English relies primarily on horizontal terms. We present results from two tasks comparing... /react-text react-text: 398 /react-text [Show full abstract]

Abstract Six unsuccessful attempts at replicating a key finding in the linguistic relativity literature [Boroditsky, L. (2001). Does language shape thought?: Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time. Cognitive Psychology, 43, 1-22] are reported. In addition to these empirical issues in replicating the original finding, theoretical issues present in the original report are discussed. In sum, we conclude that Boroditsky (2001) provides no support for the Whorfian hypothesis.

Abstract The authors investigated cultural differences in the way people perceive and represent temporal information. It was hypothesized that Chinese would attend to the past information more than would Canadians. In Studies 1 and 2, Canadian and Chinese participants read a description of a theft along with a list of behaviors that occurred in the past or present. Chinese participants rated behaviors that had taken place in the remote and recent past as more relevant to solving the case than did Canadians. Study 3 showed that Chinese participants recalled greater detail about past events than did Canadians. Studies 4A and 4B showed that Chinese perceived past events as being closer to the present than did Canadians, suggesting that Chinese had a greater awareness of the past. Overall, Chinese attended to a greater range of past information than did Canadians, which has significant theoretical and practical implications. (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved.

Time is often conceptualized in terms of space. For instance, the phrase “to take a step back in time” metaphorically implies a mental time travel toward the past as well as an egocentric backward motion in physical space. A prevalent representation of temporal concepts, indeed, construes the past and the future as respectively behind and in front of the ego. The egocentric Mental Time Line... [Show full abstract]

Abstract What influences how people implicitly associate "past" and "future" with "front" and "back?" Whereas previous research has shown that cultural attitudes toward time play a role in modulating space-time mappings in people's mental models (de la Fuente, Santiago, Rom n, Dumitrache & Casasanto, 2014), we investigated real life experiences as potential additional influences on these implicit associations. Participants within the same single culture, who are engaged in different intermediate-term educational experiences (Study 1), long-term living experiences (Study 2), and short-term visiting experiences (Study 3), showed their distinct differences in temporal focus, thereby influencing their implicit spatializations of time. Results across samples suggest that personal attitudes toward time related to real life experiences may influence people's space-time mappings. The findings we report on shed further light on the high flexibility of human conceptualization system. While culture may exert an important influence on temporal focus, a person's conceptualization of time may be attributed to a culmination of factors. 2017 Scandinavian Psychological Associations and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

According to the Temporal Focus Hypothesis (TFH), space–time mappings in people’s minds are shaped by their attentional focus. Previous research has shown that numerous cultural and individual factors underpinning temporal focus may contribute to the direction of space–time mappings in people’s mental models. However, the role of time of day in shaping spatial conceptions of time has not been... [Show full abstract]

Lakoff [Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1987.] and other “conceptual metaphor” theorists have argued that our use and understanding of figurative language is mediated by unconscious metaphoric correspondences that structure human concepts. Communication scholars have employed the conceptual metaphor framework to infer attitudes and beliefs from the figurative expressions people use to describe their personal experiences. However, these scholars rarely scrutinize the framework’s assumptions, many of which have been vigorously challenged in other disciplines. In this article, I critically assess the explanatory value of the “conceptual metaphor” construct and review the empirical evidence for and against it. Based on this assessment, I conclude that despite its important atmospheric influence, the conceptual metaphor framework has not fared well as an account of conceptual structure or a model of figurative language understanding.

Everyday concepts of duration, of sequence, and of past, present, and future are fundamental to how humans make sense of experience. In culture after culture, converging evidence from language, co-speech gesture, and behavioral tasks suggests that humans handle these elusive yet indispensable notions by construing them spatially. Where do these spatial construals come from and why do they take the particular, sometimes peculiar, spatial forms that they do? As researchers across the cognitive sciences pursue these questions on different levels--cultural, developmental--in diverse populations and with new methodologies, clear answers will depend upon a shared and nuanced set of theoretical distinctions. Time is not a monolith, but rather a mosaic of construals with distinct properties and origins.

Abstract Cognitive research on metaphoric concepts of time has focused on differences between moving Ego and moving time models, but even more basic is the contrast between Ego- and temporal-reference-point models. Dynamic models appear to be quasi-universal cross-culturally, as does the generalization that in Ego-reference-point models, FUTURE IS IN FRONT OF EGO and PAST IS IN BACK OF EGO. The Aymara language instead has a major static model of time wherein FUTURE IS BEHIND EGO and PAST IS IN FRONT OF EGO; linguistic and gestural data give strong confirmation of this unusual culture-specific cognitive pattern. Gestural data provide crucial information unavailable to purely linguistic analysis, suggesting that when investigating conceptual systems both forms of expression should be analyzed complementarily. Important issues in embodied cognition are raised: how fully shared are bodily grounded motivations for universal cognitive patterns, what makes a rare pattern emerge, and what are the cultural entailments of such patterns? 2006 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Abstract Time is often conceptualized in terms of space. For instance, the phrase -o take a step back in time metaphorically implies a mental time travel toward the past as well as an egocentric backward motion in physical space. A prevalent representation of temporal concepts, indeed, construes the past and the future as respectively behind and in front of the ego. The egocentric Mental Time Line (MTL) is supposed to originate from our walking experience in the physical world, though direct evidence supporting this representation is still needed. On these grounds, here we reasoned that if the egocentric MTL originates from walking, temporal processing should affect step movements along the sagittal space (i.e., both in the front and in the back space). By recording whole-body movement kinematics, we show that participants initiated faster steps backward in response to past- than to future-related words, whereas they initiated faster steps forward in response to future- than to past-related words. These results provide striking evidence in support of the moving ego metaphor of time, according to which we would approach future events and leave them behind, as moving through a mental time line projected on a physical space.

We explore whether time shifts in text comprehension are represented spatially. Participants read sentences involving past or future events and made sensibility judgment responses in one of two ways: (1) moving toward or away from their body and (2) pressing the toward or away buttons without moving. Previous work suggests that spatial compatibility effects should be observed, where the future is mapped onto responses away from the body, and the past is mapped onto responses toward the body. These effects were observed, but only when participants were moving to make their responses, and only for larger time shifts (e.g., a month).

Temporal focus is the attention individuals devote to thinking about the past, present, and future, and the concept is important because it affects how people incorporate perceptions about past experiences, current situations, and future expectations into their attitudes, cognitions, and behavior. However, temporal focus has not been clearly defined nor situated in a nomological network of constructs. In addition, existing measures of temporal focus suffer from various shortcomings. In this paper, we advance the concept of temporal focus by critically examining its conceptualization, developing a new measure of temporal focus (Temporal Focus Scale; TFS), and evaluating the validity (i.e., construct, convergent, discriminant, nomological, and predictive validity) of the TFS across four studies. We conclude that understanding how individuals focus their attention toward the past, present, and future clarifies their responses to explicit and implicit temporal information, which suggests that a variety of research streams would benefit from incorporating the concept of temporal focus.

It is widely assumed that there is a natural, prelinguistic conceptual domain of time whose linguistic organization is universally structured via metaphoric mapping from the lexicon and grammar of space and motion. We challenge this assumption on the basis of our research on the Amondawa (Tupi Kawahib) language and culture of Amazonia. Using both observational data and structured field linguistic tasks, we show that linguistic space-time mapping at the constructional level is not a feature of the Amondawa language, and is not employed by Amondawa speakers (when speaking Amondawa). Amondawa does not recruit its extensive inventory of terms and constructions for spatial motion and location to express temporal relations. Amondawa also lacks a numerically based calendric system. To account for these data, and in opposition to a Universal Space-Time Mapping Hypothesis, we propose a Mediated Mapping Hypothesis, which accords causal importance to the numerical and artefact-based construction of time-based (as opposed to event-based) time interval systems.

It is widely assumed that there is a natural, prelinguistic conceptual domain of time whose linguistic organization is universally structured via metaphoric mapping from the lexicon and grammar of space and motion. We challenge this assumption on the basis of our research on the Amondawa (Tupi Kawahib) language and culture of Amazonia. Using both observational data and structured field linguistic tasks, we show that linguistic space-time mapping at the constructional level is not a feature of the Amondawa language, and is not employed by Amondawa speakers (when speaking Amondawa). Amondawa does not recruit its extensive inventory of terms and constructions for spatial motion and location to express temporal relations. Amondawa also lacks a numerically based calendric system. To account for these data, and in opposition to a Universal Space-Time Mapping Hypothesis, we propose a Mediated Mapping Hypothesis, which accords causal importance to the numerical and artefact-based construction of time-based (as opposed to event-based) time interval systems.

Abstract People often make use of a spatial “mental time line” to represent events in time. We investigated whether the eyes follow such a mental time line during online language comprehension of sentences that refer to the past, present, and future. Participants' eye movements were measured on a blank screen while they listened to these sentences. Saccade direction revealed that the future is mapped higher up in space than the past. Moreover, fewer saccades were made when two events are simultaneously taking place at the present moment compared to two events that are happening in different points in time. This is the first evidence that oculomotor correlates reflect mental looking along an abstract invisible time line during online language comprehension about time. Our results support the idea that observing eye movements is likely to “detect” invisible spatial scaffoldings which are involved in cognitively processing abstract meaning, even when the abstract meaning lacks an explicit spatial correlate. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

Vietnamese speakers can describe the future as behind them and gesture forwards to indicate the past, which suggests they use a conceptual model of Time in which the future is behind and the past is in front. This type of model has previously been shown to be pervasive only among older speakers of Aymara in the Andes (Nú09ez and Sweetser 2006. With the future behind them: Convergent evidence from Aymara language and gesture in the crosslinguistic comparison of spatial construals of time.Cognitive Science30. 401–450). Whereas Time in the Aymara model does not “move”, the present data show that Time in Vietnamese can “approach” from behind the Ego and “continue forward” into the past. To our knowledge, no other language has been identified with a model where Time moves from behind Ego to in front. Recognition of this model in Vietnamese will open up new research opportunities, particularly since the model does not seem to be endangered in Vietnamese.

Flexibility in conceptual projection constitutes one of the most challenging issues in the embodiment and conceptual metaphor literatures. We sketch a theoretical proposal that places the burden of the explanation on attentional dynamics in interaction with mental models in working memory that are constrained to be maximally coherent. A test of this theory is provided in the context of the conceptual projection of time onto the domain of space. Participants categorized words presented at different spatial locations (back090009front, left090009right) as referring to the past or to the future. Responses were faster when the irrelevant word location was congruent with the back090009past, front090009future metaphoric mapping. Moreover, when a new highly task-relevant spatial frame of reference was introduced, it changed the projection of past and future onto space in a way that was congruent with the new frame (past was now projected to left space and future to right space), as predicted by the theory. This study shows that there is substantial flexibility in conceptual projection and opens a venue to study metaphoric variation across tasks, individuals, and cultures as the result of attentional dynamics.

To talk about time, English speakers often use horizontal spatial metaphors whereas Chinese speakers use both vertical and horizontal spatial metaphors. Boroditsky (2001) showed that while Chinese-English bilinguals were faster to verify a temporal target like June comes earlier than August after they had seen a vertical spatial prime rather than a horizontal spatial prime, English monolinguals showed the reverse pattern, thus supporting the linguistic relativity hypothesis. This finding was not conceptually replicated in January and Kako's (2007) six experiments for English monolinguals. In the current experiment, we failed to conceptually replicate her English monolinguals' findings: both Chinese-English bilinguals and English monolinguals were faster to verify the sentences after seeing a vertical spatial prime than a horizontal spatial prime. While we replicated Boroditsky's findings, in part, for our Chinese-English bilinguals, the similarity in the pattern of findings for both Chinese-English bilinguals and English monolinguals argues against the linguistic relativity hypothesis.

Reasoning about bedrock abstract concepts such as time, number, and valence relies on spatial metaphor and often on multiple spatial metaphors for a single concept. Previous research has documented, for instance, both future-in-front and future-to-right metaphors for time in English speakers. It is often assumed that these metaphors, which appear to have distinct experiential bases, remain distinct in online temporal reasoning. In two studies we demonstrate that, contra this assumption, people systematically combine these metaphors. Evidence for this combination was found in both directly elicited (Study 1) and spontaneous co-speech (Study 2) gestures about time. These results provide first support for the hypothesis that the metaphorical representation of time, and perhaps other abstract domains as well, involves the continuous co-activation of multiple metaphors rather than the selection of only one.

People use space in a variety of ways to structure their thoughts about time. The present report focuses on the different ways that space is employed when reasoning about deictic (past/future relationships) and sequence (earlier/later relationships) time. In the first study, we show that deictic and sequence time are aligned along the lateral axis in a manner consistent with previous work, with past and earlier events associated with left space and future and later events associated with right space. However, the alignment of time with space is different along the sagittal axis. Participants associated future events and earlier events—not later events—with the space in front of their body and past and later events with the space behind, consistent with the sagittal spatial terms (e.g., ahead, in front of) that we use to talk about deictic and sequence time. In the second study, we show that these associations between sequence time and sagittal space are sensitive to person-perspective. This suggests that the particular space-time associations observed in English speakers are influenced by a variety of different spatial properties, including spatial location and perspective.