人们对事物的心理表征具有不同的抽象水平即解释水平,解释水平取决于人们所感知的与认知客体的心理距离,进而影响了人们的判断与决策。大量研究表明,人们倾向于更多地使用反映事物内涵的一般的、核心的、去背景化的特征来解释心理距离遥远的事物,更多使用偶然的、外围的、背景化的特征来解释心理距离较近的事物。未来的研究应明确区分解释水平本身、解释水平的表现形式和解释水平的前导变量;应更关注其他心理变量在心理距离、解释水平、判断与决策因果链条中的调节或中介作用。

Psychol Bull. 1975 Jul;82(4):463-96. Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.; Review

ABSTRACT Guilt is widely recognized as an important self-regulatory emotion, yet alternative theoretical accounts view guilt primarily as either a punishment cue or a prosocial motivator. Integrating these views, we propose that guilt functions dynamically to first provide a negative reinforcement cue associated with reduced approach motivation, which transforms into approach-motivated behavior when an opportunity for reparation presents itself. We tested this hypothesis in the context of racial prejudice. White subjects viewed a multiracial series of faces while cortical activity was recorded using electroencephalography. Following bogus feedback indicating anti-Black responses, subjects reported elevated guilt, which was associated with changes in frontal cortical asymmetry indicating reduced approach motivation. When subjects were presented with an opportunity to engage in prejudice-reducing behavior, guilt predicted greater interest in prejudice reduction, which in turn was associated with an approach-related shift in frontal asymmetry. The results support a dynamic model in which guilt is associated with adaptive changes in motivation and behavior.

Abstract Choice, active response, self-regulation, and other volition may all draw on a common inner resource. In Experiment 1, people who forced themselves to eat radishes instead of tempting chocolates subsequently quit faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who had not had to exert self-control over eating. In Experiment 2, making a meaningful personal choice to perform attitude-relevant behavior caused a similar decrement in persistence. In Experiment 3, suppressing emotion led to a subsequent drop in performance of solvable anagrams. In Experiment 4, an initial task requiring high self-regulation made people more passive (i.e., more prone to favor the passive-response option). These results suggest that the self's capacity for active volition is limited and that a range of seemingly different, unrelated acts share a common resource.

A picture-word version of the Stroop task was used to test the automatic activation of psychological distance by words carrying various senses of psychological distance: temporal (tomorrow, in a year), social (friend, enemy), and hypotheticality (sure, maybe). The pictures implied depth, with the words appearing relatively close to or distant from the observer. The participants classified the spatial distance of words faster when the word's implicit psychological distance matched its spatial distance (e.g., a geographically close word was classified faster when it was "friend" than when it was "enemy"). The findings are consistent with the idea that psychological distance is accessed automatically, even when it is not directly related to people's current goals, and suggest that psychological distance is an important dimension of meaning, common to spatial distance, temporal distance, social distance, and hypotheticality.

ABSTRACT The strength model suggests that self-control relies on a limited resource. One candidate for this resource is glucose. Counter to the proposals of the glucose hypothesis, this study argues that the resource issue is one of allocation, not of limited supply. It addresses the argument from three perspectives: the evolution of mental processes at the species level, the adaptation of these same processes at the individual level, and the physiology of glucose transport. It is argued here that the brain has both sufficient resources and resource delivery mechanisms with which to support self-control but that these resources are allocated in accordance with personal priorities. As an alternative to the limited resource model, the current study proposes a resource-allocation model of self-control and presents several testable hypotheses.

In this paper we elicit preferences for money-time pairs via experimental techniques. We estimate a general specification of discounting that nests exponential and hyperbolic discounting, as well as various forms of present bias, including quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We find that discount rates are high and decline with both delay and amount, as most of the previous literature. We also find clear evidence for present bias. When identifying the form of the present bias, little evidence for quasi-hyperbolic discounting is found. The data strongly favor instead a specification with a small present bias in the form of a fixed cost, of the order of $4 on average across subjects. With such a fixed cost the curvature of discounting is imprecisely estimated and both exponential and hyperbolic discounting cannot be rejected for several subjects.

Previous research has suggested that self-regulation results in low-level construals but has inferred construal levels after self-regulation only indirectly, through construal-dependent judgments and choices. In the present paper, we demonstrate a direct link between engaging in self-regulation and low-level construals, by manipulating self-regulation and subsequently assessing construal levels using well-established and straightforward measures of construal level in three studies. Participants who engaged in self-regulation subsequently provided lower egocentric spatial distance estimates (Studies 1A and 1B), formed more groups when categorizing objects (Study 2), and used more concrete language when describing cartoon main characters' behavior (Study 3) than participants who did not engage in self-regulation. These findings provide direct evidence that low-level construals result from engaging in self-regulation. Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract The authors tested the hypothesis that affirming self-transcendent values attenuates negative consequences of self-threat better than affirming self-enhancement values. If value-affirmation buffers against threat because it bolsters the self, then affirming either a self-

Abstract We examined the neural basis of self-regulation in individuals from a cohort of preschoolers who performed the delay-of-gratification task 4 decades ago. Nearly 60 individuals, now in their mid-forties, were tested on "hot" and "cool" versions of a go/nogo task to assess whether delay of gratification in childhood predicts impulse control abilities and sensitivity to alluring cues (happy faces). Individuals who were less able to delay gratification in preschool and consistently showed low self-control abilities in their twenties and thirties performed more poorly than did high delayers when having to suppress a response to a happy face but not to a neutral or fearful face. This finding suggests that sensitivity to environmental hot cues plays a significant role in individuals' ability to suppress actions toward such stimuli. A subset of these participants (n = 26) underwent functional imaging for the first time to test for biased recruitment of frontostriatal circuitry when required to suppress responses to alluring cues. Whereas the prefrontal cortex differentiated between nogo and go trials to a greater extent in high delayers, the ventral striatum showed exaggerated recruitment in low delayers. Thus, resistance to temptation as measured originally by the delay-of-gratification task is a relatively stable individual difference that predicts reliable biases in frontostriatal circuitries that integrate motivational and control processes.

Given assertions of the theoretical, empirical, and practical importance of self-control, this meta-analytic study sought to review evidence concerning the relationship between dispositional self-control and behavior. The authors provide a brief overview over prominent theories of self-control, identifying implicit assumptions surrounding the effects of self-control that warrant empirical testing. They report the results of a meta-analysis of 102 studies (total N = 32,648) investigating the behavioral effects of self-control using the Self-Control Scale, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, and the Low Self-Control Scale. A small to medium positive effect of self-control on behavior was found for the three scales. Only the Self-Control Scale allowed for a fine-grained analysis of conceptual moderators of the self-control behavior relation. Specifically, self-control (measured by the Self-Control Scale) related similarly to the performance of desired behaviors and the inhibition of undesired behaviors, but its effects varied dramatically across life domains (e.g., achievement, adjustment). In addition, the associations between self-control and behavior were significantly stronger for automatic (as compared to controlled) behavior and for imagined (as compared to actual) behavior.

The present research explored the nature of automatic associations formed between short-term motives (temptations) and the overriding goals with which they interfere. Five experimental studies, encompassing several self-regulatory domains, found that temptations tend to activate such higher priority goals, whereas the latter tend to inhibit the temptations. These activation patterns occurred outside of participants' conscious awareness and did not appear to tax their mental resources. Moreover, they varied as a function of subjective goal importance and were more pronounced for successful versus unsuccessful self-regulators in a given domain. Finally, priming by temptation stimuli was found not only to influence the activation of overriding goals but also to affect goal-congruent behavioral choices.

Assuming that people often hold the abstract goal of acquiring accurate feedback but recognize that acquiring favorable feedback can make the self-evaluative process more comfortable, the authors posited that low-level construals (of how action is performed) would elicit greater self-enhancement motivation than would high-level construals (of why action is performed). Individuals chronically using low-level construals had greater interest in downward social comparison (DSC) and less interest in negative feedback (NF; Studies 1 and 3). Decreases in temporal distance (which foster low-level construals) also elicited greater interest in DSC and less interest in NF (Studies 2 and 4). The latter effect was explained by participants' aversion to inconvenience (Study 5) and not by approach-avoidance conflict (Study 6). These results suggest that the level of abstraction at which people construe self-evaluative situations can influence their feedback preferences.

Self-control failure is a ubiquitous and troubling problem people face. This article reviews psychological models of self-control and describes a new integrative approach based on construal level theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003 ). This construal-level perspective proposes that people's subjective mental construals or representations of events impacts self-control. Specifically, more abstract, global (high-level) construals promote self-control success, whereas more concrete, local (low-level) construals tend to lead to self-control failure. That is, self-control is promoted when people see the proverbial forest beyond the trees. This article surveys research findings that demonstrate that construing events at high-level versus low-level construals promotes self-control. This article also discusses how a construal-level perspective promotes understanding of self-control failures.

It is argued that the temporal distance of attitude objects systematically changes how the object is mentally represented, and thus influences the strength of particular persuasive appeals. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people preferentially attend to arguments that highlight primary, abstract (high-level) vs. incidental, concrete (low-level) features when attitude objects are temporally distant vs. near. Results suggested that when attitude objects are temporally distant vs. near, arguments emphasizing primary vs. secondary features (Study 1), desirability vs. feasibility features (Study 2), and general classes vs. specific cases are more persuasive (Study 3). The relation of construal theory to dual process theories of persuasion and persuasion phenomena, such as personal relevance effects and functional matching effects, are discussed.

When people anticipate that future temptations may undermine valued goals, they use a number of prospective self-control strategies (or “precommitment devices”) to increase the likelihood of future self-control success. Little is known, however, about the conditions under which people are more or less likely to use them. Drawing from construal level theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003), we argue that people are more likely to engage in prospective self-control when they construe events more abstractly (at higher-level construals). Results from two experiments demonstrated that higher-level construals promote use of two well-documented prospective strategies: choice bracketing and self-imposing punishment. Higher-level construals thus appear to enhance people's efforts to protect their valued goals from anticipated temptations.

Self-control benefits from an asymmetric pattern of cognitive associations whereby temptations facilitate the activation of goals, but goals interfere with the activation of temptations (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003). The present research examines how these cognitive associations are dependent on people's subjective construals of events. Drawing from past work demonstrating that abstract, goal-relevant (higher level) rather than concrete, goal-incidental (lower level) construals promote self-control (Fujita, Trope et al., 2006), three experiments tested the hypothesis that higher level construals promote asymmetric temptation-goal associations. Results confirmed that asymmetric temptation-goal associations are construal-dependent: higher level construals enhanced the tendency for temptations to facilitate activation of goals (Studies 1 and 2), and for goals to interfere with the activation of temptation (Study 3).

The authors propose that self-control involves making decisions and behaving in a manner consistent with high-level versus low-level construals of a situation. Activation of high-level construals (which capture global, superordinate, primary features of an event) should lead to greater self-control than activation of low-level construals (which capture local, subordinate, secondary features). In 6 experiments using 3 different techniques, the authors manipulated construal levels and assessed their effects on self-control and underlying psychological processes. High-level construals led to decreased preferences for immediate over delayed outcomes, greater physical endurance, stronger intentions to exert selfcontrol, and less positive evaluations of temptations that undermine self-control. These results support a construal-level analysis of self-control.

Abstract The present work suggests that self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source. Laboratory tests of self-control (i.e., the Stroop task, thought suppression, emotion regulation, attention control) and of social behaviors (i.e., helping behavior, coping with thoughts of death, stifling prejudice during an interracial interaction) showed that (a) acts of self-control reduced blood glucose levels, (b) low levels of blood glucose after an initial self-control task predicted poor performance on a subsequent self-control task, and (c) initial acts of self-control impaired performance on subsequent self-control tasks, but consuming a glucose drink eliminated these impairments. Self-control requires a certain amount of glucose to operate unimpaired. A single act of self-control causes glucose to drop below optimal levels, thereby impairing subsequent attempts at self-control. ((c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved).

The human psyche is equipped with the capacity to solve problems using different mental states or mindsets. Different mindsets can lead to different judgment and decision making styles, each associated with its own perspective and biases. To change perspective, people can, and often do, switch mindsets. We argue, however, that mindset switching can be costly for subsequent decisions. We propose that mindset switching is an executive function that relies on the same psychological resource that governs other acts of executive functioning, including self-regulation. This implies that there are psychic costs to switching mindsets that are borne out in depleted executive resources. One implication of this framework is that switching mindsets should render people more likely to fail at subsequent self-regulation than they would if maintaining a consistent mindset. The findings from experiments that manipulated mindset switching in five domains support this model.

Abstract Self-regulatory failure is a core feature of many social and mental health problems. Self-regulation can be undermined by failures to transcend overwhelming temptations, negative moods and resource depletion, and when minor lapses in self-control snowball into self-regulatory collapse. Cognitive neuroscience research suggests that successful self-regulation is dependent on top-down control from the prefrontal cortex over subcortical regions involved in reward and emotion. We highlight recent neuroimaging research on self-regulatory failure, the findings of which support a balance model of self-regulation whereby self-regulatory failure occurs whenever the balance is tipped in favor of subcortical areas, either due to particularly strong impulses or when prefrontal function itself is impaired. Such a model is consistent with recent findings in the cognitive neuroscience of addictive behavior, emotion regulation and decision-making. Copyright 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Growing evidence points to a bidirectional relationship between spatial distance and level of mental representation, whereby distant (vs. near) events are represented by a higher level of representation, and higher levels of representations increase perceptions of distance. In the current article, we review research that establishes this association and explores its implications. We begin by briefly describing construal level theory, the theoretical framework that gives rise to this associative prediction, and then review a set of theory-consistent findings that serve to illuminate the way that spatial distance influences cognition and behavior and the way in which people make judgments about spatial distance. Finally, we discuss open questions for future research on spatial distance using a construal level theory approach.

This research examines the effect of regulatory fit on self‐regulation. People experience regulatory fit when their strategy of goal pursuit fits (vs. conflicts) with their regulatory focus. Four experiments provide support for the hypothesis that regulatory fit improves whereas regulatory nonfit impairs self‐regulatory performance. These results were obtained across multiple self‐regulatory tasks that included a handgrip exercise to test physical endurance (experiment 1), a choice between a healthy and a decadent snack to test willpower in the face of temptation (experiments 2 and 3), and a health‐related compliance decision to demonstrate self‐regulation (experiment 4). Intensified motivation seems to be the mechanism underlying the regulatory fit effect.

According to the resource model of self-control, overriding one's predominant response tendencies consumes and temporarily depletes a limited inner resource. Over 100 experiments have lent support to this model of ego depletion by observing that acts of self-control at Time 1 reduce performance on subsequent, seemingly unrelated self-control tasks at Time 2. The time is now ripe, therefore, not only to broaden the scope of the model but to start gaining a precise, mechanistic account of it. Accordingly, in the current article, the authors probe the particular cognitive, affective, and motivational mechanics of self-control and its depletion, asking, "What is ego depletion?" This study proposes a process model of depletion, suggesting that exerting self-control at Time 1 causes temporary shifts in both motivation and attention that undermine self-control at Time 2. The article highlights evidence in support of this model but also highlights where evidence is lacking, thus providing a blueprint for future research. Though the process model of depletion may sacrifice the elegance of the resource metaphor, it paints a more precise picture of ego depletion and suggests several nuanced predictions for future research.

A series of four studies demonstrates that, across different operationalizations of level of construal, different types of activities, and for both the self and another person as targets, construing activities in high-level terms fosters perception of the more distal future as appropriate for their enactment. Specifically, the studies show that thinking about superordinate “why” (rather than subordinate “how”) aspects of actions, about the implications of actions for one’s personality (rather than the objects that would be used in performing the action), and about abstract (rather than concrete) aspects of actions leads people to expect the actions to be performed in the more distant future. These results suggest that the association of level of construal and time perspective is bi-directional, in that time perspective affects level of construal and, in addition, level of construal affects time perspective.

Goals are related to many interpersonal processes. As one of the cognitive representations of...

Abstract Research indicates that inducing high-level construal (processing that highlights invariant, essential features) relative to low-level construal (processing that highlights idiosyncratic, peripheral features) promotes self-control (Fujita & Carnevale, 2012). In the present work, we investigate to what extent people recognize the self-control benefits of high-level construal, and explore the consequences of this knowledge. Studies 1 and 2 provide initial evidence that individuals are aware that high-level relative to low-level construal promotes self-control in the dieting domain. Studies 3 and 4 find that individual differences in this knowledge predict self-control success outcomes (i.e., body mass index) among those who are motivated by dieting goals. Examining academics as a domain of self-control, Study 5 demonstrates that those with higher knowledge of construal level's impact on self-control earned higher end-of-semester grades to the extent that they were motivated to do well academically. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

Prior research has demonstrated that individuals show decreasing levels of impatience as the delay of consumption gets longer (i.e., present-bias). We examine the psychological underpinnings of such present-biased preferences by conceptualizing timing decisions as part of a series of judgments. We propose that shifts in the abstractness of processing (focusing on details vs. broad aspects) triggered by aspects of an earlier (related or unrelated) decision systematically influence the degree of present-bias in subsequent decisions. The results of five studies show that the processing mindset (concrete vs. abstract) evoked in previous related and unrelated decisions influences the level of construal evoked in subsequent decisions and moderates the extent of present-bias without changes in affect. We further show the default mindset is concrete (displaying high present-bias) and thus the effect of construal is eliminated when the subsequent intertemporal task is inherently more abstract.

A 2-system framework is proposed for understanding the processes that enable--and undermine--self-control or "willpower" as exemplified in the delay of gratification paradigm. A cool, cognitive "know" system and a hot, emotional "go" system are postulated. The cool system is cognitive, emotionally neutral, contemplative, flexible, integrated, coherent, spatiotemporal, slow, episodic, and strategic. It is the seat of self-regulation and self-control. The hot system is the basis of emotionality, fears as well as passions--impulsive and reflexive--initially controlled by innate releasing stimuli (and, thus, literally under "stimulus control"): it is fundamental for emotional (classical) conditioning and undermines efforts at self-control. The balance between the hot and cool systems is determined by stress, developmental level, and the individual's self-regulatory dynamics. The interactions between these systems allow explanation of findings on willpower from 3 decades of research.

Abstract Explored the role of attentional processes in voluntary delay of reward by manipulating children's attention to the rewards for which they were waiting in a delay-of-gratification paradigm. 32 preschool children waited for a preferred but delayed reward while facing either the delayed reward, a less preferred but immediately available reward, both rewards, or no rewards. The dependent measure was the amount of time they waited for the preferred outcome before forfeiting it for the sake of the less desired but immediately available one. Results contradict predictions from psychodynamic theory and from speculations concerning self-instructions during time binding. Unexpectedly, but in accord with frustrative nonreward theory, voluntary waiting time was substantially increased when Ss could not attend to rewards during the waiting period. Implications are discussed for a theory of the development of delay of gratification. (22 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Abstract Objectives: Priming a high level construal has been shown to enhance self-control and reduce preference for indulgent food. Subtle visual cues have been shown to enhance the effects of a priming procedure. The current study therefore examined the combined impact of construal level and a visual cue reminder on the consumption of energy-dense snacks. Method: A student and community-based adult sample with a wide age and body mass index (BMI) range (N = 176) were randomly assigned to a high or low construal condition in which a novel symbol was embedded. Afterward participants completed a taste test of ad libitum snack foods in the presence or absence of the symbol. Results: The high (vs. the low) construal level prime successfully generated more abstract responses (p < .0001) and reduced intake when the cue-reminder was present (p = .02) but not when it was absent (p = .40). Conclusions: Priming high construal level thinking reduces consumption of high energy dense snacks in the presence of a visual cue-reminder. This may be a practical technique for reducing overeating and has the potential to be extended to other unhealthy behaviors. (PsycINFO Database Record

Abstract Research has established that acts of self-control deplete a resource required for subsequent self-control tasks. The present investigation revealed that a psychological intervention-self-affirmation-facilitates self-control when the resource has been depleted. Experiments 1 and 2 found beneficial effects of self-affirmation on self-control in a depleted state. Experiments 3 and 4 suggested that self-affirmation improves self-control by promoting higher levels (vs. lower levels) of mental construal. Self-affirmation therefore holds promise as a mental strategy that reduces the likelihood of self-control failure. (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved.

The present experiment tested the hypothesis that low-level construals--a known contributor to self-control failure--can improve self-control under some circumstances. In support of this hypothesis, the authors found evidence that low-level construals (relative to high-level construals) improve performance on a measure of response inhibition that requires close attention and responsiveness to the immediate environment--the stop signal task (SST). They also found evidence, consistent with previous research, that high-level construals (relative to low-level construals) improve performance on a modified version of the SST (i.e., the delay SST) that requires both response inhibition and goal maintenance in working memory. These results suggest that, depending on the nature of the task, either low-level construals or high-level construals can enhance self-control.

The self-control strength model posits that exerting self-control on one task, such as resisting temptations, will deplete self-control and impair subsequent self-regulatory performance, such as controlling smoking. The current study examined interventions designed to replenish depleted self-control strength to prevent tobacco use by inducing positive affect. In a 2 2 design, 200 participants were randomized to either (1) resist eating from a plate of desserts (high temptation) or from a plate of raw vegetables (low temptation) and then (2) undergo a positive or neutral affect induction. Two inductions were compared (video vs. writing technique). Participants were then given a 10-min recess. Whether or not participants smoked during the recess, assessed by self-report and biochemical verification, served as the primary dependent variable. The interaction between depletion and exposure group was significant, Wald's = 9.66, df = 3, p < .05. Among those assigned to resist desserts, 65.5% to 85% smoked if they were in the neutral video or writing conditions versus 10.5% in the positive affect video group. Positive affect elicited with a video was able to counteract the detrimental effects of self-control depletion on smoking behavior, while writing exercises were associated with smoking. Implications for tobacco cessation intervention are discussed.

61We test the effect of abstract versus concrete mindsets on physical activity.61Level of goal conflict and affect were tested as potential moderators.61An abstract mindset increased physical activity more so than a concrete mindset.61Level of goal conflict did not impact physical activity.61Negative affect helps to explain how abstract thinking impacts physical activity.

People are capable of thinking about the future, the past, remote locations, another person's perspective, and counterfactual alternatives. Without denying the uniqueness of each process, it is proposed that they constitute different forms of traversing psychological distance. Psychological distance is egocentric: Its reference point is the self in the here and now, and the different ways in which an object might be removed from that point-in time, in space, in social distance, and in hypotheticality-constitute different distance dimensions. Transcending the self in the here and now entails mental construal, and the farther removed an object is from direct experience, the higher (more abstract) the level of construal of that object. Supporting this analysis, research shows (a) that the various distances are cognitively related to each other, (b) that they similarly influence and are influenced by level of mental construal, and (c) that they similarly affect prediction, preference, and action.

What factors influence our understanding of metaphoric statements about time? By examining the interpretation of one such statement – namely,Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward by two days –earlier research has demonstrated that people may draw on spatial perspectives, involving multiple spatially based temporal reference strategies, to interpret metaphoric statements about time (e.g.Boroditsky 2000;Kranjec 2006;McGlone and Harding 1998;Nú09ez et al.2006). However, what is still missing is an understanding of the role of linguistic factors in the interpretation of temporal statements such as this one. In this paper, we examine the linguistic properties of this famous temporally ambiguous utterance, considered as an instantiation of a more schematic construction. In Experiment 1, we examine the roles of individual lexical items that are used in the utterance in order to better understand the interplay of lexical semantics and constructional meaning in the context of a metaphoric statement. Following up on prior suggestions in the literature, we ask whether the locus of the ambiguity is centred on the adverb, centred on the verb, or distributed across the utterance. The results suggest that the final interpretation results from an interplay of verb and adverb, suggesting a distributed temporal semantics analogous to the distributed semantics noted for the metaphoric source domain of space (Sinha and Kuteva 1995) and consistent with a constructional view of language (Goldberg 2003). In Experiment 2, we expand the linguistic factors under investigation to include voice and person. The findings suggest that grammatical person, but not grammatical voice, may also influence the interpretation of theNext Wednesday’s meetingmetaphor. Taken together, the results of these two studies illuminate the interplay of lexical and constructional factors in the interpretation of temporal metaphors.

Abstract Eating and exercising behaviour are both characterized by immediate and future consequences. Consequently, consideration of these consequences (i.e., time orientation) predicts eating and exercising behaviour. We investigate whether construal level acts as an underlying mechanism of these relations. Students (N = 101) completed measures of consideration of immediate and future consequences (i.e., CFC-food and CFC-exercise), construal level, eating and exercising behaviour and preferences. For self-reported eating and exercising behaviour, only direct effects of consideration of immediate and future consequences were found. For eating preferences, however, there was evidence of an indirect effect through construal level. A stronger tendency to consider future consequences led to a stronger preference for utilitarian (as compared to hedonic) food products through a more abstract construal level. All in all, construal level partially explains the differential relations between consideration of immediate and future consequences and eating and exercising behaviour and preferences. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

The stop-signal paradigm is very useful for the study of response inhibition. Stop-signal performance is typically described as a race between a go process, triggered by a go stimulus, and a stop process, triggered by the stop signal. Response inhibition depends on the relative finishing time of these two processes. Numerous studies have shown that the independent horse-race model of Logan and Cowan [Logan, G.D., Cowan, W.B., 1984. On the ability to inhibit thought and action: a theory of an act of control. Psychological Review 91, 295–327] accounts for the data very well. In the present article, we review the independent horse-race model and related models, such as the interactive horse-race model [Boucher, L., Palmeri, T.J., Logan, G.D., Schall, J.D., 2007. Inhibitory control in mind and brain: an interactive race model of countermanding saccades. Psychological Review 114, 376–397]. We present evidence that favors the independent horse-race model but also some evidence that challenges the model. We end with a discussion of recent models that elaborate the role of a stop process in inhibiting a response.

The ability to regulate one emotions is an integral part of human social behavior. One antecedent emotion regulation strategy, known as reappraisal, is characterized by cognitively evaluating an emotional stimulus to alter its emotional impact and one response-focused strategy, suppression, is aimed at reducing behavioral output. People are capable of using these specific emotion regulation strategies when instructed to do so; however, it is equally important to investigate natural and self-selected strategy use. This study was designed to determine to what extent people spontaneously regulate their emotions and the emotion regulation strategies they choose to achieve their regulatory goals. Participants were given no instructions to regulate their emotions before they were shown a negative and a positive film clip, but were instead asked afterwards about the specific strategies that they had used. Participants reported regulating their emotions more to the negative film than to the positive film. Reappraisal was more frequently selected as an emotion regulation strategy than suppression. As expected, participants with high baseline respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) adopted reappraisal strategies more than those with low RSA but, surprisingly, RSA was not associated with facial expressivity. Suggestions for future research in this relatively young field of spontaneous emotion regulation are offered.

The present research investigated whether asking “why” concerning the pursuit of one goal can affect the subsequent pursuit of a previously chosen goal. Asking “why” should activate cognitive procedures involving deliberation over the pros and cons of a goal (why-mindset). This mode of thinking should spill over to subsequently pursued goals, with different consequences for goal striving guided by goal intentions and for goal striving guided by implementation intentions (if-then plans). As goal intentions guide behavior by effortful top-down action control processes motivated by the expected value of the desired outcomes, being in a why-mindset should induce defensive postdecisional deliberation and thereby promote goal pursuit. In contrast, implementation intentions guide behavior by automatic bottom-up action control processes triggered by the specified situational cues; in this case, being in a why-mindset should eliminate the effects implementation intentions have on goal pursuit. Performance on a handgrip self-control task (Study 1) as well as on a dual-task (simultaneous go/no-go task and tracking tasks; Study 2) supported these predictions: why-mindsets reinforced goal intention effects and impaired implementation intention effects on handgrip and dual-task performance. Implications for effective goal striving are discussed.

Construal Level Theory states that psychologically proximal outcomes are construed concretely while psychologically distal outcomes are construed abstractly. Previous research suggests that the principles of Construal Level Theory can be applied to enhance self-control, as measured by delay discounting. The present studies replicate and expand on this work by examining whether theory-informed priming manipulations lead to delay discounting reductions in a repeated-measures design. Study 1 conceptually replicated previous work, with reduced delay discounting observed as a function of thinking abstractly. Studies 2 and 3 expanded on this work by reinterpreting (a) preference for immediate outcomes as preference for outcomes that are construed concretely, and (b) dispreference for delayed outcomes as dispreference for outcomes that are construed abstractly. Study 2 provided support for the first interpretation, as reduced delay discounting was observed as a function of thinking concretely about the future. Study 3 provided support for the second interpretation, as reduced delay discounting was observed as a function of thinking abstractly about the present. In studies 1 and 3, significant condition order interactions were observed. In all three studies, the same impact of order of exposure to priming manipulation was observed, indicating specific carryover effects.