关键词: 道德角色, 道德判断, 视角采择, 事件相关电位, 反馈相关负波

Abstract:

Previous studies have revealed inconsistencies in moral judgments of the same behavior when evaluated by decision-makers, victims, and bystanders in specific scenarios. However, no prior research has examined how the experiences of being a decision-maker or a victim influence individuals’ moral judgments when they assume the role of a third-party bystander. The present study employed a modified harm paradigm combined with event-related potential (ERP) techniques to investigate how pre-existing experiences with different moral roles modulate third-party moral judgments.

This study comprised two experiments, each structured as a two-stage task: a moral role priming experiment and a main moral judgment experiment. In the first, participants were assigned to a decision-maker perspective group, a victim perspective group, or a control group. Participants in the decision-maker group completed moral decision-making tasks, while those in the victim group evaluated the decisions made by the decision-makers; the control group did not engage in any priming task. All three groups then participated in the second experiment, in which they assessed the morality of decisions made by anonymous decision-makers from the perspective of a third-party observer.

Experiment 1 was a behavioral study involving 90 healthy adults (44 males, mean age 20.58 ± 1.92 years). It employed a mixed design with three factors: 3 (Moral Role Perspective: Decision-maker, Victim, Control) × 3 (Decision-makers’ Benefit: High, Medium, Low) × 2 (Decision Outcome: Accept, Reject). Experiment 2 utilized ERP techniques and included 54 healthy adults (28 males, mean age 21.18 ± 2.21 years), also following a mixed design comprising 2 (Moral Role Perspective: Decision-maker, Victim) × 2 (Decision-makers’ Benefit: High, Low) × 2 (Decision Outcome: Accept, Reject).

The results indicated that different primed moral role perspectives significantly influenced third-party moral judgments. In both experiments, participants in the victim perspective group rendered stricter moral judgments compared to those in the decision-maker perspective group. Additionally, the level of benefits gained by decision-makers from immoral actions moderated this effect; as these benefits increased, the differences in moral judgments between the groups regarding various decision outcomes became more pronounced.

ERP findings suggested distinct neural patterns associated with role-based perspectives. Participants in the decision-maker perspective group exhibited larger N1 and P2 amplitudes when observing others’ moral decisions compared to the victim perspective group. Notably, N1 amplitudes were modulated by the level of benefits, with higher benefits eliciting significantly greater amplitudes than lower benefits. Conversely, participants in the victim perspective demonstrated a significantly larger feedback-related negativity (FRN) amplitude than those in the decision-maker group. FRN results aligned with the behavioral results, showing an interaction between role-based perspective and decision outcomes. Specifically, individuals in the victim perspective group exhibited higher FRN amplitudes for “accept” decisions than for “reject” decisions, while no such significant differences were observed for participants in the decision-maker perspective group.

This study highlights the challenges third-party bystanders face in maintaining impartiality in moral judgments, as prior experiences involving morality lead to varying preferences that evoke either stricter or more lenient evaluations. Under different perspective priming conditions, individuals’ moral judgments are shaped by morality-related roles they have previously occupied. The ERP results indicate that perspective priming primarily influences early attentional selection and emotional arousal processes, as reflected in the N1, P2, and FRN components. These findings provide neurophysiological evidence for the role of past experiences in modulating of moral judgments. They further support the dual-process theory of morality by underscoring the importance of early emotional responses in moral decision-making.

This research may enhance our understanding of how past experiences shape and update individuals’ moral standards and associated judgments. Further, it highlights the flexible nature of moral decision-making and illustrates how experiences with morality influence and refine personal standards, ultimately contributing to a deeper comprehension of the mechanisms underlying moral judgment.

Key words: moral roles, moral judgment, perspective taking, event-related potentials, feedback-related negativity (FRN)