经典和对偶共结果效应对前景集结果区间的依赖性：基于概率权重的视角

doi:10.3724/SP.J.1041.2025.0398

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 已有研究发现经典共结果效应在窄前景集结果区间不出现, 因而认为此时个体的决策行为符合期望效用理论(EUT)。但是, 经典共结果效应不出现并不意味着违背EUT的对偶共结果效应也不出现。此外, 相关研究普遍采用特定概率水平, 未考察概率变化后经典共结果效应是否出现。鉴于此, 通过逻辑递进的两项实验探究了三个问题。其一, 对偶共结果效应在窄前景集结果区间是否出现以及前景集结果区间变化对其有何影响。其二, 概率变化后, 经典共结果效应在窄前景集结果区间是否出现。其三, 前景集结果区间对两类共结果效应的影响机理。结果发现：(1)对偶共结果效应在窄前景集结果区间不仅存在, 且相较于宽前景集结果区间显著增强; (2)相较于宽前景集结果区间, 经典共结果效应在窄前景集结果区间显著减弱, 但仍然存在; (3)前景集结果区间通过改变个体对客观概率的风险感知(即概率权重)影响两类共结果效应。上述发现不仅驳斥了EUT适用于窄前景集结果区间的观点, 揭示了决策偏好对前景集结果区间的依赖性, 还从概率权重依赖前景集结果区间的视角为发展累积前景理论等非期望效用理论提供了实证依据。从实践方面, 实验发现也为盲盒销售的产品设计及其调整提供了管理启示。

关键词: 风险决策, 共结果效应, 对偶共结果效应, 前景集结果区间, 概率权重

Abstract:

Expected utility theory (EUT) was considered capable of aptly explaining individual choice behavior. However, a plethora of research has uncovered phenomena that violate EUT, such as the classic common consequence effect (CCCE) and the dual common consequence effect (DCCE), especially when the choice-set outcome range (COR) is broad. Subsequent scholars have examined the stability of behaviors that violate EUT by conducting empirical studies within a narrow COR. They discovered that CCCE no longer appeared, thereby suggesting that individuals’ behaviors conform to EUT under these conditions. Nevertheless, the absence of CCCE does not imply the nonexistence of DCCE. Studies on CCCE with a narrow COR typically employ a specific probability level without exploring whether the effect remains absent under other probability levels. Given these considerations, this study sequentially addresses three questions: first, whether DCCE exists within a narrow COR and how changes in COR influence this effect; second, whether the impact of COR on CCCE is also stably present at other probability levels; and third, what the underlying mechanisms are if changes in COR influence both types of common consequence effects.

This study conducted two experiments to address the aforementioned questions. In Experiment 1, a choice task was executed to explore whether the COR affects both types of common consequence effects. This experiment employed a between-subjects design with two experimental groups: the broad-range group and the narrow-range group. A total of 160 participants were recruited for the experiment and were randomly and equally distributed into the two groups. Given that 10 participants failed the attention check, the effective sample sizes were 74 and 76 for the two groups, respectively. The experimental materials for both groups were consistent in terms of probability values. Meanwhile, the outcome values for the broad-range group were 100 times those of the narrow-range group. The Conlisk-z test method was utilized to analyze the occurrence of CCCE and DCCE. Furthermore, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was employed to examine the impact of COR on these effects. In Experiment 2, a non-parametric approach was used to explore the mechanisms by which the COR influences CCCE and DCCE from the perspective of probability weights. The experiment adopted a within-subject design, which was conducted in two phases: broad- and narrow-range phases. A total of 55 participants were invited to partake in the experiment. The t-test was utilized to analyze the influences of COR on probability weights.

The results of Experiment 1 indicate that DCCE not only exists within a narrow COR but also occurs more readily than a broad COR. Compared with a broad COR, CCCE significantly reduced, but persists in a narrow COR. The results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that the outcome range of choice sets influences both types of common consequence effects by altering individuals’ risk perception of objective probabilities (i.e., probability weights). The impact of COR on probability weights manifests such that a narrower COR entails a higher probability weight assigned by decision-makers to favorable outcomes.

Our research contributes to the literature in four ways. First, this study addresses the lack of generality in the experimental materials of existing related research by employing various levels of probabilities to investigate CCCE empirically. Second, the identification of DCCE within narrow COR challenges the viability of EUT in such contexts. Third, this research clarifies the mechanisms through which COR influences CCCE and DCCE from the perspective of probability weights. Hence, this work not only offers a new perspective for explaining the relationship between decision-making behaviors and COR but also provides empirical evidence for the development of non-EUT theories, such as cumulative prospect theory (CPT). Last, the improvements made to the existing trade-off method not only offer an operable experimental scheme for verifying the dependency relationship between probability weights and COR but also pave the way for the application of COR-dependent CPT. Beyond the theoretical contributions outlined above, our study provides practical insights for blind box sales. For instance, reducing the packaging of products is beneficial for increasing sales.

Key words: risk decision making, common consequence effect, dual common consequence effect, choice-set outcome range, probability weights

中图分类号:

B842

李春好, 刘荣媛, 刘远豪. (2025). 经典和对偶共结果效应对前景集结果区间的依赖性：基于概率权重的视角. 心理学报, 57(3), 398-414.

LI Chunhao, LIU Rongyuan, LIU Yuanhao. (2025). The dependence of classic and dual common consequence effects on the choice-set outcome range: From the perspective of probability weights. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 57(3), 398-414.

图/表 17

参考文献 55

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问题	前景S中各结果对应的概率值			前景R中各结果对应的概率值
问题	结果：¥60 (¥6, 000)	结果：¥30 (¥3, 000)	结果：¥0 (¥0)	结果：¥60 (¥6, 000)	结果：¥30 (¥3, 000)	结果：¥0 (¥0)
1	0	0.2	0.8	0.1	0	0.9
2	0	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.8
3	0	0.4	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.7
4	0	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.6
5	0	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.5
6	0	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.4
7	0	0.8	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.3
8	0	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.2
9	0	1.0	0	0.1	0.8	0.1

问题	前景S中各结果对应的概率值			前景R中各结果对应的概率值
问题	结果：¥60 (¥6, 000)	结果：¥30 (¥3, 000)	结果：¥0 (¥0)	结果：¥60 (¥6, 000)	结果：¥30 (¥3, 000)	结果：¥0 (¥0)
1	0	0.2	0.8	0.1	0	0.9
2	0	0.3	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.8
3	0	0.4	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.7
4	0	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.6
5	0	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.5
6	0	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.4
7	0	0.8	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.3
8	0	0.9	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.2
9	0	1.0	0	0.1	0.8	0.1

问题对	窄区间组各选择模式的被试占比				Conlisk z	p	宽区间组各选择模式的被试占比				Conlisk z	p
问题对	RR	SS	RS	SR	Conlisk z	p	RR	SS	RS	SR	Conlisk z	p
1-2	35.14	24.32	17.57	22.97	−0.73	0.233	26.32	25.00	23.68	25.00	−0.16	0.435
1-3	44.59	24.32	8.11	22.97	−2.36	0.009	34.21	19.74	15.79	30.26	−1.89	0.029
1-4	43.24	18.92	9.46	28.38	−2.76	0.003	34.21	34.21	15.79	15.79	0.00	0.500
1-5	41.89	14.86	10.81	32.43	−2.97	0.001	26.32	22.37	23.68	27.63	−0.48	0.316
1-6	40.54	21.62	12.16	25.68	−1.92	0.027	26.32	26.32	23.68	23.68	0.00	0.500
1-7	36.49	16.22	16.22	31.08	−1.89	0.029	22.37	32.89	27.63	17.11	1.38	0.084
1-8	33.78	16.22	18.92	31.08	−1.49	0.068	26.32	32.89	23.68	17.11	0.90	0.185

问题对	窄区间组各选择模式的被试占比				Conlisk z	p	宽区间组各选择模式的被试占比				Conlisk z	p
问题对	RR	SS	RS	SR	Conlisk z	p	RR	SS	RS	SR	Conlisk z	p
1-2	35.14	24.32	17.57	22.97	−0.73	0.233	26.32	25.00	23.68	25.00	−0.16	0.435
1-3	44.59	24.32	8.11	22.97	−2.36	0.009	34.21	19.74	15.79	30.26	−1.89	0.029
1-4	43.24	18.92	9.46	28.38	−2.76	0.003	34.21	34.21	15.79	15.79	0.00	0.500
1-5	41.89	14.86	10.81	32.43	−2.97	0.001	26.32	22.37	23.68	27.63	−0.48	0.316
1-6	40.54	21.62	12.16	25.68	−1.92	0.027	26.32	26.32	23.68	23.68	0.00	0.500
1-7	36.49	16.22	16.22	31.08	−1.89	0.029	22.37	32.89	27.63	17.11	1.38	0.084
1-8	33.78	16.22	18.92	31.08	−1.49	0.068	26.32	32.89	23.68	17.11	0.90	0.185

问题对	窄区间组各选择模式的被试占比				Conlisk z	p	宽区间组各选择模式的被试占比				Conlisk z	p
问题对	RR	SS	RS	SR	Conlisk z	p	RR	SS	RS	SR	Conlisk z	p
1-9	27.03	14.86	25.68	32.43	−0.76	0.224	11.84	27.63	38.16	22.37	1.79	0.036
2-9	36.49	18.92	21.62	22.97	−0.17	0.431	18.42	32.89	32.89	15.79	2.19	0.014
3-9	37.84	10.81	29.73	21.62	0.97	0.165	22.37	23.68	42.11	11.84	3.92	<0.001
4-9	47.30	16.22	24.32	12.16	1.76	0.040	17.11	32.89	32.89	17.11	1.98	0.024
5-9	47.30	13.51	27.03	12.16	2.09	0.018	25.00	36.84	28.95	9.21	2.92	0.002
6-9	44.59	18.92	21.62	14.86	0.96	0.168	23.68	39.47	26.32	10.53	2.33	0.010
7-9	50.00	22.97	17.57	9.46	1.35	0.089	18.42	44.74	21.05	15.79	0.75	0.225
8-9	48.65	24.32	16.22	10.81	0.89	0.186	19.74	42.11	23.68	14.47	1.31	0.096