

# 道德化：人们如何赋予中性事物以道德意味？\*

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**摘要** 道德化(moralization)意指将原本价值中立的事物赋予道德内涵的过程。道德化的诱发受认知、情感、社会等多层次因素影响。现有关于道德化的理论模型主要为道德放大模型与道德推拉模型,但两者均忽视了宏观社会因素的作用。新构建的道德化“认知-情感-社会”整合模型旨在弥补这一不足。道德化之后效具有“双刃剑”的功能:一方面,道德化对于规范社会行为和个体目标寻求具有积极作用;另一方面又会导致认知偏见、无端歧视、敌对态度、群体极化、集体暴力等消极后果。未来研究应重点探索“去道德化”的心理机制与干预手段、社交媒体新技术对网络道德化心理与行为的影响、人工智能时代的道德化研究以及基于中国本土文化的道德化心理现象。

**关键词** 道德化, 去道德化, 放大模型, 推拉模型, 中国文化

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## 1 引言

道德(morality)不仅关乎抽象的哲学讨论,更深植于日常生活的决策与实践。以一次普通的朋友聚餐为例,选择点一份牛排还是素食沙拉,看似是简单的个人选择,却可能引发围绕环境保护、动物权利甚至社会责任的复杂对话(Feinberg et al., 2019)。在日常生活中,类似的争议总是无处不在:无论是环保运动对塑料制品的批判,还是对饮食习惯(如食素或食肉)、生活习惯(如抽烟)背后伦理意义的争论(Rozin et al., 1997; Rozin & Singh, 1999)。这种从个人偏好到道德议题的转变,反映了民众将价值中立的行为、信念或物品赋予道德意义的过程,这正是本文所要探讨的“道德化(moralization)”现象。道德化旨在解释道德信念如何产生、增强和巩固的过程(Rozin, 1997, 1999)。这一常见的心理现象在个体层面塑造了人们的价值判断、信念体系与行为倾向,在社会层面则深刻影响了群际关系、文化规范与社会变迁(Skitka et al., 2021)。然而,相比于其他热门的道德心理学

议题,如道德推理、道德情感、道德人格、道德发展、道德困境等,道德化的心理学研究相对受到学界的忽视(Rhee et al., 2019)。

近年来,学者们从不同的理论视角探讨了道德化的形成机制,构建了相关的理论模型,并讨论了道德化导致的行为后果(例如 Decety, 2024; Feinberg et al., 2019; Rhee et al., 2019; Rozin, 1999)。这些研究不仅深化了对道德化心理机制的理解,也揭示了道德化之于个体行为和社会发展的积极与消极作用。尽管现有文献已取得一定进展,对于道德化的定义、成因与后效仍缺乏系统的梳理与总结,与道德化相关的理论模型亟待进一步完善,且存在诸多值得未来深入拓展的道德化议题。本文旨在系统梳理与道德化相关的心理学研究文献,辨析道德化的定义及其与相关概念的区别,详细分析诱发道德化的认知、情感与社会层面的心理机制,总结与述评道德化相关的理论模型,并针对现有理论模型的不足尝试提出新的整合式模型,最后讨论道德化在个体与群体层面产生的“双刃剑”后效。未来研究应着重关注“去道德化(de-moralization)”的心理机制与干预手段、社交媒体新技术对网络道德化心理与行为的影响、人工智能时代的道德化研究,并探索基于中国本土文化的道德化心理现象。

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## 2 道德化之内涵

### 2.1 道德化的概念定义

与一般的道德判断(moral judgments)不同,道德化旨在强调道德信念的形成过程。目前学界一般沿用心理学家 Paul Rozin 的定义,即道德化意指将原本呈道德中立(morally neutral)状态的事物赋予道德内涵的过程(Rozin, 1997, 1999; Rozin et al., 1997)。这里的“道德中立”指的是某些事物并非具有明显的道德意味,而在道德上是较微妙或模棱两可的。人们通常不会将此类事物看作是道德问题,但在某些情境的触发下又会将其道德化。例如吸烟在一般情境下是一种与道德无关的日常生活行为,人们并不会觉得吸烟是不道德的。但在某些社会情境(如妨碍他人)、规范(如有害于健康)和情绪(如厌恶)的诱发下,人们便会认为吸烟是一种不道德行为,这便是发生了道德化的过程(Fitouchi & Nettle, 2025; Rozin & Singh, 1999)。

### 2.2 道德化与相关概念的联系与区别

道德化的本质在于将原本价值中立的对象赋予道德意义,使之进入规范性的道德范畴。道德化作为一个较为宽泛的概念,可以与众多道德相关的概念或议题联系起来,如道德判断、道德态度、道德信念等。在实际研究过程中,研究者通常会将个体对某一事物或行为的道德判断、道德态度作为道德化的测量手段,从而操作性地量化个体的道德化倾向与强度(Rhee et al., 2019; Skitka et al., 2021)。虽然道德化与众多道德概念与议题相关,但其独特之处在于,道德化并不是某一特定道德概念的子类(如道德判断、道德推理等),而是一种“上位的过程性机制”,旨在描述个体或群体如何将原本中性的事物赋予道德意义,进而影响道德判断、态度与行为。此外,道德化与其他相关概念存在本质区别。首先,道德化不等于道德判断。道德化的议题一般不明显属于道德领域所讨论的典型问题(Rozin, 1997, 1999),且道德化是一种动态过程,更强调某些行为、事物或信念从非道德领域纳入道德领域的转变。如上文所举的例子,吸烟曾经被认为是个人选择的问题,但由于健康和社会影响的讨论,逐渐被道德化为“不负责任”的行为。而道德判断则是对某一行为或情境是否符合道德标准的评价,它通常作为某

些事物已经被道德化之后的后果判断。例如,当吸烟被道德化后,人们可能对某人是否在公共场所吸烟进行道德判断(Rhee et al., 2019; Rozin, 1997)。

其次,道德化不同于道德态度(moral attitudes)或道德信念(moral beliefs)。后者一般指个体或群体持有的关于对与错、善与恶的基本看法,通常较为稳定,具有文化和个人特质差异。例如,“诚实是一种美德”可能是很多人公认的道德态度或信念。而道德化是一个将行为或现象与这些信念产生联系的过程,其本质是一种动态的社会心理现象,它可以赋予原本被认为是中性的行为以道德意义(Rhee et al., 2019)。在实际研究中,虽然研究者往往将个体对某些行为的道德判断或道德态度作为道德化程度的指标,但是在理论层面上,道德化与一般道德判断、信念或态度的本质区别在于道德化更为关注道德中立的事物,及其道德识别、放大与消退的动态过程(Rhee et al., 2019)。

### 2.3 道德化的测量方式

在现有的实证研究中,道德化的测量手段大致可以分为直接测量和间接测量两大类。在直接测量中,最常见的方法是通过自陈问卷直接评估个体是否认为某些行为或事物属于道德问题,或者判断其在道德上是否错误。如 Lovett 等人(2012)开发的“日常生活道德化量表(moralization of everyday life scale)”,包含6维度30条目,旨在测量人们对各类日常行为中的道德化倾向,既包括一些明显的违规行为(如欺骗、伤害),也包括一些道德中立行为(如懒惰、纹身)。道德化的另一种常见的测量方式是关于某些行为或事物的道德态度,即询问被试对某些具体议题(如堕胎、死刑、枪支管制、同性婚姻等)的立场是否基于自身的核心道德信念(Skitka et al., 2021)。还有研究者采用道德扩展性量表(moral expansiveness scale)来测量个体道德关怀的边界,即人们是否会将某些实体(如人类、动物、自然、物体等)纳入其“道德圈(moral circle)”(Crimston et al., 2016, 2018)。不过,仅仅通过自陈量表的横断研究很难捕捉道德化的发生与变化过程,所以研究人员通常会采用纵向追踪的方式,比较人们在不同时间节点的道德化倾向,以此反映道德化产生、放大、巩固和消退的过程(例如 D'Amore et al., 2024; Feinberg et al., 2019; Leal et al., 2025; Luttrell & Togans, 2021)。除了自

陈量表,随着大数据与自然语言处理技术的发展,研究者也开始借助文本分析方法(如 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 软件或基于道德基础词典的分析)来量化社交媒体中道德化的程度与趋势(例如 Kennedy et al., 2023; Kirkland et al., 2024; Mooijman, Hoover, et al., 2018; Solovev & Pröllochs, 2023)。

在道德化的间接测量中,常见的方法是通过测量态度的普遍主义与不可妥协性来间接推断道德化水平,因为道德化的立场通常表现为僵化、不容妥协(Decety, 2024)。其次,因为道德化往往伴随强烈的情绪反应,研究者也会将与道德相关的情绪(如羞耻、厌恶、愤怒、内疚)作为测量道德化的辅助指标(Feinberg et al., 2019; Leach et al., 2026)。此外,研究者也会根据与道德认知与情感相关的脑区或其他生理指标的激活程度来推断道德化的程度,例如杏仁核与前扣带皮层的激活,以及皮肤电反应和心率变异性等生理指标(Decety, 2024)。

### 3 道德化之过程

#### 3.1 道德化的诱发因素

##### 3.1.1 认知层面因素

诱发道德化过程的认知因素主要有感知伤害、认知反思、道德基础、道德认同与政治意识形态等。首先,感知伤害(perceived harm)是人们做出道德判断所依据的核心准则(Gray & Pratt, 2025; 张昊天 等, 2023)。在研究中凸显某些事物受到的伤害可以增加人们对道德中立问题的道德化倾向。研究表明,向人们呈现屠杀动物的残忍画面,并凸显动物的痛苦显著增加了人们对食肉行为的责备(Feinberg et al., 2019);向人们呈现吸烟危害健康的图片或信息会显著增加人们对吸烟行为的责备(Rozin & Singh, 1999);引导人们感受水资源匮乏对当地居民造成的伤害会显著预测人们对政府政策的道德化态度(Wisneski et al., 2020);引导人们感受种族歧视和冲突导致的伤害可以显著预测对冲突事件的道德化信念(D'Amore et al., 2022, 2024)。

从个体的认知特质来看,倾向于理性思考的个体往往会更审慎地做出道德判断,因为大多数道德判断或态度往往基于直觉或情感(Haidt, 2001)。有研究者发现拥有高认知反思特质(cognitive

reflection trait, 即付出更多时间精力来审视和解决问题的能力或意愿)的个体倾向于将道德违规与习俗违规(conventional violations, 如穿睡衣上班)进行区分,表现出低道德化倾向;低认知反思性个体则更可能将习俗行为认定为不道德行为,表现出高道德化倾向(Royzman et al., 2014)。其次,更加认同约束性道德基础(binding moral foundations, 即忠诚、权威、洁净)的个体会表现出更高的道德化倾向。如 Mooijman, Meindl 等人(2018)的研究发现,启动约束性道德基础会使个体增加对自控行为的道德化倾向。此外,道德认同(moral identity)也是影响个体道德化倾向的重要认知特质因素。道德认同较高的个体更加认为道德是自我概念中不可或缺的一部分(Aquino & Reed II, 2002),从而更倾向于关注价值中立行为或议题的道德意义。研究表明,道德认同更高的个体表现出对食肉行为更高的道德化倾向(Feinberg et al., 2019)。最后,政治保守主义者更倾向于将道德中性的行为视为道德问题,这可能源于保守主义者坚守传统价值观,对社会变迁持审慎态度,更加强调集体责任以及对权威和传统的尊重(Everett et al., 2021; Horberg et al., 2009)。

##### 3.1.2 情感层面因素

已有大量研究证实了情感对道德化过程的关键作用。Haidt (2001)的社会直觉主义模型(social intuitionism model)认为,个体做出道德判断往往基于情感驱动的道德直觉(moral intuition),之后个体才会基于理性对自身判断进行合理化解释。影响道德化的情绪主要有厌恶(disgust)和愤怒(anger 或 outrage)。厌恶情绪的主要功能在于规避病原体 and 威胁刺激。研究者通过让被试闻恶臭气体诱发生理上的厌恶情绪,发现被引发生理厌恶的个体对道德违规行为的责备更加严苛(Wheatley & Haidt, 2005),同时也增加了对并无明显伤害的洁净(purity)行为的道德化倾向(Horberg et al., 2009; Rottman et al., 2017)。不过,诱发生理厌恶影响道德化的相关研究遭遇可重复性质疑,研究者们近些年并未发现生理上的厌恶情绪增加了人们的道德化倾向(Ghelfi et al., 2020; Inbar & Pizarro, 2022)。相比之下,与特定事件有关的厌恶情绪(如堕胎; Wisneski & Skitka, 2017)和个体的特质性厌恶水平(即厌恶敏感性, disgust sensitivity; Donner et al., 2023; Landy & Piazza, 2019)可以更

稳定地预测人们的道德化倾向。

其次,愤怒也是引发道德化的重要情绪。作为对欺骗或不公平的主要情绪反应,愤怒情绪会导致道德谴责和惩罚性的态度和行为(Ginther et al., 2022; Plaks et al., 2022)。研究表明,社会负面事件所导致的愤怒情绪显著预测了个体的道德化态度,而且两周后实验效应依然存在(Clifford, 2019)。而在社交媒体比传统媒体或现实生活更能激起强烈的道德愤怒(Crockett, 2017),并进一步导致了群体极化等消极后果(Effron & Brady, 2025; Mooijman, Hoover, et al., 2018)。

### 3.1.3 社会层面因素

现有理论模型多从认知与情感因素考虑道德化的形成过程,相对忽视了宏观社会层面的因素。首先,社会不平等会增加人们的道德化倾向,使其对一般违规行为的道德谴责更加严苛(Cervone et al., 2024; Kirkland et al., 2024)。Cervone 等人(2024)的研究表明,社会不平等增加了人们的道德愤怒(moral outrage),从而更加支持集群行为。Kirkland 等人(2024)对美国社交媒体“X”的推文内容进行大数据分析,发现社会不平等程度越高的国家在社交媒体上出现了越多与道德相关的语言。基于41个国家的大样本研究发现,社会不平等程度越高的国家民众越能感知到更多社会秩序的混乱,从而对违规行为有更加严苛的道德谴责(Kirkland et al., 2024)。另外,来自不同文化下的民众也体现出不同的道德化信念差异。研究表明,相比于“松文化(cultural looseness)”,“紧文化(cultural tightness)”更加强调对社会规范的遵从以及对偏差行为的低容忍度,较强的社会规范往往会强化人们的道德化倾向(Gelfand et al., 2011)。还有研究发现,来自集体主义国家的民众会将“不文明(uncivilized)”的行为(如随地吐痰、乱扔垃圾等)视作不道德行为,而欧美民众则并未体现出如此道德化心理特征,仅仅是把具有明显伤害性的行为(如欺骗伴侣)判定为不道德行为(Berniūnas et al., 2022; Buchtel et al., 2015)。

最后,一些重大社会危机事件同样会增强人们的道德化倾向,如恐怖袭击增加了对破坏社会秩序行为的道德谴责(Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006),气候变化增加了对能源节约政策的道德化倾向(Salomon et al., 2017)。最近关于新冠疫情的研究也表明,人们在疫情期间针对保持社交距

离、佩戴口罩以及疫苗接种的道德化态度或信念显著增加(Francis & McNabb, 2022; Graso et al., 2021; Kunnari et al., 2024; Malik et al., 2021; Prosser et al., 2020)。由以上研究可以看出宏观社会因素诱发道德化的核心心理机制是威胁感(sense of threat),因为面对威胁往往使人变得更加保守主义(Nail et al., 2009),而保守主义动机又会显著增加道德化倾向(Klebl et al., 2024; Versteegt et al., 2024)。

## 3.2 道德化相关的理论模型

### 3.2.1 道德化的放大模型

Rhee 等(2019)通过梳理前人的相关研究,提出了道德化的放大模型(moral amplification model, 见图1),将道德化的具体表现形式划分为三种,即判断(judgments)、态度(attitudes)与实体(entities);并将道德化的过程划分为两个阶段,即道德识别(moral recognition)与道德放大(moral amplification)。

从道德化的具体表现形式来看,了解个体道德观最常用的方法是测量对特定行为的道德判断。研究中,通常先向参与者呈现一个假设性或真实的道德违规案例,随后要求他们评定该行为的错误程度。道德化的第二种表现形式是道德态度,即衡量人们对某些社会问题(如枪支管制)或行为(如吸烟)的态度(Skitka et al., 2018)。道德态度乍看与道德判断似无区别,实则不同。道德判断一般指的是对某些情境下具体行为的是非判断,而道德态度则反映出个体对某类事物或者行为的抽象价值观(Rhee et al., 2019)以及核心的道德身份认同(Ekstrom & Lai, 2022)。例如测量道德判断可能要求参与者指出他们认为“某人在公共场所吸烟”这种行为在道德上有多错误,而测量道德态度则会问他们“吸烟作为一种生活常见行为”在道德上有多错误(Rozin & Singh, 1999)。也就是说,道德判断测量易受情境因素(Malle, 2021)和情绪因素(Haidt, 2001; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005)的影响,因此很难通过某种情境下的道德判断预测未来的判断或行为(Clifford et al., 2015);道德态度则反映了人们对于某件事物一般意义上更抽象、更核心、更稳固的道德笃信(moral conviction; Luttrell & Togans, 2021; Skitka et al., 2005, 2018, 2021)。所以道德态度往往可以预测个体或群体在重大社会事件中的表现,如抗议活动(Mooijman, Hoover, et al., 2018; Steinert-Threlkeld, 2018)、政治选举




图 1 道德化的放大模型(译自 Rhee et al., 2019)

(Brandt et al., 2015)等。道德化的最后一种表现形式即道德问题所涉及的实体范围,即人们是否会表现出超越自我的道德宽容性(moral expansiveness),给予整个人类群体或非人类实体(如动物、植物与大自然)以道德关怀(Crimston et al., 2016, 2018)。而实体范围的大小同样需要诱发特定的认知或情感因素,如个体一旦认识到动物遭受了痛苦并被归类为易受伤害的道德客体,则可能会将一些与道德无关的事物视为道德问题,并将这些事物纳入自己的道德圈(moral circle; Singer, 1981),如食肉、动物实验、动物表演等(Rozin et al., 1997; Schein & Gray, 2018)。

从道德化发生的过程来看,人们会首先认定某种事物或行为是否是道德问题,此即道德识别的过程。之后人们会表明其道德判断的强度,即认为某种事物或行为在多大程度上是道德/不道德的,这便是道德放大的过程(如图 1)。

### 3.2.2 道德化的推拉模型

Feinberg 等人(2019)将已有关于道德化内涵及成因的各种观点进行整合,提出了“道德化的推拉模型(push-pull model of moralization, 见图 2)”,旨在解释道德化(moralization, “推动”)与去道德化(de-moralization, “拉动”)的形成过程。推拉模型主张道德化与去道德化并非对立的两个维度,而是在同一连续体上呈现动态的变化过程。在道德化过程发生之前,个体对某种事物或现象的看法是道德中立的,此时可以视为初始平衡的状态。在偶然条件下,个体经由新闻报道、政治演讲或个人对话等外界刺激唤起道德情感和认知,便会推动道德化过程,进而达到一个新的平衡点,即个体在多大程度上对某些中立问题进行道德化。随着时间推移或受到某些拉动因素的影响,个体对事物的看法不再有很强的道德信念,即出现去道德化的过程。




图 2 道德化的推拉模型(译自 Feinberg et al., 2019)

推拉模型主要从道德认知和道德情感两个方面总结了道德化的成因。情感因素诸如厌恶感和愤怒感等消极情绪以及同情、钦佩等积极情绪使个体更有可能谴责不道德行为(Horberg et al., 2009; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005)。道德化的认知过程主要由“道德借力(moral piggybacking)”的机制实现(Rozin, 1999),即将当下的伤害现象与基本道德准则产生关联。道德借力主要由感知伤害所驱动。例如当人们看到被宰杀的动物所遭受的痛苦,以及堕胎时婴儿所遭遇的伤害,便会将这种伤害现象与“杀生是错误的”这种一般性道德准则联系起来(Wisneski & Skitka, 2017),从而对上述现象做出道德判断。

此外,与道德放大模型不同,Feinberg 等人(2019)不仅讨论了道德化的形成过程,同时还讨论了去道德化的过程,即人们在实际行为与一般道德原则冲突时,会通过降低道德信念以合理化自身行为。此过程也可以通过认知和情感两方面来解释。情感过程主要由享乐主义(hedonism)动机驱动,因为人类的天性是趋利避害:将快乐最大化,将痛苦最小化(Bentham, 1988)。以食肉行为为例,人们在享受吃肉带来的快乐时,会忽视动物所遭受的痛苦,从而阻止个体接受动物保护相关的道德准则。在认知层面上,一旦人们经历个人偏好和道德原则的冲突时,通常会采取一些减少认知失调(cognitive dissonance)的策略来合理化他们所做出的不道德行为。例如个体可能说服自己

相信受害主体没有经历那么多的苦难或痛苦,以及将道德责任推脱给食品加工厂或者政府来实现去道德化(Bastian & Loughnan, 2017; Buttlar & Walther, 2019)。

### 3.3 述评与新模型建构

道德化的放大模型描述了道德化如何产生和放大的过程,并区分了三种不同的道德化表现形式,即道德判断、道德态度与道德实体。但此模型较为粗糙,只讨论了道德识别与放大的过程,而未总结具体的影响因素,并且未从另一个方向考虑何种因素会阻碍人们将某种事物道德化,即去道德化(de-moralization)的过程。道德化的推拉模型弥补了放大模型的诸多不足(Feinberg et al., 2019),不仅同时探讨了道德化的“推(即道德化)”和“拉(即去道德化)”过程,而且从认知与情感因素的角度分析了道德化与去道德化的成因。

尽管学者们针对道德化的类型与成因不断修正相应的理论模型,但现有模型都集中于微观个体层面的认知与情感过程,忽视了道德化的另一个重要成因,即宏观社会层面因素。针对这一不足,本文尝试构建道德化的“认知-情感-社会(cognitive-affective-social, CAS)”整合模型(如图 3),将宏观社会层面因素纳入道德化的成因,与认知因素和情感因素共同决定道德化的“推拉”过程,最终产生行为上积极或消极的影响。具体而言,认知因素、情感因素与宏观社会因素是导致道德化的三个独立成因,但三者之间又通过动态交互共同塑




图 3 道德化的“认知-情感-社会(cognitive-affective-social, CAS)”整合模型

造道德化的过程。首先,文化差异、社会不平等和重大社会危机事件等宏观社会因素,会引发复杂的认知与情感过程,如对伤害和威胁的感知,从而进一步导致人们更加严苛的道德判断和道德态度,以此获得秩序感与掌控感(Stanley et al., 2020)。其次,认知因素与情感因素可作为影响道德化的独立成因(Feinberg et al., 2019; Rhee et al., 2019)。同时,两者也可互为因果,共同影响个体道德化倾向(Rozin, 1999; Rozin & Singh, 1999)。总之,道德化的CAS整合模型首次尝试将个体层面的认知、情感因素与宏观社会因素相结合,以更全面地总结道德化的形成过程与心理机制。未来研究可以继续从理论和实证层面探索宏观社会因素对个体或群体道德化倾向的影响,例如可从社会结构层面的阶层流动、时空维度层面的社会变迁以及社交媒体虚拟环境等方面展开研究。在方法上,此类问题的探索也需要突破传统实验室研究的局限,充分运用自然实验、历史比较分析与大数据文本分析等生态效度较高的方法,从而更全面地揭示宏观社会因素对道德化的影响。

## 4 道德化之后效

### 4.1 道德化对规范社会行为的积极作用

道德化作为将特定行为、信念或价值观赋予道德意义的过程,对规范社会行为具有重要意义。从进化视角来看,人类必须以群居性方式形成部落以抵御外部世界的威胁与危险,这导致人类成为高度社会化的物种且依赖群体内的协作与信任(托马塞洛, 2017)。确立共同的道德标准有助于增强社会凝聚力,促使个体在价值观上趋同,从而强化群体认同感和归属感(Haidt, 2012)。研究表明,道德化行为(如互助或分享)能激励个体牺牲短期利益以换取长期群体生存的成功(Curry et al., 2019; Haidt, 2012),而忠诚有凝聚力的群体比不忠诚松散的群体存活几率更高(Clark et al., 2019)。另一方面,道德价值可以约束自私行为,通过惩罚不道德行为(如欺骗或掠夺)以保护集体利益(Vollaard & van Soest, 2024)。此外,道德化还为推动社会变革提供动力,例如废奴运动或女权运动的兴起都源于将不平等视为道德问题,从而激发有益的社会变革以推动社会进步(Purzycki et al., 2023)。

如前文所述,在人们面对重大的社会危机时,

往往伴随着更严苛的道德化信念。如新冠疫情期间,保持社交距离、佩戴口罩、接种疫苗等危机应对行为都是被高度道德化的社会问题,人们往往会对违背者进行严厉的道德谴责(Francis & McNabb, 2022; Graso et al., 2021; Kunnari et al., 2024; Malik et al., 2021; Prosser et al., 2020),且道德规范越严格的地区感染率和死亡率越低(Gelfand et al., 2021)。此外,政府常常将某些社会议题道德化作为一种社会宣传的策略,如环境保护(Klebl et al., 2024; Skitka et al., 2021)、公共健康宣传(Arhiri et al., 2022b; Fitouchi & Nettle, 2025)、减少性交易(Silver et al., 2022)等。由此可见,道德化作为规范社会行为的重要手段,在增强社会凝聚力、维持社会秩序以及宣传集体责任等方面发挥了不可或缺的积极影响。

### 4.2 道德化对个体目标寻求的积极作用

做一个有道德的人对于维持积极的自我认同至关重要(Aquino & Reed II, 2002)。生活中,人们通常会在言语和行为上努力展现出崇高的道德品质以获得积极的社会赞许(Anderson et al., 2020)。研究表明,将个人目标道德化可以增加目标承诺(goal commitment),例如将健康的生活方式视为一种美德可以使得个体更加愿意承诺去完成目标,且更加愿意为之付诸行动(Hosey, 2014; Mooijman et al., 2020; Mooijman, Meindl, et al., 2018)。其他关于健康道德化的研究表明,将暴饮暴食、吸烟等不健康行为视为恶习会导致个体更倾向认识到自己在道德上的不足,认为个人应对自己的健康状况负更大的责任,从而做出补偿性行为以追求积极的道德自我形象(Fitouchi & Nettle, 2025; Jackson et al., 2023; Sheikh et al., 2013),例如愿意为自身的医疗保健付出更多的钱(Ringel, 2020)。此外,将热爱工作视为一种道德义务可以激励人们追求有意义、更令人满意的职业(Kwon et al., 2023; Kwon & Sunday, in press),也会更细致、更尽责地对待工作(AMOS et al., 2019),同时也会赢得他人更高的道德评价(Celniker et al., 2023; Gai & Bhattacharjee, 2022; Roth et al., 2025)。

另一方面,道德化信念还会赋予人们积极的心理地位(psychological standing),使其更自主地采取行动(Effron & Miller, 2012)。心理地位是指个体认为自己做出特定行为是适当的主观感受。当人们拥有心理地位时,会认为自己更有权利发

言、更愿意表达自身态度和采取行动,尤其是面对环保、堕胎等社会争议问题时(Effron & Miller, 2012)。

### 4.3 道德化的“阴暗面”

道德化信念虽对于规范社会行为和个体目标寻求具有积极作用,但也有其负面影响。首先,从个体层面上,道德化信念会导致认知偏见。Kraaijeveld 和 Jamrozik (2022)详细分析了诸多社会现象相关的道德化信念,发现这些信念往往与对他人的污名化(stigma)和基本归因谬误(fundamental attribution error)有关,把某些社会现象归咎于个人的不道德行为或不道德人格(如对艾滋病、新冠肺炎等传染病的道德化),而忽视情境和其他社会因素的影响(Bagcchi, 2020; Frank & Nagel, 2017)。此外,道德信念更激进的个体往往表现出更多的反科学信念(如反对进化论; Kovacheff et al., 2018)以及反对对人类有益的科学技术进步(如疫苗接种技术; Philipp-Muller et al., 2022)。还有研究发现,一些迎合受众道德价值观的假新闻、假信息更容易被转发传播(Abdurahman et al., 2025)。神经科学的证据也表明,针对某件事物极端的道德笃信往往会激活与掌控冲动行为、情绪唤醒相关的脑区,如腹内侧前额叶皮层(vmPFC)、腹侧纹状体(ventral striatum)和杏仁核(amygdala)等(Workman et al., 2020; Yoder & Decety, 2022)。这说明道德信念更激进的个体所做出的判断存在更多的事实谬误,对自己的感性判断过度自信,并拒绝修正自身的错误信念(Decety, 2024)。

从群体层面上,大量研究揭示了群际冲突的根本原因在于道德价值观的对立(Haidt, 2012),因为人们常常将道德作为武器以使群体冲突合法化(Arhiri et al., 2022a)。研究表明,对社会问题的道德化尤其是极端的道德笃信会导致对外群体的“非人化(dehumanization)”倾向,并引发更高层次的敌对态度与无端歧视(Ballone et al., 2023),且更不包容和边缘化少数群体(如肥胖群体和LGBTQ群体等; Adelman et al., 2021; Monroe & Plant, 2019; Ringel & Ditto, 2019)。这些道德化信念往往意味着较强的排他性,导致不同群体间的相互对抗(Garrett, 2019),且更不愿意妥协(Delton et al., 2020),从而造成群体极化(D'Amore et al., 2024; Finkel et al., 2020; Garrett & Bankert, 2020;

Marie et al., 2023; Zaal et al., 2017)。而这些道德化信念所导致的极化现象在社交媒体中体现得尤为突出,并时常引发不文明争论、网络暴力等极端行为(Brady et al., 2020; Rathje et al., 2021; Van Bavel et al., 2024)。有研究分析了北美一些仇恨团体的语言内容,发现这些极端团体在表达仇恨时使用了更多的道德语言(Pretus et al., 2023)。道德化所导致的极端群体对立与极化最终会演变为集群行为与群体暴力(Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021; Skitka et al., 2021)。相关研究表明,对社会焦点问题的道德化程度越高,人们越支持通过暴力行为抗议而非和平抗议(Cervone et al., 2024; Mooijman, Hoover, et al., 2018),并认为与之相关的暴力行为是合法的(Workman et al., 2020)。

## 5 总结与展望

道德化作为一种将道德中立事物赋予道德内涵的过程,对于规范社会行为以及个体目标寻求具有重要意义,但同时也会引发一系列对个体和社会有害的消极后果,尤其是极化的道德笃信。本文详细介绍了道德化的定义及其与相关概念的区别,并从认知、情感、社会层面分析了道德化的成因及相关的理论模型。但目前研究相对忽视了宏观社会因素对道德化过程的影响,本文尝试构建道德化的“认知-情感-社会”整合模型则致力于弥补这一不足。作为一个重要的道德心理学议题,道德化相关的研究仍有诸多值得探索的空间。笔者认为未来研究可以从以下四个方面具体展开。

### 5.1 探索“去道德化”的心理机制与干预手段

道德化的本质是对事物赋予“好与坏”或“善与恶”的价值倾向,其对于规范社会行为以及个体目标寻求具有积极意义。但同时,道德化思维尤其是极端的道德笃信往往会导致认知偏见、无端歧视、敌对态度、群体极化、集体暴力等消极后果,所以在适当的情境下进行去道德化的干预至关重要,因为适度的去道德化也被视为一种“道德进步(moral progress)”(Buchanan & Powell, 2017; Sauer et al., 2021)。不过,去道德化并非意味着“道德虚无主义(moral nihilism)”或“道德废除主义(moral abolitionism)”(Wright & Pözlner, 2022),其本身并不否认道德存在的价值,而是致力于削弱极端道德笃信可能导致的对他人或社会的消极

后果。但现有关于“去道德化”的机制与干预手段的相关研究仍较为缺乏,未来研究可以从以下方面入手。

首先,引导人们认识到道德价值观的差异至关重要。研究表明,当人们将道德问题视为客观存在或普遍主义时,会对持不同观点者表现出更高的不容忍度,但如果人们认为道德问题是主观感知或文化相对时,则会表现出更高的宽容度(Wright & Pözlner, 2022)。其次,尽管人们的道德价值观存在巨大差异,不同群体之间仍存在一些普遍认同的道德基础,例如对伤害他人的责备和对公平正义的追求(张昊天等, 2023)。最近的研究表明,引导人们思考不同群体间共同认同的道德价值观可以降低群体间的仇恨心理(Voelkel et al., 2024)。因此,引导人们思考不同群体共享的道德价值观可以作为降低极端道德化信念的手段。最后,培养谦逊的元认知思维品质对于减少极化的道德态度至关重要(Decety, 2024)。研究发现,认知上越谦逊的个体对不同于自身价值观的观点更为宽容(Wright & Pözlner, 2022),并表现出较低的自我中心倾向(Bowes et al., 2022)。未来研究可以尝试训练个体针对道德问题的谦逊思维品质,缓解道德化思维带来的消极后果。

## 5.2 社交媒体技术发展对道德化的影响

纵观人类历史,人与人之间的社会互动大多通过面对面以及书信交流的方式得以实现。但近几十年随着社交媒体等新技术的不断发展,社会互动的形式与环境发生了根本的转变,人们越来越依赖于通过网络进行社会互动。这同时也对人们的道德态度与行为产生了重要影响。已有研究发现,社交媒体上往往存在“道德放大(moral amplification)”和“道德传染(moral contagion)”的现象:人们会在网络上表达比现实生活中更加强烈的道德价值观与道德愤怒情绪(Brady et al., 2020; Marie et al., 2023; Van Bavel et al., 2024),并且这些包含道德语言和情绪词汇的推文往往会获得更高的转发量(Brady et al., 2017; Brady & Van Bavel, 2025; Leach et al., 2026)。另一方面,社媒平台为了盈利需求会推送迎合用户价值观的信息,再加之用户自身的确认偏见(confirmation bias),容易导致人们在同质化的信息环境中不断强化自己的道德信念,即形成“道德回音室(moral echo chambers)”,从而进一步加剧群体极化

(Mooijman, Hoover, et al., 2018)。这些网络道德化行为的成因较为复杂,如社媒平台为了盈利目的而对用户投其所好、虚拟互动缺乏非言语线索、社交网络上的匿名性所导致的责任缺失引发攻击性或煽动性的言语(Crockett, 2017; Van Bavel et al., 2024)。现有研究大多是以描述客观现象为主,呈现出碎片化的状态,尚缺乏对网络道德行为心理机制的探讨与完备的理论模型,以及网络道德化对现实生活产生的诸多不良后果与应对措施。这些重要的问题都值得在未来研究中加以探讨。

## 5.3 关注人工智能时代的道德化研究

近些年,人工智能(artificial intelligence, AI)技术的迅猛发展引发了学界对其道德地位的关注,研究者开始探讨 AI 是否已成为新的道德主体或客体。随着 AI 智能水平和社会功能的提升, AI 逐渐被人们赋予能动性,成为具备道德决策能力的道德主体(moral agents),同时也表现出脆弱性,成为需要被保护关怀的道德客体(moral patients; Ladak et al., 2024)。道德主体是指能够对自身行为负责、承担道德义务的实体,而道德客体则指那些应当被保护、关照或避免伤害的对象。人类是否将 AI 视为道德主体或客体,主要受到“心智感知”(mind perception)的影响(滕玥等, 2024)。拟人化(anthropomorphism)在此过程中发挥着关键作用:个体倾向于将自身的心智属性投射到 AI 之上,当人们认为 AI 具备类似人类的能动性(agency)与感受性(experience)时,他们更倾向于赋予 AI 相应的道德责任与权利(Ladak et al., 2024; Sullivan & Fosso Wamba, 2022)。随着 AI 智能日渐发展,对 AI 智能体的道德化开始出现第三种形式,即将 AI 视为道德代理(moral proxies)代替人类进行决策(Bonnefon et al., 2024)。这改变了人机互动过程中人类的道德决策模式和责任归因。最新的研究表明,人们对 AI 的心智感知显著增加了对 AI 的责备程度,并减少了对相关人类主体(如程序员、公司)的责任归因(Joo, 2024)。当 AI 参与决策时,人们更容易出现道德推脱,减少对消极后果的责任承担(Salatino et al., 2025)。总体来看,尽管 AI 能否成为道德主体仍然充满争议(Gamez et al., 2020),但随着 AI 的自主性与能动性的不断进步,人们已然将 AI 视为道德代理代替自己承担道德责任(Bonnefon et al., 2024)。因此,对 AI 智能体道德化趋势所引发的道德责任归属与分配问题,

以及其可能带来的社会后果, 亟需未来研究进一步加以探讨。

另一方面, 人们在 AI 使用过程中引发的各种道德化问题值得关注。人工智能的设计初衷是通过模拟人类心智能力, 以扩展和增强人类智能。虽然 AI 已经在医疗诊断、股票预测等多领域的能力超越人类专家, 但人们依然不信任 AI 做决策, 表现出“算法厌恶”(algorithm aversion)的倾向(Dietvorst et al., 2015)。最近的研究表明, 算法厌恶的本质并非是人们基于理性权衡收益与风险后的审慎判断, 而是源于道德层面的非理性排斥(de Mello et al., 2025)。de Mello 等人(2025)的研究发现, 在抵制 AI 的人群中, 超过 60%的受访者表示自己对于 AI 的抵制是出于道德原因, 而且这种对于使用 AI 的道德化态度体现在艺术、法律、陪伴等多个 AI 应用的领域。与此同时, 人们不仅会道德化使用 AI 的行为, 也会对使用 AI 的用户产生道德化倾向。研究表明, 人们会更加不信任、贬低利用 AI 辅助工作的使用者(Bonnefon et al., 2024; Reif et al., 2025), 尤其是人们将 AI 的使用归因于偷懒时, 会认为使用 AI 的同事更加不道德, 进而减少对该同事的帮助行为(Zhou et al., 2025)。不过研究者们也指出, 这种对于 AI 使用和用户道德化倾向的心理机制尚不明晰, 同时存在诸多个体差异(如社会阶层、自然性偏好、预先存有的道德信念; Dietvorst & Bartels, 2021; Schenk et al., 2024; 张昊天, 喻丰, 2023)以及文化因素的影响(例如 Folk et al., 2025), 值得在未来研究中继续深入探究。

#### 5.4 基于中国文化背景的道德化心理研究

虽然有关道德化的研究在近些年取得重要进展, 但目前相关研究选取的样本大多局限于“WEIRD”人群(指西方、受教育、工业化、富裕和民主社会的人群), 这在一定程度上限制了道德化研究的文化多样性(Fitouchi et al., 2023)。未来研究应着重探讨在不同文化背景下开展道德化研究的可行性与必要性, 特别是要深入分析中国本土文化语境下的道德化现象。中国传统文化历来有着极其丰富的伦理道德学说, 甚至有学者断言, 中国传统文化以道德作为人生的终极关怀, 表现出“泛道德主义”的倾向(如 梁漱溟, 2021; 金观涛, 2015; 殷海光, 2024)。这种“泛道德主义”的功能在于对抗道德虚无主义, 克制原子式的个人主义(程

志敏, 2024), 但同时又会引发舆情失控, 致使群体极化与撕裂等消极后果(陈珂, 万欣荣, 2023)。但是目前中国学界有关道德化的研究主要以哲学与伦理学领域的理论思辨为主, 较为缺乏利用心理学实证方法分析中国人独特的道德化心理与行为, 仅有少数实证研究发现中国人相较于西方人更倾向于将习俗行为道德化(Berniūnas et al., 2022; Buchtel et al., 2015)。

除此之外, 中国传统文化提倡“仁爱孝悌、礼义廉耻”, 在日常生活中遍布着各式各样的道德规范, 表现出诸多独特的道德化心理与行为, 如对自然万物、飞禽走兽乃至对体育运动的道德化。例如, 山水被赋予道德属性, 智者通过观察水流领悟通达事理的方法, 仁者通过静观山势体会宽厚待人的境界, 所谓“知者乐水, 仁者乐山”, 这体现出对于自然环境的道德化。玉在中国文化中象征“仁、义、智、勇、洁”五德, 强调做人应有如玉般的品德和修养, 亦即“君子比德于玉”(出自《论语·雍也》)。鸡在中国文化中同样象征“文、武、勇、仁、信”五德(出自汉·韩婴《韩诗外传》)。此外, 古人认为一些体育运动, 如射箭, 可以展现一个人的内在品德和修养, 所谓“射以观德”(出自《礼记·射义》)。这是因为古代射箭比赛有着严格的礼仪规范, 射手需保持内心平静、身体端正, 这与儒家“内圣外王”理念相契合, 使得射箭成为观察品德的重要途径。此类例子不胜枚举, 均可以生动揭示中国人生活中无处不在的道德滤镜。总之, 未来研究需着重从中国本土文化的背景研究中国人独特的道德化心理现象, 并分析这些现象背后的心理机制, 为道德化的研究贡献中国视角与中国智慧。

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## Moralization: How do people ascribe moral meaning to morally neutral things?

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**Abstract:** Moralization refers to the psychological process by which morally neutral objects, behaviors, or issues are imbued with moral meaning. The emergence of moralization is shaped by a range of cognitive, emotional, and social factors operating across multiple levels. Existing theoretical models of moralization, namely the moral amplification model and the push-pull model, offer valuable insights, yet they all overlook the influence of macro-sociocultural factors. The newly developed “cognitive-affective-social” integrative model of moralization aims to address this gap. The consequences of moralization are double-edged: on the one hand, it can promote prosocial behavior and help individuals pursue meaningful goals; on the other hand, it can also foster cognitive biases, unjustified discrimination, antagonism, group polarization, and even collective violence. Future research should focus on elucidating the psychological mechanisms and potential interventions for demoralization, investigating the role of emerging social media technologies in shaping moral-related attitudes and online behaviors, delving into the moralization study in the era of AI, and exploring moralization phenomena grounded in Chinese cultural contexts.

**Keywords:** moralization, demoralization, amplification model, push-and-pull model, Chinese culture