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Acta Psychologica Sinica    2018, Vol. 50 Issue (6) : 583-591     DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1041.2018.00583
Reports of Empirical Studies |
Positive effect of intuitive processing is modulated by cognitive resources under different levels of consciousness
Tingting YU1,Yue YIN1,Shu WANG1,Shujin ZHOU1,Xiaochen TANG2,Junlong LUO1()
1 Department of Psychology, College of Education, Shanghai Normal University, Shanghai 200234, China
2 Shanghai Key Laboratory of Psychotic Disorders, Shanghai Mental Health Center, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai 200030, China
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Abstract  

It was argued that thinking is characterized by the action of two distinctive cognitive systems, namely, intuitive (Type 1) processing and analytic (Type 2) processing. Intuitive processing is generally described as rapid, automatic, unconscious, and effortless, whereas analytic processing appears to be slow, controlled, conscious, and effortful. Decades of research have established that human judgment is often predisposed to rapid, intuitive processing. However, recent research has indicated that intuitive processing can support reasoning and even enhance it under certain conditions. Recent findings have suggested that intuitive processing should be as affected by cognitive resources and consciousness as analytic processing. However, intuitive and analytic processing will interfere with one another through a series of classical paradigms in which the results of two distinctive cognitive systems are in conflict. To avoid this interference, the present study applied the Chinese character chunking decomposition task, predicting that intuitive processing positively affect problem solving, but that it would disappear under conditions wherein cognitive resources were extremely scarce.

In the present research, we first drew up the Chinese character chunking decomposition task as materials, and participants were asked to judge whether the target character (e.g., “又”) was a component of the original character (e.g., “支”). Then, the formal experiment was organized into a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subject design. The first variable was the duration time of the target character, consisting of 2 levels: 24 ms and 200 ms; the second variable was the material category, consisting of 2 levels: intuitive material and analytic material; and the third variable was the inclusion relation, consisting of 2 levels: inclusion and exclusion. The inclusion condition meant that the target character was a component of the original character, whereas the exclusion condition denoted that the target character was not a component of the original character.

The results indicated that participants showed a lower rate of accuracy and a longer response time on analytic materials than on intuitive ones. However, no difference was observed between the two types of materials in terms of response time and accuracy when the duration time of the target character was 24 ms, and the inclusion relation was inclusion. Meanwhile, the accuracy scores of intuitive and analytic processing were approximately 0.5 at the guessing level. Signal detection analysis showed that the results under the unconsciousness condition were not influenced by the response bias.

The results proved that intuitive processing was rapid and analytic processing was slow. As predicted, intuitive processing positively affects the problem solving process. In addition, the experiment showed that intuitive processing was effortful and relied on cognitive resources, which was inconsistent with prototypical dual-process theories. Therefore, the positive effect would disappear when the cognitive resources were below demand.

Keywords level of consciousness      cognitive resource      intuitive processing      analytic processing.     
ZTFLH:  B842  
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Corresponding Authors: Junlong LUO     E-mail: luo831023@163.com
Issue Date: 28 April 2018
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Tingting YU
Yue YIN
Shu WANG
Shujin ZHOU
Xiaochen TANG
Junlong LUO
Cite this article:   
Tingting YU,Yue YIN,Shu WANG, et al. Positive effect of intuitive processing is modulated by cognitive resources under different levels of consciousness[J]. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 2018, 50(6): 583-591.
URL:  
http://journal.psych.ac.cn/xlxb/EN/10.3724/SP.J.1041.2018.00583     OR     http://journal.psych.ac.cn/xlxb/EN/Y2018/V50/I6/583
  
  
实验条件 正确率 反应时
包含下的直觉 0.99 (0.01) 796.94 (68.85)
包含下的分析 0.85 (0.07) 1204.83 (129.17)
不包含下的直觉 0.98 (0.02) 876.97 (62.82)
不包含下的分析 0.81 (0.08) 1224.08 (124.71)
  
  
  
  
条件 分析材料 直觉材料
24 ms 0.32 (0.60) 0.78 (0.78)
200 ms 2.62 (0.85) 3.97 (0.69)
  
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