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心理学报
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身体与认知表征: 见解与分歧
叶浩生
广州大学心理与脑科学研究中心
Body and Cognitive Representation: Understandings and Divergences
Hao-Sheng
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摘要 对于身体的不同理解促使认知心理学形成了不同研究取向。经典认知心理学视身体为不同于心智的生物物理实体。认知表征则成为沟通心智与包括身体在内的外在世界之间联系的“桥梁”。在经典认知心理学那里,心智是一种运算,运算的内容则是认知表征。 认知表征是符号性的、抽象的,与身体的构造和感觉—运动通道无关。身体似乎仅仅是认知表征的“载体”或“容器”。 具身认知则强调了身体在认知过程中所发挥的关键作用。具身认知中的“温和派”视身体为心智中的身体,认知在其根本上是一种身体经验。因此,认知表征不是抽象的,而是身体格式的,是身体特定感觉-运动通道提供的具体身体体验。心智是一种运算,但运算的内容不是抽象符号,而是具体的身体经验。具身认知中的“激进派”则主张彻底抛弃“运算”和“表征”。在激进派那里,认知是被身体作用于世界的活动塑造出来的。认知是为了解决问题,而不是为了形成认知表征。基本的心智不涉及内容,换言之,基本心智过程不涉及认知表征。认知在本质上是一种具身的行动。
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叶浩生
关键词 认知 表征 具身认知 身体 心智 生成论    
Abstract:What is meant by “the body” here? There are many understandings about what the human body is, which promote a variety of research programs in cognitive science in general and cognitive psychology in particular. The classical information-processing model of cognitive psychology treated the body as a biophysical substance that is different from the mind as a mental entity. Therefore, as a science of mind, the body has always been ignored and relegated to the position of a “physiological basis” of the mind. The classical cognitive psychology is founded on the idea that brain is something like a digital computer in which the physical structure of the brain is like a hardware, and the cognition is a software. In other words, the cognition was assumed as a computation of a computer. Usually, computation is understood as the rule-governed manipulation of representations , therefore, it requires the assumption that the mind contains some cognitive representations of aspects of the objective world that is independent of our perceptual and cognitive capacities. The cognitive representations are abstract symbols and they are amodal and exist independent of structures and functions of the body. As if the body is only a “carrier” or “container” of the mind. In contrast, embodiment theories of cognitive psychology had tried to distance itself from the classical cognitive psychology, highlighting the pervasiveness of in cognition of bodily factors. Right now, there are many approaches and programs sailing under the banner of “embodied cognition.” A “moderate” or “weak” approaches to embodied cognitive psychology do not separate the body from the mind. They take the body as more in mind, and want to elevate the importance of the body in explaining cognitive processes. From the point of view of the moderates, cognition is in essence a kinds of bodily experience, and the nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for our thinking and feeling. For the moderates, cognition is still involved in mental representation and computable processing which are staples of classical cognitive psychology. However, the cognitive representations are not disembodied symbols, but are body-formatted or body-related codes. The “radical” or “strong” approaches to embodied cognitive psychology claim that cognitive systems do not rely on internal representations and computations. Human cognition should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. Our cognition is essentially grounded in the brain as it is integrated with our body. The nature of our cognitive processes is determined by the specific action possibilities afforded by our body. Our cognitive system is for action, and about solving problems for the organism, not for forming cognitive representations. Cognition is essentially a embodied action.
Key wordscognition    representation    embodied cognition    body    mind    enactivism
收稿日期: 2017-07-25      出版日期: 2018-01-08
通讯作者: 叶浩生   
引用本文:   
叶浩生. 身体与认知表征: 见解与分歧[J]. 心理学报, .
Hao-Sheng. Body and Cognitive Representation: Understandings and Divergences. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 0, (): 0-0.
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http://journal.psych.ac.cn/xlxb/CN/      或      http://journal.psych.ac.cn/xlxb/CN/Y0/V/I/0
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