ISSN 0439-755X
CN 11-1911/B
主办:中国心理学会
   中国科学院心理研究所
出版:科学出版社

心理学报 ›› 2008, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (03): 339-349.

• • 上一篇    下一篇

谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响:角色的调节作用

王敏; 张志学;韩玉兰   

  1. 北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871
  • 收稿日期:2006-12-30 修回日期:1900-01-01 发布日期:2008-03-30 出版日期:2008-03-30
  • 通讯作者: 张志学

The Impact of the First Offer on Negotiation Impasse: Negotiating Roles Matter

Wang Min;Zhang Zhixue;Han Yulan   

  1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
  • Received:2006-12-30 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-03-30 Published:2008-03-30
  • Contact: Zhang Zhixue

摘要: 谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义

关键词: 第一次出价, 谈判破裂, 权力, 图式

Abstract: This paper aims to examine the impact of negotiators’ first offers on negotiation impasse as well as the moderating effect of negotiating roles.
Even though first offers can have significant effects on the process and outcome of negotiations, this topic has been largely overlooked in existing literature on negotiation impasse. Two studies were conducted to investigate the relationship between first offers and negotiation impasse. In Study 1, we predicted that extreme first offers can lead to impasse in that such offers might narrow the possible negotiation zone and elicit competitive behaviors from the counterparts. Study 2 focuses on whether negotiating parties with different powers can moderate the relationship between the first offers and the negotiation impasse. Since negotiation situations are characterized by uncertainty and information asymmetry, the negotiating parties will rely on schema or heuristics to predict and judge their opponent’s behaviors. For negotiators with less power, making an extreme offer could violate the schema or the other party’s expectations toward them, and thus, the negotiating parties would be likely to feel dissatisfied and offended and finally quit negotiations. In contrast, powerful negotiators’ extreme first offers are consistent with the schema possessed by negotiators, and high first offers are more likely to be accepted by the opposing parties, thus leading to agreements. We also propose that the powerful party’s perception mediates the relationship between the weak party’s first offer and the negotiation impasse.
Study 1 used a two-party, single-issue, distributive negotiation simulation to investigate the effect of first offers. The exercise described a bonus negotiation between an MBA student in the job market (job candidate) and a personnel manager from a consulting company. Study 2 used a similar exercise, but the power discrepancy was manipulated with the personnel manager having more power than the candidate. Study 1 comprised 116 MBA students who formed 58 negotiating dyads, and Study 2 comprised 266 students forming 133 dyads. They were required to participate in the studies as part of a negotiation class. ANOVA and hierarchical regression analysis were used to test the hypotheses.
In Study 1, 37 dyads (64%) arrived at agreements and 21 dyads ended with impasse. An ANOVA showed that the higher the first offers, the more likely was it that the negotiation dyads reached an impasse. In Study 2, 100 dyads (75%) reached agreements and 33 dyads failed to reach agreements. This showed that when power asymmetry existed, the negative impact of the first offer on impasse was moderated by the negotiating role. In particular, the high first offer proposed by the weak party was more likely to result in impasse. Mediation analysis revealed that when low-power negotiators made extreme first offers, they were perceived as being too aggressive, which finally led to a negotiation impasse.
This research demonstrates that the first offer is a significant predictor of the negotiation impasse. In addition, we discovered the moderating effect of negotiation roles on the relationship between the first offer and the impasse, providing a deeper understanding of the power dynamics involved in negotiation.
The practical implications of this research are as follows: Although high first offers are often advised to obtain an advantage in negotiations, our results suggest that while a high first offer could improve benefits, it could also increase the possibility of an impasse. Negotiators should pay attention to such an effect, particularly those negotiators who are in a relatively less powerful position

Key words: First offers, negotiation impasse, power, schema