ISSN 0439-755X
CN 11-1911/B

心理学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 52 ›› Issue (12): 1436-1451.doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1041.2020.01436

• 研究报告 • 上一篇    下一篇


陈思静(), 徐烨超   

  1. 浙江科技学院经济与管理学院, 杭州 310023
  • 收稿日期:2020-03-02 出版日期:2020-12-25 发布日期:2020-10-26
  • 通讯作者: 陈思静
  • 基金资助:
    * 国家自然科学基金项目(71701185);浙江省软科学项目(2020C35020)

Warmth and competence: Impact of third-party punishment on punishers’ reputation

CHEN Sijing(), XU Yechao   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou 310023, China
  • Received:2020-03-02 Online:2020-12-25 Published:2020-10-26
  • Contact: CHEN Sijing


第三方惩罚会对惩罚者的声誉产生显著影响, 然而就影响的方向而言, 现有文献给出了不同答案。上述问题的一个潜在原因是先前研究未能区分声誉的不同维度以及惩罚的不同动机与形式。通过将温暖-能力双维度结构引入惩罚者的声誉, 实验结果显示, 第三方惩罚从总体上降低了人们对惩罚者在温暖维度上的评价而提高了对其在能力维度上的评价。调节效应分析表明, 动机被归因为集体聚焦的惩罚进一步提升了其对能力的正面作用而减缓了对温暖的负面作用, 并且惩罚者的合作水平越高, 其动机被归因为集体聚焦的程度也越高。针对不同惩罚形式的进一步分析显示, 当惩罚动机被归因为个体聚焦时, 经济惩罚对温暖的负面作用显著高于社会惩罚, 而在集体聚焦的归因下经济惩罚对能力的正面作用显著低于社会惩罚。

关键词: 第三方惩罚, 社会规范, 惩罚动机, 声誉, 经济惩罚, 社会惩罚


Third-party punishment (TPP) provides a theoretical explanation to the extensive cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals but also raises a second-order free-riding problem. To solve this challenge, some researchers have proposed the reputational benefits of TPP as a potential explanation. That is, given the positive reputation derived from the punishment, the probability that the punisher would be helped in the future is enhanced. However, a growing body of literature has suggested that punishers’ reputation (PR) is not necessarily positive. Three reasons underlying the contradictory findings regarding PR may exist in the existing literature. Previous research a) views reputation as a uni-dimensional variable that is simply negative or positive, b) fails to take into account punishment motives, and c) only considers financial punishment and overlooks the existence of other forms of punishment.
A series of experiments were conducted to answer the main research questions raised in the current study: a) Does TPP have different effects on the two dimensions of PR (experiment 1)? b) Does the attribution of punishment motives (APM) significantly affect PR (experiment 2)? c) Do financial and social punishment diverge on the effects on PR (experiments 2 and 3)? All these experiments used the dictator game as the experimental paradigm, in which the dictator received an initial endowment and decided to what extent she/he wanted to split this endowment with the recipient, and the observer (financially or socially) punished the dictator for an offer she/he deemed unfair. In experiments 1 and 2, every participant played each role four times in random order. In experiment 3, the participants just observed the game. After being presented with the performance of their partners (experiments 1 and 2) or the actors (experiment 3), the participants were asked to rate their reputation using a seven-point Likert scale consisting of six items and attribute punishment motives using a seven-point Likert scale with self-focused or group-focused anchors.
The results of experiment 1 showed that TPP generally reduced participants’ evaluation of PR in the warmth dimension and improved their evaluation in the competence dimension. Moreover, the punishment deemed group-focused could further improve the positive impact of TPP on competence while ameliorating its negative impact on warmth. The results of experiment 2 revealed that participants relied to a large extent on the cooperation level of punishers to determine whether their punishments were group-focused or self-focused, thus affecting their evaluation of PR. Moreover, with the option of social punishment available, financial punishment significantly reduced the evaluation of PR in terms of warmth regardless of their punishment motives, but the evaluation in terms of competence was quite different. In the absence of social punishment, financial punishment improved the evaluation of PR. Otherwise, financial punishment reduced its evaluation. This finding was partially replicated in experiment 3, which further demonstrated by examining the interaction between APM and punishment forms that the APM moderated the effects of the two types of punishment on PR. When deemed self-focused, the financial punishment reduced participants’ evaluation of PR in the warmth dimension significantly more than the social punishment. When viewed as group-focused, financial punishment enhanced participants’ evaluation of PR in the competence dimension significantly less than social punishment.
In conclusion, this study found evidence that, when considering the impact of TPP on PR, considering the motives underlying punishment and viewing reputation as a multi-dimensional construct is necessary, implying that the reputational benefits of punishing cannot fully explain the selective advantages of TPP and that other factors must have contributed to the selection and diffusion of TPP in evolution.

Key words: third-party punishment, social norm, punishment motive, reputation, financial sanction, social sanction