ISSN 1671-3710
CN 11-4766/R
主办:中国科学院心理研究所
出版:科学出版社

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道德直觉合乎道义却不客观

袁晓劲,刘昌   

  1. 南京师范大学
  • 收稿日期:2020-06-20 修回日期:2020-10-05 发布日期:2021-01-11
  • 通讯作者: 刘昌

Moral Intuition is Moral But Not Objective

  1. 1. Nanjing Normal University
    2.
  • Received:2020-06-20 Revised:2020-10-05 Published:2021-01-11
  • Contact: chang changLiu

摘要: 面对道德困境,道德直觉会促使人们做出道义论的判断。但是,道德直觉受情感因素影响,具有主观性,道德直觉警惕有意图地采用个人力量造成的伤害,却会接受由非个人力量或连带作用引发的伤害。依据“模块近视假说”,大脑中存在一个预警系统,能快速地对主动伤害的想法发出情绪警报。但该系统的审查机制是一种简单的“单通道”加工,这种加工局限使连带作用造成的伤害避开了审查机制的监控。道德直觉的不客观提示,面对现实生活中的道德争议,不应该仅听凭直觉作为行动的依据。

关键词: 道德困境, 道德直觉, 情绪, 模块近视假说

Abstract: Many studies have shown that moral intuitions people to make deontological judgments. However, moral intuition is dominated by emotional factors and is therefore highly subjective. Moral intuition is highly sensitive to intentional harm through the use of personal power, but ignores harm caused by non-personal force or by side effect. The modular myopia hypothesis holds that the human brain contains a cognitive subsystem (module) that monitors an individual’s planned behavior and issues emotional alerts when the individual intends to harm others. However, this system is “myopic” and cannot identify harmful side effect. That is, the system’s review mechanism is a simple “single-channel”process that cannot monitor multiple causal chains simultaneously. The subjectivity of moral intuition suggests that in the face of moral disputes in real life, we should not just rely on intuition as the basis for action.

Key words: moral dilemma, moral intuition, emotions, modular myopia hypothesis